The origins of Thailand's modern Ministry of Justice and its early development. by Kittayapong, Rungsaeng
                          
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been





The origins of Thailand's modern Ministry of Justice and its early development.
General rights
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author, unless otherwise identified in the body of the thesis, and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. It is permitted to use and duplicate this work only for personal and non-
commercial research, study or criticism/review. You must obtain prior written consent from the author for any other use. It is not permitted to
supply the whole or part of this thesis to any other person or to post the same on any website or other online location without the prior written
consent of the author.
Take down policy
Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions prior to it having been deposited in Explore Bristol Research.
However, if you have discovered material within the thesis that you believe is unlawful e.g. breaches copyright, (either yours or that of a third
party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation,
libel, then please contact: open-access@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:
• Your contact details
• Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
• An outline of the nature of the complaint
On receipt of your message the Open Access team will immediately investigate your claim, make an initial judgement of the validity of the
claim, and withdraw the item in question from public view.
THE ORIGINS OF THAILAND'S MODERN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE 
AND ITS EARLY DEVELOPMENT 
by 
Rungsaeng Kittayapong 
A dissertation submitted for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL 
April 1990 
Abstract 
This is a study of the origins of Thailand's modern Ministry of Justice 
and its early development. It divides into three main parts. Part one which is 
the background to this thesis consists of three chapters, and deals with 
political development in the reign of King Chulalongkorn, the Thai traditional 
legal system, and growing pressures for the establishment of a Ministry of 
Justice. Part two of this thesis divides into two chapters; chapter 4 is devoted 
to discussion of the impact of the West in terms of reform generally, and 
chapter 5 considers the Chakri reformation in other fields in the same period 
as this thesis. 
Part three, which is the heart of this thesis, concerned with the period 
1894-1910, divides into four chapters: chapter 6 and 7 analyse legal policy and 
judicial reform in the Ministry of Justice while Princes Phichit and Raphi 
were Minister. Chapter 8 investigates the role of the General Advisers and 
the Legal Advisers in judicial reform, and chapter 9 considers the staff of the 
Ministry of Justice and the role of leading Siamese lawyers in shaping the 
Ministry of Justice. Finally, the conclusion of the thesis considers the 
consequences of the judicial refom and the establishment of the Ministry of 
Justice. 
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Preface 
In attempting to write this thesis I have been encouraged by several 
factors. First, despite the fact that modern research has been going on in 
almost all fields of Thai studies since the 1960s, there is surprisingly only one 
book, by D.M. Engel, Law and Kingship in Thailand During the Reign of 
King Chulalongkorn, l concerned with judicial reform in the fifth reign, but 
this book did not investigate primary sources in the National Archives, 
Bangkok, or the voluminous comments of British diplomatic observers 
preserved at the Public Record Office, London, and therefore is not a 
fundamental study. Second, since the mid-1960s, a great many more historical 
documents have been discovered or collected together and transferred into the 
charge of the National Archives, Bangkok. These documents, particularly 
original documents of the Ministry of Justice, have never been investigated in 
depth by any historians before Western or Thai. I, therefore, resolved to 
research in depth into these documents as, I believe, they can contribute a 
great deal of knowledge about Thai studies, not only regarding legal reform 
but also other reforms during the reign of King Chulalongkorn. 
Third, I am personally of the opmIOn that the OrIgms of Thailand's 
modern Ministry of Justice and the judicial reform are very important and 
partly contributed to the maintenance of Siam's independence. Furthermore, 
this judicial reform was the root of the Thai modern legal system. I, 
therefore, design this research as a pioneering study to pave the way for other 
historians to delve further into the development of the Ministry of Justice and 
the judicial reform from the end of the fifth reign up to the present. 
1 Engel D.M., Law and Kingship in Thailand During the Reign of King 
Chulalongkorn, U. of Michigan 1975. 
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The Subject 
This study concentrates on the Western impact upon the origins of the 
Ministry of Justice and its early development. Without the Western powers, 
the process of the judicial reform would have been much slower. It also 
investigates the Siamese traditional legal system before the reform. Besides it 
analyses whether the reform was Qualitative or Quantitative and who were the 
persons instrumental in carrying out the reform. Finally, the study suggests 
whether the establishment of the Ministry of Justice and the judicial reform 
achieved its purposes and what were the hindrances to reform? 
The Sources 
Most of the primary sources referred to in this thesis are documents in 
the National Archives, Bangkok, and the Public Record Office, London. 
Other primary sources are files in the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of 
Justice, Bangkok. Secondary sources are books and theses written by both 
Western and Thai scholars. 
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The Origins of Thailand's Modern Ministry of Justice and its E:lrl \ 
Development 
Introduction 
Thailand's modern history probably starts with the reIgn of King Mongkut 
(Rama IV) (1851-1868) and King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) (1868-1910), as there is 
reliable and substantial evidence available. Historians have concentrated their 
research on the era of King Chulalongkorn because it was the most important and 
crucial period as Siam's independence was at risk, and it was the transitional reform 
period in which the Siamese elites tried to implement reform in many fields to 
survive colonization. Various studies have been made in this field, for instance, N.A. 
Battye researched society and military development in the reign of King 
Chulalongkorn;l Tej Bunnag studied the provincial administration;2 I.G. Brown 
discussed financial development;3 and D.K. Wyatt education reform. 4 
No Western historian has researched in depth the development of the legal 
system or the Ministry of Justice in Thailand during the reign of King 
Chulalongkorn. There is only one available book, "Law and Kingship in Thailand 
during the Reign of King Chulalongkorn" by David M. Engel, who ranged widely 
over the changes in the judicial system in that period but he did not investigate 
primary sources; therefore, his study is not profound. One important point which 
Engel failed to consider was the persons who carried out the changes. He tended to 
1 N .A. Battye, The Military, Government and Society in Siam, 1868-1910, Cornell 
University Ph.D., 1974. 
2 Tej Bunnag, The Provincial Administration of Siam, 1892-1915 (Kuala Lumpur, 
1977). 
3 I.G. Brown, The Ministry of Finance and the early development of modern 
Financial Administration in Siam, 1885-1910, University of London Ph.D., 1975. 
4 D.K. Wyatt, The Politics of Reform in Thailand: Education in the Reign of King 
Chulalongkorn (New Haven, 1969). 
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suggest that all the judicial reform was carried out by King Chulalongkorn himself, 
which was not in fact true, as the changes were supervised by the King but the 
persons who carried out those changes were Siamese lawyers and Foreign General 
Advisers and Legal Advisers. The lack of investigation of the persons instrumental in 
implementing the legal reform makes study obscure and uncertain. It is therefore 
indispensable to consider the actual legal reform by scrutinizing the ideas, personality, 
and relationships of the persons who influenced the reform with a view to finding the 
purposes and direction of the reform. 
The judicial reform and the establishment and development of the Ministry of 
Justice were absolutely essential for Siam at that time as it would maintain peace and 
facilitate foreign commercial intercourse in Siam. The peaceful situation in Siam 
together with the policy of the Siamese Government to encourage British investment 
in particular played an important part in securing Siam's independence in face of 
French aggression. There is an argument that Siam survived because of the rivalry of 
the Western Imperialists, and therefore, the reforms during King Chulalongkorn's 
reign were not important as they did not do anything to help Siam in securing its 
independence. This argument is probably half true. It is accepted that the rivalry of 
the Western imperialists played a part in maintaining Siam's independence, but reform 
during the reign of King Chulalongkorn, particularly judicial reform, also contributed 
to Siam's survival. The truth of this argument will be displayed in this study. 
Various studies have been made by Thai scholars relating to judicial reform 
and the development of the Ministry of Justice. These studies are: 
I) Kanpratirup kansarn naisamai Phrachulachomklao (The Judicial Reform in 
the Reign of King Chulalongkorn), Bangkok, 1968, by Thanin Kraiwichian, who 
ranged widely and superficially over the judicial reforms implemented during King 
3 
Chulalongkorn's reign without researching into primary sources. The author proposed 
that all legal reform was initiated by King Chulalongkorn even though he hint that 
there were some ministers and lawyers who played a great role in the reform, but he 
did not investigate the role of the actual persons who influenced the reform. 
2) An M.A. thesis, "Kanpratirup kansarn naikrasuang yuttitham naisamai 
Phrachulachomklao" (The Reform of Courts in the Ministry of Justice in the Reign of 
King Chulalongkorn), Prasanmit University, 1973, by Mr. Manu Udomwet, also 
studied judicial reform in this period. This study investigates primary sources in the 
National Archives in Bangkok and also considers the role of some important lawyers 
who influenced the reform, but it fails to analyse those pnmary sources 
fundamentally; therefore, it is a descriptive study. 
3) A Chulalongkorn University study, Wiwattanakarn Khongkotmaithai 
nairobsongroipi (The Development of Thai law over 200 years), Bangkok, 1982, by a 
group of scholars who concentrates on the actual laws which had been implemented 
in Siam from 1782-1982. This study did not investigate primary sources in the 
National Archives, Bangkok. Even though it analyses the cause of the reform, it is 
only in the legal context and does not use any political or historical approach. It also 
failed to investigate the roles of important lawyers and advisers who influenced the 
reform. 
By contrast with these three studies, the purpose of this one is to examme, 
through the use of Thai and British documents, firstly, the traditional Siamese legal 
system before the reform, secondly, the factors which influenced the judicial reform, 
the judicial reform process, by analysing how fundamental were the changes, and 
lastly, who were the persons instrumental in carrying out the reform, and how 
important was the judicial reform in securing Siam's independence? 
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The structure of this thesis is divided into three parts: 
Part one, political and legal background and the origins of the Ministry of 
Justice, comprises three chapters: chapter 1 discusses Siam's political background from 
King Chulalongkorn's first coronation, in 1868, to the end of his reign, in 1910. This 
chapter emphasizes the important political events which affected judicial reform. 
Chapter 2 considers the traditional Siamese legal system before the reform. The 
significant law was the Law of Three Seals which had existed up to the reign of King 
Chulalongkorn. Another feature of this chapter is the royal despotism in the Siamese 
legal system. Chapter 3 focuses on the unequal treaties and the origins of the 
Ministry of Justice. The main part of this chapter concentrates on the effect of the 
unequal treaties and the role of Prince Phichit Prichakorn, who was the most 
knowledgeable Siamese lawyer In its traditional system. It also investigates why 
Prince Phichit was not appointed as the first Minister of Justice, and the role of 
Prince Sawat as the first Minister of Justice. 
Part two features the Western powers' influence as the most important factor 
which forced Siam to commit itself to the reform programmes. This part divides into 
two chapters: chapter 4 explains Siam's struggle to maintain its independence and 
restore extraterritorial rights; chapter 5 studies the Chakri reformation which spread 
into every field in the Siamese administration, viz. military reform, provincial 
administration, financial and education reforms. 
Part three focuses on the role and ideas of the persons instrumental in 
carrying out the judicial reform in the Ministry of Justice. This part divides into 
four chapters: chapter 6 and 7 investigate the judicial reform in the Ministry of 
Justice under Princes Phichit and Raphi respectively as the Minister; chapter 8 
5 
analyses the role and influence of the General Advisers and the Legal Advisers o\er 
the judicial reform; chapter 9 investigates the Siamese staff in the Ministry of Justice 
and their role in the judicial reform. 
Finally the conclusion will answer these three significant questions: firstly, 
what caused the judicial reform; secondly, was the reform qualitative or quantitative; 
lastly, what were the consequences and hindrances of the judicial reform? 
Sources for this thesis have been primarily documents from the National 
Archives (NA) in Bangkok, and from the Public Record Office in London. The files 
consulted at the National Archives were: firstly, files of the Ministry of Justice which 
are mainly correspondence between King Chulalongkorn and his Ministers of Justice 
and correspondence between the latter and their advisers or staff. These files also 
include the reports of the Ministry of Justice and of the cabinet meetings concerning 
the Ministry of Justice affairs. Secondly, there are files of the Foreign Ministry 
which are mainly correspondence between the Foreign Minister, Prince Thewawong, 
and the King or staff. These files are classified as R5 Ky for the files in the 
Ministry of Justice, and R5 Kt for the files in the Foreign Ministry. Thirdly, files of 
the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Defence were also consulted. They are 
classified as R5 Kkh for the files in the Ministry of Finance, and R5 Kk for the files 
in the Ministry of Defence. 
The files consulted at the PRO (Public Record Office) in London are files of 
correspondence between the British representatives in Siam and the British Foreign 
Office. These files are classified as FO 422 and FO 69. Other documents at the PRO 
also consulted are the diaries of Sir Ernest Mason Satow, the British Minister 
Resident in Bangkok, 1884- 7. This file is classified as PRO 30/33/15. Moreover, 
King Chulalongkorn's diaries were also consulted. 
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One major problem encountered during the course of this thesis is a marked 
lack of materials In some areas. Such Thai documents are not found probably 
because of either their non-existence, or due to their sensitivity causing them to have 
been withdrawn from public inspection. 
Another problem is the identification of individual Siamese, particularly 
Siamese officials, as surnames were not introduced In Siam until 1916. Previously, 
men were known by their personal name, but if they became government officials, 
they were known by their current official title, ranked from Meun, Khun, Luang, 
Phra, Phraya, to Chaophraya and exceptionally Somdet Chaophraya. Princes in the 
royal family may have been conferred these ranks and become Chaotangkrom (Prince 
of rank), for instance, Prince Krommeun, Prince Kromkhun etc. However, it is 
possible to discover the surname subsequently adopted by a man's descendants, and 
this is thus included in brackets after the title. 
The name "Siam" was the name used for the country by Western imperialists at 
that time. As this thesis is a study of judicial reform during the period of Western 
imperialism and for the promotiontion of knowledge in the West, therefore, it is 
desirable to call the country "Siam" throughout the thesis. But the Thai people always 
called their country "Prathet Thai" or "Muang Thai" which is translated into English as 
Thailand. 
It is also important to consider the countries subject to the same conditions as 
Siam. Such countries were China and Japan. In 1885, the Siamese Government 
demanded that their law should be applied and enforced upon British subjects. This 
is evident in Satow's, the British Minister Resident in Bangkok, diaries of 3 July 
1885, in which he noted that: 
7 
With regard to the Siamese demand that their laws should be accepted 
by us without demur, and enforced against our people, such a claim 
had not yet been admitted in any other extraterritoriality country, not 
even in Japan, & that Her Majesty's Government had not given way 
on that point when I had urged it.. .. 5 
In China, the Opium War and the Nanking Treaty of 1842 marked the first 
use of Western military force in China. Great Britain bought a large quantity of tea 
from China but it had few products that China was interested in buying by way of 
exchange, so Britain lost a lot of silver to pay for tea. In order to mitigate this loss, 
British merchants began to export opium which they obtained from India, to China. 
An increasing Chinese addiction to opium caused a boom in imports of opium and led 
to an unfavourable trade balance paid for by a steady loss of China's silver reserves. 
In the light of the economic effects of the opium trade, plus the physical and mental 
deterioration of opium users, the Chinese Government banned the opium trade. The 
enforcement of the ban became stringent toward the end of the 1830's; stores of 
opIUm were confiscated. On the second of November 1839, British warships 
decimated Chinese war junks at Canton. The overwhelmingly superior fire-power of 
the British forces caused a quick cease-fire. Again in 1842, the British threatened to 
bombard Nanking and China was forced to sign the Treaty of Nanking which 
provided for I) cession of Hong Kong to the British Crown; 2) the opening of five 
treaty ports, where the British would have residence and trade rights; 3) China's 
concession of extraterritorial legal jurisdiction; 4) a fixed tariff.6 
In the case of Japan, according to the policy of the Tokugawa Shoguns, Japan 
became a country closed to the outside world for nearly two centuries. Commodore 
Perry who left the United States for Japan in 1852 was the first to intrude. When he 
5 Satow Diaries, PRO 30/33/15/9. 
6 Gong, G.W., The Standard of Civilization In International Society (Oxford, 1984), 
pp.136-138. 
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returned to Japan in the early spnng of 1854, he brought three steamships, three 
sloops of war, and three storeships. This hastened the signing of the treaty at the end 
of March 1854, which was the first of its kind between Japan and Western imperial 
powers. This Treaty opened the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate to the United States, 
but clauses granting extraterritoriality were conspicuously absent. Later, on 17 June 
1857, Townsend Harris, the United States Consul General to Japan, secured a 
Convention which provided for the permanent residence of Americans at Shimoda 
and Hakodate, and secured extraterritorial privileges in criminal cases. 
In 1858, another American-Japanese Treaty was concluded which led to the 
restriction of Japan to a fixed tariff and trade regulations. Later, the Netherlands, 
Russia, Britain, and France followed the American lead in signing new treaties within 
the year. Therefore, the fixed tariff and the export regulations, along with the 
extraterritoriality conceSSlOn, formed the heart of Japan's grievances against the 
"unequal treaties" which left Japan less than fully independent. Extraterritoriality 
quickly became an issue, perhaps the first issue in Japanese history, to be influenced 
to a great extent by public opinion. The Japanese accepted their condition without 
using arms to protect their rights, because they realized that the Western imperialists 
were mightier than them both militarily and economically? 
The Western imperial impact quickly helped the Japanese Tokugawa regime to 
collapse. The other reason for its collapse was weakness and deterioration inside the 
Tokugawa regime. Japan at the time of Meji restoration in which a new generation 
of Japanese leaders took over administrative power from the Tokugawa house, 
reverted to a unified central government. These leaders brought the nation through a 
great transformation and established many institutions which facilitated the process of 
social reconstruction. The Meiji Government reconstructed and strengthened the 
7 Ibid., pp.168-170. 
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position of the Emperor by usmg the slogan "restoration of Imperial authority". The 
Meiji leaders looked back to the early Chinese and Japanese codes for inspiration in 
establishing a new legal system. According to the traditional Japanese legal system, 
their jurists and officials were in general more familiar with the Chinese legal 
tradition than the Western as a result of their common Confucian background, and 
the Japanese codifiers were inclined to follow the Chinese legal draftsmanship, but 
owing to the intensive contact with the Western world adjusted the Japanese legal 
system to Western legal principles. The idea of adopting the Western legal system 
became greater as Japan tried to secure its independence from Western political 
intervention and to abolish the unequal treaties between itself and the Western 
powers. The main intention of Japan was to convince the Western powers of 
Japanese willingness and ability to establish an acceptable legal system. 
The Meiji leaders realized that the best way to lmpress the Western powers 
with Japan's progress was to adopt a constitutional form of government with 
representative institutions and, therefore, on 11 February 1889, the new constitution 
was promulgated as a gift from the Emperor, who remained the sole source of 
authority in Japan for the Japanese people.8 Reform of the government along 
Western lines and the implementation of the principal codes of law which Japan 
adopted from the German and French systems brought approval from the treaty 
powers and provided an important step towards revision of the unequal treaties. The 
Aoki-Kimberley Treaty signed in July 1894 made Great Britain the first power to 
relinquish extraterritoriality in Japan by 1899 when the new Japanese legal codes 
would become fully operational. The other Western powers followed suit and in June 
1899, an Imperial Rescript was issued to recognlze the actual passmg of 
extraterritoriality in Japan. 
8 Ibid., p.177. 
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By contrast, m China, the Chinese were still struggling to preserve the old 
Confucian order. Even in the early twentieth century, the Boxer rebellion appealed 
to the popular misconception that the foreign devils, i.e. Westerners, could be driven 
into the sea and their influence eradicated. China was not the same as Japan because 
China had a strong belief in the tributary system, whereby the Chinese had long 
believed that China was the centre of the world, and other countries had to pay 
respect and tribute to it. Because of this belief, China was in too rigid a position to 
adjust and develop itself according to the ideas of the West. In comparison with 
Japan, China's acceptance of Western law and principles of social behaviour appears 
slow. 
In January 1912, the Republic of China was founded after the revolution 
against the Ching dynasty. China's constitutional government intended to consolidate 
the gains of the revolution by restraining the powers of the conservatives and the 
military and to replace the Confucian orthodoxy which had lasted for many centuries 
with the fundamental principle of popular legitimacy. In fact the transition from the 
Ching dynasty to the constitutional government happened relatively quickly and was 
essentially bloodless because the Ching dynasty had been in decline even under the 
famous Dowager Empress who died in 1908. 
There was another reason which made China's prospect of revIsmg the 
unequal treaties slow. After the Republic of China was founded in 1912, but owing 
to the weakness which had undermined China under the Manchu regime, the problem 
of factionalism and rivalries for power emerged. Civil war, between the dominant 
K uomintang party and the Chinese Communist party which gained strength from 
Russian support, made China's efforts to revise its unequal treaties appear 
questionable in the eyes of the Western powers.9 
9 Ibid., p.148. 
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Ultimately China too realized that the only way to reVise its unequal treaties 
was to reform its legal system in line with that of the Western powers. The reform 
of China's domestic legal system was well under way by the time of the 1911 
revolution. The Law Codification Commission directed the drafting of Criminal, 
Commercial and Procedural Codes and the Criminal Code was promulgated in 1909. 
After the 1911 revolution, the Revised Law Codification Commission continued its 
work, enlisting French and Japanese advisers in 1914 to help make Chinese laws 
compatible with the general expectations of the Western powers. The instability of 
China and the lack of independence of the Chinese judiciary made the abolition of 
extraterritoriality happen very slowly. Only after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor III 
1941 did change occur in the Western policy on extraterritoriality so that China could 
restore its full independence in July 1943.10 
Siam also lost its full sovereignty through the unequal treaties. The process of 
restoring extraterritorial legal jurisdiction happened alongside the judicial reform 
which will be illustrated in full in this thesis. 
10 Ibid., p.163. 
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Chapter Political Development in the Reign of King Ch ulalongkorn 
There are many phases to Thai political development from the beginning of 
Thai history until the reign of King Chulalongkorn. It is desirable to investigate the 
changing of politics in each period briefly in order to understand the political system 
prior to King Chulalongkorn coming to the throne and the reason for the changes. 
It is probably accepted among historians that Sukhothai was the first kingdom 
of Thailand. King Ramkhamhaeng was apparently the most able King of this period. 
He reputedly ruled his people like a father caring for his son. The kingdom was free 
of oppressive laws. Evidence of this is to be found in many inscriptions which were 
made during his reign. The political system during that time was paternalistic; if any 
commoner in the land had a complaint he could go to strike the bell which the king 
had hung at the gate and the king would settle the case by himself. 
The kingdom of Ayuthya was founded by King Uthong (Ramathibodi I) in 
1351. The kingdom progressed greatly in the reign of King Trailok (1448 - 1488). 
He undertook major changes to strengthen the administrative institutions of the 
kingdom. He is supposed to have promulgated two important pieces of legislation, 
the law of the civil hierarchy and the law of military and provincial hierarchies. The 
first concerned the hierarchy and the rank differentiation in which the law assigned 
to everyone a number of unit of sakdina (field power). For example, the phrai 
(peasant freeman) were given a sakdina of 25 rai (2.5 ral = 1 acre), the khunnang 
elite were given at least 400 rai. The second law was about the government 
administration. The law divided the bureaucracy into two divisions, with the military 
under the minister of kalahom and the civil under the minister of mahatthai. 
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The most distinctive change from the time of Sukhothai to Ayuthya was the 
political ideology of the king. In the Sukhothai kingdom the conception of kingship 
was paternalism but In the Ayuthya kingdom, probably because of Khmer 
(Cambodia's) influence In the meanwhile, the position of the king was far more 
distant because the king was believed to be descended from Hindu gods. Therefore 
the relationship between the king and his subjects changed from father and son to 
master and servant. This established the king as thewaracha (god king) and led to the 
conception of the king as chao paendin (lord of land) and chao chiwit (lord of life), 
with the absolute power of life and death over his subjects. But this concept of 
kingship was made less forbidding by the Mon tradition of Buddhism. According to 
this Buddhist theory, the king was to promote the teachings of the Buddha, and to 
conform his own behaviour to the ethical principles which the Buddha had 
articulated. 1 
In 1767, the kingdom of Ayuthya was completely destroyed by the Burmese 
OWIng to the weakness of King Suriyamarin. All laws, edicts and records were 
destroyed. It was King Rama I (1782-1809), the founder and the first King of the 
Chakri dynasty, who ordered the restoration of those laws and edicts. The outcome 
was the Law of Three Seals and other edicts. King Rama I maintained most of the 
Ayuthya's administration system. He also maintained the position of U parat or 
second king as the most powerful person in the kingdom after the king, who was 
supposed to succeed to the throne if he outlived the king. Rama I appointed his 
brother, Surasi, as Uparat. The tradition of appointing an Uparat was followed by 
Rama II (1809-1824) and Rama III (1824-1851). When King Rama IV came to the 
throne he also appointed his brother, Prince Chutamani, as second king called King 
Pinklao. 
1 D.M.Engel, Law and Kingship in Thailand during the Reign of King ChuI31on0,k,)rn 
(Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1975), pp.2-3. 
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During the reIgn of King Rama III, the West exerted much pressure on Siam 
and its neighbouring countries. In early February 1826, the British concluded their 
first Burma war by inflicting a serious defeat on the Burmese. This forced Siam also 
to reach agreement with the British. The result of the agreement was the Burney 
Treaty of 1826, by which Siam agreed to abolish the royal monopoly on trade which 
the Western merchants had found injurious to their interests. This Treaty was 
between Siam and the British East Indian Company. 
After King Rama IV came to the throne in 1851, Siam made many 
concessions in foreign policy. In 1855 the Bowring Treaty was signed between Siam 
and the British Home Government. This treaty conceded all the principal demands of 
the British. It gave the British the right to establish a consulate in Bangkok and the 
right to handle legal cases pertaining to their citizens (extraterritoriality). It also gave 
the British permission to reside in the country, own land, and conduct business. 
Within a decade Bowring-like treaties were negotiated with the United States, France 
and other states. King Rama IV and his chief minister, Chaophraya Si Suriyawong, 
realized that Siam needed to change its political and legal systems to bring the 
country to a position of equality with Western nations in order to preserve the 
country's independence. 
King Chulalongkorn's Background 
It is necessary to investigate the early life of King Chulalongkorn in order to 
understand the influences which were exerted over him. King Chulalongkorn was 
born in the Grand Palace on 20 September 1853, the eldest surviving son born to 
King Mongkut (Rama IV) by a senIOr wife, Rampoey Pamarapirom, who was later 
installed as Queen Thepsirin, and thus in a favoured position to succeed his father. 
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Prince Chulalongkorn had one sister and two brothers of the same parentage, namely, 
Princess Chantramonthon, Princes Chakraphatphong and Phanurangsi. 
The birth of the Prince is said to have been of wonderfully good omen for the 
country as it was preceded by the welcome arrival in the Grand Palace of a white 
elephant which King Mongkut and his people believed would bring good fortune and 
prosperity to the country. Besides, the drought of that year which threatened to 
destroy the rice plants in the country was overcome by a downpour of rain 
continuing for three days which revived rice plants to yield a surprisingly good crop.2 
When Prince Chulalongkorn reached a suitable age for schooling, King 
Mongkut provided education for him. His education was separated into two parts. 
Firstly, there was the education which followed the traditional patterns established for 
princes in the Ayuthya period. At an early age he was taught Thai by a specialist, 
Phra ong chao Putri.. He also studied other subjects which at that time were 
considered as appropriate to the education of princes, including Pali. He was trained 
in the use of firearms, in wrestling and fencing, and was taught horsemanship and 
elephantry. This part of his education had a traditional character and was similar to 
the training which had produced warrior kings in the past. Prince Chulalongkorn 
ordained as a Buddhist novice in 1866 in order to know about monastery life. After 
his period In the monastery his traditional practical education was made more 
concentrated. He was normally in attendance upon his father during the royal 
audiences at which public business was transacted, and he stayed by his father's side 
at the multitude of ceremonies that filled the year. When King Mongkut was 
deliberating public affairs Chulalongkorn was asked to sit by his father and was asked 
for his opinions. King Mongkut frequently sent him to discuss affairs with 
2 Prachoom Chomchai, Chulalongkorn the Great (Tokyo, 1965), p.2. 
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Chaophraya Sisuriyawong who was Mongkut's chief minister. All of these 
experiences made Chulalongkorn accustomed to politics and administration. 
Secondly, Prince Chulalongkorn's education was also concentrated on Western 
knowledge. King Mongkut recruited the Eurasian Mrs. Anna Leonowens in 1862 to 
instruct his children III English language, science,and literature. Prince 
Chulalongkorn at that time was about ten years old, was one of her pupils and 
impressed her with his personal warmth, his serious nature, and the way in which he 
threw himself into his studies and was excited by them.3 Prince Chulalongkorn 
studied with Mrs. Leonowens from 1862 until he underwent the sokan ceremony 
(tonsure) marking puberty and was ordained as a Buddhist novice in 1866. When he 
left the monastery he continued his studies with Mrs. Leonowens until she left 
Bangkok in 1867, and then with Dr. Chandler, an American missionary, until the end 
of his father's reign. 
King Mongkut was instrumental III educating Chulalongkorn III both 
traditional and Western knowledge. During the period of the Prince's education, in 
1861, King Mongkut also conferred upon him the rank of Chao/a Prince which 
distinguished him from most other sons of the King and would entitle him to succeed 
his father to the throne. But King Mongkut himself was not certain about the person 
who would succeed him because traditionally if he died before the so-called "second 
king", or Uparat, Phra Pinklao, the latter would succeed him. 
The political development during the reIgn of King Chulalongkorn can be 
divided into four periods: 
3 Leonowens, Anna, Siam and the Siamese, Six Years' Recollections of an English 
Governess at the Siamese Court (Philadelphia, 1897), p.6. 
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1. The regency period (1868 - 1873) 
2. The second coronation period (1873 - 1883) 
3. The period of full authority (1883 - 1893) 
4. The post-Paknam period (1893 - 1910) 
Section I The Regency Period 
King Mongkut planned for Prince Chulalongkorn to succeed him as king. He 
arranged for him to have a good standard of education and also privately taught him 
in principles of statecraft. After the death of King Pinklao, the second King, in 
1866, it was most likely that, short of illness, Chulalongkorn would succeed as king. 
King Mongkut is said to have hoped to be able to hand over the government to his 
son when the Prince came to age in 1873, but both caught malaria on a visit to 
Southern Thailand to witness a solar eclipse in 1868. King Mongkut died shortly 
after their return to Bangkok while Chulalongkorn was left sick and near to death.4 
Before King Mongkut died, he called his three half-brothers who were senIOr 
members of the royal family, Princes Mahamala, Worachak and Ratsihawikrom, and 
his senabodi (ministers) to his death-bed and asked them for their forgiveness if he 
had done bad things to them. He asked them to look after his children and also 
requested that if any of them had committed severe crimes which deserved capital 
punishment, the execution should be commuted to exile. On the question of 
successIOn to the throne, he left it to his brothers and ministers' consideration, 
suggesting that the accession council should consider one of his sons or brothers who 
was capable of governing the country to succeed him as king. 5 The reason King 
Mongkut did not ask them to appoint Prince Chulalongkorn as king was probably that 
4 Prachoom Chomchai, op.cit., p.IO. 
5 Nattawut Sutthisongkram, Somdet Phra Piyamaharat (Chulalongkorn the Great) 
(Bangkok, 1987), pp.25-26. 
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he feared that if he did so, a regent would be appointed who might depose the young 
king in order to appoint himself as king as had happened many times in the Ayuthya 
period. King Mongkut probably thought that it was better to leave this choice to the 
accession council as they would probably not overthrow the king whom they 
themselves had appointed. 
A t the accession council which met in order to select the new king, 
Chaophraya Si Suriyawong, who was the chief minister at that time, and others 
unanimously selected the sickly Prince Chulalongkorn to succeed his father, and 
Chaophraya Si Suriyawong as Regent until the young King came of age. On that 
occasion Si Suriyawong took the unprecedented step of declaring that Prince 
Wichaichan, son of the late Second King, Pinklao, should be appointed the Second 
King, an act that always before had been the prerogative of the new king. Prince 
Worachak, a half -brother of King Mongkut, opposed this appointment, but Si 
Suriyawong, the most powerful person in the country at that time, insisted and Prince 
Worachak's opposition was dropped.6 
The appointment of Wichaichan as the Second King was interpreted firstly, as 
an attempt to entrench Si Suriyawong's position and influence in the kingdom. He 
was thought to have believed that Chulalongkorn would not recover from his illness 
and that Wichaichan then would come to the throne beholden to him. Prince 
Wichaichan had a close relationship with Si Suriyawong because since his father, King 
Pinklao's death in 1866, he had been training in government administration with Si 
Suriyawong; secondly, Si Suriyawong did not want to concede the teenage King 
Chulalongkorn absolute power; therefore, he appointed Wichaichan to balance the 
power of the King in order to maintain his influential position;7 thirdly, it is also 
6 Nattawut Sutthisongkram, Somdet Chaophrava Borommaha Si Suriyawong (Bangkok, 
1961), pp.481-482. 
7 Ibid., pp.484-486. 
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possible that Si Suriyawong sympathized with Wichaichan and simply wanted him to 
succeed his father as the Second King. 
It is important to consider Si Suriyawong's role at this stage. Chaophraya Si 
Suriyawong (Chuang Bunnag) was a son of Somdet Chaophraya Borommaha 
Prayurawong (Dit Bunnag), the Phrakhlang (Finance and Foreign Minister) in the 
reign of King Rama III. He was born on 23 December 1808, during the reign of 
Rama I, and was trained in government administration by his father. He started his 
government service as a royal page under King Rama II. During this period he 
gradually acquired some knowledge of engineering. His career prospects improved in 
the Third Reign when his father, who was a close friend of Rama III, became the 
Phrakhlang and at the age of 25 he was promoted from Nai Chaikan Humprae (a 
royal page) to Luang Sit Naiwen (a senior royal page) when he married Miss Klin.8 
During the reIgn of King Rama III he had two promotions. Firstly, he was 
promoted to Chamun Waiworanat as a result of his instrumental role in dealing with 
Western powers who exerted their influence in this area at that time. He determined 
t(; obtain Western knowledge by getting in touch with many missionaries. By this 
way he could improve his knowledge in shipbuilding and engineering. As the eldest 
son of the Phrakhlang Minister, he was sent by his father to build forts at 
Samutprakan and Chantaburi in order to strengthen Siam's defences.9 It was during 
this period that he built a first modern warship for Siam and several more were soon 
in progress. His role in building these warships probably helped him to be promoted 
to Phraya Si Suriyawong in 1850.10 
8 Ibid., pp.145, 186. 
9 At that time the Phrakhlang Ministry was also responsible for the seaboard 
provinces of central Siam. 
10 Natawut Sutthisongkram, Somdet Chaophrava, op.cit., p.186. 
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Si Suriyawong's relationship with King Mongkut began when he, at that time 
Chamun Wai, and his half-brother, Chamun Rachamat, who later became Chaophraya 
Thiphakorawong (Kham Bunnag), agreed to renovate a deserted temple, Bupparam, 
situated near his house. After renovation, they invited monks from the Thammayut 
sect of which Mongkut was one of the chief monks. Mongkut had to come to inspect 
the temple and train new monks in the temple and consequently met Si Suriyawong 
several times. They developed a good relationship as they were both interested in and 
wanted to acquire Western knowledge and technology. In the absence of an obvious 
heir, it was Si Suriyawong who successfully persuaded his father and other members 
of the Bunnag family to give the throne to Mongkut after the death of Rama III. 
After Mongkut became King in 1851, he nominated the Phrakhlang to be Somdet 
Chaophraya Borommaha Prayurawong and Si Suriyawong became Chaophraya Si 
Suriyawong. ll 
There were many events in this period which are worth noting. Firstly, after 
Si Suriyawong became Regent he had absolute power over all affairs of state. He 
used his power in appointing his family and friends in high state positions and in 
financial manipulations of a self-interested character. He also appointed his son 
Chaophraya Surawong Waiyawat (Won Bunnag) to succeed him as the Kalahom. At 
that time the Bunnag family had full grip of Government's administration and its 
influence was at peak. Secondly, Si Suriyawong followed the foot steps of King 
Mongkut in continuing the conciliatory open-door policy in foreign affairs. Thirdly, 
Si Suriyawong supervised the young King's education by allowing him to tour Dutch 
and British colonial states in Java, Malaya, Burma, and India during 1871-1872. 
These trips enabled King Chulalongkorn to become familiar with modern 
administration and these knowledge enabled him to organIze the modern 
administration after his second coronation. 
11 Ibid., pp.305-306. 
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Why did Si Suriyawong not seize the throne for himself? One might suggest 
that at that time there was still a group of royalty and high government officials 
friendly to the King who might risk themselves to protect the Chakri line. This 
group was composed of half-brothers of King Mongkut, namely, Princes Mahamala, 
Worachak and Thewet, who supported the accession of King Chulalongkorn and had 
shown their determination in the accession council to support King Chulalongkorn. 12 
Another possibility is that Si Suriyawong never had the idea of seizing the throne for 
himself because he remained faithful to King Mongkut and King Chulalongkorn. 
This might seem evident from his conversation with Somdet Phra Putthachan (To), 
one of the most famous monks of that time and also a close and long-respected friend 
of Si Suriyawong. One day during Si Suriyawong's regency period, Somdet Phra 
Putthachan, with a torch in his hand, went to see Si Suriyawong in his office and 
remarked to him that: 
At present the future of the country is gloomy as I heard a rumour 
that someone is planning to seize the throne. Do you know whether it 
is true? And if it is true, I would like to beg him to cease the plan. 13 
Si Suriyawong replied that: 
Venerable, please do not be worried. So long as I am alive, the future 
of the country will not become gloomy and nobody will seize the 
throne. 14 
King Ch ulalongkorn wrote his memoirs of this period to advise his son, 
Crown Prince Wachirunhit in 1893. He recalled that: 
I was only fifteen when ascending the throne. I was alone without 
father and mother. The relatives on my mother's side were good-for-
nothing and on my father's side were under Chaophraya Si 
Suriyawong's control and therefore could not support me. Most 
officials who were close to me were junior officials and all my 
12 Ibid., pp.4 77 -479. And also see Prachoom Chomchai, op.cit., p.8. After the death 
of King Pink1ao, the Second King, Mongkut had promoted these three brothers 
from Krommull to Kromkhull. 
13 Ibid., p.509. 
14 Ibid., p.509. 
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brothers and half-brothers were younger than me and consequently 
could not give any help. I myself was only a boy inexperienced and 
incapable of government administration. I was really unfortunate and 
dominated by the Regent and was at his mercy.15 
Section II The Second Coronation Period 
King Chulalongkorn came of age in 1873 which marked the end of the 
regency period. He officially took over the administration of the country from the 
Regent on 16 November 1873. At that time the political divisions in the Government 
were clearly established. It was obvious that there were two groups known as "Young 
Siam" and "Conservative Siam".16 Obviously, it was the King's party that represented 
"Young Siam" which was composed of many young members of the royal family and 
younger officials who showed a friendly attitude toward Western civilization. This 
group was sufficiently strong by the time of King Chulalongkorn's second coronation 
to lead and urge profound changes in Siam. 
The second group was the group of officials around the Regent. This group 
can be called "Conservative Siam" and the Regent was its leader. This group had 
steadily increased its power since the reign of King Rama II. This power was based 
first on the Phrakhlang, or Ministry of Treasury and Foreign Affairs, and then on 
the Kalahom, or Ministry of Defence, which was the main bureaucratic fief of the 
Bunnag family, which firmly controlled half of the six ministries from the Third 
Reign. The power of this group reached its zenith when Si Suriyawong was 
instrumental in the accession of King Mongkut and became the Regent after King 
Mongkut's death. After the termination of the regency period, the Regent still had 
15 Nattawut Sutthisongkram, Somdet Phra Piyamaharat, op.cit., pp.28-29. 
16 O.K. Wyatt in his book The Politics of Reform in Thailand: Education in the 
Reign of King Chu\a\ongkorn (New Haven, 1969) suggested that there were three 
political groups in Siam at that time, viz, young Siam, old Siam, and conservative 
Siam. But the old Siam group's role was minimal and therefore can be 
disregarded. 
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the most secure political position because the officials he appointed to government 
office were members of his family and his supporters. 
One might mark this period with five particular events: 
1. The abolition of the custom of prostration 
2. The establishment of the Council of State and the Privy Council 
3. The bill proposing the abolition of slavery. 
4. The Front Palace incident. 
5. Phra Pricha Affair 
I. The abolition of the custom of prostration. 
At King Chulalongkorn's second coronation In 1873, he announced his 
celebrated decree abolishing prostration in the royal presence because he thought that 
it was an oppressive custom and uncivilized. In the proclamation abolishing this 
custom, the King stated that: 
When I came to the throne, I intended to help the country to progress 
and bring happiness to all people. The oppressive customs which 
caused trouble to the people needed to be abolished. Western countries 
have already abolished these oppressive customs to show that they are 
civilized countries. In our country, we have numerous oppressive 
customs all of which I intend to abolish gradually. Therefore from 
now on the custom of prostration is to be replaced by standing and 
bowing the head. 17 
2. The establishment of the Council of State and the Privy Council 
King Chulalongkorn proclaimed the establishment of these two councils on 8 
May 1874, in order to consult with him on important issues and assist him in the 
enactment of laws. The King gave his reason for establishing them that he could not 
17 Ibid., p.54. 
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carry out public duties successfully and he needed the assistance of others in order to 
bring prosperity to the country and to remove oppressive customs which obstructed 
the development of the country.I8 This appears to conceal the King's real reason that 
he wanted to increase his power because he knew that even though he was crowned 
in the second coronation as King in 1873 with full powers, in reality Si Suriyawong, 
the ex-Regent, still held the major power in the Government. The King created 
these two bodies and appointed most of his supporters as members to employ the 
legislative function to balance the executive power of the ex-Regent's group. This is 
evident in King Chulalongkorn's reply to the petitioners of 1885, which will be 
illustrated later in this chapter. The King stated his reason for creating two 
legislative bodies that: 
Siam's sovereignty is divided into executive and legislative powers. 
Both powers are in the hands of the king and his cabinet. During the 
regency period, they resided in the Regent and his cabinet. When I 
came to the throne in my own right, the executive power was still in 
the hands of the ex- Regent, but the legislative was neglected. 
Therefore, I took up this power by establishing two legislative organs 
[the Council of State and the Privy Council]. I became the leader of 
the legislative, the opposition to the Government. Subsequently, I 
gradually increased my influence in the executive and now have 
successfully become the Government. I9 
According to the royal edict for the establishment of these two councils, the 
Council of State and the Privy Council were composed of 12 and 49 members 
respectively. The King had a right to appoint more members or dismiss some 
members from both councils. The members of both councils were obliged to take an 
oath before they commenced their duty. The members of the Council of State had a 
right to discuss the points at issue and the right to vote to enact law but it had to be 
18 The Proclamation of the establishment of the Council of State and the Privy 
Council, Prachum kotmai pracham sok (PKPS), vo1.8, pp.154, 170, 185. 
19 Thailand Fine Arts Department, Chaonai lae Kharachakan krapbangkhom thun 
khwamhen chat kanplianpleng rachakan phendin R.S. 103 (The 1885 Petition of 
Royalty and Officials regarding the Reorganization of Government), printed in the 
cremation volume of Phra Anulakphubet (Tern Bunyaratpan)(Bangkok, I 970), 
pp.59-60. 
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a unanimous vote. This raises the Question whether they had real power or had to 
depend on the King's approval. Constitutionally, the King had the real power and 
the members of the Council of State had none because: firstly, the King controlled 
the membership by appointment or dismissal; secondly, the King controlled the topics 
of discussion as every topic had to command approval from the King before 
discussion; thirdly, the King could add to the voting membership by inviting 
members of the Privy Council to attend the meeting with the right to vote. 20 
The Privy Council was only an advisory organ which the King designed to 
advise him in important matters. He could appoint a committee of the Privy Council 
from the members of the Privy Council as a special court or a special committee to 
investigate government work, but he was not obliged to accept the decision of the 
committee. 21 
King Chulalongkorn offered membership of the Privy Council to the ex-
Regent, Si Suriyawong, but the latter refused to accept it on the grounds that he did 
not want to take an oath like other members. Apparently, the real reason was 
because Si Suriyawong knew the King's plan to increase his power to balance his own 
executive power. The refusal of Si Suriyawong to accept membership of the Privy 
Council indicates a serious collision between the conservative and the Young Siam 
groups which led to the Front Palace incident which will be illustrated later in this 
section. After receiving the letter of refusal from Si Suriyawong, the King was very 
anxious as evidenced by his lengthy letter to Si Suriyawong that: 
According to your letter of refusal of the membership of the Privy 
Council on the grounds that you did not want to take an oathlike other 
mem bers, there is an implication that I have insulted you in this 
matter. This is not true at all as we all know that the purpose of 
establishing the Privy Council is for the progress of the country. I am 
20 Prachum Kotmai Pracham Sok (Annual Collection of Thai Decrees) or PKPS, vol.8, 
p.170. 
21 PKPS, voL8, p.185. 
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not angry with you as whether you will accept this membership or not 
I have to consult you as usual. But I am disappointed that your letter 
was stronger than I had anticipated. 22 
Practically, the King's original idea of using the two councils to balance the power of 
the conservative group was not practicable because the senabodi (ministers) were still 
in control of real power and they were not subject to the power of the two councils. 
3. The bill proposing the abolition of slavery 
On 21 August 1874, King Chulalongkorn proclaimed the Phra ratchabanyat 
phikat krasien aryu lukthat lukthai (The Act fixing the redemption age of the 
offspring of slaves) in order to release the offspring of slaves when they became 21 
years old. The King stated clearly that he wanted to gradually abolish slavery 
because it was an oppressive custom. He stated at the outset of this Act that: 
I want to maintain the country's ancient customs which have brought 
progress, benefit and justice to the people. But the bad customs which 
are unjust and detrimental to the people, even though they have 
existed in society for a long period of time, should gradually be 
reduced at the right speed. This will achieve the purpose of the plan 
at the right time without any serious disturbance.23 
The King sympathized with the children of slaves who were born while their 
parents were slaves and were counted as in-debted slaves; therefore, he asked Prince 
Phichit, his legal adviser, to draft this Act to release slaves' children born in 1868, 
the year he came to the throne, and thereafter, when they became 21 years old. 
4. The Wang Na (Front Palace or Palace of the Second King) Incident 
This incident is supposed to have involved an attempted coup by Prince 
Wichaichan, the Second King (JV ang N a or U parat) who was Si Suriyawong's associate. 
22 Nattawut Sutthisongkram, Somdet Chaophraya, op.cit., pp.662-666. 
23 PKPS, vo1.8, pp.197-207. 
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It indicates power-struggle between the conservatives, led by Si Suriyawong, and the 
Young Siam, led by the King, and consequently brought a halt to the King's radical 
changes. The fact in this incident was that on a night at the end of December 1874, 
a fire was set near the gunpowder warehouse within the wall of the Grand Palace in 
which the King resided. The Second King's troops, apparently fully armed, sought 
entrance to the Grand Palace offering their assistance in puttung out the fire. They 
were refused admission. The fire was quenched by the palace guard, and King 
Chulalongkorn moved quickly to strengthen the palace defences. The Second King 
fled the Front Palace and in the absence of the British Consul-General, Thomas 
Knox, on leave in England, took up residence in the British Consulate on 2 January 
1875. The Governor of Singapore, Sir Andrew Clarke, came to Bangkok at King 
Chulalongkorn's invitation and by treating the incident as a purely domestic quarrel 
within the Siamese royal fam il y and refusing to intervene, ended any hope on either 
side of British aid.24 
From this incident, the King realized that the process of change was indeed a 
difficult task, and if he went ahead with his radical ideas the conservative group 
must go against them. This might cause a chaotic situation in the country and lead to 
foreign intervention and the loss of Siam's independence. It is certain that this 
incident brought the role of the Council of State and the Privy Council to a low ebb. 
For one thing, Si Suriyawong's influence in the Siamese Government was still 
very high after he left the office of the Regent. The young King always consulted 
with him in important matters, for instance, when the French Consul sent a letter to 
insist upon the right of a merchant, Her Jucker, to set up a rice mill. The King 
consulted Si Suriyawong in the matter and sent a draft letter to the latter to review 
24 D.K. Wyatt, op.cit., pp.57-62. 
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before sending it to the French Consul.25 This indicates how influential Si 
Suriyawong was at that time. Subsequently, Si Suriyawong probably lost some power 
due to his worsening relation with his half-brother, Chaophraya Panuwong, who 
controlled the Krom Tha (Foreign Ministry).26 But he managed to regain his power 
again in the Phra Pricha affair. 
5. Phra Pricha Affair 
The Phra Pricha affair represented another power-struggle between the 
conservative and the young Siam groups. By 1879, King Chulalongkorn, who was the 
leader of the young Siam group, was gaining more power at the expense of the 
conservatives led by Si Suriyawong. But the latter gained more confidence when he 
was reconciled with Chaophraya Panuwong, and both returned to Bangkok where they 
found themselves with sufficient support to project some sort of coup.27 Both must 
have seen the marriage of Phra Pricha (Sam-ang Amatyakun) and Fanny Knox, a 
daughter of Mr. Knox, the British Consul General, as a good chance to damage the 
King's power by accusing Phra Pricha of marrying a foreigner without permission 
from the Government, and peculation in connection with the Kabinburi gold-mines, 
and also accused Phrava Kesap, Phra Pricha's father, and his brothers as accessories 
and sent them to join Phra Pricha in prison. The Amatyakun family were supporters 
of the King, therefore damaging them was to damage the King's power. The other 
reason for attacking Phra Pricha was that Si Suriyawong wanted Fanny Knox to 
marry a member of the Bunnag family in order to keep Knox on his side, and 
probably Knox preferred the Bunnag to the Amatyakun because their relations had 
formerly been close. Si Suriyawong may even have felt that the marriage alliance 
25 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan (King Chulalongkorn's Diaries), vol.4 (I877), 
pp.21-22. . 
26 N.J .Brailey, The Origins of the Siamese Forward Movement III Western Laos, 
University of London Ph.D., 1968, p.240. 





between his family and that of Knox was still possible, once Fanny's husband was 
finally out of the way.28 
But the incident evolved contrary to Si Suriyawong's expection, as Knox 
demanded the release of Phra Pricha and called a gun-boat to Bangkok. Chaophraya 
Panuwong represented the matter to Lord Salisbury that Knox allowed personal 
affairs to interfere with his official duties and Knox was called back to England and 
Phra Pricha was sentenced to death, while the property of the whole family were 
sequestrated. King Chulalongkorn's prestige had reached its nadir.29 The Amatyakun 
family was made a scapegoat for the power-struggle between the conservative and the 
young Siam groups. 
In the legal context, the marrIage of Phra Pricha and Fanny Knox was not a 
crime because it did not require any royal or Government permission as evidenced by 
King Chulalongkorn's letter, of March 1879, to Chaophraya Surawong (Won Bunnag) 
and Chaophraya Panuwong (Thuam Bunnag), after the accusation of Phra Pricha. 
The King stated that: 
There has not been any tradition of the nobles or government officials ~ 
marrying foreigners; therefore, this matter is uncertain. The senabodi 
[ministersJ should consider and institute a tradition for this kind of 
marriage. 0 
Subsequently, the King wrote a letter, to consult Si Suriyawong on the same 
issue through introducing a law that: 
The noble or government official who wants to marry a foreigner has 
to inform the King and the ministers in order to get permission. If 
the King and the ministers give permission, he can marry, if 
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otherwise, he cannot. 
28 Ibid., pp.239-240. 
29 Ibid., 241-242. . 
30 Nattawut Sutthisongkram, Somdet Chaophraya, Op.Clt., p.963. 
31 Ibid., pp.967-968. 
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These two letters of the King indicate clearly that at the time of Phra Pricha 
and Fanny Knox's marriage, there was no law or tradition of seeking permission from 
the King or ministers. Consequently, their marriage was not a criminal offence and 
Phra Pricha was not guilty in this respect. This case also illustrated the arbitrary 
practices of the influential government officials and demonstrated that the Siamese 
legal system at that time was still far from the Western powers' standard. The Phra 
Pricha affair was a political challenge by the conservative group which afforded Si 
Suriyawong the chance to regain power at the expense of the King. 
Si Suriyawong's death 
After the Phra Pricha affair, Si Suriyawong's influence reached a new peak 
but his health became uncertain owing to his age which at over seventy was quite old 
for a Siamese at that time. His power declined gradually but the King was still 
cautious in making any move in national affairs without consulting him. This was 
evident by the troublesome Chiengmai cases of Mong Shwe Gong and Mr. Cox 
regarding which the King sent the former Chiengmai Commissioner Phraya Thep 
with all relevant correspondence to consult Si Suriyawong at Ratburi where he now 
spent most of his time.32 Finally Si Suriyawong died on 19 January 1883 on his boat 
at Katumban canal, Ratburi.33 
Section TIl The Period of Fu II Authority 
Si Suriyawong's death marks a considerable change in the hierarchy of Siamese 
politics as the power of the conservatives gradually declined thereafter. Chaophraya 
32 King Chulalongkorn's Diaries, vol.12 (1881), p.49. . 
33 Nattawut Sutthisongkram, Somdet Chaophraya, Op.Clt., vo1.2, p.1739. 
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pl~lnuwong, Si Suriya wong's half-brother 10 
charge of the Krom Tha (Foreign 
Ministry) resigned in 1885, and Prince Wichaichan,the Second King, died the same 
year. Much of the conservative group was now out of the way and King 
Chulalongkorn gradually appointed his brothers to Government office starting with 
Prince Thewawong, a senior royal half-brother and the elder brother of three of the 
King's Queens, as the Foreign Minister in 1885. Prince Chakrapatphong, the King's 
older fuIl- brother, was chosen to act as the Minister of Finance, Princes Phutharet 
and Prachak, half-brothers of the King, were appointed Ministers of the Capital and 
Palace respectively. 
1. The Petition of 1885 
In 1885, a petition of Princes and officials, all of them employed 10 or 
attached to the Siamese Legations in London and Paris, was presented to King 
Chulalongkorn. It argued that: firstly, there was an extreme necessity for Siam to 
change its governmental system because it was under threat of being colonized by 
either France or Britain; secondly, if Siam did not change, the Western powers would 
colonize Siam on the excuse of its backward governmental system; thirdly, superficial 
reforms which had already been implemented by the King were not adequate; Japan 
had tried the same and abandoned them as inadequate; lastly, the reform must be a 
fundamental one; ie. the replacement of absolute monarchy by constitutional 
monarchy in which the King would share his power and responsibilities with a 
cabinet. A cabinet should be established with major decision-making powers. Old 
laws and customs should be eliminated if they impeded progress. Freedom of speech 
should be guaranteed and also the right of public meeting and a free press. The law 
should be changed to guarantee the equal rights of every citizen.34 
34 Thailand Fine Arts Department, Chaonai lae Kharachakan krapbangkhom thun 
khwamhen chat kanplianpleng rachakan phendin R.S. 103 (The 1885 Petition of 
Royalty and Officials regarding the Reorganization of Government), printed in the 
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King Chulalongkorn refused to comply with the petitioners's suggestions on 
the grounds that it might provoke opposition by certain groups within the 
Government. He also explained two factors which prevented him from establishing a 
constitutional monarchy system: firstly, the inefficiency of the Siamese bureaucracy; 
secondly, the inadequacy of trained men who could carry out the reform. These two 
factors needed to be corrected before any reform could be implemented. The King 
assured the petitioners that he had no personal interest in preserving his absolute 
power but he inconsistently referred to his previous difficulty in gaining full 
authority from the ex-Regent. 35 The consequences of the petition will be illustrated 
in chapter 3. 
2. The Establishment of the Modern Cabinet Ministers 
When Chaophraya Surawong, Si Suriyawong's son, the Kalahom or Minister of 
the South, resigned from his office in 1887, and Prince Chao/a Mahamala, the King's 
uncle, the Mahatthai or Minister of the North, died the same year, King 
Chulalongkorn could organize a new cabinet administration according to his desires as 
evidenced by his 1888 proclamation of the Government Edict whereby he appointed 
twelve senabodi or cabinet ministers, nine from his brothers and three from his 
supporters as following: 
I. Prince Chakrapatphong as the Minister of Finance 
2. Prince Phanurangsi as the Minister of Army 
3. Prince Thewawong as the Foreign Minister 
4. Prince Naret as the Minister of the Capital 
5. Prince Prachak as the Minister of the Palace 
creamation volume of Phra Anulakphubet (Tern Bunyaratpan)(Bangkok, 1970), 
pp.I-50. 
35 Ibid., pp. 57 -64, and also Engel, op.cit., pp.l ~-15. 
34 
6. Prince Sawat as the Minister of Justice 
7. Prince Damrong as the Minister of Education 
8. Prince Sommot as the Minister of Royal Seal 
9. Prince Narit as the Minister of Public Works 
10. Chaophraya Ratanabodin (Bunrot Kalyanamit) as the Mahatthai Minister of North 
11. Chaophraya Ponlathep later Chaophraya Ratanathibet (Phum Sichaiyan) as the 
Kalahom Minister of the South 
12. Phraya Phatsakora wong (Porn Bunnag) as the Minister of Agriculture. 
This ministerial structive combining old and new was designed by Prince 
Thewawong who went as King Chulalongkorn's representative to attend the 
celebrations in London that year marking Queen Victoria's fiftieth year on the British 
throne. Thewawong was instructed by the King to investigate European 
governmental system and administration. Prince Thewawong traveled through 
Europe, the USA and Japan, and on his return submitted a report on "constitution" to 
the King recommending a cabinet of twelve ministers. 
3. The Power of the Siamese Monarch 
It is important to consider the sphere of power of the Siamese monarch. One 
can determine his power from these issues: 
Firstly, the Siamese king had power over the life and death of his subjects. 
The king could give an order to execute any Siamese or give amnesty to them. There 
was an expression that "the king is the Lord of Life". This is evident in the case of 
Mr. Bun who killed Mrs. Jew, in which King Chulalongkorn ordered his officials to 
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execute Mr. Bun for murder. But in some cases the King could change the sentence 
36 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan (K ing Chulalongkorn's Diaries), vol.4 (I877), p.9. 
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of the judges; for instance, in the case of Mr. Mui who killed Mr. Jam, King 
Chulalongkorn amended the judge's sentence of execution to sixty floggings. 37 
Secondly, the Siamese monarch had power to try or give judgment in all cases 
In the country; therefore he had power to fix the term of imprisonment for the 
convicts or prisoners. In the traditional Siamese legal system, judges who decided the 
cases had no power to fix the term of imprisonment. This is shown in the case of 
Mr. Nu when Chaophraya Surawong (Won Bunnag) submitted Luang Wut's plaint 
asking for the release of Mr. Nu, his son, who was put in prison for purchasing 
gunpowder, claiming that Mr. Nu had served in prison for seven years already. King 
Chulalongkorn ordered the release of Mr. Nu. 38 This point will be illustrated in 
detail later in the chapter on Prince Raphi who, when he was Minister of Justice, 
gave authority to the judges to fix the term of imprisonment. 
Thirdly, the Siamese monarch had power to upgrade or reduce the ranks of 
the nobles or government officials. Mostly the King judged by blood not ability. 
This evidenced in his appointment of his two full brothers to Somdet Kromphra 
Chakrapatphong and Somdet Kromphra Panupanwongworadet (Prince Panurangsi) in 
1885 without any special Qualification39 by comparison with Prince Phichit, a half-
brother of the King, who had done a tremendous job in the Siamese legal system, 
who was still Krommun, a much lower rank, at that time. Another distinct case was 
the King's appointment of Prince Narit to Chaoja Kromkhun which the King made 
clear was because Prince Narit was not only his half-brother but a maternal cousin as 
Narit's mother was a full sister of Queen Thepsirin, the King's mother. 4o 
37 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vol.l2 (1881), p.I02. 
38 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vol.16 (1883), p.28. 
39 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vol.19 (1885), p.184. 
40 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiw3n, \'01.24 (1887), p.134. 
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Moreover, the King could reduce the rank of any nobles or government 
officials or even royal ty. This IS evident from the case of Phra ong chao 
Yingyaowalak, the King's half-sister, and a favourite daughter of King Mongkut, 
who had a secret affair with M r. To, a peasant, and gave birth to a son. King 
Chulalongkorn was very angry and ordered the authorities to take away her title of 
Phra ong chao and leave her only the title of Mom. Mr. To was sentenced to death.41 
The case indicates the standard of the Siamese legal system which was mostly based 
on the arbitrary practices of one powerful person and, therefore, was far short of the 
reputed European standard. If Mr. To had been a British subject, he could not have 
been executed. 
One of the most interesting statements which indicates clearly the royal power 
in the eyes of King Chulalongkorn was his speech explaining the Government Reform 
10 1888. The King said: 
The power of the Siamese king is not specified by any law and is free 
from all restraint because it is unlimited. But in practice the king is 
full of conscience and justice in performing his duties. Therefore I 
will not oppose the laws to limit my power as has been done in other 
countries, when laws are established as a principle for government 
throughout the kingdom. The limitation of the royal power in Europe 
was caused by people's dissatisfaction with the monarch. This is not 
the case in Siam, where the people have requested no such limitation 
but the King himself thinks it should be imposed. The circumstances 
in each country are different, for instance, a parliamentary system is 
not suitable for Siam because few people would be able to be members 
and none would have experience of government work owing to the 
lack of training. People will not trust the members of parliament as 
they trust the King because they know the King is just and loves 
them. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the power of the king 
should be maintained as it has always existed. 42 
41 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vol.23 (1886), pp.23-26. Yingyaowalak was also 
the elder full sister of the future Buddhist Chief Patriarch, Prince Wachirayan. 
42 Thailand Fine Arts Department, Phraratchadamrat song thalaeng 
phraboromrachathibi kaekhai kanpokkhong phaendin (the King's s~eech explaini.ng 
the Governmental Reforms), printed in Chaonai lae Kharachakan, 10 the crematIOn 
volume of Phra Anulakphubet, op.cit., pp.114-I 15. 
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King Ch ulalongkorn phrased his speech in a very WIse way. First of all, he 
wanted to limit his power in this government reform, but to limit his power and 
confer it on members of a parliament would be rejected by the people because 
probably nobody was suitable and capable of being a member of parliament. 
Consequently, the people would trust the King more than members of parliament. 
Therefore, the power of the King should not be changed. It is difficult to discover 
King Chulalongkorn's intention; whether his speech on the power of the King was his 
genuine view or only an excuse to maintain his absolute power. He seems to have 
enjoyed exploiting his power to h is own and his Prince-brothers benefit. His claim 
that nobody would be a capable member of parliament because of their lack of 
education and training for a member of parliament's duties is probably true. This is 
probably the reason Prince Damrong was appointed the Minister of Education in June 
1888 to carry out educational reform. Apparently, the King's purpose in the 
governmental reform of 1888 was to consolidate his power but his intention to 
transfer the power to the people is still in doubt. 
Section IV The Paknam Inciden t and the Post-Paknam Period (1893-1910) 
During the the period of his full authority, King Chulalongkorn and the 
young Siam group were more complacent with their power as the conservative group 
was out of the way. They appeared to relax despite the presence of the Western 
imperialists as they took it for granted that in case of French aggression Britain 
would safeguard Siam's independence, because it had a great deal of investment and 
business in Siam. Furthermore, the Siamese Government was also misled by the 
British Minister in Bangkok, Capt. H. M. Jones, that Britain would assist Siam in case 
of French invasion. 
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The Paknam incident was caused by French colonial expansion III Southeast 
Asia. After France colonized Vietnam in 1883-4, it aimed to expand its empire into 
Laos which was a set of tributary states under Siam's control at that time. The 
French Government argued that it had a rightful claim over the Lao territory up to 
the left bank of the Mekong river on the ground that this part had been formerly 
claimed by the Empire of Vietnam, now a French colony. Apart from its policy of 
colonial expansion, France also wanted to strip off Siam's tributary states as it was 
not sure about British policy towards Siam; if Britain were to colonize Siam, the 
latter's tributary states would fall automatically under British control. 
In July 1892, M. Pa vie, French Vice-Consul at Luang Phrabang, was 
transferred to Bangkok as the French Minister to Siam. At the beginning of 1893, 
the conflicts between Siam and France with regard to the territory on the left bank of 
the Mekong river intensified. Prince Phichit Prichakorn, whom the King sent as 
Special Commissioner to Champasak to safeguard the area on the left bank of the 
Mekong river, sent Phraya Prachakitkorachak (Chern Bunnag) with Siamese troops to 
prevent the French invasion. M. Pavie demanded the withdrawal of Siamese troops 
from the area of the left bank of the river and also payment of an indemnity to 
French subjects for damage done by the Siamese troops. The demand was turned 
down and clashes between Siamese and French troops became inevitable. The result 
of the clashes was many deaths on both sides. M. Grosgurin was a French officer 
who was also killed in the fighting but the French Government claimed that he was 
murdered by the Siamese troops and therefore the Siamese Government must be held 
responsible for this murder. The French Government used this issue as a pretext to 
send two gunboats to threaten Siam. 
On 13 July 1893, the French gunboats Comete and Inconstant entered the 
Gulf of Siam with the, J.B. Say as their pilot boat. As they passed the mouth of the 
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Chaophraya River through the port of Paknam (Samutprakan), they were fired upon 
by the defending batteries on the fort of the river. As a result the J.B. Say was sunk 
but the French gunboats returned the fire and manage to steam up to the French 
Legation about three miles short of the Grand Palace. The Siamese Government sent 
Prince Thewawong to negotiate with the French. M. Pavie demanded Siam surrender 
its claim to the whole area on the left bank of the Mekong and to withdraw all 
Siamese troops from the area. King Chulalongkorn opposed the French demand and 
on 25 July Pavie withdrew the gunboats from Bangkok to institute a blockade of the 
Chaophraya River with reinforcements from Saigon. 
The institution of the blockade of the Chaophraya River had little effect on 
Siam as it could produce a great deal of food to meet its own demands, but it had an 
injurious effect on British trade and interests as British trade was flourishing and 
Siam was the main source of food supplies to the Straits Settlement and Hong Kong. 43 
The British Government, instead of offering any assistance to Siam, persuaded Siam 
to surrender to French demands. Finally, the Siamese Government gave in and the 
Franco-Siamese Treaty of 3 October 1893 was concluded. According to this Treaty, 
Siam had to agree to: firstly, cede the entire area on the left bank of the Mekong 
River to France and to remove all of its military posts out of the area of a twenty-
five kilometre deep zone the length of its west bank of the river as a guarantee of its 
willingness to maintain the agreement; secondly, to pay a three-million franc 
indemnity; thirdly to punish the persons found guilty of murdering M. Grosgurin. 
Furthermore, the French Government demanded the temporary occupation of 
Chantaburi, a port on the east coast, until the Siamese Government fulfilled its 
obligations. 
43 Petition from Merchants, Bankers, Ship-owners to the Earl of Rosebery, 24 July 
1893, PRO FO 422/36. 
40 
One of the most Important outcomes of the Paknam incident was that it gave 
a lesson to Siam that it could not rely on assistance from other countries, including 
Britain, to maintain its independence. Undoubtedly the Siamese Government was 
misled by Captain Jones,the British representative during the Paknam incident, who, 
without authority, encouraged them to expect British support. 44 After the incident, 
the King and the Siamese elite realized that their country's independence was at risk 
and they needed to reform their administration in every field in order to bring the 
country up to the standard of the so-call "civilized" countries and escape colonization. 
The judicial reform through the Ministry of Justice is the focus of this study, and the 
military, provincial administration, financial and educational reforms will be 
illustrated in chapter 5, about the Chakri reformation. 
Conclusion 
King Chulalongkorn was a capable leader who struggled from being a 
powerless to a pow~rful King. After his second coronation in 1873, he was supposed 
to have real power, but in reality Si Suriyawong, the ex-Regent, still held major 
power. King Chulalongkorn developed legislative power by creating the Council of 
State and the Privy Council to balance Si Suriyawong's power. The power-struggle 
between the King and Si Suriyawong led to the Wangna incident and the Phra Pricha 
affair. Si Suriyawong, after regaining power from the Phra Pricha affair in 1879, 
was soon dead of old age in 1883. Si Suriyawong's death was the beginning of the 
decline of the conservative group and the King gradually increased his power. The 
resignations of Chaophraya Phanuwong from the Krom Tha in 1885 and Chaophraya 
Surawong from the Kalahom in 1887 affirmed King Chulalongkorn's absolute power. 
After attaining absolute power, King Chulalongkorn seemed to relax and slowed 
44 N.J. Brailey, Two Views of Siam on the Eve of the Chakri Reformation, 
(Singapore, 1989), p.30. 
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down his reform programme because there was no competition for power. The 1885 
petition signified the Princes' vain attempt to share the King's absolute power. But 
after the Paknam incident the King fell seriously ill and nearly died, probably 
because he thought the incident was his fault. The Paknam incident signified the 
starting point of the acceleration of the Chakri reformation. 
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Chapter 2 The Siamese Traditional Legal System 
Section I The Origins of the Thai laws before the Bangkok period 
It is important to explain clearly at the outset that there were two main Thai 
kingdoms before the Bangkok period, namely the paternalistic Sukhothai kingdom 
which dated from the thirteenth century, and the Ayuthya god-kingdom, usually 
dated from its reputed foundation in 1351. The differing Thai legal traditions of 
these two kingdoms appear to have had a profound influence over the legal system of 
the early Bangkok period. But it is unfortunate that little evidence of the legal 
systems in those two kingdoms survive up to the present. Among this evidence are 
the inscriptions of several kings during the Sukhothai period, and a few royal decrees 
of King Petracha of the Ayuthya period. 
There are many reasons for the scarcity of even the Ayuthya legal documents. 
Firstly, during the Ayuthya period the laws were written on forms of paper by hand, 
and in 1767 Ayuthya was attacked and burnt by the Burmese. As a consequence, the 
majority of the laws were destroyed by fire. Secondly, also could not last long in the 
local climate and tended to be damaged by damp and white ants. Thirdly, as a result 
of King Rama I's codification, as will be demonstrated later, the surviving Ayuthya 
laws became invalid and could not be cited in a court of law. Not appreciating the 
historical value of the old laws, they were neglected, and some of them were 
destroyed in order to a void confusion with later ones. 1 
Owing to the destruction of a large amount of the Ayuthya legal documents, 
the study of Thai legal history has to depend mainly on the code of the Law of Three 
Seals which was promulgated by command of King Rama I, the founder of the 
1 Robert Lingat, Prawatsat Kotmai Thai (Thai Legal History), Thaiwattanapanit, 
vol.l, Bangkok 1985, pp.16-17. 
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Chakri dynasty, in 1804. This code claims in its introduction that most of the law in 
the Law of Three Seals derived from the Thammasat, which was the law applied in 
Siam in the Ayuthya period.2 Therefore, the main way to research into the Siamese 
traditional law is to investigate the Law of Three Seals. 
1. The Thammasat and its origins 
One important question is, what was the Thammasat and what were its 
origins? According to the Law of Three seals, it was an account of the development 
of the world, human beings, the origins of kings and laws deriving from the Sanskit 
Dhamasastra. It regulated the relationships between the people and the state and 
among the people themselves. It also described the power of the king and his 
authority to rule the country. It was also the fundamental basis of the traditional 
Siamese laws. 3 
According to the Thammasat, Manu was a counsellor to King Mahasammata, 
the first monarch In the history of the world. Being ashamed of himself for giving 
an unjust decision in a case about a cucumber farm, he deserted the city to reside in 
the jungle as an ascetic in order to meditate and achieve enlightenment. He 
determined to find a book of law to confer justice on all people. One day he 
achieved enlightenment and was able to fly to the end of the universe and found the 
Thammasat being written on the wall of the universe. Manu then wrote out a code 
as his version of the Thammasat and submitted it to King Mahasammata who 
subsequently ruled the country efficiently by applying the Thammasat.
4 
2 Pricha Suwantat ed., Kotmai Tra Samduang (The Law of Three Seals 1804), 
Thammasat University Press, volume 1, Bangkok 1985, p.8. 
3 Ibid., pp.7-34. 
4 Ibid., pp.13-14. 
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When did Siam adopt the Thammasat and from whom? The Law of Three 
Seals in its section 1 called thammasat, give a history of the origins of the code, 
stating that Siam derived the Thammasat from the Mon who had founded a kingdom 
in the south of Burma. 5 The Mon had derived it from the Hindu code of Jl anusat. 
The original Hindu code of M anusat's stern and forbidding image of the king as 
Devaraja was mingled to some extent with the Buddhist conception of kingship which 
the Mon had adjusted to suit their own society, and this was transferred as the 
Siamese Thammasat via the Mon.6 
One leading Thai historian, Charnvit Kasetsiri, who wrote The Rise of 
Ayudya [Ayuthya], believes that the Mon had adopted the Hindu code by adapting it 
to fit in with Buddhism. He suggested that when King Uthong founded the Ayuthya 
kingdom in 1351, he introduced the Mon Thammasat in governing his kingdom.7 
2. The Thai laws in the Sukhothai and Ayuthya kingdom 
It is necessary at this point to explain the traditional Thai laws in the period 
of Sukhothai and Ayuthya, but owing to the limitation of materials they must be 
stated briefly. One can trace the Sukhothai laws by studying several inscriptions 
during that period. There were many interesting aspects of laws indicated in various 
inscriptions. Firstly, the inscriptions indicated that the Sukhothai people had freedom 
to trade as trade was not monopolized by the king as in the later Ayuthya period. 
This aspect was illustrated in one inscription that: 
5 Ibid., p.8. . . f K' 
6 D.M.Engel, Law and Kingship in Thailand dUrIng the ReIgn 0 mg 
Chulalongkorn, University of Michigan 1975, pp.2-3: . 
7 Charnvit Kasetsiri, The Rise of Ayudhya, Oxford UnIVersIty Press 1976, p.134. 
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The people lead their cattle to trade or ride their horses to sell. 
whoever wants to trade in horses, does so; whoever wants to trade in 
silver and gold, does SO. 8 
Secondly, there was a law of succession as indicated in the inscription that 
"When any commoner or man of rank dies, his estate comprising elephants, wives, 
children, granaries, rice, retainers, and groves of areca and betel-nut, is left in its 
entirety to his son."g Thirdly, there was a concept of ownership as shown in the 
inscription that "Whoever plants coconut farms, fruit farms and other farms; the trees 
and the produce belong to the farmer who plants them."l0 
Thus the Sukhothai legal system was paternalistic In character, whereby the 
king was to rule his people like a father ruled his son. This was evident in one 
inscription: 
When commoners or men of rank differ or disagree, the King 
examines the case to establish the truth and then settles it justly. The 
King has hung a bell in the palace entrance: if any commoner in the 
land has a grievance or complaint and he wants to complain to the 
King, he strikes the bell and the King, hearing the bell, Questions the 
man and examines the case and decides justly for him.l1 
The Siamese laws in the Ayuthya kingdom 
As illustrated in chapter I, the political ideology of the king changed from 
paternalism, in the Sukhothai kingdom, to thewaracha (God kingship), in the Ayuthya 
kingdom. According to the judicial system, the most important of all the Ayuthya 
laws were the sacred laws of the Thai Thammasat referred to in the Law of Three 
Seals. Another aspect of Ayuthya law was rachasat (the king's law) which was law 
8 Phraya Nitisatpaisan, Prawatsat Kotmai Thai (Thai Legal History), Thammasat 
University Press, (Bangkok, 1954), pAD. 
9 Ibid., pAl. 
10 Ibid., p.44. 
11 Ibid., p.43. 
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declared by the kings during their current reIgns. Rachasat was temporary law, 
binding on the people because of the power of the king, and therefore different from 
the Thammasat. But it could acquire permanent status if it conformed to the 
Thammasat and was later added to it. 12 The nature of the Ayuthya laws will be 
demonstrated in section II about the Law of Three Seals, which is the best way to 
research Ayuthya law. 
3. The causes and the steps towards Rama 1's Codification 
After the city of Ayuthya capitulated and was burnt by the Burmese in 1767, 
more than half of the law books were destroyed by fire. King Rama I succeeded 
King Taksin who expelled the Burmese from the country. He built a new capital at 
Bangkok in 1782. Rama I realized that the surviving laws were not adequate 
according to the need of the courts , therefore, he ordered the revival of some past 
laws by investigating former Ayuthya court officials. 13 But this process was still 
unsatisfactory as gaps still existed. Furthermore, there appeared to be some obsolete 
laws which had not changed for many hundred of years since their inception. This 
was evident in the divorce case of amdaeng (Mrs.) Porn and nai (Mr.)Bunsi. The case 
came before Rama I in 1804 on a petition for his final judgment. 
The fact of this case was that amdaeng (Mrs.) Porn sought to divorce her 
husband, nai Bunsi, a royal blacksmith, who resisted his wife's suit by alleging that 
she had been guilty of adultery with nai Racha-at. The judge had granted a divorce 
decision in favour of her. Upon review of the petition, Rama I opined that it was 
unfair to allow the wife to obtain the divorce decree whenever she requested a 
divorce, without any inquiry into allegation of misconduct on her part, and ordered 
his officials to compare the law book in the court with another two copies in the 
12 Ibid., p. 7. 
13 Robert Lingat, op.cit., vo!.l, p.19. 
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palace. It appeared that the three copies stated the same provision that the wife 
could obtain a divorce even when there was no fault on the hushand's part. Rama I 
believed that this provision was one of a number of defects and inequities which 
appeared in the existing law. Therefore, he established a Royal Commission to 
examine and revise the entire corpus of the Siamese laws. 14 
It is noticeable that one factor which led Rama I to have the Siamese laws 
recodified was the revision of the Tripitaka (the Buddha's teachings), the Buddhist 
equivalent to the Bible, at the beginning of his reign. The reason for this revision 
was that the existing Tripitaka was untrustworthy and needed checking. Rama I 
stated his desire clearly at the outset of the Law of Three Seals that this codification 
was designed to correspond to the Tripitaka revision. 15 
The steps towards Codification 
Rama I established eleven Law Commissions to examine and reVIse the 
Thammasat. According to his command recorded in the Law of Three Seals, the Law 
Commissions had many duties to carry out for the reorganization of the Thammasat. 
Firstly, they had to reorganize it into laksana (sections). This enabled the Law 
Commissions to divide the Thammasat into substantive and procedural laws. 
Secondly, they had to eradicate repetitious laws. Thirdly, they had to examine 
obsolete laws and either eradicate or amend them, where necessary.16 
It is important to note that Rama I did not commit himself to the Law 
Commissions' resolutions as he considered their ideas as recommendations and 
. h . . 17 therefore he still reserved the right to reject t elr suggestIOns. The process of 
14 Pricha Suwantat ed., Kotmai Tra Samduang, vol. I , op.cit., pp.2-3. and 
D.M.Engel, op.cit., pp.3-4. 
15 Ibid., pp.2-3. 
16 Ibid., pp.4-5. 





codification began on 31 January 1804, and the Law Commissions had accomplished 
the code by 16 December in the same year. The whole process occupied only eleven 
months which was remarkably short for a codification. As a consequence, there were 
still some repetitions and the definition of sections was not distinct. This caused 
defects to emerge shortly after the implementation of the code. The implementation 
of the Law of Three Seals indicates that the codification was just a minor amendment 
which superficially changed the structure of the Thammasat, and Rama I, probably 
because of his conservative ideas, did not want to challenge Siamese customs and 
therefore did not want a revolution In the legal system. In his M.A.thesis, 
"Kanpratirup kansarn naikrasuang yuttitham naisamai Phrachulachomklao" (The 
Reform of Courts in the Ministry of Justice in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn), 
Manu Udomwet explains that the codification of laws in the reign of King Rama I 
was only a recompilation of Ayuthya law, and Rama I did not change the structure or 
principle of law from the Ayuthya period. 18 
As a direct outcome of the code, the old laws of Ayuthya became invalid and 
were probably destroyed in order to prevent confusion. Also the general Siamese 
public do not value antiquity. In order to signify the importance of the code, Rama I 
ordered the code be stamped with three seals, one each to represent the three 
regional, territorial departments of state, the kalahom, mahatthai, and phrakhlang. 
Only the code with the three seals on it could be used in Siamese courts, and because 
of these three seals originated the name "The Law of Three Seals". 
18 Manu Udomwet, "Kanpratirup kansarn naikrasuang yuttitham nais~ma~ . 
Phrachulachomklao" (The Reform of Court in the Ministry of JustIce In the ReIgn 
of King Chulalongkorn), M.A. thesis, Prasanmit University, Bangkok, 1873, p.3!. 
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Section II The Law of Three Seals (Substantive Laws) 
The Law of Three Seals divides into two parts namely the substantive and the 
procedural laws. The former were divided into 29 causes of action, and each cause 
of action required a specific procedure to deal with it, for example, cases of theft 
required a law of theft to be applied to cases. 
It is evident that the Law of Three Seals concentrated on public law, not 
private law. This derived from three factors: firstly, the growth of business and 
industry during the Ayuthya and the beginning of the Bangkok periods was limited 
owing to the king's monopoly over the country's trade. The ordinary Siamese people 
were prohibited from trading with foreigners but even among themselves they could 
trade only to a small extent. Therefore the development of the law of contract was 
insignificant and the few kinds of contract which did exist during that period were 
the loan agreement, contract of sale of slaves, and surety contract. 19 
Secondly, the social structure of Siamese society prevented the development of 
private law. Siamese society at that time divided people into four classes: the royal 
family, the khunnang (nobility), the phrai (commoners or peasants), and that slaves. 
Of these four groups, the phrai made up the most substantial part. Every male phrai 
had to be under the control of a person called a nai (patron) who protected and 
looked after him, and in return he was entitled to demand service from the phrai for 
a period of six months, later reduced to three months, in a year. This obligation of 
the phrai deprived them of the right to freedom of movement and indirectly 
discouraged them from establishing a business or other enterprise which in turn 
limited the growth of private law which depends on business transaction. 
19 Robert Lingat, op.cit., vo!.l, p.70. 
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Thirdly, during that period the economy of Siam had been mainly self-
sufficient and therefore the process of division of labour and specialization could not 
develop. Householders produced almost everything necessary for their own 
consumption and, as a result, internal trade was very limited. The insignificant 
internal trade that existed was mainly transacted on a barter basis as the use of money 
was still not widespread.2o This also contributed to the slow development of private 
law in Siam. 
The Important Substantive Laws 
The Law of Three Seals concentrated on offences against the king, the 
Government and the public. This will be illustrated as following: 
The aiyakarn kabotsuk (law of treason) was designed to protect the king and 
his throne by punishing the offender severely if he attempted or carried out an 
assassination of or rebellion against the king. It also covered such offences as 
betrayal of the state by assisting an enemy or the leak of confidential matters to an 
enemy. The offender who was found guilty of this charge would be executed and all 
of his properties confiscated. The offender's ancestors and descendants in line for 
seven generations, even though they did not take any part in the plot, would also be 
executed. 21 This law also covered the rulers of the distant pratethserat (dependencies) 
of Bangkok, who rebelled against the king, who too would be sentenced to 
execution.22 
20 Chatthip Nartsupha, The Political Economy of Siam (1851-1910), Sangroong 
Printing, (Bangkok, 1981), p.l. 
21 Pricha Suwantat ed., Kotmai Tra Samduang (the Law of Three Seals), Thammasat 
University Press, vol.2, (Bangkok, 1985), pp.462-463. 
22 Ibid., pp.466-46 7. 
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The kotmonlienbarn (the royal family law) was designed to regulate the 
accession to the throne. It declared that a prince who was born by a queen would be 
entitled to succeed to the throne after the death of the king.23 It also provided 
regulations for the king's procession, properties, presence and officials. There was 
one article about the royal barge which was absurd and later cost the life of Queen 
Sunanta who was one of the four Queens of King Chulalongkorn. In 1880, Queen 
Sunanta was on a royal barge heading to Bangpa-in palace at Ayuthya, but the barge 
capsized at Nonburi. The Queen and her daughter, Princess Gannaporn, were 
drowned even though there a number of soldiers and other retainers had accompanied 
them. The reason which discouraged such people from saving her life appeared to be 
an article in the kotmontienbarn which provided that, in an event like this, the 
attendants could not stay near the barge but must try to rescue the queen by giving 
her coconut fruits or some other kind of support. The person who rescued the queen 
by holding her body must be executed because the law forbade any man but the king 
to touch the queen. 24 For this reason all the soldiers abandoned the barge and could 
not find any support to save Queen Sunanta and her daughter's lives. This was 
probably one of the reasons King Ch ulalongkorn desired to substitute the modern 
code for the Law of Three Seals. 
The kotmontienbarn not only protected the king but also the royal elephants 
and the officials who performed royal duties, for example, the lukkhun nasarnluang 
(the king's legal advisers). The reasons behind this appear to be that the king's 
elephants, especially white elephants, were believed by the Siamese to be born for the 
king's merit, and whoever treated them wrongly must be punished severely.25 And 
the lukkhun nasarnluang were representatives of the king in carryIng out justice in 
23 Pricha Suwantat ed., Kotmai Tra Samduang, vol. 1 , op.cit., p.59. 
24 Ibid., p.67. In a similar incident in the reign of King Thai Sa .of Ayuth~a, the 
punishment had actually been applied, see W.A.R. Wood, A History of Slam 
(Bangkok, 1959), p.225 .. 
25 Ibid., pp. 72- 73. 
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the country. Therefore, whoever showed disobedience or resisted their order, must 
be punished.26 
The laws of phrai and that (slave) As indicated above, the phrai were the 
largest class in Siam and therefore required many sections of law to deal with them. 
Every Siamese who was not of the royal family nor nobility had be registered as 
phrai, or even worse as that. There were two kinds of phrai : the phrai luang and 
phrai sam, the former registered to a department of the government to do the service 
for the government, the latter registered to the nai and to do service for him. The 
phrai laws were designed to control manpower by forcing them to register in order to 
restrict them to a certain area. This was because in Siam, manpower was lacking and 
was much more valuable than land which was plentiful.27 
In the Law of Three Seals, a nai had responsibility to control, look after and 
gIve protection to the phrai assigned to him. He was the person who had to mobilize 
the phrai under him for corvee labour and for war.28 He was to produce his phrai on 
the demand of the government. When one of his phrai was accused of a CrIme or 
became a defendant in a law su it, a warrant was sent to the nai to produce his phrai 
for triaI.29 It was an offence not to be registered under a nai who served as the only 
link between a phrai and the government, as his access to a court of justice had to be 
made through his nai, and only through his nai could his complaint be heard by the 
government.3D 
26 b'd 81 I I ., p. . . 
27 Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok PerIod 
1782-1873, Cornell University New York 1969, p.8S. . 
28 Pricha Suwantat ed., Kotmai Tra Samduang, vol.2, Op.CIt., p.373. 
29 Pricha Suwantat ed., Kotmai Tra Samduang, vol.l, op.cit., p.297. 
30 Akin Rabibhadana, op.cit., p.86. 
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In return, the nai had almost complete control of the services of their phrai, 
as articles 103 and 106 of the law laksana bet set (miscellaneous) stated that no one 
should hire or use the service of a phrai without the permission of his nai. The Law 
of Three Seals included an article preventing the nai from making excessive demands 
on the services of their phrai by threatening punishment of the nai whose phrai had 
ran away because of their oppression. 31 
The Law of Three Seals laksana that (slavery) defined the way in which 
people fell into slavery, given that a Siamese man, as the head of his family, had the 
ownership of himself, his wife and his children. Therefore, he was legally entitled to 
sell himself, his wives, and his children to other persons as slaves.32 All contracts for 
sale of slaves were required by law to be made in writing which stated the date of 
the sale, the purchase money paid, the name of the purchaser, the seller and the 
slave. Children of slaves born in the house of the master would also become slaves of 
that master. 33 
A slave who was sold into slavery had a legal right to redeem himself and the 
price of liberty was that of the original sale. 34 This right helped to make the master 
treat the slave kindly, otherwise the slave might seek a new master to pay the 
purchase money and become a slave of the new master. 35 When the master allowed 
his slave to become a monk or a nun, the slave would be freed. 36 A female slave 
31 Ibid., p.87. 
32 Ibid., p.105. 
33 Pricha Suwantat ed., Kotmai Tra Samduang, vo!.l, op.cit., p.281. 
34 Pricha Suwantat ed., Kotmai Tra Samduang, vo1.2, op.cit., laksana that article 
51, p.99. . . . . 
35 Ernest Satow, the British Minister Resident in Bangkok, commented In hIS dlane.s 
on 7 July 1885, that the welfare of slaves in Siam proper. wa~ much better than In 
Chiengmai, a Siamese pralethseral in the North, because In Slam proper, the slaves 
could change their master if they disliked the treatment of the old master. See 
Satow Diaries, PRO 30/33/15/9. . . 
36 Pricha Suwantat ed., Kotmai Tra Samduang, vol.2, op.cIt., laksana that artIcle 
75, p.lIO. 
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would become free automatically by having a child by her master or his relatives. 37 
Therefore, the concept of that in the Law of Three Seals was different from slaves in 
the western concept. 
The Law of Three Seals dealt with criminal offences mainly by two sections: 
the laksana aryaluang and the laksana jane. The significant difference between them 
was that the former dealt with criminal offences against the king and the government 
but the latter against the people in general. As an example of the laksana aryaluang: 
firstly, article 123 provided that: 
Whoever being in possession of the royal property, dishonestly takes 
away or converts such property to himself is said to commit crime 
against the king, and shall be punished by execution. Any person in 
the offender's family who is party to the crime shall be punished like 
the offender, and if the offender disappears, his family, father, 
mother, brothers and sisters, will be accountable to compensate up to 
the value of the stolen property according to the nearness of the 
relationship.38 
Again, article 13 and 28 provided that: 
Whoever gives a daughter to a foreigner as wife and allows her to 
convert to another religion is said to commit a crime against the 
Government.39 
Whoever accuses the king's official of any crime must have the king's 
permission to pursue the case. If there is no permission and that 
person takes the law into his own hand, he is said to commit crime 
. h k' 40 agamst t e mg. 
As an example of luksana jane, article 66 provided that: 
Whoever accuses another person of any crime must proceed according 
to the law through the appropriate government department. If the 
accuser instead of proceeding by such steps, deliberately takes the law 
in his hand by arresting the accused, and the accused dies, the accuser 
is to be executed.41 
37 Ibid., p.120, laksana lhal article 96. 
38 Ibid., p.437, laksana aryaluang article 123. 
39 Ibid., p.380-381, laksana aryaluang article 13. 
40 Ibid., p.390, laksana aryaluang article 28. 
41 Ibid., p.326, laksana jone article 66. 
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One important aspect of criminal offences under the Law of Three Seals was 
, 
whether the members of the offender's family were liable for his crime, and if so, to 
what extent. It is probable that in the Ayuthya period the members of a criminal's 
family were liable for his crime both criminally and civilly. This belief is based on 
the political system in that period which divided people into groups. Each group had 
a leader and the supreme head of all the other leaders was the king. Every male 
Siamese had to registered to a krom (department of the government) when he was 
born and, once adult, was to be called to serve in that krom for a period in every 
year. People's lives depended substantially on the group with which they were 
registered. 
As indicated above, by the Law of Three Seals in the aiyakarn kabotsuk, the 
convicted man and his ancestors and descendants, even if they did not cooperate with 
him, would also be executed. But in a less serious crime, the family of the convict 
would be held responsible for the crime the convict had committed only if they took 
part in the plan. And in any case, a member of a criminal's family who lived under 
the same roof with the criminal had to be civilly responsible to pay damages to an 
injured person but not the court fine. This is evident in the laksana jane article 38 
which indicated the lenience of the Law of Three Seals towards the criminal's family. 
This article stated that: 
The father, mother, brothers and sisters of a criminal who live within 
the same house are liable for the crime the criminal had committed if 
he escaped away. If they deny knowledge of the criminal's 
whereabouts, they must find a guarantor to guarantee against their 
knowing or being an accomplice, to be punished as the criminal, 
otherwise they will be remanded in custody until the criminal is 
arrested. If the criminal is not found, they are to be held responsible 
for the cost of the damage which the criminal has done, but they are 
not responsible for the court fine. 42 
42 Ibid., p.313, laksana jane article 38. For another case of substitution, this time 
for debt, see Satow Diaries, 28 May 1884, PRO 30/33/15/8. 
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The traditional Siamese law as revealed by the Law of Three Seals emphasized 
the importance of the status of Siamese people in a society which was hierarchic as 
epitomized in the nai- phrai patronage and sakdina official ranking system. This is 
evident in the Law of Three Seals laksana tamneng naponreun (The law of official 
status) which defines the status of members of the royal family, and of all the 
Siamese official class III the country in terms of field power; for example, the Uparat 
(Second King) had a status of 100,000 rai (two and a-half rai = I acre).43 
Futhermore, the degree of punishment or fine inflicted upon the defendant depended 
upon the status of the injured person; ie. the higher the status the more serious the 
punishment. This is evident in the Law of Three Seals, aiyakarn promsak (The law 
of ranking status), in which it provides that injury to a high status person is punished 
more severely than to a low status person.44 
The traditional Siamese legal system was mainly beneficial to the king, 
members of the royal family, and the khunnang class. It was not for the benefit of 
the phrai or commoners who made up the mojority of the Siamese people. Further 
evidence is shown in the Law of Three Seals laksana Paumia (husband and wife) and 
laksana Moradok (succession) which accept the practice of polygamy. According to 
these two laws, wives can be divided into four categories: wife given by the king as a 
reward; a wife given by the king when asked for; a wife given by her parents; and 
other kinds of wife. 45 Traditional Siamese society accepted that the more powerful 
the person the more wives he could possess. This is clearly shown in the polygamous 
practice of the Siamese king. The word "Khunnang" means the ability of the noble to 
possess more than one wife. 
43 Pricha Suwantat ed., Kotmai Tra Samduang, vol. I , op.cit., pp.178-271. At the 
beginning of this law, it explains that this law was implemented in the reign of 
King Trailok of the Ayuthya Kingdom. 
44 Ibid., pp.16l-l77. 
45 Pricha Suwantat ed., Kotmai Tra Samduang, vol.2, pp.145-146, laksana moradok, 
article 5,6. 
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Section III The Procedure Laws of the Law of Three Seals 
1. The Important Procedural Laws 
This study will illustrate only the important procedural laws. Firstly, the law 
laksana rapphong (receiving of plaints or charges) defined the persons who were not 
eligible to bring cases to court, for instance, a person of unsound mind, or a senile 
person. If these persons submitted a charge or plaint to a court, the tralakarn 
(judges) would make a preliminary examination before accepting it. 46 Only persons 
registered under a nai could have access to bring a case to courts. If they were not 
registered they would be arrested and sent to register as phrai luang.47 When the 
tralakarn accepted the charge or plaint, they would issue a writ to the defendant's nai 
to submit the defendant to court for trial. 48 There was a special character to the 
Siamese traditional legal system whereby defendants could not sue their parents and 
ancestors in court; if they did , they would be punished by flogging. Only the 
government could sue their ancestors in court on their behalf.49 
Secondly, the law laksana payarn (the evidence law) prohibited thirty-three 
groups of people being witnesses unless the parties agreed together on them. These 
groups incl uded, for example, the debtors or the slaves of the parties. The Law of 
Three Seals divided witnesses into three categories viz: monks and nobility, the 
laymen, and the relatives or friends of the parties. It also ranked the admissibility of 
these three groups as following, the first was more admissible than the second, the 
second more than the third. 5o Prince Raphi, one of King Chulalongkorn's sons, who 
46 Pricha Suwantat ed., Kotmai Tra Samduang, vol. I , p.295, laksana rapphong 
article I. 
47 Ibid., p.298, laksana rapphollg article 10. 
48 Ibid., p.297, laksana rapphong article 8. 
49 Ibid., p.307, laksana rapphong article 25. 
50 Ibid., p.340, laksana payarn article 16. 
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later became the Minister of Justice in 1897, criticized this idea as unfair. He 
believed that judges should use their discretion, not categories of witnesses, In 
considering whether to believe the witnesses. 51 After he became the Minister of 
Justice, this led him to reform the law laksana payarn in 1900. 
Thirdly, the law laksana tralakarn (The law of judges) defined the 
qualification and duties of tralakarn in court procedure. It also prohibited the 
tralakarn who had a personal interest in a case or were related to any of the parties 
from presiding over the case.52 
2. The Siamese Traditional Procedure System 
In the Sukhothai period, it was likely that few cases were brought to court as 
society was based on the patriarchal system where the head of the family or the 
head-man of the village had a senior position and big role in settling disputes 
between members of the family or inhabitants of the village. Only big cases which 
were beyond their ability would be referred to the king. But in the Ayuthya period 
cases increasingly arose in courts due to the change of the political system to an 
aristocratic form in which the king was divine and had absolute power. Inevitably, 
the power of the head of the family and the head-man of the village was reduced. 
The nai was substituted for the head-man of the village but had no power to settle 
cases. The king had absolute power to settle the disputes. This power was conferred 
on him by the Thammasat which stated at the outset that all people gave this power 
h . d' 53 to the king to settle t elr lsputes. 
51 Phraya Nitisatpisan, op.cit., pp.168-169. And also Prince Raphi's lecture, The 
Ministry of Justice's library, no page number. . 
52 Pricha Suwantat ed., Kotmai Tra Samduang, vol. I , Op.Clt., p.420, laksana 
tralakarn article 113. 
53 Ibid., p.9. 
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Robert Lingat, a French historian who specialized in Siamese legal history, 
suggested in his book, Prawatsat Kotmai Thai (Thai Legal History), that at the 
beginning of the Ayuthya kingdom, the kings authorized the chatusadom (four 
pillars), which consisted of the four original senabodi (ministers) who were 
responsible for the palace, the city, the treasury and the agriculture ministries, to 
settle cases among the people for him. Only difficult or complicated cases would be 
referred to the king. Subsequently, King Trailok (1448 - 1488) recruited a group of 
brahmins, who were mainly Mon people who lived in the south of Burma. These 
brahmins were knowledgeable in law and specialized in the Thammasat. 54 
King Trailok reorganized his counsellors by dividing them into two groups: 
firstly, the lukkhun nasala, which comprised the chatusadom and two newly created 
head ministers called samuhakalahom and samuhanayok , to advise him In the 
administration of the country. Secondly, the lukkhun nasarnluang, which was 
composed of a group of brahmins, would advise him in judicial matters.55 From the 
Ayuthya period up to before King Chulalongkorn's reformation, there was no clear-
cut difference between civil and criminal cases. Therefore they were subject to the 
same court procedure and the lukkhwl nasarnluang played a substantial role in 
handling the cases. 
Ideally the traditional Siamese court procedure divided into four stages: 
a) The reception of plaints or charges 
b) The investigation and examination of witnesses 
c) The settlement of issues and the explanation of legal issues 
d) The judgment and enforcement of the judgment. 
54 Robert Lingat, op.cit., vol.2, pp.39 1-392. 
55 Ibid., p.392. 
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Firstly, when someone wanted to bring his case to court he had to go to the 
krom rapphong ( office for the reception of plaints) which was under mahatthai 
ministerial jurisdiction.. The registrar would require the plaintiff to sign a guarantee 
note that the case was genuine fact and that he had never previously brought this case 
before any court. After that the registrar would consider whether the plaintiff's 
claim was valid, and whether he was entitled to bring his case to court. In case the 
plaintiff could not write, the registrar would write the plaint for him. After that the 
registrar would channel the plaint to the court of the ministry which had specific 
jurisdiction over the case. If any problem occurred at this stage, the registrar would 
refer the case to the lukkhun nasarnluang. 
Secondly, upon reception of the plaint, the tralakarn (judge) in the court 
which had jurisdiction over the case would issue a writ to the nai of the defendant to 
submit the defendant to trial within 15 days. When the defendant appeared in court, 
the tralakarn would give him a copy of the plaint and explain it to him. The 
defendant needed to answer the plaint. The tralakarn would note his answer in the 
record and both parties were required to sign or make a mark to signify that they 
were the plaintiff and defendant. Tralakarn were judges in the courts of each 
ministry who were not specialized in the Thammasat and worked under the minister's 
command. Therefore, the Siamese traditional procedure required them to send the 
record, which included the plaint and the answer of the parties, to the lukkhun 
nasarnluang to settle the issues. The facts which were raised by one party and not 
admitted by the other would be noted as points in dispute and would require evidence 
to substantiate the arguments. The lukkhun nasarnluang would send the record back 
to the tralakarn to investigate and examine the witnesses. Both parties were required 
to bring their evidence and witnesses to be examined by the tralakarn and the latter 
would make reports of all the examinations and send the report back to the lukkhun 
nasarnluang for stage three. It is important to note that all the litigation was 
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performed by the parties and the lralakarll without any assistance from lawyers 
because the traditional Siamese legal system dl·d not allow anyone to represent the 
parties in courts. 
Thirdly, the lukkhun nasarnluang, upon reception of the report, had no need 
to make a decision, but simply interpreted and drew conclusions from the evidence in 
the plaint, the answer, and the testimony of the parties and the witnesses. They also 
suggested the laws which applied to the case and sent the report to the phuprap 
(person who made judgment). Fourthly, the phuprap would make a decision and also 
enforce that decision. It is significant to note that the phuprap were officials who 
specialized in the Thammasal and their office was in the same building as the 
lukkhun nasarnluang. 56 
Section IV Royal Despotism in the Legal System 
1. The dika petition 
Owing to the lack of evidence of Siamese legal history during the Sukhothai 
and Ayuthya periods, it is very difficult if not impossible to trace the origins of the 
dika petition. There are two possibilities; firstly, it might originate in the Sukhothai 
period when King Ramkamhaeng hung a bell in the gateway of his palace and 
allowed anyone in his kingdom who had some grievance or was treated unfairly by 
his officials to ring the bell in order to appeal to the King, the King himself would 
interrogate and settle the matter impartially. Secondly, it might originate in the 
principle of kingship in the Thammasal which represented that the people in ancient 
times had agreed together to elect one leader as king in order to settle their disputes, 
and then receive petitions. 
56 Ibid., p.396. All these procedures are derived from the ~xample case of jin 
(Chinese) vs nai Sa (1871), also see Manu Udomwet, Op.Clt., pp.32-46 .. 
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The dika petitions were divided into two categories, firstly, the petitions 
submitted to the king by the people to complain that cases which were decided by the 
tralakarn in courts had been decided wrongly and asking the king to review those 
cases, and secondly, to complain that they were oppressed or treated badly by the 
government officials. It was the custom at that time that the king himself or his 
authorized officials would investigate those dika and settled them impartially for the 
petitioners. 
It is important to note that the court system in the Ayuthya period and in the 
Bangkok period before the Fifth Reign reforms was the single court system. This 
means that a case finished when the phuprap gave and enforced the judgment. There 
was no appeal or dika court in the sense of the present legal system because there was 
no more procedure between the parties. But each party had two further choices: 
firstly, to sue the tralakarn who conducted the trial or the phuprap who gave the 
judgment that he or they were prejudiced or decided the case wrongly. Secondly, to 
submit the dika to the king to review the case. 
In the first verSIOn, it was the party who lost the case who sued the tralakarn 
or the phuprap. This was allowed by the Law of Three Seals laksana uthorn (appeal 
law) which stated in article 8 and 9 that: 
After the court gives judgment, the party which is not satisfied with 
the judgment can sue the tralakarn or the phuprap who conducted or 
decided the case by arguing that he or they were prejudiced or the 
judgment was wrong. The tralakarn or the phupr:ap will becom~ the 
defendant and if the appeal court decide that he IS wrong, he wIll be 
responsible for the appeal court's fees and the original case will go 
back to the original court to be conducted by a new tralakarn or 
phuprap. But if the tralakarn or the phuprap win the case, the appeal 
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party is sUbJect to a severe fine and also responsible for the appeal 
court's fees. 7 
This aspect of the laksana uthorll of the Law of Three Seals was very negative 
and needed to be changed, so Prince Phichit reformed it when he became the 
Minister of Justice. This will be illustrated in the chapter on Prince Phichit. 
In the second verSIOn, the party who lost the case could submit a dika to the 
king to review the case. If the king did review and give a judgment, this was final. 
The power of the king in this respect was not the power of the normal court 
procedure but the power of the "lord of the land" and the "lord of life". Therefore, 
this power was not bound by any laws as Prince Raphi explains in his book, 
Phraratchabanyat nai patyuban (The royal edicts in the present day) that: 
The power of the king to receive and decide the dika is not the power 
of the court procedure but the lord of land which is unlimited and is 
not obliged by any laws. This power depends totally on the king so 
each king applies this power differently.58 
One important question is whether the defeated party who sued the tralakarn 
10 the appeal court and lost the case could again submit a dika to the king. The 
answer is probably yes, because there was no law to regulate this aspect and even a 
person who never brought his case to a normal court but wanted to bring his case to 
the king as a dika petition could also do so if he had a nai who was close to the 
king. 59 This unlimited and uncertain power of the king channelled a tremendous 
number of dika petitions into the king's hands particularly in the reign of King 
Chulalongkorn. This caused him to follow Prince Phichit's advice to establish the 
57 Pricha Suwantat ed., Kotmai Tra Samduang, vol. I ,op.cit., pp.431-432, laksana 
uthorn article 8,9. 
58 Prince Ratburi Direkrit (Raphi), Phraratchabanyat nai patyuban (royal edicts in the 
present day), vol.2, (Bangkok, 190 I), p.988. 
59 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan (King Chulalongkorn's diary), vol.IO, p.58. 
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Dika Court and appoint Phichit in 1876 as the first athibodi (chief judge). This will 
be illustrated in chapter 3. 
There is no evidence of the method of receiving the dika during the reign of 
Kings Rama I and II of the Bangkok period, but one can assume that it should have 
been the same as in the reign of King Rama III (King Nangklao), whereby the people 
could submit their dika petitions to the king when he went out of the palace to 
attend ceremonies. There was a famous dika against the eminent Prince kromluang 
Rakronnaret in which Rama III decided that the latter used his power to oppress the 
people, and also planned to overthrow the King so he sentenced him to be executed.6o 
Subsequently, in 1850, Rama III put a drum called winitchai peri (drum for 
investigation) in his palace. Any person who wanted to submit a dika had to go to 
ask the official who looked after the drum and hit the drum. That person would be 
brought to the King's presence and the latter would investigate the petitioner by 
himself or assign his case to his officials. 61 It is possible that Rama III imitated King 
Ramkamhaeng of the Sukhothai Kingdom as shortly before this happened, Prince 
Mongkut, who was a leading monk of the Thammayut branch, had discovered several 
inscriptions of the Sukhothai period. 
The access to the drum was not convenient as the drum was kept in the palace 
and the petitioner had to ask an official who looked after the drum to hit the drum. 
The other way was to submit a dika to the King when Rama III went out of the 
palace. His successor, Rama IV (King Mongkut), who had come to know the 
difficulties of the people in submitting their petitions during his monkhood, when he 
60 Chaophraya Thipakorawong, Phrarachapongsawadarn krungrattanakosin ratchakarn 
ti S3rm, vol.2, (Bangkok, 1961), pp.135-136. 
61 Ibid., pp.180-181. 
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came to the throne himself went out to receive the dika from the people four times 
monthly.62 
King Mongkut also extended the right of the people to submit dika by 
allowing the relatives of a person where necessary to submit one for him. In order to 
discourage dishonest persons from making up false stories to submit as dika, King 
Mongkut would punish them severely. King Mongkut was always worried about his 
people's access to submit dika. Even on his death-bed in 1868, he asked his ministers 
to insist that the new king receive dika from the people as he had done.63 
2. The rapsang courts (courts established by the king for special purposes) 
were special courts which the king could appoint for specific cases. These courts were 
not normal courts because the king considered that there were special circumstances 
which the normal courts could not cope with. It is important to note that there were 
no rapsang courts in the Law of Three Seals nor in Siamese legal history up to the 
reign of King Chulalongkorn. The rapsang courts were an unprecedented move of 
King Chulalongkorn in 1874, when he established these courts to deal with pending 
cases in four ministries, namely the mahatthai, kalahom, khlang and nakhonbarn. It 
was also intended as a radical change to the traditional court system in order to 
overcome the delay and corruption in major ministries.64 The most famous instance 
of this court was the rapsang court which was established in 1893 by King 
Chulalongkorn to try Phra Yot in which Prince Phichit was appointed as the chief 
judge. 
62 Prince Damrong, Phrarachapongsawadarn krungrattanakosin ratchakarn ti ha, 
(Bangkok, 1971), pp.288-289. 
63 Prince Damrong, khwarmsongcham (memorandum), Social Science Society 
Publisher, (Bangkok, 1962), pp.82-83. 
64 . 63 D.M. Engel, Op.Clt., p. . 
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Conclusion 
The traditional Siamese legal system had a long history back to the Sukhothai 
and Ayuthya periods but few of the laws in these two periods servive up to the 
present. The Ayuthya laws were based on the Siamese Thammasat which Siam 
derived from the Mon Thammasat. For the Bangkok period, it was King Rama I 
who revised the Siamese Thammasat and codified it into the Code of the Law of 
Three Seals. Most of the analysis in this chapter is based on this code. 
It is important to analyse the advantages and disadvantages of the Siamese 
traditional legal system: 
Advantages: Firstly, the procedure in court was controlled by the lukkhun 
nasarnluang who settled the issues and controlled the tralakarn to investigate and 
examine the evidences according to the issues of disputes. And the decision and the 
enforcement were in the hands of the phuprap. Therefore the interpretation of laws 
and the procedure were in the control of the same groups of officials and were 
consistent. 
Secondly, the whole procedure was divided into four stages and each stage was 
controlled by a specific office so the officials in each group would be specialized in 
the work they handled. Thirdly, the offices of the lukkhun nasarnluang and the 
phuprap were theoretically independent of the ministers but under the king's control 
and should therefore have conferred true justice to the people. 
Disadvantages: Firstly, the delay in the court procedure which was caused by 
many factors, for instance, the tralakarn in each court of every ministry or 
department were unsalaried officials whose incomes depended on the fees from the 
67 
parties. Consequently, they did not want the disputes to be settled rapidly in order to 
earn more fees. Secondly, the investigation and examination of witnesses was 
performed by the tralakarn who were officials under the control of the ministers or 
athibodi, and therefore the procedure in court was still under the influence of the 
latter. Thirdly, confusion usually occurred through the overlap of jurisdiction among 
the various tralakarn courts in numerous departments and ministries. Fourthly, the 
criminal procedure placed the accused or defendant in a disadvantageous position 
because the law presupposed that he was guilty, and so he had a duty to prove his 
innocence. Fifthly, the torture procedure allowed the officials to use torture to force 
a defendant's confession. 
Two important questions are, whether true justice was available between 
people of different class, and was there any real substance to the traditional Siamese 
legal system? The answer to the first question is probably that true justice was 
mainly available between people of the same class, for example, between phrai and 
phrai, but if the phrai wanted to take an action against the khunnang, it was much 
more difficult as it was necessary to obtain the King's permission to do that.65 
The answer to the second question is probably yes, but to a small extent. This 
was caused by the lack of independence of the judicial system due to the control of 
the executive power over the tralakarn court in each ministry. The litigation of a 
phrai against an accused or a defendant who was a khunnang or a member of the 
royal family would work if the latter had no influence over the executive power, but 
in reality they did have influence. In 1862, King Mongkut took an unprecedented 
step in issuing a proclamation to reform the judicial system by allowing courts access 
65 This condition is provided by the Law of Three Seals laksana aryaluang article 28, 
see above p.56. 
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to make members of the royal family accountable for their crimes. This proclamation 
stated that: 
This proclamation authorizes the lukkhun nasarnluang, the court in 
every ministry, and the town councils all over the country to receive 
plaint or accusation from the people against chaotangkrom (Senior 
Prince) or any member of the royal family. The practice which these 
officials used to refuse to receive plaint or accusation on the ground 
that the people cannot sue members of the royal family must be 
abandoned. The purpose of this proclamation is to make members of 
the royal family accountable for their crimes.66 
One important aspect is that the substantive laws were not well divided into 
appropriate sections and many of them were absurd as indicated In the 
kotmontienbarn about the capsize of the royal barge. King Chulalongkorn, before the 
legal reform, compared the situation of the traditional legal system to a decaying ship 
which was beyond repair and needed to be rebuilt. 
66 Thailand Fine Arts Department, Prakat rama si pak hok (Kin.g Rama IV's 
Proclamation, vo1.6), printed in the creamation volume of PrInce Maruphong 
Siripat (Bangkok, 1923), pp.94-95. 
69 
Chapter 3 The Origins of the Ministry of Justice 
Section I The Conclusion of the Unequal Treaties and their Consequences 
I.The Bowring Treaty of 1855 
The first unequal treaty between Siam and Western countries was the Bowring 
Treaty of 1855, which resembled the unequal treaties signed by Western powers with 
China and Japan in the same period. It was called an "unequal treaty" because it was 
not equal or reciprocal. Article II of this treaty provided that: 
The interests of all British subjects coming to Siam shall be placed 
under the regulation and control of a Consul, who will be appointed to 
reside at Bangkok. Any disputes arising between Siamese and British 
subjects shall be heard and determined by the Consul, in conjunction 
with the Siamese officers; and criminal offences will be punished, in 
the case of British offenders, by the Consul, according to English laws, 
and in case of Siamese offenders, by their own laws, through the 
Siamese authorities. But the Consul shall not interfere with any 
matters referring solely to Siamese, neither will the Siamese authories 
interfere in questions which only concern the subjects of Her Britannic 
Majesty.l 
Besides, Article VIII of this treaty removed tariffs and duties from Siamese control. 
It limited import duty to three per cent of the market value of the goods.2 
Consequently, the Siamese Government lost its autonomy in judicial and fiscal 
matters because it could not exercise jurisdiction over British subjects and could not 
fix the tax rate by itself. But the terms of the Bowring Treaty of 1855 were not 
clear; therefore, on 13 May 1856, the British Government sent Harry Parkes to 
conclude an agreement supplementary to the Bowring Treaty which the Siamese 
1 Thailand Treaty and Legal Department, Foreign Ministry, Bilateral Treaties and 
Agreements between Thailand and Foreign Countries and International 
Organization, vol.l (Bangkok, 1968), pp.37-42. 
2 Ibid., pp.37-42. 
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Government agreed to sign. This supplementary agreement laid down the methods of 
procedure in detail but the essence of the treaty was still the same. 
The reason why the Siamese Government signed the unequal treaty was that 
similar treaties had already been imposed upon Japan and China. If neither Japan 
nor the region's traditional dominant power, China, had been able militarily to resist 
the British, then Siam would be even less able to do so. Furthermore, the British 
were well established on the Malay Peninsula and they had recently been engaged in a 
second Anglo-Burmese war which, by 1852, had resulted in Burma's defeat and the 
cession of much of its territory to Britain's control. 
It is significant that Siam, despite full knowledge of the disadvantageous 
consequences of an unequal treaty, entered into many similar treaties with other 
countries, viz. the United States of America and France in 1856, Denmark in 1857, 
etc. The reason was that letting many treaty powers into Siam was better than only 
one since Siam would be able to balance their influence instead of allowing one treaty 
power to dominate the country.3 
The Western powers' justification for execising extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
Siam was that the Siamese legal system was obsolete, unsystematic and uncertain. The 
judges were not independent enough to decide cases. As Sir John Bowring, when he 
was in Siam to complete the Bowring Treaty, commented: 
In an absolute monarchy country the king has absolute power and the 
judges and legislative c?unci.l canno~ procure the pe~ple's, sec~r~ty. 
Somtimes, the king's desIre wIll prevaIl and affect the Judge s OpInIOn 
or court procedure. Moreover, the method of punishment in Siam was 
b . 4 bar anc. 
3 Chulalongkorn University, Kanpattana kotmaithai nai songroipee (The Development 
of Thai Law over 200 years) (Bangkok, 1982), vol. 1 , p.18, and also see Natawut 
Sutthisongkram, Somdet Chaophraya Bormmaha Si Suriyawong (Bangkok, 1961), 
pp.550-551. 
4 Chulalongkorn University, Ibid., pp.15-16. 
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It is worth analyzing whether these reasons were justifiable. Firstly, the 
Siamese law at that time was the Law of Three Seals which originated in the time of 
the Ayuthya Kingdom and was revised by King Rama I in 1804. Some laws were 
obsolete as evidenced by the trial by ordeal called "diving trial". According to this 
method, the judge stuck two poles in deep water at about three metres distant. The 
parties, dressed in white, prayed and at the same time lowered themselves into the 
water holding on to the poles. The party which surfaced first would lose the case. 5 
Secondly, the courts of justice in Siam at that time were not independent but 
subject to intervention from the king, princes, and influential government officials. 
This was evident in the case of Phraya Charoenratchamaitri (That Amatyakun) as late 
as 1884 who had beaten a Mr. Lek to death. The judges gave the verdict that Phraya 
Charoen was a senior government official who knew the custom and intentionally 
broke the law together with his slaves by beating Mr. Lek to death, which was a 
violent crime. The Phraya was found guilty of murder and awarded the punishment 
of 90 floggings, confiscation of all his property and execution. But Phraya Charoen 
had given good service to the Government, which therefore reduced the punishment 
to imprisonment and 60 floggings and a fine of 28 chang (1 chang = 80 ticals).6 
Prince Putharet, King Chulalongkorn's half-brother, gave this case to the King to 
reVIew. The King gave the order that the judges were right in delivering a guilty 
verdict but Phraya Charoen had given plenty of good service to the Government. 
Consequently, the King cancelled the judgment and changed the punishment to 
confine Phraya Charoen to the Palace in order to deter high Government officials 
5 Prieha S~lJ JI\f~n ia. e, Kotmai trasamduong (The Law of Three Seals) (Bangkok, 
1984), pp.358-360. (ut., . 
6 No specific term of imprisonment was defined because only the Kmg had such 
authority. 
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from killing ordinary people.7 This case indicates clearly the King's intervention In 
the administration of justice. 
Another, earlier case in 1874 which showed the King's direct interference 
with court procedure by ordering an execution without trial was the case of Luang 
Sanpakorn, who was a government official accused of persecuting many innocent 
people. The police arrested him but he managed to escape. The King issued orders 
to arrest and execute him without tria1.8 But in some cases the King's intervention 
gave more justice. This was illustrated in the case of Chin Mee (Chin is the word the 
Siamese use for Chinese) who claimed that three provincial governors, Phraya 
Sukhothai, Phraya Phichit, and Phraya Phichai owed him 30 chang. The judges 
decided that his claim was unenforceable by lapse of time. Prince Phichit Prichakorn 
discussed this case with the King and the latter gave the decision that the three 
Phraya were actually in debt to Chin Mee, even though the claim was precluded, but 
as the three Phraya were government officials they should pay back their debts to 
only half the amount. 9 
Thirdly, the argument that the Siamese judicial system used barbaric 
punishments was partly true. This is evidenced by Prince Damrong's memoir where 
the Prince explained that when Somdet Chaophraya Sisuriyawong (Chuang Bunnag) 
was in power as Regent, 1868-1873, there were many violent crimes in Ayuthya 
province. The Somdet went up to Ayuthya with judges and officers. Whenever he 
arrested the leader of some bandits, he set up a court which gave a verdict of 
execution by publicly cutting the body of the bandit into two pieces while another 
bandit was executed by dissecting the body symmetrically in public in order to deter 
7 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan (King Chulalongkorn's Diaries), vol.19 (1884), 
p.163. 
8 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vol. I (1876), p.44. 
9 Ibid., p.52. 
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other bandits. Apparently these punishment did deter other bandits as the prOVInce 
was quiet after that. lO Prince Raphi, who became the Minister of Justice in 1897, 
explained about this barbaric punishment that the Siamese method of punishment 
looked barbaric, for instance, amputation of a hand or opening the skull or dissecting 
the body, but in practice it was used only in a very extraordinary cases in order to 
restore peace. 11 
Therefore, it might be considered justifiable for the Western powers to request 
extraterritoriality over Siam because they did not want their subjects to be under the 
obsolete, uncertain laws and the arbitrary practices of the absolute monarchy and 
many kinds of barbaric punishment. 
2. The Indo-Siamese Treaty of 1874 
In the north of Siam, especially Chiengmai, there was a great deal of forest 
which attracted Burmese forest concessionaires who came from British Burma. 
Therefore British influence in this region in the early 1870s was greatly increasing. 
In response, the Siamese Government sent a Special Commissioner to Chiengmai in 
1874 to guard against British intervention.12 There had been many disputes 
concerning timber rights between the Lao states in the north and the Burmese 
foresters who claimed the right of extraterritoriality, and took these cases down to the 
British Consular Court in Bangkok. In the course of the proceedings, malpractices in 
the forest concessions were revealed and the Lao princes lost eleven out of the 
twenty-one cases. But as a result of the scale of this litigation, the British 
10 Prince Damrong, Khwarmsongcham ( Memoirs), Sangkomsat Society Publisher 
(Bangkok, 1962), pp.131-132. 
11 Prince Raphi, Phraratchabanyat nai patyuban (Royal Edicts in the Present Day), 
vol. I (Bangkok, 1901), p.l. 
12 Tej Bunnag, The Provincial Administration of Siam (I 892-1915) (Kuala Lumpur, 
1977), pp.68 -69. 
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Government of India arranged the Indo-Siamese Treaty of 1874 which conceded to 
the Siamese Government responsibility for the adjudication of disputes between its 
Asian subjects without British papers and local people. 13 
The 1874 Treaty was signed between the Government of India and the 
Siamese Government at Calcutta on January 14, 1874. Its purposes, other than to 
promote commercial intercourse between British Burma and the adjoining territories 
of Chiengmai, Lakon (Nakon Lampang) and Lamphunchai (Lamphun), was to prevent 
dacoity and other serious crimes within the said territory. This was evident in article 
I of this Treaty which stipulated that the King of Siam was bound to cause the chief 
of Chiengmai to establish and maintain guard-stations on the right bank of the 
Salween River and to maintain sufficient force there. Article X which promoted 
commercial intercourse stipulated that British subjects with passport who desired to 
purchase or cut timber in the forest of the said territory had to enter into a written 
agreement for a definite period with the owner of the forest. Such agreement must 
be executed in duplicate, each party retaining a copy, and each must be sealed by one 
of the Siamese judges at Chiengmai. 14 
There was a unIque character to this treaty which by Siam regained a small 
part of its jurisdiction over British subjects in Siam in dacoity and civil cases. 
Regarding dacoity, any persons apprehended in the territory in which the dacoity had 
been committed were to be tried and punished by local courts without question as to 
their nationality. This was the first time since 1855 that the British Government 
allowed Siamese courts to try and punish British subjects in criminal cases, even 
though this authority was confined to the three northern provinces and only to 
dacoity.15 In civil cases, article V of this treaty stipulated that the King of Siam 
13 Ibid., pp.68-69. 
14 Thailand Treaty and Legal Department, op.cit., vo1.2, pp.67,84. 
15 Ibid., pp.65-66. 
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should appoint proper persons to be judges in Chiengmai, with jurisdiction: 1) to 
investigate and decide claims of British subjects against Siamese subjects in the three 
northern provinces; and 2) to investigate and determine claims of Siamese subjects 
against British subjects who had passport to enter into Siam territory from Burma. 
But this would be done only in case such British subjects consented to the jurisdiction 
of the courts; if not, the claims of the Siamese subjects should be investigated and 
decided either by the British Consul at Bangkok, or by the British officer of the 
Yoonzaleen border district of Burma. 16 As an effect of this treaty the Siamese 
Government regained a minor part of its jurisdiction over British subjects in the 
north of Siam. 
3. The appointment of a British Vice-Consul at Chiengmai 
Mr. Knox, the British Agent and Consul-General in Bangkok, wrote a letter 
to Chaophraya Phanuwong (Thuam Bunnag) the Phrakhlang or Foreign Minister, in 
November 1877, to say that the British Government wanted to appoint a resident 
British Vice-Consul at Chiengmai as a means by which the two Governments could 
give mutual assistance in the "oversight and protection" of their subjects. 17 The 
Siamese Government refused to agree to that proposal, on the ground that the 
establishment of the Vice-Consul would be a breach of the Treaty of 1874, article 
XIV of which provided that only after a period of seven years from the day that it 
b · . . d d 18 came into force would the Treaty be su Ject to reVISIOn an amen ment. The 
appointment of a Vice-Consul was not a matter included in the Treaty, and it would 
be an unfortunate precedent for every country having treaty relations with Siam. In 
response, Knox held that the British Government had the right to do as it wished, 
since the privilege of appointing Consuls and Vice-Consuls in Siam was already 
16 b'd 65 I 1 ., p. . 
17 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vo!.7 (1878), p.98. 
18 Chaophraya Phanuwong to Knox, 2 Jan.1878, PRO FO 69/94. 
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enjoyed by Germany. By virtue of article X of the Bowring Treaty which provided 
for the most-favoured-nation treatment for British subjects, the British Government 
could claim the equal privilege to appoint a Vice-Consul at Chiengmai. 19 At that 
time King Chulalongkorn consulted Si Suriyawong (Chuang Bunnag) regarding this 
matter. The latter, who was still very influential at that time, was of the opinion that 
if the British insisted upon the issue, the Siamese Government should allow them to 
appoint the Vice-Consul at Chiengmai In return for which the Siamese Government 
could also appoint Consuls in many cities in Britain.2o Therefore, the Siamese 
Government gave way to the British Government's desire to appoint a Vice-Consul 
at Chiengmai. 
4. The Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1883 
The process of appointing a Vice-Consul was delayed until, in 1883, E.B. 
Gould was appointed the Vice-Consul at Chiengmai. Prince Phichit who was In 
charge of judicial matters in the Siamese Government at that time wrote a letter to 
Phraya Ratchasamparakorn, the Siamese Commissioner at Chiengmai, advising him 
how to receive Gould.21 On 3 September 1883, the Anglo-Siamese Treaty was 
concluded at Bangkok aiming to maintain more effectual prevention of crime in the 
territories of Chiengmai, Lakon Lampang, and Lamphunchai, belonging to Siam, and 
the promotion of commercial intercourse between British Burma and these territories. 
This Treaty also abrogated the Treaty of 14 January 1874.22 
The feature of the 1883 Treaty was article VIII which created an International 
Court at Chiengmai. This article provided that: 
19 Knox to Panuwong, 7 Jan.1878, PRO FO 69/94. 
20 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vol. 7 (1878), p.l0S. 
21 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vol.16 (1883), p.278. 
22 Thailand Treaty and Legal Department, op.cit., voL2, p.8S. 
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The ~ing of .Siam will appoint a proper person or persons to be judges 
In Chlengmal. Such judges shall, subject to the limitations in this 
Tr~aty, e~ercise civil and criminal jurisdiction in all cases arising in 
Chlengmal, Lakon [Lampang], and Lampoonchai, between British 
subjects, or in which British subjects may be parties, according to 
Siamese law; provided always, that in all such cases the Consul or 
Vice-Consul shall be entitled to be present at the trial, and provided 
also, that the Consul or Vice-Consul shall have power at any time 
before judgment, if he shall think proper in the interests of justice by 
a written requisition to direct Siamese judges to transfer those cases to 
the British Consular Court at Chiengmai, and the case shall be disposed 
by the Consul or Vice-Consu1.23 
It is worth considering the reason why the British Government allowed the 
system of an International Court. The reasons probably were that: firstly, there were 
so many cases which concerned British subjects occurring in these three northern 
provinces and the British Consul at Chiengmai could not deal with all of them. 
Secondly, the Siamese judicial system was very much improved by 1883 by 
comparison with 1855. Thirdly, there were still two safeguards to protect British 
subjects. These two safeguards were : I) The British Consul or Vice-Consul at 
Chiengmai had a right of evocation which entitled him to be present at the 
International Court and could withdraw any case which concerned the British subjects 
from the International Court to be decided in the Chiengmai Consular Court by 
giving a written requisition to the Siamese judge prior to judgment. 2) These cases in 
the International Court which were decided by the Siamese judges could still be 
appealed to the Appeal Court at Bangkok which would bring these cases under review 
by the British and Siamese authorities. 24 
One interesting point IS why the Laos chao (princes) did not object to the 
Siamese Commissioners appointed to administer the 1874 and 1883 Treaties. The 
reason probably was that these chao were content with their tributary system under 
23 Ibid., p.88. . 
24 Mr. Archer to the Marquess of Lansdowne, Memorandum of the InternatIOnal 
Court at Chiengmai, 23 Aug.1902, PRO FO 422/56. 
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Siamese influence. They did not want to fall under British rule and it was possible 
that if they rejected the Siamese Commissioners the British would take them over 
from Siam. 
5. The Problems caused by Extraterritoriality 
The extraterritorial system in Siam caused tremendous problems to the Siamese 
Government. One problem was that many Chinese in Siam sought protection from 
foreign consuls by applying to be foreign subjects. When these Chinese committed 
crimes or were accused of crimes, the Siamese courts could not deal with them. This 
was evident in the case of Chin Soon, who was a Chinese in Chonburi province and 
was accused of committing a crime by forcing Mr. Bunthong to give him money 
illegally. The Siamese authorities in Chonburi prosecuted Chin Soon but the latter 
claimed that he was a Portugese subject. Chaophraya Phanuwong, after inquiries by 
the Portugese Consul, had to surrender Chin Soon to the latter.25 
The extraterritorial system undermined the Siamese administration of justice 
because a warrant for the arrest of a British subject had to be obtained from the 
consul before the Siamese authorities could proceed to effect the arrest. This 
arrangement was not practicable in case of emergency, such as smuggling of opium, 
or in cases occurring far away from the consul, such as those taking place on the 
frontiers. 26 Furthermore, the number of foreign subjects in Siam at the signing of 
the Bowring Treaty in 1855 was small. As time passed by the increasing number of 
foreign subjects, especially the British Burmese in the north, increased tremendously 
which caused more problems to the Siamese Government. All these problems forced 
the Siamese Government to attempt to terminate extraterritoriality. 
25 Chotmaihet phraratchakit rai wan, vol.16 (1883), p.287. 
26 Siamese Delegates to Balfour, 22 Feb.1919, Memorandum respecting the Revision 
of Treaty and Tariff, PRO FO 422/74 
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The regammg of mmor rights of jurisdiction m the north through the 1883 
Treaty was an encouraging step. But the Siamese Government realized that the 
system of law In Siam at that time made it impossible to regain the whole 
jurisdiction. This was apparently shown by the King's decision to send Prince 
Thewawong to Europe in 1887 to observe modern governmental systems, and when 
Thewawong came back from Europe a modern governmental system was established 
on 16 June 1888. This was the starting point of the new, modern, Ministry of 
Justice. 
Section II Prince Phichit Prichakorn's role in the development of the Siamese 
Legal System before the establishment of the Ministry of Justice 
One can divide Prince Phichit's role in this period into three stages: 
1. Prince Phichit's role before his visit to Chiengmai 
2. His role at Chiengmai 
3. His role after coming back from Chiengmai 
First of all it IS necessary to consider Prince Phichit's background. Prince 
Phichit Prichakorn was the twentieth child of King Mongkut, born on 29 October 
1855, by Chaochommanda (minor wife) Pheung. His original name was Prince 
Katkanang Yukon and Katkanang is the family name of his descendants. When he 
came of age in 1871, King Chulalongkorn sent him to supervise the construction of a 
building in the Palace, but Phichit was not interested in engineering but rather in 
law. This was the reason King Chulalongkorn sent him to practise law with 
Kromphra Thewetwatcharin, the president of the Rapsang Court in 1872. When 
King Chulalongkorn established the Privy Council in 1874, Prince Phichit was 
appointed one of the Privy Councillors. A t that time Phichit was nineteen and had 
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adequate legal knowledge so the King appointed him a judge in the Rapsang Court to 
deal with cases from 1874. At this Court he gained considerable experience especially 
in procedural law.27 
1. Phichit's role before his visit to Chiengmai 
Prince Phichit's role in the Siamese legal system before his appointment to 
Chiengmai can be sub-divided into three aspects: 
a) his role in the Dika Court 
b) his role in general judicial administration 
c) his role in the Phaeng Klang and Phaeng Kasem Courts (both civil courts) 
a) Prince Phichit's role in the Dika Court 
Evidence from the King's Diary of 1876 indicates clearly that the Dika Court 
was first established in 1876, when Prince Phichit submitted the law of the 
establishment of the Dika Court, which regulated judges, secretaries and other Dika 
Court officials to the King. 28 The reason for the establishment of this court was 
probably that the King was overloaded with Dika cases. It was the custom of the 
Siamese judicial system that the people could present their cases to the king because 
the king was the sovereign who was responsible for all cases in the country. King 
Chulalongkorn could not deal with all these cases by himself; therefore, he set up the 
Dika Court and appointed an athibodi to be responsible for these cases instead of him. 
The reason for the King appointing Prince Phichit as the first athibodi was probably 
that Phichit was the only brother of the King who, at that time, had adequate 
27 Prince Damrong, "Phra prawat phrachao Boromwongter Kromluang Phichit 
Prichakorn" (the Biography of Prince Phichit), printed in Prachum 
phraratchanipon Kro~luang Phichit Prichakorn (The Poety o~ P~i~ce .Phichit), 
printed in the crematIOn volume of i~! om Soun Katkanang, PhIchIt s wIfe, 
(Bangkok, 1950), pp.(8)-( I 0). 
28 Chotmaihet ohraratchakit raiwan, vo1.1 (1876), p.52. 
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knowledge of the Siamese judicial system. King Chulalongkorn's Diaries show 
conclusively that the King had already put Prince Phichit in charge of the Dika Court 
when Kromkhun Bodin submitted the dika of a Mr. Sun to the King. The latter 
ordered Kromkhun Bodin to submit it to Prince Phichit because it was a dika case. 29 
Moreover, the King's Diaries indicate that Phichit had already decided dika 
cases very frequently, for instance in the first half of King Chulalongkorn's Diary 
volume 2 in 1877, Prince Phichit decided dika cases almost every other day. Besides, 
King Chulalongkorn's Diaries state that Phichit submitted the monthly reports of dika 
cases to the King. 3o 
The King also sent Prince Chumphon, another of his half-brothers, to be 
trained by Prince Phichit in the Dika Court. Phichit was in charge of the Dika Court 
up to 1883. By the end of 1883, the King ordered Prince Sirit~t, another half-
brother, to help Prince Phichit in the Dika Court as the King wanted Phichit to go 
and deal with the problems in Chiengmai and leave the Dika Court in the hands of 
Prince Sirithat.31 
b) Prince Phichit's role in general judicial administration 
Apart from his responsibility in the Dika Court, one can say that Prince 
Phichit was also the chief legal adviser of King Chulalongkorn as is clearly 
demonstrated in the King's Diaries. When the King had any problems about issues of 
law, he always consulted Prince Phichit. This was evident in the case of a Mr. Sung 
who accused a Mr. Sawat about which Chaophraya Surawong consulted the King; the 
29 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vol.2 (1877), p.19. 
30 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vol.2 (1877) pp.32-33; vol.3 (I877) p.49, vol.4 
(1877) p.2S; vol.7 (1878~ p.2?4. 
31 Chotmaihet phraratchaklt ralwan, vol.16 (1883), p.12S. 
82 
latter asked Phichit to check the law In this case.32 Occasionally, during this period, 
Prince Phichit was in charge of the Rapsang Court, which was a court set up by the 
King to deal with one particular case or cases, as he reported the statistics of cases in 
this Court.33 
Prince Phichit was also in charge of drafting law. This was evident in 1877 
when he drafted the Evidence Act and submitted it to the King.34 In some cases the 
King asked Phichit to investigate the persons concerned, for instance, in the case of a 
Mr. Yeun, the King asked Prince Phichit to check the facts with Phra Suriyaphakdi 
in order to reach a decision. 35 Prince Phichit was so close a legal adviser to the King 
that he was almost totally occupied by court cases. On one occasion, he had gone on 
a river trip up to Bangkhen, to the north of Bangkok, when the King wanted him in 
audience urgently to consult him about one case. The King was furious when he 
realized that Prince Phichit had gone away on a holiday without his permission, so he 
sent someone to get him back and threatened to confine him to the Palace, but as he 
wanted to consult with him, he abandoned the confinement.36 
There was a case of Chin Tunmabun, a British subject, who was required to 
repay his debt to Phraya Phuket, but the former argued that the debt had already 
been repaid by him and he had some counterclaims. The judge in Phuket gave a 
decision, summarily without a presentation of evidence, in favour of Phraya Phuket. 
Chin Tunmabun asked for the British Consul-General, F.G. Palgrave's , protection 
and the latter demanded a retria!. Prince Phichit advised the King to sent Phraya 
Arnulakyota as Commissioner to Phuket to deal with this case. 37 
32 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vo!.l (1876), p.68. 
33 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vol.3 (1877), p.8. 
34 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, volA (1877), pA. 
35 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vol. 7 (1878), p.254. 
36 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vol.13 (1882), pA9. 
37 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vol.16 (1883), pp.15-16 and pp.137,143. 
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Moreover, the King trusted Prince Phichit and awarded him the very 
important responsibility of checking the qualifications and behaviour of the persons 
who applied for the position of tralakarn (judges), as when a Mr. Ju applied for this 
position, and Prince Phichit examined his knowledge of law. 38 The King also 
consulted Phichit about a letter of British Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, 
submitted by the British Consul regarding the case of Mr. Cox and Phrachao 
Chiengmai (the Prince of Chiengmai) asking for a retrial. Lord Granville knew that 
Prince Phichit was going up to Chiengmai so he expected that the case would be 
settled soon. He also asked Prince Phichit to investigate Mongkai and Phrachao 
Chiengmai's agent, the witnesses of the case, who were at Bangkok.39 
Prince Phichit was also in charge of the drafting of the law of the abolition of 
slavery at that time. This Act was Phraratchabanyat phikat krasian ayu lukthat 
lukthai (the Act for determination of the value of slaves' children) of 21 August 
1874. This Act provided that slaves' children born since 1868, the year in which the 
King came to the throne, were to be subject to a new formula for calculating their 
value. Consequently, they lost all their worth at 21 years of age and became 
completely free. 4o 
The King also consulted Prince Phichit about the cases from Chiengmai, for 
instance when Mr. Palgrave, the British Consul-General, came to the King about the 
case of Mong Guna who had accused Nan-aut and Noi Mahachai of stealing 
elephants. The King sent Prince Phichit to explain the details of this case to Mr. 
Palgrave. 41 Subsequently, the King wrote a letter of October 1883 to Phraya 
38 ·d 48 Ibl ., p. . 
39 Ibid., p.289. 
40 Prachoom Chomchai, Chulalongkorn the Great (Tokyo, 1965), p.61. 
41 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vol.9, pp.87,90. 
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Ratchasamparakorn in Chiengmai to advise him to consult privately with Prince 
Phichit in any cases concerned with foreign subjects. 42 When Mr. Gould was sent up 
to Chiengmai as the British Vice-Consul there, Prince Phichit wrote a letter of March 
1884 to Phraya Ratchasamparakorn advising him how to receive and deal with the 
British Vice-Consu!.43 This probably was one reason for the King's subsequent 
decision to send Prince Phichit as a Special Commissioner to Chiengmai to deal with 
its problems at the beginning of 1884. 
c) Prince Phichit's role in the Phaeng Klang and the Phaeng Kasem Courts 
Prince Damrong wrote in his biography of Prince Phichit that Phichit was 
responsible for the Phaeng Court when he drafted the Act for the abolition of slavery 
in 1874. Therefore, one can conclude that Prince Phichit was responsible for the 
Phaeng Klang and Phaeng Kasem Courts from 1874. Subsequently, the King wrote a 
letter of September 1877 to Phichit asking him to enforce cases in both civil courts. 
Later Prince Phichit drafted the regulations for these two civil courts and submitted 
them to the King for consideration and the King gave his permISSIOn to Prince 
Phichit to implement the regulation of these two civil courts in September 1877.44 
Prince Phichit, as the athibodi or Chief Judge of these two civil courts, reported the 
statistics of cases in both courts to the King.45 Subsequently, probably because of his 
heavy load of responsibilities, Prince Phichit delegated his responsibility in the 
Phaeng Klang and the Phaeng Kasem Courts to Phra Kasem and Luang Thepthada 
respectively, in 1878, but both remained still under Prince Phichit's supervision.
46 
42 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vo1.14 (1883), p.172. 
43 Chotmaihet phraratchakit rai wan, vo1.16 (1883), p.287. 
44 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vo!.3 (1877), pp.81,90 
45 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vo1.3 (1877), p.90, vol.4 (1877), p.25, vo!.7 
(1878), p.234. 
46 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vo1.7 (1878), p.24. 
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2. Prince Phichit's role at Chiengmai 
It is necessary, first of all, to consider why the King sent Phichit to 
Chiengmai. In the King's letter of February 1884 to Chao/a Prince Mahamala, his 
uncle, he stated clearly that: 
I have considered that your trip to organize the system in the Laos 
state will take about two or three years. Therefore, I would postpone 
your mission for a year and send someone to pave the way for you in 
order to enable you to organize it more easily. It is difficult to select 
a suitable person to go there because he should be a person who knows 
the Government system and at the same time should be respected by 
the Lao people. 
I have carefully considered whether Prince Phichit Prichakorn has 
considerable knowledge in Government work and is clever in 
corresponding. He is also trustworthy and has considerable knowledge 
in the Siamese legal system and the law concerning foreign subjects. 
Besides, he knows the customs and is cautious and considerate. His 
mission, even if not successful, will obtain much information about the 
Laos state which will be useful for your future mission. Moreover, the 
Laos people will give more respect to the Prince than a government 
official. I told him of this idea two days ago. He complained that it 
is a big job and asked for time to think it over. He came to see me 
today and agreed to go to Chiengmai.47 
This indicates the King's plan for Prince Phichit's mission as a mission to pave 
the way for Chao/a Prince Mahamala, the King's uncle, and how the King did not 
expect much success from it because he knew that it was a very difficult job and 
should take many years to fulfil. And Prince Mahamala also wrote a letter of April 
1884 to Prince Phichit stating that this mission was a very difficult one and it was 
more difficult than fighting in the battle field. 48 
In his "Chiengmai and the Inception of an Administrative Centralization Policy 
in Siam", Dr. Brailey states about Prince Phichit's mission that: 
47 Thailand National Archives, Nangsue Chut piset (The Record Book of the Royal 
Secretary), vo1.25, pp.31-32. 
48 Ibid., vo1.26, p.99. 
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The choice of Ph ichit indicated perhaps how the enthusiasms of the 
next "young Siam" group had already been unleashed in the course of 
the struggle to displace the Bunnags. But Chulalongkorn's dominant 
concern, undoubtedly, was to ensure adequately easy relations between 
the British Vice-Consul and the Lao Chao, but to prevent them 
becoming too intimate.49 
This is probably true because the King knew that the British influence in the north 
was increasing and he wanted to send one of his trusted supporters to keep an eye on 
the British and prevent any step to take over the Lao state. 
What did the King want Prince Phichit to do at Chiengmai? The King's 
desire appeared in Phichit's letter of June 1884. In his letter Prince Phichit 
responded to the King's suggestions and explained his plan according to King 
Chulalongkorn's desire that: 
Firstly, about the teak conceSSIOn, he would organIze the system of the teak 
concessions and make the system efficient for the benefit of the Government by: (1) 
levying the timber tax at the standard rate; (2) calculating the number of the forests 
and issuing laws to force the owners of the forests to register with the Government; 
(3) using the standard form of contract between the owners and the concessionaires in 
order to reduce conflict. 
Secondly, in the establishment of the International Court, Prince Phichit 
planned to separate the judges from the Commissioners by setting up a group of 
judges to deal with cases only, and they were not to be Commissioners or government 
official. The correspondence with the foreign consul was the duty of the 
Commissioner who would deal with politics and administration only. Phichit also 
planned to draft a new law of procedure by adopting the English law adjusted to the 
Lao custom with the consent of the Lao Chaos and the Consul. Thirdly, Phichit 
49 N.J. Brailey, "Chiengmai and the Inception of an Administrative Centralization 
Policy in Siam", Kyoto Southeast Asia Studies, vol.ll, No.4, March 1974, p.45l. 
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planned the adjustment of the tax system by applying the Siamese tax system, and 
fourthly, the establishment of security forces in the area.50 
This outline shows Prince Phichit's ideas for the separation of court procedure 
and judge's powers from the Government administration because his legal experience 
indicated that government officials could influence court procedure and if the 
Commissioner was the judge at the same time, it could cause unjustice. 
Prince Phichit's mission In Chiengmai proved to be unsuccessful. He was 
faced with many difficulties over the International Court because he could not keep 
the British subjects and the Lao people on good terms. But at least he could establish 
a good International Court system which proved to work satisfactorily after he left. 
His expansionist border policy involving an attempt to extend the effective frontier 
of Western Laos right up to the Salween River in the West and Northwest at the 
expense of Kengtung and other Shan states had eventually to be halted as a result of 
British diplomatic pressure in Bangkok. 51 His policy of increasing the Bangkok share 
of the royalty of teak-cutting, by requiring the forest-owners to register their forests 
with the Government in order to culculate the amount of teak-cutting, encouraged 
the connivance of the local Lao officialdom in the non-registration of cut timber. 52 
The serious incident which caused King Chulalongkorn to recall Prince Phichit 
to Bangkok was the slave case of Imung. One of Phrachao Inthanon of Chiengmai's 
relatives attempted to repossess Imung the Lao, freed slave wife of a British Asian 
subject. Vice-Consul Gould protested to Phichit on her behalf, but gaining no 
immediate satisfaction, broke into Inthanon's palace. Inthanon protested to Bangkok 
both of Gould's behaviour and Phichit's general uncooperativeness. This case put a 
50 Thailand National Archives, Nangsue chut piset, op.cit., vo1.26, pp.94-95. 
51 N.J. Brailey, op.cit., p.~54. 
52 Ibid., p.453. 
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real blight on the rest of Phichit's Commissionership. It was around October _ 
November 1884 that Bangkok began to put a definite brake on most of his activities, 
and in early 1885, the King decided to order his return to the capital after June. 53 
These problems proved to be very difficult for the Siamese Government to 
deal with as Phraya Montri Suriyawong (Cheun Bunnag), the next Commissioner, did 
not risk any step to undermine the internal authority of the local Lao hierarchies. 54 
Actually it was not Phichit's fault, but it was the nature of the three parties Siamese, 
British and Lao, that they each tried to pursue their own interests. 
3. Prince Phichit's role after his Chiengmai mISSIOn 
Phichit's mISSIOn to Chiengmai seems to have prove proved the truth of the 
belief among the Princes that going far away from Bangkok caused the disfavour of 
the King. As the British tutor R.L. Morant indicated in his 1894 memorandum, "All 
the King's half-brothers are always jealous of each other and are always waiting to 
rejoice in and profit by one another's falls".55 
Prince Phichit came back from Chiengmai not even successful there but 
without disgrace because the King himself did not expect success in such a difficult 
job. Phichit resumed his duty as a Privy Councillor. There is no evidence to 
indicate whether Phichit resumed his presidency III the Dika, Phaeng Klang and 
Phaeng Kasem Courts, but he was still responsible as judge in the rapsang Court as 
evidenced by the King's letter of 19 June 1891 to Phichit, by which time he had been 
sent as royal commission to Ubon, which stated that Phichit's verdict in the case of a 
53 Ibid., pp.454-455. 
54 Ibid., p.455. 
55 N.J. Brailey, Two Views of Siam on the Eve of the Chakri Reformation 
(Singapore, 1989), p.98. 
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robbery at Chonburi was correct according to the law and ordered punishment of the 
robbers according to Phichit's opinion. 56 
Prince Phichit worked closely with Satow, the British Consul-General and 
then Minister, on many occasions. In his diary, Satow recorded commenting about 
Prince Phichit to Prince Thewawong, on 25 February 1885, that Phichit was a capable 
judge and should be appointed to the post of the Lord Chief Justice of Siam.57 
After his mission to Chiengmai, Phichit still played a large role III the 
development of the Siamese legal system as following: 
Firstly, he wrote an essay called Thammasan Winitchai (A Consideration of 
Justice) in 1885, which exemplifies the transition from the traditional Siamese and 
Indian legal theory to newer ideas which were influenced by Western thought. He 
explained that the King could enact laws based upon four thamma (the right 
conscience): (I) The providing of food and sustenance; (2) The creation of plenty or 
abundance provided for time of war or famine; (3) Equality and fair treatment; (4) 
Peacefulness and protection from danger. 58 
Prince Phichit's theory explained that the broad absolute power of the King 
should be limited by these thamma in order to confer provisions or food supply, 
equal treatment under law, and protection to the Siamese people. Phichit's essay 
might have caused some dissatisfaction to King Chulalongkorn because he suggested 
56 Thailand Fine Arts Department, Prachum ratchahattha leka (The King's letters), 
vol.l, p.231. 
57 Satow's Diaries, PRO FO 30/33/15/7. Satow was a barrister of Lincoln's Inn, 
which was why he was interested in Siam's legal system and Prince Phichit. 
58 D.M. Engel, Law and Kingship in Thailand during the Reign of King 
Chulalongkorn (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1975), p.l0. 
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limiting the absolute power of the King which he had only just gained after the 
death of Somdet Chaophraya Sisuriyawong in 1883. 
Secondly, Prince Phichit was the first person to propose the plan for the 
establishment of the Ministry of Justice. He was of the opinion that the courts in 
every Ministry or Department should be abolished and the newly established Ministry 
of Justice would take over their duties to handle all cases in Bangkok and its 
suburbs.59 All the Ministers objected to his ideas on the ground that it was not a 
suitable time for them. The real reason for their objection probably was they did not 
want to change the system because they benefited from it and doubtless this was also 
the reason not only why nobody liked the idea of a Ministry of Justice, but why 
nobody thought of it before. Unfortunately, Phichit's full report disappeared so it is 
impossible to investigate thoroughly his idea of a Ministry of Justice. 
Thirdly, Prince Phichit was dissatisfied with the King and Thewawong's 
inactivity as he criticized them to Satow in April 1886: 
He said they could not get the King to surrender any part of his 
authority: he is the legislature. Told him how Russia had been ruined 
in the Napoleonic wars by the system of so-called Cabinet Ministers, 
whereas there was no real cabinet, but only Ministers reporting to the 
King separately. 
Phichit says that he is disappointed. The King does not show the same 
appetite for reform that he had expected. The death of the Regent 
and the Second King had removed all obstacle, and yet no progress is 
made. Thewawong had done nothing towards abolition of force 
service, which Phichit thinks very important, especially in the Eastern 
Laos states or provinces where 4 ticals a year has to be paid by the 
able- bodied men as a penalty for the rebellion of Vientiane 50 years 
ago. In face of France it is necessary to reform the condition of those 
. 60 provInces. 
59 Phichit to King, no date, NA R5 Ky 1/9. Also see Satow's views of Phichit in 
Satow Diaries, 13 Sep.1885, PRO 30/33/15/9. 
60 N.J. Brailey, "Chiengmai and the Inception", op.cit., p.456. 
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According to Prince Phichit's role stated above, one can judge that he was the 
most capable Prince among the brothers of the King with respect to the Siamese legal 
system. But his relations with the King and Thewawong became aggravated. The 
King probably disliked him because of the radical ideas he displayed in the 
Thammasan Winitchai or "A Consideration of Justice" and his criticism of the King's 
inactivity to Satow might actually have been reported back to the King some way. 
Thewawong probably hated Phichit because of Phichit's criticism of his inactivity, 
and probably he was jealous of Phichit and every other Prince who played a great 
role in Government office. Thewawong was a conceited person, always thinking of 
himself as more important than all his brothers except the King. This is evident by 
his conversation with Satow on 24 April 1887, when he said that: 
In the last twenty years, no one but the King had taken any interest in 
judicial matter, and how could he do anything if he had not a Minister 
to execute his wishes.61 
Thewawong made this unfair comment to Satow despite the fact that he was 10 full 
knowledge of both Phichit's role in the development of the Siamese legal system and 
Satow's comment two years earlier to him that Phichit should be appointed the Lord 
Chief Justice of Siam. 
Another incident which worsened the relationship between Prince Phichit and 
King Chulalongkorn was Phichit's novel "Sanuk Nuk" which he wrote 10 Wachirayan 
Wiset, the maxgazine of the Wachirayan Library, of which he was the chairman. 
Apart from his knowledge of law, Prince Phichit was also a famous poet of his time. 
He attempted to imitate Western-style writing, and the novel form, to which Siamese 
people at that time were not accustomed. He wrote a novel "San uk Nuk" which was a 
story set in Bowonniwet temple where the Prince-monk Pawaret, the King's uncle 
and senior monk of the Thammayutnikai royalist sect, was the abbot. The latter, 
61 Satow's Diaries, PRO FO 30/33/15/ J J. 
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being unfamiliar with such a style of writing, must have felt offended, thinking that 
the writer intended to create a scandal about the monastery for which he was 
responsible. He was so much upset that he contemplated resigning from his post. In 
response to this affair, King Chulalongkorn wrote letters to Prince monk Pawaret and 
Wachirayan to express his anger towards Prince Phichit that: 
When I knew that the story upset your Highness a great deal, I was 
very worried, for your Highness is old and might come to fall ill ... I, 
therefore, have felt very angry with Kromluang Phichit [Prince 
Phichit].62 
Section III The Petition of 1885 and its Consequence 
The content of the petition of 1885 has been illustrated in chapter 1, therefore 
this section is designed to investigate the consequences of the petition. The legal 
implications of this petition were very important because a constitutional monarchy 
would give more rights to the people and every citizen would have the same rights 
and would be under the same laws. People would have freedom of speech, public 
meeting and free press which never existed in Siamese society before. But the whole 
idea failed because the King declined to follow the suggestions of the petitioners on 
the grounds that it would cause strong opposition among certain groups within the 
Siamese Government. His explanation of how difficult it had been for him to gain 
full power from Sisuriyawong implied that he did not want to lose this power again 
when he had had it for only a few years. 
The King was furious with all the petitioners. Most of them were called back 
from London and Paris to Bangkok. All of the senior Princes managed to escape by 
putting the blame on Prince Prisdang the King's cousin. This was evident In 
62 Wibha Senanan, Genesis of the Thai Novel, (Bangkok, 1975), pp.120-124, 
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Prisdang's letter, of 13 December 1890, after his exile at Saigon, to Phra Satjaphirom, 
one of his friends. He says in his letter that: 
I am in great difficulties because of many of my best friends Princes 
Thewawong, Sawat, and Phraya Surasak who together with me ten 
years ago took the oath of allegiance, when we had the idea to submit 
a petition to the King in order to save the country from the Western 
powers, and signed our names together to propose a constitutional 
monarchy system. The King was furious, and accused us as of a 
radical idea. My friends managed to escape by putting the blame on 
me. When I came back from Europe, the King gave me a job in 
pu blic works. I tried to organize a good system and develop as a 
department. When I was about to fulfil this, Prince Sawat, my devoted 
friend, showed my private letter to him to the King. The Kin§ was 
more furious and issued orders to take away my land and salary.6 
King Chulalongkorn never forgave Prtisdang and later he went into exile. 
During his exile, his house and all his property and servants were confiscated without 
any reason being openly given or accusation made. When the French Consul asked on 
his behalf if he had done anything wrong, the reply was that he had done no wrong 
but gone mad and run away with a widow. 64 This incident indicates the arbitrary 
practice of the Siamese Government at this time. 
Pritsdang was in exile for all the rest of King Chulalongkorn's reign and only 
came back to Siam in the sixth reign (1910-1925). 
One very important question IS, was the King really interested In legal 
change? The King replied to the petitioners that he agreed with them but any 
change would be strongly opposed by certain groups in the Siamese Government. 
These groups were in a position to limit the extent and success of any reforms which 
the King might wish to undertake. Was the reply a genuine answer or only an 
excuse? One has to look into the situation at that time, in 1885. The ex-regent, 
Sisuriyawong, had died, Chaophraya Phanuwong, Sisuriyawong's brother, had resigned 
63 Pritsdang to Phra Satjaphirom, 13 Dec.1890, NA R5 Kt 6.26/2. 
64 N.J. Brailey, Two Views of Siam, op.cit., p.59. . 
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In 1885 and been replaced by Thewawong. But there still might be other 
conservatives who would cause problems if the King changed the Governmental 
system. Therefore, the King might have been right, but subsequently, in 1888, the 
King did establish a set of funtionally-organized ministries according to the Western 
style as observed by Thewawong on his trip to Europe. The cabinet comprised nine 
of the King's half-brothers and three other strong supporters. At this point, the 
situation was ripe for the King to change anything he desired because there should 
not have been any problem owing to his absolute control of the Government. But 
King Chulalongkorn did not take any step to change any fundamental law or aspect 
of the governmental system. On the contrary, he still carried on with a virtual 
puppet cabinet under the absolute monarchy. This raises the question whether the 
King did not want to give a constitution to the people because he wanted to keep his 
absolute power as long as possible, or he considered that it was not the right time to 
do that as the Siamese people were not ready for a constitutional system. It is 
difficult to discover for certain King Chulalongkorn's attitude on this point. The 
King took a step in upgrading the educational system in Siam by appointing Prince 
Damrong as the Minister of Public Instruction in charge of education in June 1888. 
But even at the end of his reign In 1910, when the situation of Siam in every aspect 
was very much improved, the King still did not show any sign of surrendering his 
absolute power. 
Section IV The Establishment of the Ministry of Justice and the Role of 
Prince Sawat as the first Minister 
The Ministry of Justice was established informally, at the same time as the 
other nine new ministries, in June 1888, according to the plan which King 
Chulalongkorn devised after Thewawong returned from observing the Governmental 
systems in Europe in 1887. A t that time there were three persons whose 
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qualifications at least adequately suited the post of the Minister of Justice; VIZ. 
Princes Phichit, Sawat, and Sirithat. 
Prince Sawat was a son of King Mongkut by Chaochom manda (minor wife) 
Piam. He was a full brother to Thewawong and three of the King's four chief 
Queens, one by now deceased. He had been in the first group of Siamese students 
who were sent to study in England in the early 1880s. Indeed, Prince Sawat was the 
only brother of King Chulalongkorn who was ever sent to be educated abroad. The 
King stated the reason for sending him to study in England in his diary as follows: 
Prince Sawat is a clever young man but untidy and hot-tempered. If 
he is stays in Siam, he might cause problems. Therefore, we should 
send him to study in England. Write to Phra Siamturapa to send him 
the same amount of money as Prisdang.65 
Prince Sawat eventually studied law at Balliol College, Oxford University. He studied 
law, like the English nobility, for no degree. He finished his study and came back to 
Siam in 1886. 
The King evidently disliked Prince Phichit because of his radical ideas and 
therefore he did not want to appoint him as the Minister of Justice, even though his 
experience in the Siamese legal system was greater than all other Princes. Prince 
Phichit's ability in the Siamese legal system was also recognized by Ernest Satow, the 
British Min ister Resident in Bangkok, as he noted in his diary of 13 September 1885, 
in which he suggested that the proper post of Prince Phichit was the Minister of 
Justice, to organize the judicial system, and look after the personel [sic]. Even 
though at that time the Ministry of Justice had not been established.66 
65 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vol.12 (1880), p.27. It is noticeable that he was 
to get the same financial support as Prince Prisdang even though the latter was a 
Siamese diplomat and the former was only a student. 
66 Satow's Diaries, 13 Sep.1885, PRO 30/33/15/9. 
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Satow made this suggestion in response to Prince Phichit's ideas about a new 
judicial system with trained staff. Phichit said that: 
~ifficulty of a new system would be in getting men; all [existing] 
Judges belonged to a school which was governed by tradition. Young 
men the only ones for reform. Old people had laid out too much 
money on their attempts to care about innovations.67 
Without Prince Phichit, the King was left with only two choices, VLZ. Princes 
Sawat and Sirithat. Prince Siritat was a traditional Siamese lawyer albeit trained by 
Prince Phichit, and therefore, was in a less favourable position than Prince Sawat who 
had studied law in England. Apart from that, Sawat was also a full brother to two of 
the King's chief Queens as well as the Foreign Minister and chief minister Prince 
Thewawong. His close relationship with the King's family was also evident when 
Prince Chao/a Tripetcharut, one of the King's Chao/a sons by Queen Sawang, when 
he was ill stayed at Prince Sawat's palace until he died. 68 Thus, Prince Sawat was 
appointed the first Minister of Justice in June 1888. 
The proclamation of the establishment of the Ministry of Justice like the other 
Ministries was only formally published on 25 March 1892. It explained as the reason 
for the establishment of the Ministry that the people faced inconvenience and 
problems because of various different courts scattered among many Ministries and 
Departments with overlapping jurisdiction and uncertain lines of authority and 
supervision.69 At that time there was a commoner, Luang Ratana Yati (Pleng 
Wepara), who won a King's scholarship to study law in England, and graduated 
Barrister from the Middle Temple, also qualified for the Minister of Justice because 
he was knowledgeable in both English and Siamese laws as he was trained by Prince 
Phichit in traditional Siamese law before he won a King scholarship.70 Of course he 
67 Ibid., same date. 
68 Chotmaihet phraratchakit raiwan, vol.24 (I887), p.120. 
69 Ratchakit janu beksa (Thai Government Gazette), vo1.9 (I892), pp.9-10. 
70 His role and biography will be illustrated in depth in chapter 9. 
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was not considered either, and Prince Sawat was formally appointed the Minister of 
Justice on I April 1892 because he was a Prince of the royal blood, and therefore, in 
a much better position than a commoner. 
The essence of the proclamation was: firstly, the Ministry of Justice was to be 
responsible for facilitating business and removing obstacles and administering the 
procedure in courts to ensure justice in the decisions of the courts. Secondly, the 
various courts in each ministry which amounted to sixteen courts were abolished and 
there were to be now only seven courts in existence. The seven courts were: the Dika 
Court (Royal Appeals Court); the People's Appeals Court; the Phra Ratcha-arya Court 
(Criminal Court); the Phaeng Klang and Phaeng Kasem Courts (both were Civil 
Courts); the Sanphakorn Court (Revenue Court); and the International Court. An 
athibodi (chief judge) was appointed in each court to supervise the trial process. The 
practice of sending the case out of court to a separate tralakarn court in a different 
ministry was eliminated. Each case was to be supervised from the beginning to end 
by the athibodi of the court in which it was brought. Thirdly, the Krom Rapphong 
(the office to receive plaints), was established in the Ministry of Justice to receive 
cases from the people and channel them to the appropriate court. This abolished the 
practice of submitting cases through influential government officials.71 
The transferring of the Dika Court (Royal Appeals Court) under the control 
of Ministry of Justice was probably to relieve the King from the burden of dika 
cases. The new Dika Court was intended to receive cases from the Court of the First 
Instance when afarty was not satisfied with the decision. From now on, the dika 
petition could be submitted to the King only when there was an accusation that the 
judges or the Minister of Justice were prejudiced in performing their duties.72 
71 Ratchakit janu beksa (Thai Government Gazette), op.cit., vol.9 (1892), pp.9-12. 
72 For the petition of dika also see Pritsdang comments in N.J. Brailey, Two Views of 
Siam, op.cit., pp.73-74 
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Prince Sawat's role as the Minister of Justice 
During his office In the Ministry of Justice, Prince Sawat introduced several 
new laws as follows: 
I) The most important law during Prince Sawat's period of office was the 
Court Organization Act 1893. This Act established a new criminal court called 
Ratchathanphichet Court (Penitentiary Court) to divert half of the cases from the Phra 
Ratcha-arya Court which was overloaded by criminal cases. Moreover, this Act 
merged the two Appeals Courts together to be called the People Appeals Court. 
Consequently, the Dika Court which had been transferred from the King's control in 
March 1892, was transferred back to the King's control again. 73 
2) Prince Sawat also established the Porispha Court (Court of Petty Offences) 
In 1893 in order to deal with petty cases where the punishment could not exceed fifty 
floggings, six months imprisonment, or a fine of more than 160 ticals. This court 
was well established and helped to divert petty cases from the Phra Ratcha-arya 
Court. The work of this court expanded considerably when Prince Phichit was the 
Minister of Justice as will be illustrated in depth in chapter 6. 
3) Prince Sawat also introduced several unimportant laws such as: The Act 
requiring the plaintiff to take an oath before suit 1892; The Pinai Luang Act (The 
Fine Act) 1892; The Min istry of Justice's regulation for copying records 1892. Prince 
Sawat himself probably knew that Prince Phichit was more suitable for the post of 
the Minister of Justice than himself as he wrote a letter, dated 13 December 1892, to 
73 PKPS Prachum Kotmai Pracham Sok (Annual Collection of Thai Decrees), vol.13, 
p.180. 
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the King, when he was already Minister of Justice, and there was no one in charge of 
the Phra Ratcha-arya Court which was overloaded with unsettled cases. Sawat wrote 
that: 
Honestly, I am not enamoured of the posItIOn of the Minister of 
Justice. I do not mind if Your Majesty would put me in charge of the 
Phra Ratcha-arya Court and appoint Prince Phichit as Minister of 
Justice because I am worried about the Government's effectiveness 
more than my personal benefit. 74 
But the King wanted Sawat to carryon with his post. Despite the extreme shortage of 
staff in the Ministry of Justice, Prince Sawat failed to initiate any important project 
for the training of the staff. 
It IS worth considering why Prince Sawat was sent to Europe in 1893, and 
therefore had to resign as Minister of Justice. According to R.L. Morant's 
memorandum, most of the King's half brothers were jealous and distrustful, and 
competed fiercely with each other. This had considerable consequences in the 
emergency of the Paknam incident in July 1893, because it prevented any joint action 
of the cabinet, and therefore the cabinet was hopeless and could not respond to 
French aggression. 
Morant further stated in h is memorandum that: 
Prince Sawat was the member [of the cabinet] who caused the most 
dissension and the worst scenes in the Council; indeed his tones and 
action in the council-room became in time so gross as to absolutely 
terrorise his brothers into the wildest plans; and he latterly took to 
behaving in such a fashion as to make any courteous interchange of 
opinion impossible during his presence at the table... However, the 
tension was at last slightly relieved by his being persuaded to take 
himself out of the country in August under the pretext of an 
important "Diplomatic Mission" to France, to the immense relief of the 
. .... 75 KIng and the remaInIng mInIsters. 
74 Sawat to King, 13 Dec.1892, NA R5 Ky 3/1. . 
75 Brailey, Two Views of Siam on the Eve of the Chakri ReformatIOn, (Arran, 
Edinburgh, 1989), p.90, and also see Pritsdang's views of Sawat, same book, p.79. 
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It was no misfortune for Siam when Sawat left the country because the period 
of his office in the Ministry of Justice had little improved the Ministry. This gave a 
chance to Prince Phichit who was the only choice for the King as Sawat's replacement 
after the Paknam incident. 
Conclusion 
The unequal treaties signed during the Reign of King Mongkut (Rama IV) 
caused Siam to lose its autonomy in legal jurisdiction and revenue. The basis upon 
which the Western powers imposed unequal treaties upon Siam was that Siam's legal 
system was obsolete, unsystematic and uncertain. This was probably true as Siam's 
administration of justice was still under direct influence from the executive power 
and the Law of Three Seals, which as applied in Siam at that time, was obsolete. By 
the provision of the Indo-Siamese Treaty of 1874, the British Government of India 
allowed the Siamese courts to try and punish British subjects in the three northern 
provinces of Chiengmai, Lakon, and Lumphunchai for dacoity, but in civil cases the 
Siamese court could try cases if British subjects consented to the Siamese jurisdiction. 
By the provisions of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1883, the International Court 
system was established by the Siamese Government in the same three northern 
provinces to try British su bjects according to Siamese law, but the British Consul or 
Vice-Consul had a right to withdraw those cases for decision in the Consular Court. 
Prince Phichit Prichakorn was the most knowledgeable traditional Siamese 
lawyer, who was also instrumental in reforming the traditional Siamese legal system 
and who initially was also chief legal adviser to King Chulalongkorn. Prince Phichit's 
departure for Ch iengmai to organ ize the northern provinces' administration reduced 
his influence over the King dramatically. His relationship with the King became 
aggravated when on his return he started criticizing the King's inactivity and 
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expressing radical ideas to curb the King's absolute power. This deprived him of the 
chance of being appointed the first Minister of Justice, the most suitable job for him. 
Prince Sawat, who had no experience in the Siamese legal system, was appointed 
instead, and because of his inexperience, he did little to develop the Ministry of 
Justice. The Paknam incident was partly the consequence of an unsuccessful cabinet 
of ministers and King Ch ulalongkorn realized that he needed to change his Minister 
of Justice. 
PART TWO 
THE IMPACT OF THE WEST AND THE CHAKRI REFORMATION 
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Chapter 4 Siam and the Climax of Western Imperialism 
Section I Background of Siam's Foreign Relations before the Paknam Incident 
Before the Paknam incident of 1893, the relationship between Siam and 
Britain was substantially based on trade. Thus the statistics submitted by the London 
Chamber of Commerce to the Earl of Rosebery, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, on 24 May 1893, showed that the percentages of British trade with Siam 
were ninety-three per cent of the total imports, and eighty-five per cent of the total 
exports, while the percentage of French trade was only about 0.3 per cent of the 
total. 1 The British interest in Siam was concentrated on tin mines in the Malay 
Peninsula and the teak forests in the north of Siam. The Siamese Government at that 
time allowed the British trade to grow increasingly because it doubted that Britain 
was interested in annexing Siam, therefore, increasing the British interest would 
probably safeguard Siam from French colonization. But the Paknam crisis indicated 
clearly that so long as the British interest was not affected, Britain would not assist 
Siam to fight the French. As the Earl of Rosebery stated when he dispatched British 
warships to Siam at the time of Paknam crisis, the dispatch of the British ships to 
Siam was rendered necessary by the fact that British merchants loudly demanded 
protection, but not aimed against France. 2 
The British and the French imperialists colonized other states each in order to 
create their own empires in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The contrast 
between them as empire-builders was that Britain annexed areas where it had 
interests to protect, whereas France annexed areas where it wished to have interests to 
1 The London Chamber of Commerce to the Earl of Rosebery, PRO FO 422/39. 
2 Rosebery to Phipps, 3 July 1893. PRO FO 69/157. 
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protect, and so hoped to shut out competition from the start. 3 This phenomenon can 
be illustrated by the British policy to annex Burma in order to secure its interests in 
the Indian empire, whereas the French tried to annex the area of the Menam (river) 
Kong (Mekong) because they wished to secure the way to interests in Southern China. 
When King Chulalongkorn became King of Siam in 1868, the British had 
already expanded their Indian empire to lower Burma and some parts of the Malay 
Peninsula to the west and south of Siam respectively. To the east of Siam, the French 
also created their empire in Vietnam and much of Cambodia. The location of Siam 
made it suitable to be a buffer state between the British and the French empires in 
order to prevent difficulties should they have a common frontier. France took the 
first step in 1889 by making a proposal to Britain for the neutralization of Siam. The 
French claimed to want to establish a strong, independent kingdom of Siam, with 
well-defined frontiers on both sides, and that they desired to come to an arrangement 
by which a permanent barrier might be established between the possessions of Great 
Britain and France in the Indo-China Peninsula. They proposed that such an 
agreement would be advantageous to both countries, and would prevent the 
complications which otherwise might arise between them.4 But the real reason was 
probably that France wanted to maintain the dominant role in the Mekong valley to 
secure the way to Southern China and to stop the British from approaching this area 
as Nigel Brailey explains in Two views of Siam on the eve of the Chakri 
Reformation: 
French oriental interest in the nineteenth century had always focused 
on China, so that even in the latter part of the century, Siam's main 
significance for the French was still its command of the Mekong 
valley, one of the best putative back-door routes into the always 
uncooperative middle Kingdom. s 
3 D.E.G. Hall, A History of South-East Asia, 3rd ed.(New York, St. Martin's Press, 
1968), p.679. 
4 Salisbury to Earl of Lytton, 3 April 1889, PRO FO 422/3~. . 
5 N.J. Brailey, Two Views of Siam on the Eve of the Chakn ReformatIOn (Arran and 
Edinburgh, 1989), pA. 
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The French proposal was unsuccessful because the British Government was not 
interested in guaranteeing the neutralization of Siam at that time. 
After the vain attempt to guarantee the neutralization of Siam, France desired 
to control all of the areas on the left bank of the Mekong by increasing its influence 
to eliminate the Siamese control in this area. Count Kergaradec, the French Charge 
d' Affaires in Bangkok in the late 1880s, regarded such states as Luang Phrabang and 
all the other towns on the banks of the Mekong, plus Battambang in the east, as well 
as Chiengmai, Nakhon Lampang, Nan, and Phre in the north, as really by right 
independent states. Siam had used its power as the strongest state in the area to force 
them to send annual or triennial tributes, but Siam had no right to reduce these states 
to the condition of provinces of Siam proper. The Count further stated that it was 
more necessary for France to prevent Siam from absorbing these states into Siam 
proper, because it was possible that Siam might at any time become so subject to 
British influence as to enable England to gain these states which would bring British 
influence too near to the French empire in Annam and Tonquin.6 The conflicts over 
these territories between Siam and France brought about the Paknam incident. At the 
same time in the Malay Peninsu la, the British also increased their influence. 
In 1891 the Russian Crown Prince, the Tsarevich who later became Tsar 
Nicholas II, visited Southeast Asia en route to Uladivostok to open the Pacific Ocean 
terminus of the tran-Siberian Railway. King Chulalongkorn, spotting a way to 
balance the powers of Britain and France by having good relations with Russia, tried 
to persuade the Crown Prince to visit Siam. Unfortunately, there was news of 
cholera spreading in Siam, and the Russian Government informed Luang Suriya, later 
Phraya Suriya, the Siamese Ambassador in Paris, that the Crown Prince could not 
6 Mr. Gould to Salisbury, 9 Aug.1888, PRO FO 422/34. 
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visit Siam owing to the fear of contracting cholera.7 King Chulalongkorn tried his 
best to communicate to the Russian Government via Luang Suriya that there was no 
risk in the Crown Prince coming to Siam and Siam would receive him with honour.8 
Eventually, the Crown Prince visited Siam. 
Good relations between King Chulalongkorn and the Russian Crown Prince 
developed out of the latter's stay in Siam, and in recognition of the courtesy shown to 
the Crown Prince during his stay in Bangkok, the reigning Tsar, Alexander III, 
presented to King Chulalongkorn the Grand Cross of St. Andrew. In response, King 
Chulalongkorn sent a mission headed by Prince Damrong to Russia later in 1891, to 
present the Tsar with the order of Chakri, which is the highest order of Siam. H.B. 
Smith suggested in his article, "Nineteenth Century Siamese Adventures in Fringe 
Diplomacy", that Prince Damrong's mission had more intriguing undertones than the 
form of the mission suggested. He opined that the trip represented a deeper and 
more complex effort on the part of the Siamese to adopt diplomatic courtesies and 
rituals to achieve greater, and, hopefully more egalitarian, European recognition for 
Siam. He also suggested that the Siamese Government wanted to keep the British 
Government suspicious about Prince Damrong's mission to Russia, but without giving 
grounds for reaction against Siam.9 
King Chulalongkorn tried to emphasize the importance of the relationship between 
his country and Russia by ordering Damrong to visit Russia first before going to 
other European countries. lO The King had two purposes: to show Russia that Siam 
considered it to be the most important and powerful country in Europe, and at the 
same time to reveal to the other European countries the importance of Siamese-
7 Thewawong to Damrong, 21 Feb.1891, N A R5 Kt 2.3/1. 
8 Luang Suriya to Thewawong, 13 Oct.1890, NA R5 Kt.2.3/1.. . " 
9 H.B. Smith, "Nineteenth Century Siamese Adventures III FrInge DIplomacy, 
Southeast Asia (Univ. of S. Illinois, Fall, 1971), pp.288-299. 
10 Suriya to Damrong, 2 Sept.1891, N A R5 Kt 12.1/1. 
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Russian friendship. The King was delighted to know that Damrong's mission to 
Russia caused some perturbation to the British Government and the latter's treatment 
of Siam was better thereafter, as he suggested in a letter to Damrong: 
It is good to keep the British suspicious about your mission to Russia. 
The newspaper reports were good in reporting about your trip that 
there was no element of politically related aims in spite of the fact 
that we might talk with the Russians about political relations. We have 
to manage on the way to have the British suspicious, but without 
giving them grounds for reaction because if they know that we are 
trying to have political relations with the Russians, they might attack 
us at a time when we are still unprepared. I notice that the British 
officials treated your mission better than formerly which probably was 
caused by this mission to Russia. 11 
Even though the order of the countries to be visited had reluctantly to be 
changed by the King owing to the Tsar's inability to receive Damrong until mid-
November 1891, King Chulalongkorn had arranged that the Russian court would not 
be offended. 12 But the Siamese Government's effort to balance off the European 
powers could not save it from conflict with France. 
Section II The Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1893 and its Consequences 
After the Paknam crisis of 1893, Siam had no alternative but to yield to the 
French ultimatum by which the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 3 October 1893 was 
concluded. 
By article I of this Treaty, the Siamese Government renounced its claim to 
all land on the left bank of the Mekong. By articles 2,3,4,6,7, the Siamese 
Government undertook not to maintain or employ armed vessels on the Mekong, or 
on its affluents within certain regions of Siamese territory, nor to maintain any 
military post in the provinces of Battambang and Siem-Reap, nor a twenty-five 
11 King to Damrong, no date Aug.1891, NA R5 Kt 12.1/1. 
12 H.B. Smith, op.cit., pp.288-299. 
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kilometre deep zone the length of the Siamese west bank of the Mekong River, as a 
guarantee of Bangkok willingness to maintain the agreement. By article 5, the 
Siamese Government could not make fiscal regulations in those above-stated areas and 
allowed French subjects or dependents to travel and trade in those territories on a 
French passport. By Article 8, the Siamese Government allowed the establishment of 
French consulates wherever the French Government pleased. 
By this treaty the Siamese Government also practically renounced all sovereign 
rights over the areas to the east of the Mekong. The consequence was that Siam laid 
itself open to attack along a frontier of many hundreds of miles, while at the same 
time such attack would be facilitated by the establishment of French posts on the 
west bank as the French were not restricted by a similar stipulation. Besides, the 
Siamese Government was to pay an indemnity of two million francs, and deposit 
three millions to pay for damage incurred in the fighting. The French were to 
continue to occupy Chantabun until all stipulations of the Treaty had been fully 
executed. 
After the signing of the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 3 October 1893, the 
relationship between France and Siam again became aggravated owing to the conflict 
between them over the following aspects: 
I. The conflict over the territory on the right bank of the Mekong and the 
Mekong itself 
By article 1 of th is treaty the Siamese Government renounced all claims to the 
whole of the the territories on the east bank of the Mekong and to the islands of the 
river, but it contended that any rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction which Siam had 
possessed before the signing of the treaty in territories on the west bank of the 
Mekong were left untouched by the treaty. The problems arose when the French 
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Government acted repeatedly as if the renunciation of the east bank could be 
extended to any part of the west bank by encouraging and assisting the Chief of 
Luang Prabang and the persons who acted under his orders to behave as if the part of 
his territory, situated on the right bank of the Mekong, had entirely ceased to be 
dependent on the kingdom of Siam. 13 The Siamese Government agreed that it had 
promised not to send any troops into the area of the 25 kilometre-zone on the west 
bank, but insisted that the civil administration was still in its hands. However, the 
French wanted to have full control in the area and cut the Siamese Government off 
from further communication with people inside it, so they drove all the Siamese 
officials out of the area including administrators and even postmasters. 14 
Confl ict also occurred over the River Mekong itself owing to the French 
Government acting as if the Mekong was entirely under French sovereignty and 
control. But, on the other hand, the Siamese Government contended that by the 
terms of article 2 of the treaty the Siamese Government bound itself not to maintain 
or navigate armed ship or vessels on the Mekong which, far from implying that the 
water was placed under the exclusive sovereignty and control of France, suggested 
that the Mekong River might be freely used for all peaceful purposes by Siamese 
subjects of the west bank, as well as by French subjects of the east bank. IS 
2. The conflicts over the occupation of Chantabun 
The French prom ised that as soon as all stipulations of the 1893 Treaty were 
fully executed, they would withdraw their troops from Chantabun, but originally they 
showed no intention to do so. They used the occupation of Chantabun not only as a 
guarantee for the Siamese performance of their part in the treaty but also as a pretext 
13 Thewawong to M. Defrance, ~3 June 1898, PRO FO 422/49. 
14 M.L. Manich Jumsai, "Report of Research on old Thai History during my trip to 
Europe in 1974-1975" (Mimeo), p.2. 
S 
"'13 J 1898, PRO FO 422//49. 1 Thewawong to M. Defrance, _ une 
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to remain m this part of Siam because they had planned in advance that they would 
use Chantabun to bargain with the Siamese Government in order to gam more 
territory. This is evident from the fact that as early as April 1894, Siam had already 
fulfilled all of its obligations under the Treaty of 1893,16 and yet on 3 December 
1900, the British Foreign Secretary, the Marquess of Lansdowne, wrote a letter to his 
Charge d Affaires Mr.Archer in Bangkok to say that the Siamese Minister had made 
a statement that Siam had long since fulfilled its obligations to France under the 1893 
Treaty, but France still retained 500 troops at Chantabun.17 
The occupation of Chantabun, an important part to the east of Bangkok, by 
the French troops, caused considerable concern to British interests. In July 1894, the 
London Chamber of Commerce wrote a letter to the Earl of Kimberley explaining 
that with the French troops In Chantabun, and also considerable forces in Cochin 
China, France could at any time easily occupy Bangkok. Should this happen the 
British interests in Siam would suffer a grievous blow, while the annexation would 
endanger the British control of the Bay of Bengal and threaten the Indian empire. 18 
This probably was one of the reasons which steered British foreign policy towards 
guaranteeing the central area of Siam in January 1896. 
Mr. Delcasse, the later French Minister of Foreign Affairs, also made a 
statement in 1902 to Phra.1'a Suriya, the Siamese Ambassador to Paris, that normally 
wherever a powerful country like France put its flag in the ground, the longer the 
time, the deeper the root of the flag. If the flag was there for one or two years, it 
was easier to negotiate withdrawal, but if it were to stay there for many years as it 
. . hd . 19 had in Chantabun, he would heSItate to Wit raw it. 
16 Kimberley to Marquis of Dufferin, 25 Apr.1894, PRO FO 422/39. 
17 Lansdowne to Archer, 3 Dec. I 900, PRO FO 422/53. 
18 London Chamber of Commerce to Kimberley, 24 July 1894, PRO FO 422/40. 
19 Suriya to Thewawong, 21 Jan.1902. NA R5 Kt 2.20. 
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3. The Question of Registration 
By the 1893 Treaty, The Siamese Government admitted that, as a consequence 
of its renunciation of the territory on the east bank of the Mekong, any Siamese 
subjects who at the time of the conclusion of the treaty were domiciled in this 
territory, and continued to be so, had become French subjects. But no person 
domiciled on the west bank of the Mekong, who before the treaty was a Siamese 
subject and under Siamese jurisdiction, had ceased to be so by the effect of the 
treaty. The conflict occurred when the French Consul indiscriminately registered as 
French subjects persons who were 10 fact Siamese subjects, domiciled on the west 
bank of the Mekong at the time of the treaty, because they or their fathers or 
grandfathers, or remote ancestors, were born on the east bank of the Mekong at the 
time when the east bank belonged to Siam. 2o 
Moreover, the French Consul issued blank certificates of registration to his 
subordinates, who afterwards went about and filled in the names of all the people 
they could find willing to accept certificates, or in some cases, if they refused to 
accept, those French subordinates forced them to accept by threatening them. 21 In 
the worst case, the Siamese Governor of Intaburi was secretly lured to a French 
steamer, then arrested, and put in the consular prison in Bangkok, simply because he 
did not allow his people to be registered as French subjects.22 The registration 
caused considerable problems to the Siamese authorities because by becoming French 
subjects, those registered could be free from Siamese law and administration. They 
also paid no taxes, could not be conscripted for the Siamese army, could not be 
arrested by Siamese police nor judged by Siamese courts. Many Chinese ran illegal 
businesses to the disadvantage of the Siamese Government and sought protection as 
French proteges from the French Consul. The French scheme to increase their 
20 Thewawong to M. Defrance, ~3 June 1898, PRO Fa 422/49. 
21 Phrava Uthai to Phraya Sarit, 21 Feb.1899, NA R5 Kt 2.8/5. 
22 '. .' 3 M.L. Mamch Jumsal, Op.Clt., p .. 
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subjects on the west bank of the Mekong was clearly designed to turn this zone into 
an area of complete French control, and for the further purpose of expanding their 
empire into the northeast of Siam even after 1896 joint declaration. 
After the Paknam incident of 1893, French demands on Siam were 
tremendous and the British Government offered no help but recommended the 
Siamese Government to yield to the French demands. Furthermore, the option of 
partitioning Siam between Britain and France was under consideration as indicated in 
a letter of 26 May 1894 from the Earl of Kimberley, the British Foreign Secretary, to 
Mr.Scott, the British Representative in Bangkok: "The partition of Siam, or some 
similar arrangement is in contemplation between England and France.,,23 
Siam reacted to the threat of partition by dropping hints to Mr. Scott for 
transmission to the Earl of Kimberley that if Britain agreed with France to partition 
Siam, Siam would put all of its territories under French protection.24 The Siamese 
Government totally disagreed with the idea of partition because it realized that if the 
country was divided into two parts, it would be very difficult ever to reunite them 
again. Therefore, it threatened the British Government with sacrificing all of its 
territories to France along with the loss of all British interests in Siam. This also 
contributed to the changing of British foreign policy to guarantee the central area of 
Siam. The Siamese Government realized that it could not rely on any assistance from 
foreign powers. The independence of the country depended on its own foreign policy 
of how to playoff Britain and France against each other, and another most important 
thing was to improve the administration of the country, especially the administration 
of justice, and this was the reason why Prince Phichit, the most capable Siamese 
person in the legal field at that time, was appointed the Minister of Justice despite 
King Chulalongkorn's prejudice against him. 
23 Kimberley to Scott, 26 May 189~, PRO FO 422/39. 
24 Chandran Jeshurun, The Contest for Siam (1889-1902), (Kuala Lumpur, 1977), 
pp.112, 118 and 125, and also N.J. Brailey, Two Views, op.cit., p.93. 
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Section III Siam's Struggle to Maintain its Independence 
1. The Anglo-French Declaration of 1896 
The British Government was anxious about the French movement in Siam 
because the French could establish their consulates wherever they pleased, which 
could lead to the French control of the resources of the country at the expense of 
British trade. Moreover, in the case of French influence in Siam becoming 
increasingly great, the British trade which was preponderant at that time might be 
affected tremendously. The issue which caused most anxiety to the British 
Government was the fear of the imminent death of King Chulalongkorn, which could 
have sunk the country into chaos and exposed it to French annexation which could 
lead to the total loss of British interests in Siam. This had affected the British 
Government's policy with regard to the neutralization of Siam. Another important 
reason was that after the Paknam crisis, a part of the new French empire in Laos 
bordered on British Burma, and if the British did not stop the expansion of French 
influence in Siam, not only their interests in Siam would be affected but their Indian 
empire could also be vulnerable. All these reasons led to the conclusion of the 
Anglo- French Declaration signed in London on 15 January 1896. By this agreement, 
the British and the French Governments engaged to each other that neither of them 
would, without the consent of the other, in any case or under any pretext, advance 
their armed forces into the region of the valley of the Menam (river) Chaophraya; i.e 
the central part of Siam. 
Was Siam satisfied with the Anglo-French Declaration? The answer was 
probably no, the reason being principally, that the agreement only involved the area 
of the valley of the Chaophraya River, not all Siamese territory. But some Siamese 
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leaders were partly satisfied because it was better than no guarantee at all. The 
evidence appears in a letter from Prince Sawat to Prince Raphi in which he wrote: 
I will not tell you all that I think of the arrangement but I will tell you 
some for I can't help it. You will understand me if I use the idiom 
"Half a loaf is better than no loaf at all". 25 
The Siamese Government attempted to expand the Declaration by sending 
Prince Chira, a son of King Chulalongkorn, then aged twenty and later head of the 
Siamese army, to Paris in order to induce the French Government to consent to an 
extension of the Anglo- French Agreement so as to effect a joint guarantee of the 
integrity of the whole Siam, instead of just the valley of the Chaophraya River. The 
Siamese believed that if the French were willing to extend it, the British would be 
ready to accede to the extension.26 But the attempt failed because the French 
Government rejected the Siamese Government's proposal. 
It is interesting to consider the reasons why the Anglo-French Declaration did 
not include all of the Siamese territories; Lord Salisbury stated that the object of 
guaranteeing only the valley of the Chaophraya River was because "it is an area 
which affected British interests as a commercial nation" and that "there would be 
advantage in giving the necessary security to the commercial world that, with regard 
to the region where the most active development was likely to take place, no further 
disturbance of territorial ownership was to be apprehended".27 But Mr. Rivett-
Carnac, the later Financial Adviser to the Siamese Government, in his minute upon 
the present political situation of Great Britain, France, and Siam in 1902, stated that: 
The political reason for not embracing in the Convention the whole of 
the dominions of the Kingdom of Siam was, it may be surmised, the 
desire to reserve to the two guaranteeing Powers a means of putting 
pressure upon the King of Siam, should it at any time become 
necessary to do so, by reminding him that a large portion of his 
25 Sawat to Raphi, 31 Jan.1896, N A R5 K t 38/2. 
26 Archer to Lansdowne, 20 Aug.1902, PRO Fa 422/56. 
27 Minute by Mr. Rivett-Carnac, II Feb.1902, PRO Fa 422/56. 
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territory could, at any moment, presumably by mutual consent of the 
two Great Powers, be seized by either power seperately.28 
It is also conspicuous that Siam was not a party to the Declaration of 1896. This 
means that Britain and France, at any time, by mutual consent, could abolish the 
agreement and seize or partition Siam at any time and Siam would not be able to 
protest because it was not a party to the agreement. 
King Chulalongkorn and all the Siamese leaders, including Prince Raphi, the 
new Minister of Justice who was appointed only one year after the conclusion of the 
Declaration, were all a ware of the impending danger which still threatened Siam's 
independence despite the existence of the Anglo-French Declaration. They realized 
that the only way that Siam could maintain its independence was to reorganize and 
reform the administration of the country. As King Chulalongkorn, on 18 January 
1896, a few days after the signing of the Anglo-French Declaration, reiterated the 
case for the reform of the government and administration, in his letter to Prince 
Damrong: 
28 Ibid. 
In former times, our territories adjoined those of countries which 
possessed similar strength and systems of administration. Now from the 
west to the north-west, those countries have fallen to the British, and 
from the east to the north-east, they have fallen to the French. Our 
country finds itself in the midst of nations which possess more 
rigorous systems of administration and greater power than our former 
neighbours. We can no longer regard our neighbours with 
indifference, for we come into constant contact with them on the 
frontiers. There are three ways by which we can protect ourself 
against internal and external dangers. Firstly, we can maintain 
peaceful relations; secondl y, we can possess sufficient power to defend 
the peace within our country; and thirdly, we can make our 
administration as good as theirs. If we are to protect ourselves by 
maintaining peaceful relationships, the fact that we do not possess the 
power to defend the peace within the country will prevent peaceful 
negotiations from being always successful. If we do not put our 
administration in order, we will not have enough income, which is the 
source of the power needed to defend the country. The expansion of 
power depends on the administration's taxation of the earnin?s whic.h 
result from the facilitation of the people's methods of earnmg theIr 
livelihood and making a living out of the produce of the soil. The 
strengthening and the rationalization of the administration and the 
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development of the economy are therefore the ultimate alms of this 
kingdom. 29 
This process of improving the administration of the country included the legal reform 
which was designed to maintain the internal peace. Prince Raphi had to carryon this 
project after the first steps had been carried out by Prince Phichit. 
It is significant that King Chulalongkorn wrote this very important letter to 
Prince Damrong only a few days after the conclusion of the Anglo-french Declaration 
of 1896, clear evidence that the King realized that Siam was still at risk despite the 
guarantee of the Declaration. This letter indicates clearly that King Chulalongkorn 
determined to improve the administration of his country in order to maintain Siam's 
independence. Actually, the letter also highlighted most of the King's policies which 
he subsequently implemented in every Ministry and supports the argument that the 
Chakri Reformation proper was in fact started after the Paknam incident. 
2. The A nglo-Siamese Secret Agreement of 1897 
The British authorities In Malaya wanted to increase their sphere of influence 
III the Malay peninsula. Mr. Satow, the British representative at Bangkok, stated in 
1885 that he believed the true British Malayan policy was to extend British 
influence over all the Malay states of the Malay Peninsula up to British Burma, for 
even if Siam fell under French influence Britain would still have influence in those 
areas.
30 Britain wanted to be the only power in the Malay Peninsula and the southern 
part of Siam since Britain had established its influence in Singapore in 1819, and in 
Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang in 1874. But the Malay states in the 
29 Tej Bunnag, The Provincial Administration of Siam, 1892-1910, (Kuala Lumpur, 
1977), pp.91-92. 
30 Satow memorandum, 20 June 1885, PRO FO 69/103. 
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north of the Malay Peninsula were still under Siamese influence and the Singapore 
Government desired to extend its influence to these states. 
After the Paknam incident, France was interested in digging a canal across the 
narrowest point in the Kra Isthmus to shorten the journey from Indian Ocean to its 
Indo-Chinese empire. Regarding this project, the British Government strongly 
opposed the French and submitted an ultimatum to the Siamese Government that if 
the latter allowed the French to dig this canal the British Government would seize the 
Malay Peninsula. 31 Moreover the British Representative in Bangkok demanded 
assurances from Foreign Minister, Prince Thewawong, that there was no agreement 
for a Kra canal In any contract which the Siamese Government had signed with the 
French Government. 32 Th is incident indicated clearly that even the British 
Government in London did not want any other powers to have influence in the Malay 
Peninsula because it realized that if the French dug the Kra canal British influence in 
this area must be disturbed. 
Besides the French project for a Kra canal, there were also rumours of the 
German and the Russian Governments trying to obtain the concession of islands in 
the south of Siam for the purpose of establishing coaling stations. The British 
Government, being aware of the vulnerability of its interest in this area, desired to 
maintain it by proposing a secret pact to the Siamese Government. This was designed 
to block any attempt by any third power to acquire dominion or to establish influence 
or protectorate in the Siamese Malay Peninsula territory in exchange for Siam's 
promise not to grant, cede or let any special privilege or advantage, as regards land or 
trade, within this territory, either to the Government or to the subjects of a third 
power without the written consent of Britain. 
31 Mahayota to Thewawong, 23 A ug.1893, NA R5 French Sec.ret File 18/8. 
32 Thewawong to King, 11 Oct.1893, NA R5 French Secret FIle 18/10. 
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The Siamese Government recognized two consequent benefits; firstly, that 
they would gain a limited guaran tee of this territory which was not covered by the 
Anglo- French Declaration of 1896; secondly, by signing this agreement, the British 
Government might seem to recognize the Siamese rights over the northern Malay 
states, which is not inconsistent with Prince Pritsdang's statements to F. Swettenham, 
the British Minister Resident in Perak 1889-1895, about Siam's policy towards its 
pratethserat (dependencies) that: 
The Siamese Government has always told him [Pritsdang] they wished 
to claim as much as they could (whether on the French side or in the 
Malay Peninsula) & hold on to it as long as possible with the idea that 
some day that might, like Medea, save Siam or some part of it, by 
throwing these outlying provinces, one by one, to the pursuers, France 
on one side & England on the other.33 
As a consequence, the Siamese Government signed the Secret Agreement with the 
British Government on 6 April 1897, in the hope that London would impose its views 
on the British authorities in Malaya. 
Section IV King Chulalongkorn's Plan to Improve Relationships with Russia 
and Germany and the Idea to resist France 
King Chulalongkorn's first European trip In the summer of 1897 was aimed 
mainly at improving the relationship between Siam and other European powers such 
as Russia and Germany. At that time German trade in Siam was second only to 
England's but Russian trade in Siam was not considerable. This trip was the King's 
attempt to increase German and Russian interests in Siam to balance the British 
interest and at the same time to reduce French aggression towards Siam. The King 
visited Russia first because he knew that Russia was an ally of France and could 
probably influence France to settle the conflicts between Siam and France. 
33 N.J. Brailey, op.cit., p.82, and this similar statement also appears in memorandum 
by F. Swettenham, PRO FO 422/56. 
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Moreover, since France and Russia were allies, the Siamese Government had ever 
since 1891 worried that they might cooperate together with Russia attacking India and 
France attacking Siam. 34 
After his own arrival in Russia in April 1897, King Chulalongkorn was 
delighted with his successful talk with the Tsar, the former Tsarevich of 1891. He 
described his success in a letter to Prince Thewawong that: 
The Tsar was very generous to me, agreeing to settle the conflicts 
between us and France. He also promised that he would try his best to 
maintain Siam's independence. My trip to Russia was of the greatest 
benefit to our country.35 
The apparent close relationship between Chulalongkorn and Tsar Nicholas II 
seems to have caused the latter to use his influence over his ally France to receive 
Chulalongkorn with honour. By September 1897, Hanotaux, the French Foreign 
Minister, had to change his hostility to a warm welcome and the discussion between 
them seemed to be harmonious but nothing important was agreed. As a matter of 
fact, the Siamese Government paid a price for Chulalongkorn's visit to Paris as the 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs demanded that the Siamese Government release a 
murderer named Bila, and all the French subjects held in detention in all Siamese 
prisons throughout the whole country. According to Thai evidence, Bila was a cold-
blooded criminal who killed many people in Bangkapi, a district of Bangkok, in order 
to turn them off lands he claimed. He also shot dead a policeman who went to stop 
him shooting people. He then claimed French protection as a person of Cambodian 
parentage. The Siamese Government had no alternative but to accept the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs' demand. 36 
34 Thewawong to Oamrong, 2-i Aug.1891, NA R5 Kt 12.1/1. 
35 King to Thewawong, no date April 1897, NA R5 Kt 11.1/1. 
36 M.L. Manich Jumsai, op.cit., p.4. 
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King Chulalongkorn also aimed to persuade Germany to increase its interest in 
Siam to balance the British. A t that time German trade in Siam was increasing 
rapidly. Chulalongkorn also urged the German Kaiser Wilhelm II that the 
independence of Siam should be guaranteed jointly by Britain, France, Germany, and 
Russia. The Emperor agreed with him. 37 He met the Tsar of Russia for the second 
time on this trip in Darmstadt, where he asked him to be the arbitrator to settle the 
conflict between Siam and France. The Tsar agreed to do SO,38 but France refuse to 
settle the matters with Siam, and so the King returned to Siam at the end of 1897. 
In April 1899, King Chulalongkorn informed Mr. Greville, the British 
Minister in Bangkok, that the suggestion had been made in 1897 by the German 
Emperor that an agreement should be entered into between Britain, Russia, France, 
and Germany to guarantee the independence of Siam. The King asked Mr. Greville 
to inquire whether the British would be willing to join such an agreement. 39 The 
Marquess of Salisbury responded that the existing agreement of 1896 between Britain 
and France and the Secret Agreement between Britain and Siam of 1897 rendered 
Siam sufficiently secure against foreign aggression. Under a guarantee of the four 
powers, Siam would be less independent, and quarrels between the powers would 
follow which would not be to the benefit of Siam.4o It is obvious that Britain did not 
want this kind of agreement because if this was allowed to happen, it was inevitable 
that Russia and Germany would share the benefits which Britain already enjoyed in 
Siam. 
After the Paknam incident, the influence of France in Siam had steadily 
declined while that of Britain and Germany had steadily increased. This was because 
37 Greville to Salisbury, 22 Apr.1899, PRO FO 422/51. 
38 King to Thewawong, 8 Oct.1897, NA R5 Kt 11.1/33. 
39 Greville to Salisbury, 22 Apr.1899, PRO FO 422/51. 
40 Salisbury to Greville (telegraph), 23 Apr.1899, PRO FO 422/51. 
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of France's action III the incident and also its exceSSIve demands after the incident. 
The French Government, aware of its disadvantages sent the Governor of Indochina, 
M. Doumer, to Siam in April 1899. King Chulalongkorn was very pleased with 
M.Doumer's visit, for in his eyes, M. Doumer was the only French gentleman he had 
ever seen in Siam. M. Doumer promised to keep order on the frontier and he also 
agreed to the Siamese reading of the treaty of 1893 that the civil administration of 
the 25- kilometre zone should be in Siamese hands. He also promised to use his best 
endeavours to bring about a permanent arrangement between the two countries; he 
was quite in favour of the withdrawal of the French garrison from Chantabun on 
certain conditions. In return the King promised to employ more Frenchmen III 
Siamese service and also promised that French should be taught in schools.41 But M. 
Doumer failed to settle any satisfactory arrangement between them owing to the 
French Government and Colonial Party being still on the look-out to absorb Siamese 
territories wherever possible. 
At the end of 1898, the influence of Russia over France declined owmg to 
Russia's refusal to assist France, its ally, if France went to war with Britain in the 
Fashoda incident. But the Siamese Government was still optimistic that Russia was 
still capable of assisting it to come to an arrangement with France. Therefore, in 
August 1902, the King sent Prince Chira to Russia to ask the Tsar to persuade France 
h . fl' 42 to settle t elf con ICt. As a consequence, on 7 October 1902, a new Franco-
Siamese Convention was signed, but subsequently, at the beginning of 1903, the 
French Assembly refused to ratify this convention because the French Colonial Party 
was making demands involving the construction of two railway lines, one from 
Phnom-Penh to Ubon, and the other from Nakhon Phanom to Nongkhai. These lines 
were to connect respectively with French lines from Saigon to Pnom-Penh and Hue to 
41 Greville to Salisbury, 24 Apr.1899, PRO FO 422/51. 
42 Chira to King, 28 Aug.1902, NA R5 Kt 6.2/4. 
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Nakhon Phanom. The Siamese Government's reply was that Siam was not prepared to 
pledge itself to the construction of railway lines near its frontier such as those 
suggested by the French Government; nor was it prepared to contemplate their 
construction except possibly at some future date in connection with an international 
railway scheme.43 This refusal to comply with the French demand led to the 
abandonment of the convention. 
At that time the Siamese Government was very frustrated with the excessive 
French demands. They considered that the French demands could not be met because 
if they yielded to them, the French Government would come up with others until 
Siam was left with nothing. A group among the Siamese leadership led by Prince 
Chira, the Siamese Army Commander-in-Chief, was in favour of resistance to French 
demands wherever they were excessive. Prince Chira had anticipated this approach 
since 1899 when he assured the King, h is father, that Siam could support an army of 
ten divisions of ten thousand troops each with which he reckoned that the French 
army in Indo-China could be countered. 44 On 28 October 1902, Prince Chira wrote a 
letter to the King, suggesting that if the French Government did not get Morocco, it 
was likely that France would move into Siem Reap and Battambong. Should France 
do this, he recommended that Siam respond with a diplomatic protest rather than 
military resistance, but should France move beyond these two provinces, he 
d d · 45 recommen ed arme reSIstance. 
The King seemed to agree with Chira as the Siamese Government then 
imported a large consignment of rifles and ammunition from Japan, and Maxim 
guns. 46 This policy of possible resistance to the French was probably based on the 
43 Paget to Lansdowne, 3 March 1903, PRO FO 422/57. 
44 N.A. Battye, "Military Government and Society in the Reign of King 
Chulalongkorn", Cornell Univ. Ph.D. 1974, pA05. 
45 Ibid., p.431. 
46 Paget to Lansdowne, 18 Nov.1903, PRO FO 422/57. 
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assumption that the safety of Bangkok and the central part of the country were 
anyhow guaranteed by the Anglo-French Declaration of 1896, while the French 
forces in Indo-China were not much superior to Siamese troops and the latter were 
more accustomed to the area. Another reason was probably the feeling that Siam 
would be unable at the end to satisfy the greed of the French Government except by 
the surrender of the whole valley of the Mekong, which meant they had not much 
more to lose by defeat than by a peaceful acceptance of the terms of the additional 
convention. 
Section V Siam's A ttempt to end Extraterritoriality 
The system of the International Court which was established by article 8 of the 
1883 Treaty between Siam and Britain, returned some judicial autonomy back to Siam 
via the International Court at Chiengmai. As a Siamese Court established for the 
purpose of this treaty, it could exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction in all cases 
concerning British subjects according to Siamese law, but the consul had power to 
withdraw cases to decide by himself at any time before the judgment was made. 
Subsequently, in 1902, the Siamese Government represented by Prince Thewawong, 
made a proposal to the British Government that British subjects should be allowed to 
hold land within the territories of northern Siam affected by the Treaty of 1883,47 in 
return for the abandonment by Great Britain of the provisions of article 8 of that 
treaty. It was article 8 which conferred on the British Consul or Vice-Consul at 
Chiengmai the power to remove from the International Court to his own Consular 
Court all cases in which both parties were British subjects, or in cases where the 
accused or defendant was a British subject. 48 
47 The measures of prevention of the acquisition of land by foreign settlers were 
necessitated by the Treaty of 1856, which allowed foreigners to hold land only 
within the limit of twentv-four hours' journey by boat from Bangkok. 
48 Lansdowne to Paget, 27 Feb.1903, PRO FO 422/57. 
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The Marquess of Lansdowne, the British Foreign Secretary at that time, after 
consultation with the Secretary of State for India, informed Mr. Paget, the British 
Minister in Bangkok, that the British Government was ready to sign an agreement 
modifying the Treaty of 1883 in the manner the Siamese Government proposed.49 
The reason the Marquess of Lansdowne made this decision was probably due to a 
letter sent to him by Mr. Archer, the British Consul at Chiengmai. Mr. Archer 
explained that the system of the International Court worked with remarkable success. 
An indication of its satisfactory working was, doubtless, the Consul's lack of need to 
transfer cases to his own Consular Court. He stated that during the ten years of his 
connection with the Consulate at Chiengmai,he did not remember removing a single 
case. He accepted that the power of removing cases might act as a check to any 
possible injustice against British subjects, but the effect was not considerable. In his 
opinion, the power of appeal to Bangkok, which would bring a case under review by 
the British and Siamese authorities, would be adequate safeguard against any 
injustice. 50 Mr.Archer considered that the right to hold land was more valuable than 
the right of removal of cases from the International Court, and he strongly favoured 
the Siamese Government's proposal. 
Mr. Archer also enclosed a memorandum on a suggested alteration in the 
Chiengmai Treaty of 1883 by Mr.stringer, the Acting Consul at Chiengmai from 
1889-1894. Mr. Stringer explained that during the period of about four and a half 
years for which he was acting Vice-Consul, he only remembered removing one case 
from the International Court to his Consular Court. In that case a British firm at 
Chiengmai wished to prosecute a British subject for obtaining money by false 
pretences, and the Siamese Judge informed the Consulate that the offence was 
49 Ibid. 
50 Archer to Lansdowne, 23 A ug.1902, PRO FO 422/56. 
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unknown to Siamese law, and he, therefore, removed the case because the accused 
could not be prosecuted criminally in the Siamese International Court. He was now 
of the opinion that the power of removing a case had become less necessary In 
Chiengmai as the present Judge was a much more intelligent and better trained man. 
In his opinion the right to hold land was more valuable than the right of removing 
cases and he was in favour of the Siamese Government's proposal.S1 
By contrast, Mr. Paget, the British Minister in Bangkok, was against the 
Siamese Government's proposal. He wrote a letter dated 4 August 1903 enclosing a 
memorandum about the Siamese International Court in the north by Mr. Lyle, the 
Vice-Consul at Nan, a province in the north of Siam. In his memorandum Mr. Lyle 
illustrated three weak characteristics of the Siamese International Court system: 
firstly, he was of the opinion that all the progress and improvements of the judicial 
system in the north could be traced to and were dependent solely upon the abilities of 
a single individual Judge, and the replacement of that particular Judge would bring 
the system back into decline. He accepted that the International Court system at that 
time was workable because it was under the charge and direction of Phraya 
Charanyar, a Siamese Judge of exceptional ability and firmness, who had been 
appointed in 1899. But prior to Phraya Charanyar's appointment, Mr. Gould, the 
British Vice-Consul at Chiengmai from 1884-1886, described the Siamese judicial 
system in the north as still falling short of the necessary standard to take charge 
independently of British subjects. Secondly, the Siamese Government was short of fit 
and competent officials. Mr. Lyle explained that suitable men were indeed scarce in 
Siam, and the few who existed declined to accept service so far from the capital. He 
raised the example that in 1902, the Judge of Sawankaloke Court had been found 
51 Ibid., Mr. Archer enclosed Mr. Stringer's memorandum to the Marquess of 
Lansdowne in order to substantiate his opinion. 
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guilty of corruption and been put in prIson, but on his release he was reinstated, 
owing to the impossibility of finding another to fill his position. 52 
Thirdly, Mr. Lyle was of the opinion that the Siamese judicial system was not 
independent but was subject to political influence. His illustration was the case in 
which Chaophraya Surasak, the Siamese Commander-in-Chief of an army to the 
north in 1902, demanded that the Chief Justice condemn certain people alleged to 
have been connected with a rising in Phrae, also a province in the north of Siam. 
The latter demanded the production of a charge, and evidence, but was informed that 
such details were quite unimportant; all he was required to do was to frame a 
condemnatory judgment. On his refusing to take part in such a proceeding, one of 
his junior Judges was obliged to perform the task. 53 
Lastly, Mr. Lyle explained that the International Court system in the north 
was greatly improved only at Chiengmai, while the Nan International Court was still 
far from sharing in the improvement in Chiengmai owing to the lack of a competent 
judge. Although strenuous efforts were made by the British Consul to persuade the 
Siamese Government to transfer a capable judge to Nan, when the latter responded 
by ordering a capable judge to go to Nan, that judge actually resigned on the spot 
rather than go to Nan. 54 This was due to the belief amongst the Siamese elite and 
high rank officials that being sent very far away from Bangkok was a terrifying exile 
because they not only had to sacrifice their convenience and luxurious life but also 
lost the chance to maintain or increase the King's favour. 
52 Paget to Lansdowne, 4 Aug.1903, PRO FO 422/57. 
53 Ibid., In this point, the contemporary Japanese judicial system was more 
independent from the executive power as shown by Arthur Von Mehren in his 
book, Law in Japan, Harvard University Press, 1963, p.121, in which he raises an 
example in the Otsu case whereby the Japanese Chief Justice sentenced the 
defendant. who attacked the Crown Prince of Russia, to life imprisonment, despite 
the Japanese Government's pressure for capital punishment. 
54 Paget to Lansdowne, 4 .A ug.1903, PRO FO 422/57. 
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Mr. Paget also submitted his own ideas about the power of removing cases and 
the Siamese legal system generally to the Marquess of Lansdowne. In his letter he 
indicated: firstly, that he was of the opinion that the Chiengmai International Court 
had proved adequate to obtain justice for British subjects due to the influence 
exercised therein by the British Consul to remove any cases in which a British subject 
was defendant. The removal of a case with a view to preventing the delivery of a 
certain decision by a Siamese judge would amount to a declaration that the judge was 
behaving unjustly and that the court was unfit to deal with the case in question. 
Naturally the Siamese judge, who was not certain about the decision he was about to 
make, must consult the British Consul before he made his decision. 55 
Secondly, Mr. Paget explained that even though the interests of the British 
subjects would be amply safeguarded by the facilities which remained for appeal to 
the Consul-General in Bangkok as provided by the Treaty of 1883, in practice the 
expense and distance between Ch iengmai and Bangkok would prohibit British subjects 
and witnesses from attending the Appeal Court at Bangkok. Consequently, cases 
before the Appeal Court would be decided mostly on evidence in the report, and 
evidence was likely to be misleading owing to the particular patron-client relations 
existing in Siamese society, whereby every man owed allegiance to another above him 
in rank. This type of relationship discouraged witnesses who, though they might 
know the truth, preferred often to testify against it rather than incur the risk of 
. h b h' 56 punts ment y t elr patrons. 
Mr. Paget concluded that if the Consul was deprived of the power to remove 
cases from the International Court, British subjects would be put in the hands of 
55 Ibid. . 
56 Ibid., This indicates that Paget was of the opinion that the nai-phrai (patron-chent) 
system in Siam hindered the administration of justice. 
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Siamese judges who, OWing to the Treaty of 1883, would apply to the cases Siamese 
law, which he explained as a very ill-defined substance. He admitted that the 
Siamese law at that time was making progress as the introduction of codifying was in 
process, as well as the abolition of unsuitable laws, but it was still far from possessing 
a satisfactory system applicable to the needs of a modern community. He also 
suggested that an unscrupulous Siamese judge could produce some obscure rule to 
support any judgment he wished to deliver. 57 
After reconsidering this matter, the Marquess of Lansdowne advised Mr. Paget 
by letter dated 28 April 1904, to withdraw from the negotiation with the Siamese 
Government because he believed that it was dangerous to put British subjects in the 
hands of the Siamese Courts. He suggested that Mr. Paget justify this action by 
giving the reason that to surrender the right of removal of cases would cause people 
to stir up British subjects in the north because the French Consul had only just 
gained this identical right from the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1904.58 
The purpose behind the Siamese Government's proposal to allow British 
subjects to hold land in return for the abandonment of the Consul's right of removal 
of cases from the International Court was to eliminate extraterritoriality gradually, 
starting with the International Court in the north, and, if successful, to proceed to 
effect the plan all through the country. The British Government at the beginning 
was so impressed with the dramatic progress In the International Court system at 
Chiengmai, it was inclined to accept the proposal, but when it took into account that 
the surrender of this right would amount to the abolition of extraterritoriality in the 
Lao states, and that the Siamese judicial system was still not up to an acceptable 
standard, it declined to accept the proposal. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Lansdowne to Paget, 28 Apr.1904, PRO FO 422/58. 
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Section VI The Consequences of the Entente Cordiale of 1904 
It was fortunate for Siam that Britain and France reached agreements, 
collectively known as the "Entente Cordiale" on 8 April 1904, whereby they agreed on 
territorial compensation between them. By one section of the agreement France 
recognized the British right to dominate Egypt in return for France gaining an option 
to embark on a policy to obtain similar rights in Morocco. In the Entente Cordiale 
treaties they also agreed on the future of Siam whereby the two Governments 
confirmed the Anglo-French Declaration of 15 January 1896. They also agreed to 
disclaim all idea of annexing any Siamese territory, and determined to abstain from 
any act which might contravene the provisions of the existing treaties.59 
It is evident that the independence of Siam was much more secure after the 
signing of the Entente Cordiale. It is interesting to consider why France accepted 
Morocco instead of Siam. The reasons probably are: firstly, Morocco was nearer and 
was adjacent to Algeria which had already been colonized by France; therefore, it 
was much easier to effect colonization in both countries together. Secondly, if France 
wanted to annex Siam, it would have to fight with Siam which was very far away and 
therefore difficult to transport troops and arms to. Lastly, at that time Germany, 
which wanted to share the colonial market, threatened both Britain and France by 
building up a strong navy, and being in conflict with France over Morocco, 
threatened France with war. Consequently, France's colonial expansion deminished 
because its own independence was at risk. German hostility promoted friendship 
between Britain and France because Britain anticipated that if Germany defeated 
France, it might also attack Britain. 
59 P.l.V. Rolo, The Entente Cordiale (London, 1969), p.272-273. 
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After the signing of the Entente Cordiale in April 1904, French aggression in 
Siam was reduced dramatically. Later in the same month the differences between 
Siam and France were largely settled and the Agreement of 1904 was signed between 
them. According to this agreement France would evacuate Chantabun and would 
instead occupy Trat, a Siamese province close to the Cambodia border, in exchange 
for the Siamese Government giving up its claims to the territories of Luang Prabang 
on the right bank of the Mekong River. The Siamese International Court also 
obtained jurisdiction over French Asiatic subjects in civil cases but the French Consul 
kept the right to withdraw those cases to consider and decide in his own Consular 
Court. Later in March 1907, France and Siam signed another agreement by which 
France agreed to withdraw its troops from Trat in exchange for Siam abandoning its 
suzerainty over the three Cambodian provinces of Battambang, Siem Reap, and 
Srisophon. And the Siamese International Court now gained jurisdiction over French 
Asiatic subjects both in civil and criminal cases on condition that the French Consul 
had the right to withdraw cases to consider and decide in the Consular Court, rights 
which would be terminated when the Siamese Criminal Code and Civil Code were 
promulgated. However, this agreement did not aII'ect full French citizens who still 
were not subject to Siamese law. 
Besides the two Franco-Siamese Treaties of 1904 and 1907, the Siamese 
Government also signed an A nglo-Siamese Treaty of 9 July 1909 with the British 
Government. By th is Treaty, the Siamese Government transferred to the British 
Government all rights of suzerainty, protection, administration and control which 
they possessed over the States of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perlis and 
adjacent islands, in exchange for the extension of the Siamese International Court 
system to cover all British subjects in Siam registered at the British Consulates before 
the date of this Treaty. This system would be terminated, and the jurisdiction of the 
International Courts \vould be transferred to the ordinary Siamese courts, after the 
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promulgation and the comIng into force of the Siamese Codes, namely, the Penal 
Code, the Civil and Commercial Codes, the Codes of Procedure, and the Law for 
Organization of Courts. 
Conclusion The Siamese Government concentrated considerably on its foreign 
policies because it saw how its neighbours resisted the Western powers and lost their 
independence. The Siamese appreciated their independence and steered their policy 
to maintain it. Despite the existence of the Anglo-French Declaration of 1896 and 
the Anglo-Siamese Secret Agreement of 1897, the Siamese Government, led by King 
Chulalongkorn, realized that the independence of the country was still at risk and 
tried to improve the administration of the country. The Paknam incident was a good 
lesson for the Siamese that their survival depended on internal change as well as their 
foreign policy, and the Chakri Reformation ensued. After the failure to obtain the 
international guarantee and the exhaustion of French demands, the Entente Cordiale 
released Siam from many difficulties and assisted Siam to conclude treaties with 
France and Britain. These treaties promised to return judicial autonomy to Siam 
provided that Siam implemented modern Codes of Law. This forced the Ministry of 
Justice to produce new Codes of Law which will be illustrated in later chapters. 
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Chapter 5 The Chackri Reformation 
In order to respond to the Western threat, King Chulalongkorn established a new 
trial governmental administration of twelve ministries on 16 June 1888. The 
arrangement resulted in ten different functional ministries along with two regional 
ministries, the M ahallhai and Kalahom, which were still responsible for the 
administration in the northern and southern provinces respectively. The establishment 
of these twelve ministries was formally announced in March 1892. 1 Despite the 
change Siam could not escape French aggression in the Paknam incident of July 1893. 
One lesson the Siamese learned from this incident was that they could not rely on the 
British for military support in case of French intrusion. The Siamese ruling elite 
realized that they needed to reorganize the administration of the country dramatically 
in order for it to survive as an independent country. This appeared in Rolin-
Jaequemyns, the General Adviser to the Siamese Government's, description of the 
response of the Siamese ruling elite to the Paknam crisis: 
There is a general feeling among the enlightened Siamese that instead 
of brooding over their loss, they must try to improve as soon and as 
completely as possible, the administration of the splendid country 
which is still under their rule. A new impulsion must be given. The 
last [late] events have revealed how sadly deficient are some services 
which everybody thought to be at least satisfactorily organized, what is 
the want of unity, of serious organization, how urgent it is to create or 
improve all sorts of communications, to provide for the police and 
security of the country at large. 2 
One of the consequences of the Paknam incident was King Chulalongkorn's 
prolonged and serious illness. The King was deeply regretful of the loss of Siamese 
territory and was afraid of being blamed for this. His illness started in September 
1 At that time the Mahatthai and Kalahom were still territorial Ministries. They 
became different functional Ministries at the death of Chaophraya Rattanathibet 
(Phum Sichaiyan), the Kalahom Minister, in 1894, when the s.outhe:n. provi.nces 
were transferred under Prince Damrong, henceforth the InterIor MInIster, In 
charge of provinces all over the country except the capital. 
2 Rolin-Jaequemyns to F. Verney, Secretary to the Siamese Legation in London, 16 
Aug.1893, PRO FO 69/141. 
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1893 and became aggravated because of his refusal to take any medicine. He wrote 
many letters to his relatives, for instance Prince Damrong, to describe his Sorrow 
about the incident and warn of his impending death. 3 It was fortunate for Siam that 
King Chulalongkorn survived his illness, for otherwise there might have been a 
chaotic situation consequent upon the vacation of the throne. This would have given 
an opportunity to ambitious French colonialists who were on the look-out for such a 
chance to annex Siam. 
Two prIme questions about the Chakri Refomation are: what was the Chakri 
Reformation and when did it start and end? The Chakri Reformation was a period 
of dramatic changes in the administration of Siam which were motivated by the 
realization of the Siamese Government and the ruling elite that Siam could only 
secure its independence by the reorganization of its administration and the 
maintenance of internal order. The process started simultaneously in most Ministries 
after the Paknam Crisis of 1893. Some scholars have opined that it started from the 
beginning of the Chakri Dynasty, some at the beginning of King Mongkut's reign, 
some at the second coronation of King Chulalongkorn in 1873. But the changes in 
those periods represented ordinary progress in the society which only gradually 
changed at a modest pace. This study views the Chakri Reformation in terms of 
dramatic changes which affected the whole country, ie. after Paknam. The 
termination of the Chakri Reformation is more debatable. Some argue that the 
Conscription Act of 1905 was the last important act which affected the majority of 
the Siamese people. Therefore the Reform ended in 1905. But in a legal context, the 
judicial reform continued until at least the departure of Prince Raphi from the 
3 Natawut Sutthisongkram, Somdet Phra Piyamaharaj (Chulalongkorn the Great) 
(Bangkok, 1987), pp.297 - 299. 
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Ministry of Justice at the end of May 1910, which marked a major set-back for the 
Ministry of Justice as will be illustrated in the chapter on Prince Raphi.4 
If one looks back to the time of King Chulalongkorn's second coronation In 
1873, the King made efforts to develop the country and at the same time to regain 
the powers of the monarch from the Regent which led to the Front Palace incident in 
1875, when he had to stop his programmes. After the Regent's death, in 1883, the 
King gradually re-established his power, and had largely attained absolute power by 
1885. But at that time the King became complacent with his authority, because there 
was no lasting challenge, and the balance between his power and the progress of the 
country proceeded very slowly. In 1888, the King established a trial cabinet and 
appointed his brothers as Ministers in most Ministries mainly still in order to secure 
his status and increase h is power. The French aggression in Siam's northeast territory 
became increasingly important, but the King and his brothers remained hopeful that 
In case of French in vasion the British would support them. The real cabinet was 
announced on I April 1892, but it did nothing to prevent the Paknam incident. After 
the crisis the King and all the Siamese elite realized that they could not rely on 
British support and they had to stand on their own feet to reorganize the country 
radically to secure Siam's continuing independence. The changes in the reign of King 
Wachirawut, Chulalongkorn's son who suceeded him (1910-1925), were only to 
continue his job. This section is designed to illustrate reform in different Ministries 
related to each other. The Chakri Reformation brought about advance in many 
different aspects of the Siamese administration which this chapter is about to 
investigate as follows: 
I. Military Reform 
2. Provincial Centralization 
4 One might indeed argue that the Chakri Reformation c?nt~nued until the end of the 
first half of King W3chirawut's Reign (1917), as he stIli Implemented many 
changes in that period. 
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3. Financial Reform 
4. Education Reform 
Each of these is already covered by a substantial study, N.A.Battye's "Society and 
Military in the Fifth Reign Thailand", Tej Bunnag's The Provincial Administration of 
Siam, I.G.Brown's "The Ministry of Finance in the Fifth Reign", D.K.Wyatt's Politics 
of Reform. 
Section I Military Reform 
The Paknam incident marked the failure of the Siamese Navy to resist the 
French gunboats. The fight was limited to a small area at Paknam, the province at 
the mouth of the Chaophraya (Bangkok) River. The Siamese army was not directly 
involved in the crisis of 1893, but there was evidence of a shortage of troops during 
the incident. 5 
1. Phan urangsi's proposal of reform 
The military reform started half a year after the Paknam CrISIS. On 4 March 
1894, Prince Phanurangsi, one of the King's full brothers and the Minister of War, 
presented the King with an analysis of military organization, an assessment of 
strength and a reform proposal. The Prince criticized the lack of co-ordination 
between the Ministry of the South (the old Kalahom) and the new Ministry of War. 
He stressed the need for a single, central authority to concentrate all the military 
functions within a single ministry in order to overcome the overlap of offices and 
duties within the military affairs. He also advocated the extension of military 
organization throughout all prOVInces and the increase of the army to 16,000 men. 
Provincial military organization was to follow on the heels of the new centralized 
provincial government (thesaphihan) as that reached into the country. By 23 April 
5 N.A. Battye, "State, Society and the Military in the Fifth Reign Thailand", Cornell 
Univ. Ph.D. Thesis, 1974. p.375. 
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1894, Phanurangsi secured the support of a council of eight ministers, seven of them 
princes, for his first reform proposal.6 
The King's health relapses and delays the reform 
King Chulalongkorn's health relapsed in June 1894, and the Government came 
to a stand-still and the issue of the succession to the throne diverted attention from 
reform. Most of the Princes left Bangkok to visit the King at Si Chang, an island in 
the Siamese Gulf where the King mostly had his holidays. The King's death was 
believed imminent. The British Legation supported the Crown Prince, Wachirunhit, 
10 order to secure his uncle, Foreign Minister, Prince Thewawong's position. On the 
other hand, Prince Phanurangsi was suspected of counting on French support to 
counter the plan of his riva!.7 Fortunately, most of the princes came to the same 
conclusion that if there were any quarrels between them regarding the succession to 
the throne, they would seriously imperil the independence of Siam because it would 
open the way for the French or the British to colonize or partition Siam. Therefore 
the Princes united behind the Crown Prince as heir. 
One difficult problem wh ich would have ensued with regard to the succession 
of the throne had the King died, was who was to be appointed as Regent to govern 
the country in the name of the Crown Prince until the latter came of age. This might 
have caused a serious problem in Siam had the King died, but it was fortunate for 
Siam that the King did survive his illness. 
2. Phanurangsi's proposal fails and the decline of the Army 
When King Chulalongkorn was clear of danger in the second half of 1894, 
Rolin-Jaequemyns, the Belgian international lawyer and General Adviser to the 
6 Ibid., pp.374-375. 
7 Ibid., p.376. 
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Siamese Goverment, devised a national plan which was read to the King by Prince 
Damrong, fast establishing himself as the King's favourite after the Paknam incident. 
This plan rested on the proposition that the safety and existence of Siam as an 
independent state depended on urgent internal reforms. It was essential that the King 
set his kingdom in order by manifesting himself as a strong ruler and patriarch. The 
highest priority had to be given to public security and the administration of justice. 
There must be an end to legal delays. Mil itary reform was not absolutely urgent and 
the army and the navy were assigned low priorities.8 The King agreed with 
Jaequemyns' plan and disregarded Phanurangsi's urgent military reform. 
The military share of the budget began to decline gradually according to the 
re-ordering of the national priorities as statistics show as follows: 18% in 1894/5, 
19.3% in 95/6, then 16.3% in 96/97, 13.1 %, 12.4%, 13.8%, and in 1900/01 only 12.1 %. 
In 1898/9 the Ministry of Interior received a larger share of the budget than the 
Ministry of War and, by 1902/03, War received less than half the allocation of 
Interior.9 
Prince Phanurangsi resigned his post in 1896 after the military share of budget 
decreased dramatically. It is evident that his resignation was caused by his failure to 
convince the King and his colleague Ministers of the importance of military reform. 
Phanurangsi's failure was not his fault but because of the circumstances of Siam at 
that particular period, and the increasing favour of the King towards Prince Damrong 
who pressed the importance of provincial centralization. Another important reason 
which caused the decline of the army was the general Siamese idea of a military 
career as unattractive, as Wyatt explains in his book The Politics of Reform in 
Thailand for the I880s: 
8 Ibid., p.378. 
9 Ibid., p.381. 
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Siamese parents were hesitant to send their sons to the new schools, 
fearful that the schools were but devices for recruiting boys into the 
army... The King acted to dispel their fears in a decree of I May 
1885, in which he explained that the rumors to the effect that the 
schools were merely a disguised form of conscription were completely 
unfounded, and that, if he wished to conscript men into the army, he 
had no need to go to the trouble and expense of founding schools. lO 
Battye also stresses the low general estimate of the prospect of a military 
career in the eyes of the Siamese general public which left a shortage of men entering 
military service. ll Prince Phanurangsi's resignation caused more suffering to the 
army because he was a full brother of the King who voiced his opinion and fought 
battles in the cabinet to gain more budget for the army. The Siamese army at that 
time needed a strong leader to reform the military administration and play a 
considerable role in keeping the peace of the country. 
3. Prince Chira and the new era of the Army 
Prince Chira Prawat Woradet who was to succeed in persuading King 
Chulalongkorn to regard the army as the top priority was born on 7 November 1876. 
He was the seventeenth son of King Chulalongkorn by Chaochom manda Thap Thim, 
mother also to a later Minister of Defence, Prince Singhwikrom Wutthichai. He was 
educated in Siamese and English in the palace, and at Suan Kulap (Rose Garden) 
School. At the age of nine, the Prince became one of the first sons of the King to be 
sent to England for education at the King's personal expense. He later graduated 
from the Royal Danish School of the General Staff as an army officer and came back 
to Siam to serve in the Department of the General Staff in April 1898. Prince Chira 
began to urge his father in 1899 that Siam could support an army of ten divisions of 
10 O.K. Wyatt, Politics of Reform in Thailand: Education in the Reign of King 
Chulalongkorn (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1969), pp.115-116. 
11 N.A. Battye, op.cit., p.381. 
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ten thousand troops each. With such a force, he reckoned, the French army in Indo-
China, Siam's most likely opponent, could be countered. 12 
Two external conditions which motivated Chulalongkorn to reconsider his idea 
of the army were; firstly, his knowledge of Western treatment of China after its 
defeat by the Japanese in 1895. Secondly, the King anticipated imminent problems 
stemming from the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1893, by which France had insisted on 
occupying Chantabun even though Siam had fulfilled its parts of the treaty (France 
claimed to occupy Chantabun in order to obtain a guarantee that Siam would fulfil its 
obligations of the treaty). After many vain attempts to renegotiate with France, the 
King continued to worry about Siam's independence. 
4. Universal Conscription substituted for Patron-client Relations (Corvee) 
In Siam under the old corvee system every free commoner male (this term 
excluded slaves) who was not an official was required to pay a head tax, or, as an 
alternative, to serve the Government for three months a year, each under the 
direction of an official patron to whom he was responsible. Commoners would derive 
legal protection from their patrons in return for their services. This meant that when 
commoners had been injured or their rights were infringed by outsiders, their patrons 
would take legal proceedings for them. Earlier, the required service period had been 
four months, and before that Six. 13 Theoretically, men had the right to choose their 
patrons. This traditional system was organized to control the amount and the flow of 
Siamese population. 
In 190 I, the Siamese army was still rather weak. There were only about four or 
five thousand troops who were capable of combat, and the method of raising men on 
12 Ibid., p.405. . . 
13 For more detail of the llai-phrai (patron-client) system see Kachorn Sukhaphalllt III 
Thanandon phrai (The Status of Commoner) (Bangkok, 1971). 
140 
the basis of the corvee system had long been unworkable. By that time Prince Chira 
had successfully persuaded the King to believe that Siam could create a strong army. 
The King made his decision in favour of Prince Chira in November 1901. The 
Military Council which included Prince Chira, the Commander-in-Chief of the army, 
and Prince Phanurangsi, the Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy 
who had been enticed back out of retirement, agreed that a large army could only be 
recruited by military conscription. 14 
Prince Damrong, the Minister of Interior and a member of the Military Council, 
anticipated popular opposition to this plan. The Prince argued that the enactment of 
compulsory universal conscription would incite rebellion and mass desertion. He 
suggested that the Government give something as an incentive for the service, for 
instance, upon completion of their service, conscripts could be exempted from 
payment of the poll-tax that other commoners had to pay in lieu of service. The 
King agreed with his idea. 15 Prince Damrong was of the opinion that universal 
conscription and tax collection could entail the abolition of the traditional corvee 
system. But it was obvious that this method would seriously threaten the power and 
wealth of the nobles who would no longer be able to call for personal service. Prince 
Phanurangsi suggested that a cash compensation be paid to those who suffered from 
the loss of services and taxes enjoyed under the old system, but the majority of the 
. d h' 'd 16 councIl oppose IS 1 ea. 
Prince Chira volunteered to draft the Conscription Act according to the consensus 
of the meeting on 30 November. He finished the draft of the Act and submitted it to 
the King on 7 January 1903.17 The King gave this draft Act to Prince Damrong to 
14 N.A. Battye, op.cit., p.407. 
15 Ibid., p.408, and the Report of the Military Council's meeting, 30 Nov .190 I, NA 
R5 Kk 13.2/21. 
16 Ibid., p.410. 
17 Chira to King, 7 Jan.1903, NA R5 Kk 13.3/6. 
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make comments and revise on 6 February.18 This is one of the incidents which 
indicates clearly that after the Paknam incident the King trusted Damrong's opinion 
more than Foreign Minister Thewa wong's. In his letter of 16 February to the King, 
Damrong was of the opinion that some provisions in the draft Act needed revision 
and owing to the importance of this Act he dared not correct it alone. He requested 
the King to call the meeting of the Council of the Ministers to review this draft 
Act. 19 
The King disagreed with Dam rong by expressmg his ideas in a letter of 19 
February to Damrong anticipating problems and difficulties as following: firstly, he 
believed that the majority of the Council of Ministers would oppose the plan and this 
might lead to the delay and abandonment of the Act. Secondly, he planned to 
promulgate the U ni versal Conscription Act gradually from monthon to monthon 
(circle) all over the country. This process would consume a long period of time. The 
meeting of the Council of Ministers, if it took place, would panic the public and 
would afford a good opportunity for people to oppose the plan, or for persons who 
wished to incite a rebellion to do so. Lastly, the meeting of the Council of Ministers 
would be reported by the newspapers and would cause suspicion among the Western 
powers who might obstruct the plan. The King believed that the meeting of the 
council of Ministers should not be called until the plan was successfully tried in some 
Monthons. 2o 
S. The Implementation of the Conscription Regulation 1903 
Instead of implementing the Conscription Act, the King issued a "Conscription 
Regulation 1903" and implemented it for the first time in monthon Nakhon 
Ratchasima in the Northeast. This regulation was composed of nine sections which 
18 King to Damrong, 6 Feb.1903, NA RS Kk 13.3/6. 
19 Damrong to King, 16 Feb.1903, NA RS Kk 13.2/26. 
20 King to Damrong, 19 Feb.1903, N A RS Kk 13.2/26. 
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dealt with the name of the regulation, the age of men who were under the regulation, 
the exemptions, the registration, the method of selecting, the release from the 
regulation, the departments in charge, the punishments, and the Ministries which 
supervised this regulation respectively.21 Under the absolute monarchy system, the 
King could still bypass a regulation without any meeting of the Council of Ministers. 
But the main purpose of bypassing the Council of Ministers was to avoid alarming the 
public. 
Before the implementation of the 1903 Conscription Regulation there occurred 
"The Holy Mens Rebellion" or Kahol Phu Mi Bun in the Northeast of Siam at the 
beginning of 1902. Because of the inadequacy of the troops sent out from Bangkok, 
the conscript army of Nakhon Ratchasima participated in the suppressing of the 
uprising which was defeated in April 1903.22 The following Shan Rebellion which 
.--.-~.-.~-.-
occurred later in 1902, in the Nonn of Siam, caused the King to order the provincial 
-;- --/ 
authorities of Phitsanulok and Nakhon Sawan to muster men and arms wherever they 
could find them and to march North to engage the Shans while Bangkok prepared an 
army itself. This caused the King to order the implementation of the 1903 
Conscription Regulation to momhon Phitsanulok and Nakhon Sawan in August 1903.23 
These two risings were suppressed with some difficulties and delay because of the 
Siamese Government's lack of a strong army and these incidents confirmed the King's 
ideas of the need for creating a strong army. 
6. The Conscription Act 1905 and its consequences 
After the Conscription Regulation of 1903 had been successfully implemented 
10 monthon Nakhon Ratchasima, Phitsanulok and Nakhon Sawan, the King called for 
21 The Conscription Regulation 1903, NA R5 Kk 13.3/6. 
22 The conference report of the application of the Conscription Regulation, ~8 
Aug. I 905, NA R5 Kk 13.3/5. 
23 Damrong to King, I I A ug.1903, N A R5 Kk 13.2/26. 
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a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 28 August 1905, in order to consult them 
whether it was the right time to promulgate the Universal Conscription Act all over 
the country. He delivered a speech in the meeting that: 
I hesitated to promulgate this Act at the beginning because; firstly, I 
was afraid that the Western powers would misunderstand that Siam was 
preparing for a war and at that time the problem with France still 
existed. Secondly, this is a very important Act which would change 
the old tradition of the corvee system that affects the whole country 
and probably cause alarm to the people. Consequently, I issued a 
Conscription Regulation in 1903 in three Monthons which proved to be 
successful. But the regulation is not a law so that the application of 
the regulation to an offender might cause problems. Now the Franco-
Siamese Treaty of 1904 has been finally signed and I consider the time 
has come to promulgate this Act all over the country.24 
The Council of Ministers agreed with the King and the Conscription Act was 
promulgated in October 1905. The content of the Act was very similar to the 
Conscription Regulation of 1903, but the exemptions in the new Act stated clearly 
that the Act was not applicable to the members of the Royal Family and the high 
government officials who had been given titles, and if they wished to serve in the 
army they should be appointed in high positions according to their qualifications. 
The Act included the schedule of implementation to each monthon and monthons all 
over the country would be under this Act by 1916.25 
The Consequences of the Conscription Act 
The Conscription Act 1905 had three profound effects in Siam. Firstly, it created 
a strong, effective and efficient army to maintain the stability inside the kingsom 
and in the Siamese Government's contemplation, to defend the country. Secondly, it 
, 
released the peasants from the burdensome corvee system to become free citizens who 
enjoyed an equal and independen t life. Thirdly, the corvee system had prevented the 
emergence of bourgeois or middle class people because commoners were subject to 
24 The meeting report of the Council of Ministers, 28 Aug.1905, NA R5 Kk 13.3/6. 
25 The Conscription Act 1905. N A R5 K k 13.3/6. 
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the control of their official patrons and a limitation of trade ensued. The Act 
abolished the corvee and created middle class people who subsequently played a great 
role in developing Siam. The legal consequence was that the Act abolished the legal 
relation between commoners and their patrons; commoners were no longer under legal 
protection of their patrons and therefore they had a right to proceed in both criminal 
and civil actions in the court by themselves. As a consequence, they also were more 
free to testify as witnesses in the courts of justice without any threat from their 
patrons. 
Section II Provincial Centralization 
The traditional Siamese provincial administration was divided into the 
Ministry of the North (lvt ahatthai) responsible for the administration of the northern 
provinces, the Ministry of the South (Kalahom) responsible for the administration of 
the southern provinces, and the Phrakhlallg responsible for a few of the Gulf of Siam 
provInces. Prince Damrong, a half brother of the King, was the Minister of the 
North for over two years before he became the first Minister of Interior on 23 
December 1894. The Ministry of the South was finally dissolved upon the retirement 
of its Minister, Chaophraya Rattanath ibet (Phum Sichaiyan), in 1894. Its territorial 
responsibilities were transferred to the Ministry of the North (Mahatthai) and it was 
then merged with the Ministry of Defence. The Mahatthai then became the Ministry 
with sole responsibility for the kingdom's provincial administration and was called the 
Ministry of Interior from 1894. 26 
The traditional provincial administration became unworkable because, firstly, 
the central Government \\'3S IJcking in resources and could not afford to pay regular 
26 Tej Bunnag, The Provincial Adm inistration of Siam 1892-1915 (Kuala Lumpur, 
1977), pp.92-93. 
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salaries to its officials. The officials had to make a living out of their job which led 
to much abuse in the administration. Secondly, the traditional administration was 
lacking in functional differentiation. The direct consequence of this was the 
inefficiency of all the government departments resulting in long delays and waste of 
resources. Thirdly, during Prince Damrong's unprecedented provincial tour to find 
out the intrinsic defects of the traditional system of provincial administration during 
October to December 1892, he found that the quality of the officials in the provincial 
administration was generally poor. He strongly criticized many of the governors who 
made a living out of the provincial administration, and that many of the governors 
were too old to perform their duties. 27 
New Policy of Provincial Administration 
The traditional system of provincial administration was largely put right by 
Prince Damrong between 1892 and 1899. During his first two years 1892-1894, he 
transformed the Ministry of the North into the basis of the modern Ministry of 
Interior. The old Ministry, whose sphere of activities had overlapped those of other 
Ministries, became a Ministry with a clearly differentiated function. The old 
departments whose responsibilities had overlapped each other's became functionally 
differentiated departments. New men were recruited and given a new professional 
training. 28 After he had established the modern Ministry of Interior as the centre of 
administration, he was searching for a new system of provincial administration. 
Prince Damrong did not create a new method of provincial administration by 
himself but was able to apply the ideas of the experimental cabinet expressed in 1891 
about the provincial administration, namely that the Government should, first of all, 
continue to create High Commissionerships which would superimpose a centralized 
27 Ibid., pp.99-100. 
28 Ibid., p.98. 
146 
structure of command upon the traditional provincial administration. Secondly, it 
should terminate the provincial nobility's almost independent existence by 
transforming them into salaried civil servants. Thirdly and fourthly, it should 
systematically centralize the judicial and financial administration of the prOVInces. 
The fifth step was added by Prince Damrong in 1892, that the Government should 
also secure the cooperation of the people for the lower levels of every sphere of 
provincial administration. 29 
I. The Creation of monlhon as the Basis of Provincial Administration 
After the Paknam crisis of 1893 had passed, Damrong pursued his new policy 
of provincial centralization by establishing "monthon" as the basis of provincial 
administration. Between 1893 and 1899, fourteen commissionerships were established 
on these principles. The commissioner was given the new name of superintendent 
commissioner or kha/uang lhesaphihall, and his area of jurisdiction was called an 
administrative circle or monlhon. 30 
In order to enforce the policies of provincial administration through the monthon, 
m 1897 Damrong issued the Act concerning district administration or the 
Phraratchaballyat /aksalla pokkhrong thongthi, and the regulations concerning 
provincial administration or the Khobangkhap pokkhrong huamuang. By these two 
laws, the functions and powers of the muang and district officials were defined with 
great preCISion. The heads of large muang were placed directly under the 
superintendent commissioners, the head of their mOllthon, and were directly appointed 
by the King. It was planned that all directives should be sent to the superintendent 
commissioners, who then passed them to the muang chiefs for implementation at the 
lower levels; viz the muang, district, communal and village administration. 31 
29 Ibid., pp.IOO-IOI. 
30 Ibid., p.IO I. 
31 Ibid., pp.l 18-119. 
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The monthon was the backbone of the provincial administration and it was also 
the unit for other Ministries to attach their officials to, for instance, monthon military 
assistant comm issioner, mUI1Lhon reven ue commissioner, monthon education officer. 
These officers were selected and assigned by their Ministries which gave directives 
and received response by the chain of monthon administration.32 But it was accepted 
that they were under indirect command of the superintendent commissioners, as the 
heads of the monthon. 
2. The Integration of the Tributary states into the Thesaphiban system 
The Ministry of Interior proceeded also to integrate the peripheral tributary states 
into the Thesaphiban system in 1899 because, firstly, the Siamese considered that they 
had to be integrated in order to secure the kingdom's territorial integrity against 
continued pressure from France and Britain. Secondly, despite the Anglo-French 
Declaration of 15 January 1896, the Siamese Government realized that the declaration 
had not guaranteed Siamese control of the tributary states. Therefore, it was necessary 
for them to integrate the tributary states into the Thesaphiban system in order to 
guard against any further loss of the territory. Thirdly, the centralization of the 
judicial and financial systems of the tributary states were major purposes of the 
Siamese Government because the uniform and progressIve judicial system would 
eliminate the extraterritoriality enjoyed by the western powers, and the financial 
centralization would bring about more efficient tax collection and more revenue from 
all over the country to finance all the reforms of the country. 
When Prince Damrong extended the Thesaphiban system to the northeast and 
the north of Siam, there were some opponents who objected to the destruction of the 
32 W.J. Siffin, The Thai Burureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development 
(Honolulu, 1966), p.86. 
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old system. This perhaps helped to cause two UPrISIngs In 1902, namely the Holv 
Men or Phu mi bun rebellion in the northeast, and the Shan rebellion in the north. 
According to Tej Bunnag, in his book The Provincial Administration of Siam, 1892-
1915, both uprisings had related to some local nobility who suffered from the change 
and opposed the reform but this is disputed elsewhere .. 33 However, the Siamese 
authorities were able to suppress the uprisings with some difficulty. These two 
rebellions apparently worried the Siamese Government whether it had made the 
correct decision to centralize the tributary states before the situation had got out of 
hand. 34 
The provincial centralization proceeded seriously after the Paknam incident as 
evidenced in the creation by Prince Damrong of monthon as the basis of the 
Thesaphiban system after the crisis had passed. The completion largely by 1899 of 
the Thesaphiban system or mOlllhon organization strengthened the Siamese 
Government because the modern and efficient provincial administration collected 
more revenue, upgraded the j ud icial system, and modernized every aspect of 
administration. Every sphere and level of provincial administration had been 
centralized and controlled by the mOlllhon headquarters. The provincial centralization 
had considerable impact over the whole area of Siam except Bangkok, the capital and 
the most important city of Siam, which was main residential area for European 
people; therefore it had small impact on them. 
33 Tej Bunnag, op.cit., pp.151- 152. With regard to the Northern rebellion A. 
Ramsay, "Modernization and Reaction Rebellion in Northern Siam", Journal of 
Asian Studies, XXXVIII (Feb. 1979), 283-298, especially footnote 39, suggested 
that the Shan rebellion in Phrae was caused only by Shan immigrants, and the Lao 
Princes were forced to cooperate. Chaophraya Surasak, the Commander-in-Chief 
sent by Bangkok, used this opportunity to punish the Lao Princes in order to scare 
them, a view apparen tl y substan tiated above, chapter 4, p.126. 
34 Tej Bunnag, Ibid .. pp.15-1- 155. 
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Section III Financial Reform 
One of the significant changes in the Siamese financial system which 
happened in June 1873 was the establishment of the Central tax Office (Hor 
Ratsadakornphiphat). King Chulalongkorn was very much involved in financial 
reform because he realized that the progress of the reforms he might accomplish and 
the extent of his absolute power would depend upon the provision of adequate 
revenues, and the traditional organization of state finances would not suffice to raise 
them. 35 This motivated the King to establish a Ministry of Finance, as one of the 
twelve Ministries in the trial cabinet in 1888, to be in charge of taxes and public 
revenue and expenditure. 
Despite the establishment of the central Tax Office and the Ministry of 
Finance, the Siamese tax system was still far short of efficient. Mr.Mitchell-Innes, 
who became the first Financial Adviser to the Siamese Government in 1896, 
described the Siamese fiscal system in his report of 6 September 1896: 
A I most all the tax collect ion v iolates the principles of good taxation. 
They press more heavily on the poor than on the rich, they interfere 
with commerce, they are easy to evade, difficult to collect and 
impossible to control. Taxes are collected in many different ways, 
some taxes are collected by the Ministry of Finance, some by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, some by the Ministry of Interior, while some 
are given out to farmers. As regards the control it may truly be said 
that there is no means of properly controlling either the revenue or the 
expenditure. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that there is no such 
thing as inspector [sic] in any branch of the finance. There is the 
absence of organization. Actually there is no existence of the Ministry 
of Finance in the proper sense of the word and this Ministry of 
Finance is indeed little more than an office for the receipt of portions 
f I . 36 of the revenue and the payment 0 sa arIes." 
35 . 53 O.K. Wyatt, Op.Cl!., p. . 
36 Mitchell-Innes's Report on the Financial System of Siam, 6 Sep!.1896, NA R5 Kkh 
5.1/14. 
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1. The Appointment of Prince Mahit as Minister of Finance 
After slow progress from 1888 to 1896, the appointment to the Ministry of 
Finance of Prince Mahit, another half brother of the King, in 1896, was a sign of 
advance for the ministry. His main policy was to establish a system of efficient and 
effective budget procedures. He demanded that every ministry submit its preliminary 
expenditure estimates to the Ministry of Finance before the council of Ministers met 
to consider the budget, but at first most ministers ignored and did not cooperate with 
his requirement. The King's outburst in January 1899 on being told of this by Prince 
Mahit, at last convinced the Ministers of the importance of submitting their 
preliminary expenditure estimates to the Ministry of Finance on time .. 37 
After the reorganization of budgetary control, Prince Mahit faced some 
difficulties in raising money to finance the northern railway's construction and the 
modernization of the army. These two projects were necessary because the Siamese 
Government wanted to maintain control of its northern tributary states after the Shan 
Rebellion of 1902 which had shaken its position in the north. Owing to a shortage of 
resources to finance both programmes, Prince Mahit explained the need for a 
European loan; otherwise the Government had to stop the reform programmes .. 38 The 
King, being convinced by Prince Chira that the modernization of the army was 
necessary to keep the internal peace and deter French aggression, reprimanded Mahit 
and ordered that the suppression of disorder had priority over long-term economic 
development and commanded Mahit to find money; if necessary, railways could be set 
aside .. 39 
37 J.G. Brown, "The Ministry of Finance and the Early Development of Modern 
Financial Administration in Siam. 1885-1910", London Univ. Ph.D., 1975, p.89. 
38 Ibid., p.129. 
39 N.A. Battye, op.cit., p.428. 
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Despite strong opposition to the European loan by Princes Thewawong and 
Narit, former Minister of Finance, the King, being advised by Mr.Strobel, the 
American General Adviser to the Siamese Government, in favour of the loan, 
proceeded with the plan. With the help of Phraya Suriya, the Siamese Ambassador in 
Paris, the first European loan was successfully negotiated in April 1905;40 and the 
Siamese Government could proceed with the reform programmes. 
2. The Currency Reform and the Abolition of the Gambling Dens 
In November 1902 Siam had abandoned the silver standard and adopted a 
gold-exchange standard. Under the new exchange mechanism one of the principal 
obligations of the Ministry of Finance was to ensure that the Treasury always had 
sufficient reserves of baht coin to meet all the demands of the Bangkok banks in 
connection with the financing of the trade of the kingdom. Were the Ministry to fail 
in that obligation, the kingdom's trade could grind to a halt. Rivett-Carnac, the new 
Financial Adviser, argued that the Government could not allow its reserves to fall 
below twenty- two m ill ion haht (Siamese currency) without endangering trade . .41 
The actual gold standard Act was promulgated in November 1908. The reason 
for introducing this Act was to maintain the stability of the rate of exchange in order 
to secure the trade of the kingdom. Th is Act determined the issue of coin and fixed 
the value of the baht, the Siamese monetary unit, as equivalent to a certain weight of 
gold, and the reserve fund was set up to stabilize the rate of exchange between the 
Siamese currency and the foreign ones . .42 
40 I.G. Brown, op.cit., p.148. For government priorities in this period, see also I.G. 
Brown, The Elite and the Economv in Siam, c.1890-1920 (Singapore, 1988). 
41 Ibid., p.137. 
42 Prachoom Chomch3i, Chublongkorn the Great (Tokyo, 1965), p.86. 
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The abolition of gambling dens had been initiated by Prince Chakrapatphong, 
a full- brother of the King, in the late 1880s when he had been appointed the 
Minister of Finance. The closure of gambling dens by Chakrapatphong had been 
limited to the Bangkok area . .43 Later, in May 1898, Prince Damrong, the Minister of 
Interior, and Prince Mahit, the Minister of Finance at that time, decided also to 
abolish all the provincial gambling farms where the revenue was small or where the 
existence of the dens was found to be encouraging crime . .44 The Council of 
Ministers' decision on 14 January 1905, concluded that the remaining gambling dens 
should be gradually closed down over a period of three years . .45 The abolition of 
gambling dens was gradually and successfully implemented all over the country, and 
the Siamese Government successfully recovered the lost gambling tax by raising the 
level of the land tax. 
The Siamese Government proclaimed the Note Act in 1902 because the 
commerce in the kingdom had grown considerably more than before, and circulation 
of money as a medium of exchange thus became more rapid. Therefore the ministry 
of Finance arranged the paper-money called notes to render counting and inspection 
convenient and carrying easier than that of a good deal of money . .46 
3.Prince Mahit's resignation and the appointment of Phraya Suriya as the 
Min ister of Finance 
Prince Mahit resigned from the Ministry of Finance in 1906 officially on the 
ground of bad health, but I.G. Brown in his thesis indicated that Mahit's opponent in 
the Council of Ministers, Prince Thewawong, who was resentful of Mahit's success in 
43 Ibid., p.67. 
44 I.G. Brown, "The Ministry of Finance", p.ISl. 
45 Ibid., p.155. 
46 Prachoom Chomchai, op.cit.. p.80. 
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floating the European loan, used the so-called "Book Club" issue to force Mahit's 
resignation. The British Minister had complained that Mahit used his influence to 
benefit the Book Club, the first Siamese bank which began business on 4 October 
1904 . .47 
Phraya Suriya (Koet Bunnag, 1862-1937), a son of Phraya Montrisuriyawong 
(Chum Bunnag) and a grandson of Somdet Chaophraya Borommahaprayurawong (Dit 
Bunnag), and formerly a leading Siamese diplomat in Europe, was appointed the new 
Minister of Finance in June 1906. According to Brown, he soon greatly antagonised 
the King, Princes Thewawong and Damrong. The King criticized Suriya severely, 
argumg that a loss of revenue to the kingdom was caused by Suriya's lack of ability, 
causmg everyone to despise him. Damrong asserted that no one had faith in 
Suriya . .48 Suriya and Damrong were in dispute over the audit by which Suriya tried 
to increase his power to audit the finance of other Ministries . .49 
Suriya's failure in tax collection was not actually his fault for the reduction of 
revenue was intensified by the poor monsoons of 1906 and 1907 and also the collapse 
of the opium monopoly. The poor level of agricultural production discouraged the 
tax farmers from competing for the farms which caused a further loss of revenue. 
Suriya's policy was distinct from the King and other Ministers, for instance, he 
insisted on his recommendation to establish a national bank to give credit to poor 
farmers, stimulate cultivation, and confer benefit to Government revenue rather than 
• '1 50 the construction of ral ways. His policies were consistent with his book, 
Suppayasat, which he wrote later In 1911. In this book he pointed out that the basic 
problem of the economy of Siam was the unequal distribution of income and wealth. 
47 l.G. Brown, "The Ministry of Finance", pp.162-163. 
48 Ibid., p.187. 
49 Ibid., p.178. 
50 Ibid., p.127. 
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The problem was not adequately dealt with by King Chulalongkorn because various 
reforms of the King had not fundamentally changed the structure of Siamese 
. 51 H' b SOCIety. IS ook was duly suppressed. 
Phraya Suriya was forced to resIgn as the Minister of Finance in February 
1908 probably because of his socialist ideas rather than his failure in tax collection 
caused by monsoons. Another possible reason was that he was not a member of the 
royal family but a son of a noble of the Bunnag family. He was replaced by Prince 
Kittiyakorn, a son of King Chulalongkorn, in February 1908. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Siamese Government regarded the 
tax-farm system as an inefficient and oppressive way of collecting the kingdom's 
revenue. It developed the new idea of collection of revenue by direct Government 
agency which was believed to be the most effective, efficient, and least oppressive 
method of securing the Government's tax income. 52 
Even though the Ministry of Finance was first established in the trial cabinet in 
1888, there was no radical change in its administration under Princes Narathip, Narit, 
and Sirithat, all half-brothers to the King, as the Ministers of Finance in 1889-1893, 
1893-1894, 1894-1896 respectively. The dramatic reforms were initiated when Prince 
Mahit was appointed the Minister in 1896, and after the report of Mitchell-Innes 
about the defect in the financial administration of Siam. During 1896-1904, Mahit 
reorganized the financial system by introducing budgetary control, the Note Act, the 
Gold Standard Act, and the first local bank, the Book Club which became the Siam 
Commercial Bank. He also started abolishing the tax-farm system and completed the 
abolition of the gambling dens. That the financial system operated more efficiently 
51 Phraya Suriyanuwat, SuppaV3sat (Bangkok, 1911), pp.71-74. 
52 I.G. Brown, "The Ministry of Finance", p.342. 
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facilitated the Government administration. 
Section IV Educational Reform 
I. Traditional Siamese Education 
Traditional Siamese education was based on the monastery as the place of 
learning where monks were teachers. When the parents wanted their children to be 
educated, they would send their children to monks who taught the boys in reading 
and writing of Siamese, Pali and a fair amount of arithmetic. The aim was to give 
them basic knowledge which would enable them to continue on their own. It can be 
seen that this system of education was confined solely to men, while women stayed at 
home and were educated III domestic affairs by their parents. When King Mongkut 
became King in 1851, he realized the importance of western education, so he 
employed Anna Leonowens from Singapore to teach his children English during 
1862-1867. This was the first step in adopting western-style education in Siam. The 
young Prince Chulalongkorn was one of her pupils. 
It was during the Regency period, 1868-1873, that the new King 
Ch ulalongkorn paid two trips to Singapore and India in the early and late months of 
1871. These two trips had favourable effects on the progress of education because 
upon his return the King commanded that a school be set up in the Grand Palace to 
teach Siamese and English to the children of the Royal Family and civil servants. 
Phraya Sisunthorn Woharn (Noi Achariyangkul) and Mr.Francis Patterson were 
responsible for Siamese and English teaching respectively. This school was named 
"Suan Kularp" or Rose Garden School. 53 
53 Prachoom Chomchai, op.~it., p.98. 
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The Front Palace (Wang Na) incident of 1875 marked a serious conflict 
between the conservatives led by Si Suriyawong, the former Regent, and the 
reformers led by the King. The course of reform proceeded much slower and no 
fundamental change was initiated by the King for nearly ten years. But four months 
after the incident, the King made some small progress in education by issuing a 
decree calling for the extension of public primary education under royal patronage to 
all the royal monasteries. The King expressed his real concern for the quality of the 
traditional Siamese education, the monk-teachers and textbooks they were using. It is 
evident that this decree of 1875 had absolutely no effect at the time it was issued. 
Contemporary sources make no mention of any regular teaching having been 
established in the royal monasteries; they report on no distribution of textbooks and 
no public examinations.54 The decree seems to have had absolutely no effect. This 
might have been caused by the political intrigues during that time in view of the fact 
that when an identical decree was issued nine years later, after the death of Si 
Suriyawong, it had some effect almost immediately. 
2.Prince Damrong's Role 10 Educational development 
In 1884, the King gave Prince Damrong the task of planning the extension of 
public education along the lines of the 1875 decree, which called for the founding of 
modern schools in the royal monasteries. In September of that year, the King 
appointed a committee to prescribe the organization, textbooks and standards for 
these public schools. The arguments in favour of establishing schools in the 
monasteries were so strong that no alternatives seem seriously to have been 
cons-idered. Firstly, traditional education had been carried on in the monasteries, and 
the physical facilities to sustain formal instruction were readily available there. 
Secondly, the monks who acted as teachers gained additional commitment and support 
54 . 75 O.K. Wyatt, Op.Clt., p. . 
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from the boys' parents. Thirdly, if the Government were to establish schools outside 
the monasteries, they would lead to duplication and waste. 55 Lastly, it was a means 
to promote Buddhism at the same time. The Government gave full support to the 
monastery school system and it grew fast, expanding to monasteries all over the 
country. 
The establishment of the Education Department was officially announced by 
royal decree on 6 May 1887, for the purpose of controlling and distributing modern 
education all over the country. Actually the department per se dated from 1885, for 
it was at that time that all modern ed ucation was put under Damrong's control and 
handled through a special bureau of his office in the Royal Pages' Bodyguard Corps. 
From summer 1885, Damrong submitted directly to the King quarterly an annual 
reports on the educational activities under his direction on a letterhead marked 
"Office of the Education Department".56 
During the first seven years (1885-1892) of the Education Department under 
Prince Damrong, the Siamese ed ucation system was reorganized and systematized. In 
1891, Damrong was sent on his first trip to Europe as King Chulalongkorn's special 
envoy, to visit Russia. During his trip he investigated modern education systems In 
order to apply them in Siam, but when he came back to Siam he was appointed as 
Minister of the North on I August 1892. The King gave this job to him to organize 
the provincial administration because the king believed that this job was now more 
. h d . 57 Important t an e ucatlOn. 
55 Ibid., p.112-l 13. 
56 Ibid., p.IIS. This seems to suggest that by 1885 functional ministry was already 
formed as foreign, judicial, and educational affairs were in the hand of Princes 
Thewawong, Phichit and Damrong. 
57 Ibid., p.144. 
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3. The Appointment of Chaophrava Phatsakorawong as the Minister of Public 
Instruction 
Chaophraya Phatsakorawong (Phon Bunnag), a partly British-educated son of 
Somdet Chaophraya Borommaha Prayurawong (Dit Bunnag), was appointed Minister 
of Public Instruction III charge of education III 1892. Supposedly because of his 
incapability and lack of support from the King, the Ministry of Public Instruction 
went through uncertainties and indirection, but as a commoner and Bunnag, he 
probably faced much the same jealousy a.nd hostility from the royal family as did 
Phraya Suriya later. Within SIX months of the King's return to Bangkok from his 
first European trip in 1897, the King became concerned for educational reform III 
Siam. At the King's request, Phraya Wisut Suriyasak (Pia Malakun), a grandson of 
Chaoja Prince Mahamala, who had been sent to England as the Siamese Minister in 
London and Siamese language tutor to Prince Wachirawut, sent a report back 
recommending educational reform to the King. Remarkably, the report recommended 
raising the Siamese educational standard to a level with the British. By late July 
1898, the King was looking for support in carrying out new educational policies. On 
26 September 1898, the King called for a meeting of the Ministry of Public 
Instruction to which Damrong and Prince-monk Wachirayan, yet another half brother 
of the King, were also invited. At this meeting King Chulalongkorn made a decision 
to transfer the education in the provincial monasteries into Prince Wachirayan's hands 
to organize with the assistance of Prince Damrong. The King left only education III 
Bangkok under the control of the Min istry of Public Instruction. 58 
A t the beginning of 1899, the problem of shortage of staff was facing every 
Ministry, particularly the Min istry of I nterior. A t the end of April 1899, Damrong 
wrote a letter to Wisut in London complaining that all the plans of the Ministry of 
58 Ibid., p.224. 
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Interior were severely jeopardized by the lack of educated men to fill newly created 
positions. He stated that he was in need of two High Commissioners, not less than 
five provincial governors, not less than fifteen deputy governors. He added that were 
the King to allow him to do so he would resign to return to the field of education, 
which was the only solution to such problems. 59 
Wisut's recommendations for the establishment of the civil service school, sent 
by sea from London in February 1899, did not reach Bangkok until early May, and 
therefore crossed with Damrong's letter to him. Damrong opposed Wisut's suggestions 
that the school from the beginning should be designed to serve the civil service in 
general, that it should work closely with the Education Department, and that Nai 
(Mr.) Sanan, who had finished a teacher-training course in England, should be 
appointed its director. Damrong argued that Wisut simply was not aware of the 
hindrance in educational reform caused by Phatsakorawong and added that the only 
possible course was to create a civil service school within the Ministry of Interior, 
with Damrong himself acting as director until such time as Wisut could assume the 
duty. Upon receiving Damrong's complaining letter of 20 April 1899, Wisut agreed 
to return to Bangkok for the post. A t the beginning of 1900, the civil service school 
had begun operation, and by the end of that year it already had graduated seventeen 
young men for service in the Ministry of Interior and had a total enrollment of 182.60 
Section V Agricultural development and the development of Buddhism 
It is important also to ~onsider economic development and particularly that in 
agricultural development in the time of King Chulalongkorn. Up to 1855, the year of 
the signing of the Bowring Treaty which marked the openning of Siam to foreign 
59 Ibid., p.260. 
60 Ib'd "6" 1 ., p._ .:... 
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transaction, the economy of Siam had been mainly self-sufficient with householders 
producing almost everything necessary for their own consumption. After Siam began 
to participate in international trade in 1855, there were significant changes in the 
structure of the traditional agriculture which was evident by the expansion of the rice 
cultivation area. One article of the Bowring Treaty of 1855 provided that Siam was 
obliged to export rice except when there was a shortage in the country. This article 
was includeded in the Treaty because of the demand for Siamese rice in the British 
colonies as well as in the European countries.61 
Despite the increasing demand for Siamese flce In the market, Siamese 
agricultural development in the reign of King Chulalongkorn was not entirely 
successful. The traditional method of rIce growing totally depended on the rain, 
therefore, the lack of rain could devastate the production. This was evident by the 
petition of 14 Jan uary 1891 of 404 fam il ies of an eastern province complaining to the 
Department of Agriculture (krom Na) that they were facing a crop failure in which 
the rice fields had dried up owing to lack of rain in that year.62 The Bangkok 
Times, which was the main English-language newspaper published in Bangkok, had 
published an article in early 1891 warning the Siamese Government about the issue of 
irrigation and recommended that irrigation become a governmental undertaking in 
f 63 order to overcome the problem of lack 0 water. 
After the Paknam incident of 1893, agricultural like other economic development 
development proceeded very slowly because the Siamese Government gave priority to 
justice, provincial centralization, the army and finance. In 1897, Chaophraya 
Surasakmontri, the Minister of Agriculture, submitted his resignation because the 
61 D.B. Johnston, "The Rice Frontier in Thailand 1880-1930", Yale Univ. Ph.D., 1975, 
pp.18-19. 
62 Chatthip Nartsupha, The Pol i tical Economy of Siam 1851- 1910, 2nd edition 
(Bangkok, 1981), p.~2 7. 
63 DB J h . 86 
. . 0 nston, Op.Clt., p. . 
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Government's policy disregarded agriculture and consequently the Ministry of 
Agriculture ceased to exist for two years. In 1899 Chaophraya Thewetwongwiwat 
(Larn Kunchon) was appointed the new Minister of Agriculture. He reviewed the 
irrigation projects and in 1902, J. Homan van der Heide, a Dutchman, was hired as 
the first director of the Irrigation Department. Van der Heide produced a report 
recommending the construction of a dam across the Chaophraya River at Chainat, a 
province in the central Siam, to distribute water to numerous smaller canals, with the 
end result being a totally coordinated system of irrigation for all of central Siam.64 
But Van der Heide's project was turned down by the Siamese Government because it 
considered that railway construction was a higher priority than irrigation and the 
Government thought it unwise to embark on major projects in both fields at the same 
time owing to its limited resources. 
Another agricultural project which was submitted by Phraya Suriya, as 
Minister of Finance, was the establishment of a national bank to give credit to poor 
farmers, also rejected by the Siamese Government in favour of railway construction. 
It was inevitable that agricultural development during the reign of King 
ChuJalongkorn proceeded very slowly because it was given a low priority. 
It is also worth considering the development of Buddhism during the reign of 
King Chulalongkorn. Buddhism was and also is a fundamental institution in Siam on 
which most of the Siamese custom and culture are based and it also sustained the 
monarchy. King Chulalongkorn realized its importance as he vowed that: 
When I came to the throne, I intended to improve Buddhism in order 
to maintain a firm foundation of Buddhism in Siam. I gave a vow that 
so long as I live I will constantly foster the growth of Buddhism. 65 
64 Ibid., p.91. See also I.G. Brown, The Elite and the Economy, op.cit., chapter 1. 
65 Phra ratchabanyat songthaleng, 1874-1910 (King Chulalongkorn's Speech), 
Sophonpipatanakan Publisher {Bangkok, 1915), p.89. 
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King Chulalongkorn had longed for the opportunity to put one of his brothers 
In charge of Buddhism; therefore, when Prince Wachirayan, a half-brother of the 
King, ordained as a monk on 27 June 1879 at the age of twenty, hesitated whether to 
remain monk for the rest of his life because he believed that becoming a monk meant 
discarding government service, Chulalongkorn actively encouraged Prince Wachirayan 
to remain by persuading him that such a course could serve the government, and also 
promised to grant a krom rank to him if he remain in the monk hood for three lenten 
seasons. 66 
In his thesis, "The Buddhist Monkhood in Nineteenth Century Thailand", 
Reynolds explained that Wachirayan decided to remain in the monkhood for the rest 
of his life when the King came to visit him at his residence in Wat (temple) 
Bowornniwet a month after his ordination, and showed respect to him in a way that 
he would not give to other half -brothers. Moreover, the King increasingly favoured 
him after he had consented to try the monkhood and he did not want the King to 
lose his faith in him. 67 
King Chulalongkorn utilized the Buddhist temples to increase the 
Government's control and to implement some of his policies. With the assistance of 
Wachirayan, the King implemented the Sangha (monk) law of 1902 which created a 
Monk Association (Mahatelasamaf..:.om) to be his advisers to deal with religious affairs. 
Furthermore, he appointed a uniform Sangha hierarchy headed by Chaokana Monthon 
(the head of monks in the mOfllhon) in each monthon to coincide with the provincial 
centralization. In effect, the law announced that the central Government was 
prepared to consider more seriously than ever before its role of projecting a model 
for Buddhist practice throughout the kingdom. 68 That the Siamese Government 
66 C.l. Reynolds, "The Buddhist Monkhood in Nineteenth Century Thailand", Cornell 
Univ. Ph.D., 1973, p.145. 
67 Ibid., pp.146-147. 
68 Ibid., p.226. 
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implemented some of its policies through the temples is evident in the implementation 
of the policy of provincial education in the temples in 1898. It is conspicuous that 
Chulalongkorn's government not only centralized the country's civil administration, it 
also centralized the temples and utilized them to implement government policies. 
Conclusion The Chakri Reformation was initiated in most Ministries after the 
Paknam crisis of 1893. Two problems which every Ministry faced together in the 
reform programme were the shortage of budget and staff. The Ministry which had 
most budget was often the Ministry whose Minister was currently the favourite of the 
King and could convince him of the prospect of the reform programmes. This is 
evident in the King's support for Prince Damrong when he was in charge of the 
educational reform and the stand i ng of education was considerably increased. 
Subsequently, when Damrong was transferred to the Ministry of the North, he still 
gained support from the King, and with his distinct ability he successfully 
reorganized the whole provincial administration. In transferring Damrong to the 
Ministry of the North, the King indicated the lower priority that education 
henceforth would enJOY in pressing its claims upon the state's limited resources. 
When Chaophraya Phatsakorawong succeeded Damrong in the Ministry of Public 
Instruction, his lack of support in either the Council of Ministers or on the part of 
the King led to a delay in educational reform. 
It was difficult for the Ministers who were commoners to gam support and 
obtain funds for their Ministries from the King and the Council of Ministers which 
was dominated by the royal family. This phenomenon also appeared when Phraya 
Suriya, the Minister of Finance, and Chaophraya Surasakmontri, the Minister of 
Agriculture, could not obtain support and budget for their Ministries. The royal 
family, especiall y the King, had experienced deprivation of power by the Bunnag 
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family at the beginning of his reIgn and they were determined never to allow this 
situation to happen again. 
The legal reform which is the main concern of this study was one of the most 
important reforms in the Chakri Reformation. The appointment of Phichit whom the 
King disliked indicates how important the legal reform was. The King knew that 
Prince Promwaranulak, who was temporarily in charge of the Ministry of Justice 
after Prince Sawat's departure for Europe in 1893, was incapable of running the 
Ministry as nothing had progressed since his appointment. The King was left with 
virtually no choice except Phichit whose legal ability he knew of. Consequently, for 
the benefit and independence of Siam, the King put his prejudice against Phichit 
aside. 
PART THREE 
JUDICIAL REFORM, THE FOREIGN ADVISERS AND THE STAFF 
OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE 
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Chapter 6 Legal Policy and the Reform of the Ministry of Justice while Prince 
Phichit was the Minister ( 22 October 1894 - 3 March 1897 ) 
Section I The Appointment of Prince Phichit as the Minister of Justice 
As a consequence of the Paknam Incident, Phra Yot Muang K wang who was a 
Siamese official at Tong Chieng Kam east of the Mekong River was charged with 
murdering Inspector Grosgurin, a French official, in June 1893. There were two 
trials in this case, the first trial undertaken by the Siamese authorities, a 
representative of France attending the judgment, while a second trial before a Mixed 
Court was to be insisted upon by the French Government as it felt the penalty of the 
first trial was not sufficient. The composition of the mixed court was to be 
determined by the French Government. At first, King Chulalongkorn called Prince 
Phichit back to Bangkok from his commissionership at Ubon to preside over this case 
for the Siamese authorities. In the Siamese view, Prince Phichit conducted the case 
splendidly and gave judgment "not guilty" in favour of Phra Yot. This judgment was 
acceptable to the Siamese and most foreigners including the English Representative, 
Mr. Scott, the English Charge d' Affaires, who reported to the Foreign Secretary, the 
Earl of Kimberley in London, that: 
It appears that the accused IS guilty of no crime, the court in 
pronouncing judgment, shall conclude by declaring him quit and 
discharged of the accusation. Phra Yot is not guilty of any of the five 
charges as set forth in the indictment. 1 
Khunluang Phraya Kraisi (Pleng Wepara), the first Siamese called to the 
English Bar, who held the title of Luang Ratana Yati at that time and was appointed 
the Registrar of the Court in Phra Yot's case, wrote in his memoir that Prince Phichit 
who was the presiding judge performed his duties splendidly and speedily so that this 
1 Scott to Kimberley, 19 March 1894, PRO FO 422/39. 
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very long case could be concluded within three weeks and that the decision was 
substantiated by reliable evidence. 2 
One most important point IS why King Chulalongkorn appointed Prince 
Phichit the second Minister of Justice in October 1894, despite his apparent prejudice 
against Phichit. One has to look at the situation at that time when the King's health 
was mentally and physically poor. Following Prince Sawat's departure to Europe in 
September 1893, he was left with virtually no choice except Phichit, for the Ministry 
of Justice could not be left in the hand of Prince Promwaranulak who had been 
temporarily in charge since Prince Sawat's departure, but who had proved incapable 
of running the Ministry as nothing had been done since his takeover. Besides that, 
Prince Damrong's influence over the King had grown increasingly after the Paknam 
incident until he was appointed the full Minister of Interior in December 1894. It is 
probable that Prince Damrong supported Phichit's appointment as the Minister of 
Justice because it would be much easier for him to reorganize the Northeast of Siam 
if Phichit was withdrawn from Ubon and it was under the control of a commoner 
commISSIOner. Damrong also admired Phichit, as he wrote years later in Phichit's 
biography that the latter had performed splendidly in the Phra Yot case and was 
outstanding in qualifications and experience as a Judge in the Rapsang Court, the 
president of the Phaeng Klang and Phaeng Kasem Courts, and the president of the 
Dika Court. 3 
2 Marut Bunnag (ed.), Arnusorn nai nganphraratchatanpengsop Khunluang Phraya 
Kraisi (Pleng Wepara) (Biography and career of Khunluang Phraya Kraisi), Printed 
in his cremation volume (Bangkok, 1983), p.33. 
3 Prince Damrong, "Phra prawat phrachao Boromwongter Kromluang Phichit 
Prichakorn" (the Biography of Prince Phichit), printed in Prachum 
phraratchanipon Kromluang Phichit Prichakorn (The Poetry of Prince Phichit), 
printed in the cremation \olume of Jfom Soun Katkanang, Phichit's wife, 
(Bangkok, 1950), p.lO. 
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After King Chulalongkorn decided to appoint Phichit as Minister of Justice, he 
wrote a letter of 18 October 1894 to Phichit describing the situation of the Ministry 
of Justice: 
I consider that the administration of the Ministry of Justice is one of 
the most important issues in the country at the present. Now the post 
of the Minister of Justice is vacant, and there is a huge amount of 
unsettled cases. I consider you as the most suitable person with the 
experience to perform this duty. Therefore I appoint you the Minister 
of Justice and request you to perform your duty and bring about 
progress to the country.4 
King Chulalongkorn's decision in appointing Prince Phichit as Minister of 
Justice was an appropriate decision because Phichit's reputation at that time did not 
only impress the Siamese but also the representatives of the Western Powers as 
evidenced by a letter of Mr. De Bunsen, the new British representative in Bangkok, 
to the Earl of Kim berley, the British Foreign Secretary, in November 1894, where he 
reported: 
Some proof of His Majesty's renewed interest in public affairs is 
perhaps to be found in the appointment of a new Minister of Justice 
in the person of Prince Bijit [Phichit), a man of known energy and 
capacity, who is already engaged in reforming his Department, and 
assures me of his intention immediately to increase the number of 
City Magistrates, and to invest them with such summary powers of 
punishment in small cases as will enable them to clear off a huge mass 
of arrears and I to keep gace in future with the more pressing 
requirement of their office. 
Phichit probably had quite a good idea of the problems in the Ministry of Justice. 
After a personal discussion with the King at the latter'S request, there was an 
announcement proclaiming that Prince Phichit was appointed the Minister of Justice 
on 22 October 1894. On the same day, he wrote a letter to the King expressing his 
anxieties about his job, and that he believed that the whole system of the 
administration of justice in Siam faced deep-rooted problems which had existed for 
4 King to Phichit, 18 Oct.1894, NA R5 Ky 3/2. 
5 De Bunsen to Kimberley, II nov. 1894, PRO FO 422/40. 
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hundreds of years. The piecemeal method of putting some procedure right 
temporarily, or correcting some minor points, was not durable and needed reform. 
He suggested that the whole system of the administration of justice be reorganized. 
Apart from that, the quality of judges and the court officials was not up to the 
standard to enable the reform. The parties in complicated cases had to compromise 
with each other to make a decision possible. 6 
Phichit clearly visualized the problems of the Ministry of Justice he was about to 
face at that time. Therefore, he requested some special authority from the King in 
supporting his performance. He asked for full support from the King and full 
cooperation from the other ministries concerned with the Ministry of Justice, and 
power of direct command and punishment over the officials and departments within 
his responsibility. Besides, Prince Phichit requested a conference of government 
officials to consult about issuing desirable laws according to a programme, and for 
speed and convenience he requested the establishment of petty courts to deal with 
trivial cases in Bangkok and the suburbs of Bangkok. 7 
Why did Phichit ask the King for some special authority? There are two probable 
reasons, firstly, the nature of the job, for Phichit foresaw the difficulties of work he 
was about to encounter. Secondly, there was the personal relationship between him 
and the King. He apparently knew that the King disliked him, perhaps because of 
his criticism of the King's earlier inactivity and his own controversial novel Sanuk 
Nuk. 8 Without this special authority he would not be able to solve the difficult 
problems and the King could dismiss him because of his failure and he would end up 
in disgrace. The King, however, granted permission for all Phichit's requests, and 
6 Phichit to King, 22 Oct. 1894, NA R5 Ky 3/2. 
7 Ibid. 
8 The detail of King Chula)ongkorn's prejudice against Phichit is illustrated 10 
Chapter 3. 
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confirmed that a meeting of all the ministers could be held provided that Phichit 
informed the Minister of the Privy Seal to set the date, and if he needed any other 
consultation, the King would be available for him most of the time. 9 
Prince Phichit was a very active person. After his appointment as Minister of 
Justice he commenced work immediately. With his experience in judicial affairs 
going back many years he knew well the defects of the whole system. There were 
various projects of judicial reform implemented by him. One can divide his reform 
into three categories: 
1. The enactment of laws 
2. The solution of case backlog 
3. The improvement of the staff and the court procedure 
Section II Prince Phichit's role In the Enactment of Laws 
Phichit was instrumental in issuing many laws while he was Minister of 
Justice. These are only the important laws which were implemented by him. 
1. The Evidence Act 1895 
The evidence law which was applied in courts in Siam up to the time of 
Prince Phichit's judicial reform was the evidence law of the Ayuthya Kingdom 
reputedly implemented in the reign of King Ramathibodi I (King V-thong) who 
reigned from 1350 - 1369. This law had thus been used for more than five hundred 
years so it was obsolete by the time of Phichit. It is probable that on the 
establishment of the Ayuthya Kingdom, Ramathibodi I, the first King, issued the 
evidence law to start the process of j ud icial reform. It was the same when Prince 
9 King to Phichit, 30 Oct. I 89..1, NA R5 Ky 3/2. 
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Phichit, as perhaps the person to start the process of Chakri judicial reform, issued 
the Evidence Act 1895 to launch the reform programme. 
In his letter to the King dated 30 November 1894, Prince Phichit expressed 
his opinion: 
Now, owing to Western influence, the judges cannot any longer use 
arbitrary practices to summarise or shorten the judicial process and we 
have abolished all arbitrary practices. And our old evidence law is 
obsolete. Consequently, Siam needs anew, specific, and efficient 
evidence law to deal with the load of unsettled cases in the courts. 
Prince Sawat, the previous Minister of Justice, had submitted the 
Evidence Act which I have reviewed and amended. I am confiient 
that this act will be very useful to the Government and the people. 0 
On 6 December 1894, Phichit wrote another letter to the King to ask for permission 
to implement this new Evidence Act. The King agreed with Phichit and therefore he 
allowed it to be prom ulgated on I April 1895. 11 
As admitted by Phichit the idea of implementing the Evidence Act had been 
initiated by Prince Sawat when he was the Minister of Justice. The latter wrote a 
letter dated 26 January 1892, informing the King about the obstacles in the judicial 
process caused by the obsolete evidence law at that time. He submitted his idea of 
solving the problems and improving the judicial procedure by implementing a new 
Evidence Act which he enclosed in the same envelope. The King submitted it to a 
meeting of the ministers for consideration. The ministers consulted together and 
finished the amendment in 1893. 12 
It is noteworthy that this Evidence Act was still only promulgated nearly two 
years after the original amendment meeting of the ministers even though it was 
absolutely necessary for the Ministry of Justice to apply this Evidence Act in 
10 Phichit to King, 30 Nov.1894, NA R5 Ky 1/9. 
11 King to Pitthayalap, 23 Dec.1894, NA R5 Ky 2/2. 
12 Phichit to King. 6 Dec.1894, NA R5 Ky 2/2. 
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procedure in courts. A major reason behind the delay appears to have been the long 
and serious illness of King Chulalongkorn after the Paknam incident in July 1893. 
As Mr. Scott, the British representative in Bangkok, reported to the Earl of 
Kimberley, the British Foreign Secretary, in April 1894: 
The King recently spent a fortnight at Koh Sichang [Sichang island]. 
While at Koh Sichang he could not be induced to take any interest in 
questions of state, but it is said that since his return he has shown 
some intention of attending to public affairs, which is fortunate, for 
nothing can be done without His Majesty's authority, and since the 
beginning of December 1893, when he fell ill, it has been impossible 
to get any business transacted. 13 
King Chulalongkorn's prolonged sickness which disrupted government 
administration also appeared in Prince Damrong's letter in response to the King's 
letter in which the King had indicated his despondency and sense of doom ensuing 
from the Paknam incident. Damrong consoled the King that: 
When I received Your Majesty's letter, I felt very anxious about your 
sickness as the country would lack a captain. At the moment the 
cabinet ministers are disorientated and, as a result, public transactions 
are at a standstill. I wish you to get well soon as I am a fully 
equipped horse ready to be Your Majesty's instrument in carrying out 
projects which Your Majesty desires. 14 
The new Evidence Act of 1895 changed the principle of witness In the 
Siamese judicial system distinctly. The most conspicuous change was In the 
prohibition of groups of people being witnesses in court, as the old evidence law 
prohibited thirty-three groups of people as witnesses unless the parties agreed 
together on them. These groups, for example, included the debtors of the parties, the 
slaves of the parties, the persons who cohabited with the parties, homosexual persons, 
children below seven years of age, old people above seventy years old. But the 
Evidence Act of 1895 provided that any man or woman who was conscious, 
13 Scott to Kimberley, 3 April 1894, PRO FO 422/39. 
14 Natawut Sutthisongkram, Somdet Phra Piyamaharat (King Chulalongkorn the 
Great) (Bangkok, 1987), pp.299-300. 
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responsible, and comprehensible, could be a witness for the prosecution or plaintiff, 
or for the defence or defendant, unless they were specially prohibited according to 
this Act, or a person whom the judge considered could not understand the questions, 
or could not answer them owing to their very young or old ages, or persons who were 
seriously ill physically or mentally and could not remember the incidents at issue. IS 
2. The Constitution of the Ministry of Justice's Staff 
As a consequence of the Evidence Act 1895, Phichit initiated a new 
programme to establish the staff of the Ministry of Justice. In his letter to the King 
of 29 May 1895, two months after the promulgation of the Evidence Act, he 
expressed h is idea: 
Currently the staff of the Ministry of Justice is not permanent. None 
of the people who work here, except the persons who were conferred 
titles by the King, belong to the Ministry of Justice. They belong to 
their patrons and have no fixed salary. Their incomes depend on the 
cases they handle. I think it is the right moment to recruit some 
qualified persons, dismiss those redundant, and reorganize the structure 
of the staff in order to put them in positions to enhance the Ministry 
of Justice's efficiency. I enclose the new ~onstitution of the Ministry 
of Justice's staff together with this letter. l 
The King replied that this constitution of the Ministry of Justice's staff was 
inappropriate and returned it to Phichit. 17 There was no further reason given but 
the real reason was probably that the King did not want to spend a large sum of 
money on the staff's salaries. These salaries had to come from the treasury which the 
King regarded as his own money. This was a myopic opinion because if the Ministry 
of Justice had been well organized it might have needed less staff, would have 
worked more efficiently, would have had less corruption, and would have earned 
much more fee revenue. It was inevitable that with the existing system, where the 
15 The Evidence Act 1895, Prachum Kotmai Pracham Sok (PKPS) (Annual Collection 
of Thai Decrees), volume 14, p.228. 
16 Phichit to King, 29 May 1895, NA R5 Ky 3/1. 
17 King to Ph ichit, the King wrote his opinion on the envelope of Phichit's letter of 
29 May 1895. 
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staff's income depended on the cases they handled, that there must have been a great 
deal of corruption. Worst of all, the Ministry was still disorganized and this caused 
frustration and tremendous problems to Phichit. This was a disadvantage of the 
absolute monarchy system whereby the king's opinion was final, and if one could not 
persuade the king to change his mind, no change would be implemented. 
3. The Proclamation changing the Punishment of Flogging to Imprisonment 
In the same request of 30 November 1894, which caused the King to give his 
permission to Phichit's proclamation of the improvement of the Porispha Court 
(announced on 25 December 1894) which will be dealt with later in section 3, Phichit 
introduced the punishment of imprisonment instead of flogging in these new Porispha 
Courts. 18 After long experience in the administration of justice in Siam, Phichit 
seems to have sympathized with the persons who were punished by flogging. 
Therefore, when he took charge of the Ministry in 1894, he initially abolished this 
kind of punishment in the Porispha Courts. 19 
Later Phichit desired to apply this change to every court under the Ministry 
of Justice. This was a big change and it needed the King's consent so he wrote a 
letter of I August 1895 to ask the King's permission. The King gave his consent on 
13 January 1896, stating that: 
Flogging is an unnecessary torturing punishment. Even in the Phra 
Ratcha-arya Court, Appeal Court or Dika Court whereby the convict 
was subject to flogging and imprisonment, I often cancel flogging. 
The Proclamation changing the punishment of flogging to 
imprisonment of 25 Decem ber 1894 has already been implemented in 
the Porispha Court. This proclamation proves to be suitable for our 
reformed judicial system, and therefore from today, 13 January 1896, I 
allow this ~roclamation to be applied to every court under the Ministry 
of Justice. 0 
18 Phichit to King, 30 Nov.1894, NA R5 Ky 1/9. 
19 The Proclamation of improvement of the Porisapha Court 1894, PKPS, volume 14, 
pp.208-209. 
20 The Proclamation to repl3ce flogging by imprisonment, PKPS, volume 15, pp. 
49-50. 
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4. The Implementation of the Temporarv Criminal Procedure Act 1896 and 
the Temporary Civil Procedure Act 1896 
Owing to the obsolescence of the old criminal procedure law, the criminal 
procedure in courts was inefficient and slow. Prince Phichit realized this problem 
and therefore, in September 1895, he submitted to the King a proposal to reform the 
criminal procedure and the civil procedure laws. Phichit suggested that the 
completion of the full codes which was part of his policy but had not yet been 
started, would consume much time and the Ministry of Justice needed these laws 
urgently.21 Consequently, Phichit's proposal revived the Temporary Criminal 
Procedure Act which had already received the consideration of the Legislative 
Council but was delayed owing to the King's request to apply this law also to the 
provincial courts. Prince Pitthayalap, formerly Prince Sonabanthit, the president of 
the Legislative Council, instead of adding the provision to apply this Act to the 
provincial courts and be pronounced as law, resubmitted the same draft to the King 
with the provision to apply it to the provincial courts. This was a waste of time. 
The reason for doing th is appears to have been his being afraid of being attacked by 
h is half-brother min isters as they were all jealous of each other and trying to win the 
King's favour. (This will also be seen later when Phichit appointed Luang 
Thammasat as the athibodi of the International Court in the place of Phraya 
Manusansat, who refused to accept the post, and was severely attacked by Prince 
Thewawong for it.) As a result, the King probably forgot to review the Act when it 
was resubmitted and Pitthayalap had to remind him, 22 and after nearly one year's 
delay th is temporary Cri m i nal Procedu re Act was promulgated on 27 April 1896. 
21 The conclusion of Phichit's suggestion to the King in September 1895, NA R5 
Ky 1/ I O. (The date on the document is obliterated). 
22 Pitthayalap to King, ~ I April 1896, NA R5 Ky 2/7. 
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The draft of the Temporary Civil Procedure Act 1896 was submitted by 
Prince Damrong, the Minister of Interior since 1894, and a member of the Legislative 
Council, on 21 January 1896. 23 The King submitted this draft to the Legislative 
Council for consideration. The latter investigated and amended it in three stages and 
resubmitted it to the King for promulgation. The King promulgated it on 21 October 
1896. 24 
These temporary Criminal and Civil Procedure Acts of 1896 were designed by 
Phichit to be temporary because the completion of the full Acts would consume a 
long period of time and the Ministry of Justice needed them urgently. After they 
had been amended by the Legislative Council, Phichit complained to the King that 
the amendments removed so many articles that the drafts were not adequate. 2 5 But 
the King gave permission to Pitthayalap to promulgate as they stood. These two Acts 
did not turn out as well as Phichit hoped. The codes were inadequate and worked to 
a certain extent as Phichit had already foreseen. 
5 The A bol ition of Torture Procedure Act of 1897 
One of the old traditional procedures in the Siamese judicial system pnor to 
Prince Phichit's reform was the torture procedure. jareatnakornban, which was a 
method to force the accused to speak the truth. Practically, it was a means to torture 
the accused to confess that he had committed the crime. Sometimes the accused was 
innocent but he had to confess in order to release himself from torture. 
The idea of abolishing torture was proposed by M. Kirkpatrick, a Belgian 
legal adviser to the Foreign Ministry and protege of Rolin-Jaequemyns, the General 
23 The Temporary civil Procedure Act 1896, PKPS, volume 15, pp.157-232. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Phichit to King, no date, N A R5 Ky 1/ I O. 
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Adviser. He also advised the Ministry of Justice to abolish the practice of sometimes 
arresting relatives of the defendant instead of the defendant himself which the 
Siamese judicial system called "Chanmam" (guarantee). 2 6 This Act was applied at 
once in Bangkok courts after its proclamation on 1 March 1897,27 but in the 
provincial courts which were under the Ministry of Interior the practice of torturing 
still continued in use for some time. 
Prince Phichit had never studied abroad but he had more advanced ideas than 
some princes who had been educated abroad. For instance, Phichit issued this Act 
which put an end to this kind of torture. By contrast, Prince Sawat, who studied at 
Oxford University, supported this practice as seen in the case in which Prince Naret, 
on behalf of Phraya Mahayota, sued the latter's wife for adultery with several 
gentlemen of rank. Prince Sawat was one of the judges who had Nai (Mr.) Rong 
Snor M ahatlek (Royal Page) su bm itted to flogging in order to extort a confession. 2 8 
It is necessary to note here that Crown Prince Wachirawut in 1910 tried to restore the 
torture procedure in a particular case. Prince Raphi objected but his objection 
failed. 29 This caused conflict between Raphi and the Crown Prince which will be 
discussed in the chapters on Prince Raphi. 
Most of the laws in th is section were very useful to the Siamese judicial 
system practically and therefore were not a paper reform. Prince Phichit planned to 
implement these laws to enhance the efficiency of the Ministry of Justice. But some 
of his ideas could not be implemented because the King still held absolute power and 
could stop any la\',/ he opposed. Phichit's plan was to confer benefit to Siamese all 
26 Prince Raphi, Phraratchabanvat nai patyuban (Royal Edicts in the Present Day) 
Vol.2, Bangkok 1902, p.621. 
27 The Abolition of Torture Procedure Act 1897, PKPS, Vol.15, pp.243-247. 
28 King to M. Rolin-Jaequemyns, 8 June 1899, NA R5 Kt 2/13. 
29 Second lieutenant Lien Sic han, Kanpatiwat kungraek naimuangthai 2454 (The First 
Revolution in Siam 1911), printed in his cremation volume, (Bangkok 1971), 
pp.2-3. 
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over the country including the subjects of the Western powers. But his plans were 
sometimes limited only to Bangkok and its suburban areas because the provincial 
courts at that time were still in the hands of Minister of Interior. 
Section III The Solution to Case Backlog 
When Phich it accepted the post of Minister of Justice in October 1894, he 
realized that one of the most difficult problems for the Ministry was the great 
number of unsettled cases in courts. He estimated that the number would be much 
greater in the near future if he could not find a method to overcome them, because 
the inflow of cases into courts was much more than the rate of settlement. He 
detailed the statistics of the inflow and the settled cases of the Phra Ratcha-arya 
Court (Court of Punishable Offences) and the Ratchathanphichet Court (Penitentiary 
Court), both of which were criminal courts for felony, in his letter to the King of 30 
November 1894: 
In September 1894, the month before I became Minister of Justice, the 
unsettled cases in these two courts amounted to 1,500 cases, those 
reaching settlement were 26 cases, but the inflow amounted to nearly 
100 cases per month. I would like to remark that if the Ministry of 
Justice cannot overcome this problem it will face a chaotic situation 
and will eventually collapse. I would suggest that it is most urgent for 
me to deal with this problem. 3 0 
Prince Phichit's policies towards the reduction of the backlog of unsettled 
cases in the Ministry of Justice's courts: 
I. The Regulation to abolish the punishment of the judges of the Court of 
First Instance whose decision was reversed by the Appeal Court 
This was the first policy of Prince Phichit to deal with the problem of the 
tremendous number of unsettled cases in the Court of First Instance. This defect 
30 Phichit to King, 30 Nov.1894, N A R5 K y 1/9. 
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should have been eliminated long before, but had been in existence until Phichit 
became Minister of Justice because of the obsolete legal system and incompetent 
leadership. The old regulation punished the judges of the Court of First Instance 
whose decisions were reversed by the Appeal Court. The regulation provided that: 
After the judge of the Court of First Instance gives his decision, a 
party who is not satisfied with the decision can appeal it to the Appeal 
Court by arguing that the decision was wrong. The judge of the court 
of First Instance will be the defendant and if the Appeal Court rrverse 
his decision, he will be responsible for the Appeal Court's fees. 3 
This obsolete regulation delayed the procedure in every Court of First 
Instance because the judges were afraid of their decision being appealed by the party 
who was not satisfied with it. Inevitably, the judges in the Court of First Instance, 
in some cases where they were in doubt of the decision, hesitated to decide the cases. 
Thus there were some cases in the civil or criminal court where the trial had been 
completed but which awaited decisions for a year or more, by which time the judge 
might be transferred to another court. 3 2 
When Prince Phichit became the Minister of Justice, he was fully acquainted 
with the situation and proposed that such regulation be abolished. He issued a 
Ministry of Justice regulation on 18 November 1894, prohibiting the Appeal Court 
from charging the judge of the Court of First Instance whose decision was reversed, 
for the Appeal Court's fees. This new regulation provided that: 
If the plaintiff or the defendant in the Court of First Instance appeal 
the decision to the Appeal Court, the judge in the Appeal Court 
cannot treat the judge in the Court of First Instance as the defendant, 
and if the decision is reversed, the latter is not responsible fOj 3the 
Appeal Court's fees unless the party accuse the judge personally. 
31 The Ministry of Justice's Regulation prohibiting the Appeal Court to charge the 





Regarding the Appeal Court's fees, if the Appeal Court reversed the decision the 
, 
fees would be returned to the appellant, but if otherwise, the fees fell to the 
Crown. 34 
This regulation complies with the natural rule because no judge who tries to 
interpret and apply law honestly and genuinely likes to be held responsible if his 
decision is reversed by another judge's opinion. Applying law to the circumstances 
of all cases is an art of which the result is not certain like arithmetic. It depends 
upon the opinion of particular judges, therefore it is right to protect judges who are 
sincere in using the law. 
Prince Phichit's new regulation was practical and had three consequences: 
firstly, it gave direct support to the judges of the Court of First Instance by releasing 
them from the anxiety of being defendants in cases in which they gave the decision, 
so they would no longer hesitate or delay in giving a decision. Moreover, they were 
not to be responsible for the Appeal Court's fee except when they were dishonest in 
applying law. Secondly, it gave direct support to the contending parties because their 
cases would be settled much quicker. Lastly, it improved the efficiency of the 
Ministry of Justice owing to the consequent dramatic fall in unsettled cases. 
2. The Improvement of the Porisapha Court (Court of Petty Offences) 
The Porisapha Court was first established when Prince Sawat was the Minister 
of Justice (1888 - 1894). Prince Phichit's method of using the Porisapha Court to 
tackle the backlog of unsettled cases was to divide it geographically into four separate 
jurisdictions. Each court had an equal area of responsibility. The first and second 
Porisapha Courts \vere responsible for the northeast and southeast of Bangkok and 
34 Ibid. 
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surrounding towns .. The third and fourth Porisapha courts were responsible for the 
northwest and southwest of Bangkok and the surrounding towns respectively.3 5 
Prince Phichit's mam purpose In improving the Porisapha Court was to divert 
the trivial cases from the higher courts. He considered that it was not convenient for 
people to present their cases to the original Porisapha Court owing to its extensive 
territorial jurisdiction which covered the area of Bangkok, Thonburi, and various 
surrounding towns. Therefore, if he divided this jurisdiction geographically into four 
separate areas, it would confer benefit to the people to forward their cases to courts 
within their reach. 3 6 But there was no alteration in the competency jurisdiction of 
the Porisapha Court for offe-nces where the punishment was not more than fifty 
floggings, or six months imprisonment, or fine not exceeding six hundred baht 
(Siamese currency). 
Prince Phichit transferred judges from other courts in the Ministry of Justice 
to the newly established Porisapha Courts. His principle was that judges in the 
Porisapha Courts were to be transferred every two or three years in order to prevent 
corruption. 37 This policy had both advantage and disadvantage. The advantage was 
that it prevented corruption and arbitrary practices which often occurred if judges 
were positioned permanently in one place for a considerable duration of time. But 
the longer judges were in one territorial jurisdiction, the more efficient the handling 
of cases became. Thus this method also had the disadvantage that when the judges 
were transferred to the new terri torial jurisdiction, it took time for them to become 
accustomed to the cases in the new area. 




Prince Phichit was a leader who knew how to mobilize potential resources. 
This was seen in his management of the new Porisapha Courts. He ordered the 
transfer of cases which were under the Porisapha Courts' jurisdiction from higher 
courts to their territorial jurisdiction. 3 8 This benefited the Government because the 
newly established courts would have cases to consider and decide from the beginning 
of their establishment, without any lapse of time waiting for new cases to enter into 
them. 
The King agreed with Phichit's policy and gave his permISSIOn on 31 
November 1894. Apart from that the King increased the Ministry of Justice's budget 
by 1550 baht per month from January 1895 onwards for these newly established 
courts. 39 
The weakness of dividing the Porisapha Court geographically into four equal 
territorial jurisdictions was that Phichit overlooked the size of the population in each 
area. As one can see, Phichit was cautious in that the division of jurisdiction was 
only a trial. This is seen in his policy of using unoccupied government offices or 
leasing buildings as new court offices. He did not use the Ministry's budget to build 
new offices. This enabled him to make use of these offices immediately without 
waiting for newly constructed offices. After the Porisapha Courts had operated for 
seven months, Prince Phichit knew from the statistics of cases that the cases in the 
third and fourth courts were less than the first and second courts. Consequently, he 
asked permission from the King to merge the third and fourth courts as one court 
responsible for the area of the previous third and fourth courts. The King gave his 
permission on I August 1895. 40 
38 Ibid. 
39 King to Phichit, 31 Nov.1894, NA R5 Ky 1/9. 
40 Phichit to King, I Aug.1895. NA R5 Ky 1/15. Phichit wrote this letter to ask 
the King's permission to merge the third and fourth courts and the King gave his 
sanction on the same date b:. \'.riting on Phichit's letter. 
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This policy of Phichit worked splendidly as evidenced by the statistics of all 
cases in the Ministry of Justice in January 1895. The output of settled cases in this 
month was 560 cases, 347 of which were dealt with by the newly established 
Porisapha Courts. 41 
3. The Regulation to abolish Appeal during Trial 
One of the most important causes which delayed proceedings in courts was 
"appeal during trial". Prince Phichit who had plenty of experience in court procedure 
knew that the practice of allowing one party to appeal against a court order during 
the trial disrupted the Siamese judicial system. Such a party who was losing or did 
not want the case to be finished, was able to delay the procedure in court by 
submitting an interlocutory motion to the judge. If the latter gave an order against 
his motion, he could still appe31 to the Dika Court (the Supreme Court), and when 
the Dika Court gave an order against his motion he could submit another 
interlocutory motion again in the first court. Consequently, cases could be endless, 
some were abandoned, and some took many years until the trial commenced, thereby 
I · h' . d'ff' I 42 p acmg t e wItnesses m I ICU ty. 
Prince Phichit attempted to apply his reform first in the four Porisapha 
Courts, planning if successful to apply it to all courts in the Ministry of Justice, and 
if possible to courts allover the country. The regulation he issued in the Porisapha 
Courts was: 
Whilst the trial is in process, if one of the parties submits an 
interlocutory motion, the judge has to consider it within three days, 
make an order and explain it to the parties. If the claimant is not 
satisfied with the court's order, the judge must make note of it. But 
41 Phichit to King, 25 MJY 1895, NA R5 Ky 1/9. 
42 Phichit to King, IS Nov.IS95, NA R5 Ky 1/9. 
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the claimant should not appeal at this stage, but wait until the judge 
decides the case, when thj claimant can appeal the motion at the same 
time as the whole case. 4 
A present-day lawyer should see one disadvantage in this regulation owmg to 
some cases needing a court order for the interlocutory motion to be corrected at the 
first stage. For if a lower court had ordered the interlocutory motion wrongly, it 
would still carryon until disposing of the case and the party who objected to the 
order would then appeal on the order and the decision. If the Appeal Court 
considered that the order of the motion was wrong, the judge of the Appeal Court 
would have to order the lower court to hold a retrial. Such procedure would still be 
time-consuming and would be eliminated if the first order were corrected at once. 
Despite this weakness, Phichit's policy had advantages and was practicable as 
evidenced by the fact that it was adopted as a principle of law in the Thai Civil 
Procedure Code of 1934, subject to some exceptions. This policy of Phichit was very 
distinct. It improved efficiency and business in the Porisapha Courts which 
proceeded rapidly as shown by the statistics of all cases which had been disposed of 
by them for January 1895, which amounted to 347 cases, ten times the cases which 
were disposed of by the Phra R atcha-arya Court during the same period. 4 4 
After nearly one year of trial m the Porisapha Courts, Phichit suggested that 
the regulation be appl ied to every court under the Ministry of Justice, and all 
provincial courts throughout the country. The provincial courts which were still 
under the Interior Ministry also had the same problems with appeal against the court 
order during trial. They sent these cases to the Appeal Court in Bangkok and this 
caused many difficulties. Phichit wrote a letter to King Chulalongkorn complaining 
that" if we still allow the parties to appeal against the court orders during trial, a 
43 The Proclamation of the POr/sapha Court of 1894, PK PS, Vol.l4, pp.210-2l2. 
44 Phichit to King, 25 May 1895, N A R5 Ky 1/9. 
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chaotic situation and pile of unsettled cases would be unavoidable. We should apply 
this regulation to all the courts throughout the country.,,45 The King noted that this 
regulation was already in operation in the Porisapha Courts and up to then it had 
worked efficiently and there was no defect. Therefore, he promulgated this 
regulation as an Act to apply throughout the country in November IS95, without any 
sanction from the Legislative Council. 46 
Prince Phichit was a careful person who would not take a risk. This is 
evident from his method of implementing this Act which he initially introduced as a 
regulation in the Porisapha Courts, and when successful, expanded it to apply to the 
whole country. 
4. The merger of the Phra Ralcha-arva (Court of Punishable Offences) and 
the Ratchathanphichet Court (Penitentiarv Court) 
These two criminal courts had jurisdiction over serious criminal cases (felony) 
in Bangkok. The Ratchathanphichet Court was established on 1 April 1893, by Prince 
Sawat, when he was Minister of Justice, on the grounds that one criminal court in 
Bangkok was not enough to deal with the load of cases. He proclaimed the 
establishment of the Ratchathanphichet Court without any separate territorial 
jurisdiction from the Phra RaLcha-arya Court. 47 When Prince Phichit became 
Minister of Justice in 1894, he believed that the existence of two criminal courts had 
caused confusion, disun ity, irresponsibility, and a waste of resources. 4 8 This was 
evident by the number of unsettled cases in these two courts as of September 1894 , 
the month before Phichit became Minister of Justice, which amounted to 1500 cases. 
45 Phichit to King, 18 Nov.1895, NA R5 Ky 1/9. 
46 King to Phichit, the King gave his sanction by writing on Phichit's letter of IS 
Nov.lS95. 
47 The Court Organization Act 1893, PK PS, vol.13, p.lS!. 
48 Phichit to King, 27 Nov.IS95, NA R5 Ky 1/9. 
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The output of settled cases In that month was 26, but the inflow amounted to nearly 
100. 49 
The reason for the confusion, disunity, and avoidance of their responsibilities 
by the two criminal courts was that they had no separate territorial jurisdictions. 
This was due to Prince Sawat's failure to define the separate jurisdiction of the newly 
established Ratchalhanphichel Court. Phichit had two ideas to cure this failure, either 
defining separate territorial jurisdictions or merging them together. Phichit asked 
permIsSIOn from the King on 4 January 1896 to merge the two criminal courts 
together to be called "Phra Ralcha-ar.l'a" Court (Court of Punishable Offences). The 
King gave his sanction on the same date. 50 
The advantages of merger of the two criminal courts were that it enabled 
some of the judges to be transferred to other courts, it ended the avoidance of 
responsibility, expenditure was reduced, and the Government could use the vacated 
offices for other purposes. 
5. The Establishment of Special Commissioners to deal with Unsettled cases 
who later formed a Rapsnl1f! Court 
This policy of Prince Phichit was recommended to the King in the same 12 
Novem ber 1895 letter as the merger of the two criminal courts. The situation of the 
unsettled cases in all courts at that time was very serious because there were about 
. h M" f J . 51 3,000 unsettled cases in all courts In t e Inlstry 0 ustlce. This tremendous 
number of unfinished cases suggested to the Western Powers the obsolescence of the 
49 Phichit to King, 30 Nov.1894. N..-\ R5 Ky 1/9. 
50 Phichit to King, 4 1an.1896. N A R5 Ky 1/9. The King gave his sanction by 
writing on this letter on the same date. 
51 Phichit to King, 27 Nov.1895, NA R5 Ky 1/9. 
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Siamese judicial system. Phichit believed that he should appoint three groups of 
Special Commissioners to deal with the quantity of pending cases because the normal 
court procedure was in no position to deal with all these cases. He also wanted to 
reduce these pending cases dramatically before the enactment of the Temporary 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1896. 52 He discussed this matter with M. Kirkpatrick, 
the Legal Adviser to the Foreign Ministry, regarding the proclamation and regulations 
of the Special Commissioners. Prince Phichit was a leader with initiative and a sense 
of judgment. He realized that M. Kirkpatrick was enthusiastic and willing to assist 
him in dealing with this problem. He reckoned that Kirkpatrick would be 
disappointed if he was excluded from the project. Moreover, Phichit believed that 
the appointment of a European as one of the Special Commissioners would impress 
the Western powers. Therefore he appointed Kirkpatrick as a Special Commissioner 
in group I. This appointment was to kill two birds with one stone; namely gaIn a 
capable person to help and impress the Western powers at the same time. 
One of the issues wh ich aroused much discussion was the order of priority of 
cases to be decided. Prince Phichit argued that they should give priority to all cases 
which had been pending in courts for more than three years; i.e. cases which had 
been pending in courts before 1892, or before the proclamation of the Ministry of 
Justice. However, M. Kirkpatrick held a different opinion. He proposed that the 
Special Comm issioners should deal with all kinds of pending cases simultaneously by 
dividing all pending cases into groups ~md allotting each group to a set of Special 
Commissioners organized by themselves into three groups. 
Group 1 of the Commissioners would deal with all pending cases which had been In 
courts for more than th ree years. 
52 Ibid. 
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Group 2 would deal with all pending cases already decided but left in the courts for 
execution of judgment. This group would also deal with pending cases which had 
been left in courts for less than three years. 
Group 3 would deal with compoundable offences. Cases in which the parties had 
failed to reach a settlement would be transferred to group 1 to be considered and 
decided upon. 
M. Kirkpatrick was applying the European mode of thinking. He knew that 
giving priority only to cases pending in courts for more than three years would not be 
effective. As a result Europeans would find Siam's judicial system rather backward 
owing to the number of cases which had been pending in courts for two or three 
years. 53 Eventually Phichit concurred with M. Kirkpatrick as there had been more 
than three hundred cases pending in courts after 1892. 54 It was found appropriate 
to settle cases simultaneously. 
Prince Phichit submitted his opinIOn on appointing three groups of Special 
Commissioners and his choice of suitable persons to King Chulalongkorn. Group 1 
had seven persons including M. Kirkpatrick, group 2 had five persons including 
Prince Phichit himself, group 3 also had five persons. Writing three days after the 
Anglo-French Joint Declaration which purported to guarantee Siam's independence, 
King Chulalongkorn agreed with Phichit and wrote a letter of 18 January 1896 asking 
if there was any guarantee that cases which had been pending in courts less than 
three years would not accumulate. The King also stated in his letter that the reason 
why Siam's judicial system was overloaded with pending cases was due to the lack of 
modern procedural laws. After introducing these laws the Siamese judicial system 
would gain confidence, and the King also warned Phichit that: 
53 Phichit to King, 17 Jan.1896, NA R5 Kyl/13. 
54 Ibid. 
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When we obtain these new procedural laws, at the same time all the 
pending cases would be settled. This will show clearly the efficiency 
of the Ministry of Justice. Ygu must try your best to plan and 
improve Siam's judicial system. 5 
The King's letter of 18 January 1896 to Phichit was distinct from all others 
because in this letter the King demanded some success from Phichit and asked for 
guarantees. The reason behind this was perhaps that the King knew that Prince 
Raphi, his son, whom he had sent to study law at Oxford University, had finished his 
studies and was com ing back to Siam. The King's old prejudice against Phichit might 
have come back to his mind. Now Phichit was not indispensable to him any more, 
and if Phichit fell short of required standards in any project, he could dismiss him in 
due course and appoint Raphi in his place. 
One of the arguments which caused much discussion was the status of the 
Special Commissioners. Phichit suggested that they should hold Rapsang Courts 
(Courts appointed by the King to deal with particular case or cases). Phichit had 
much experience in Rapsang Courts because he had been appointed by the King to 
deal with a Rapsang Court back in 1874, and he had also been appointed the 
president of the Dika Court in 1885, and the Dika Court was a kind of Rapsang 
Court. Phichit knew that the Rapsallg Courts' procedure was brief and efficient, that 
there was no appeal to the Appeal Court, and therefore if one or both parties were 
not satisfied with the decision of a Rapsallg Court, he or they could appeal straight to 
the Dika Court. The King gave his consent to Phichit's idea on 18 January 1896. 56 
Finally there was a proclamation of a Royal Ordinance to establish the Rapsang Court 
for dealing with all unsettled cases in courts in the Ministry of Justice on 9 February 
1896. 57 The establishment of the Special Commissioners who subsequently became a 
55 King to Phichit, 18 J3n.1896, NA RS Ky 1/13. 
56 Ibid. 
57 The Royal ordinance to establish the Rapsallg Court for dealing with unsettled 
cases in the Ministry of Justice, PK PS, Vol.15, pp.72-7S. 
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Rapsang Court was the culmination of Phichit's ideas in co-operation with \1. 
Kirkpatrick, the Legal Adviser. This Rapsang Court considered and decided about 
100 pending cases per month. This statistic shows its efficiency, and therefore, when 
its initial life expired, it was given two extensions of six months each. 58 Phichit's 
policies had been real ized and when he left office in March 1897, the number of 
unsettled cases had dropped dramatically. 
Section IV The improvement of the Staff and the Court Procedure 
The Royal Pages' Inspection of the Court of Justice 
One factor which delayed proceedings in the courts of justice was the 
inactivity of the staff. The court officials including judges were accustomed to a 
slow routine. Prince Phichit was aware of this problem and sought to overcome it. 
King Chulalongkorn's answer to this problem after February 1896 was sending Royal 
Pages to inspect the Ministry of Justice's courts. There were various reasons for this: 
firstly, it was likely that the King still heard numerous rumours about the 
inefficiency of the Ministry of Justice. This can be seen from a letter from the King 
to Phichit of 15 September 1895, where the King mentioned that " ... at present there 
are widespread rumours that the Ministry of Justice is inefficient and deserves to be 
criticized." 59 This was too early to blame Phichit because, in September 1895, he 
had been Minister of Justice only ten months and the Ministry of Justice had deep-
rooted problems dating back hundreds of years. 
Secondly, it might also seem that the King wanted to assist Prince Phichit, 
because the King was aware of Phichit's mounting difficulties at that time. Thus in 
the King's letter of I I February 1896, to Ph ich it, he wrote: 
58 The Proclamation of extension of time for the Rapsang Court for dealing with the 
pending cases, PKPS, VoLIS p.125. 
59 King to Phichit, 15 Sept.1895, NA R5 Ky 1/10. 
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I sent the Royal Pages to inspect the courts in order to ease your work 
load. This practice should stimulate the judges and the court officials 
to perform their duties efficiently. I do not base my opinion on the 
Royal Pages' reports. I believe that the efficiency of the Ministry of 
Justice depends on the Minister. If the Minister constantly inspects 
and trains the staff to be responsible in their duties and develops the 
court procedure, it is certain that the work of the Ministry of Justice 
will be ach ibved and the reports of the Royal Pages will be 
unnecessary.6 
The Advantages and Disadvantages of sending Royal Pages to inspect the Courts. 
Advantages Firstly, the direct consequence was, as the King claimed, the 
activation of the courts' officials including judges. When the King read reports of 
the Royal Pages, any defect he identified would be mentioned to Phichit. For 
instance, in one criminal case, four defendants were imprisoned for theft for three 
years each. After serving the full term in prison, three of the defendants were 
released. The judge abandoned the case of the fourth defendant because the latter 
was supposed to have died during his term of punishment. Subsequently, the 
relatives of the fourth defendant who was in fact still alive, submitted a complaint to 
the court in order to get him released. The judge then ordered his officials to clarify 
the situation and found that the fourth defendant was still in prison. Only then did 
the judge order the release of the fourth defendant. The King mentioned this case to 
Phichit. 61 
Secondly, the reports of the Royal Pages informed the King of the diligence 
of judges. Some judges were irresponsible. For instance, one Royal Page inspected 
the Civil Court twice and found that two cases were adjourned because Phra Kasaem, 
the judge who was in charge of these two cases, did not attend the court. At first 
the King did not believe the Royal Pages so he inquired of Nai (Mr.) Mote, a Siamese 
60 King to Phichit, II Feb.1896, N.-\ R5 K Y 1/9. 
61 Phra.l'a Thewet's report to the King, I Oct. 1896, N A R5 K Y 1/9. 
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Barrister, who worked in the Public Prosecution Department, and Phraya Pracha who 
was a judge. Both informed the King that Phra Kasaem had been engaged in private 
business and seldom came to the court. The King mentioned this matter to Phichit 
and demanded that Phichit should investigate the diligence of judges and punish and 
reward them according to their responsibilities. 62 
Lastly, the Royal Pages' reports showed the dishonesty of officials in courts. 
Dishonesty tends to occur everywhere if there is no inspection. For instance, one 
Royal Page went to inspect the International Court and discovered two cases which 
were submitted in 1895. Khwl Prasat, a court official, charged the parties for the 
court's fees but did not buy stamps to affix them to the reports 63 (It is a court 
regulation in the Ministry of Justice up to the present to use the money for the court 
fees to buy stamps and affix them in the report). 
Disadvantages All the Royal Pages whom the King sent to inspect the courts 
were inexperienced young men. They were likely to make mistakes in their reports. 
This was the reason why the King did not rely entirely on their reports. The King 
considered that the most important person in the administration of Justice was the 
Minister. If the Minister was competent, honest, and whole-heartedly willing to 
improve the Ministry, all the Royal Pages' reports would be unnecessary. This point 
indicates that the King may have been suspicious from the outset that Phichit did not 
use all his authority to improve the Minister of Justice. One of the King's advisers, 
Phraya Thewetwongwiwat, attempted to find mature Royal Pages to direct their 
juniors, but the King disapproved because the King wanted these young Royal Pages 
to work independently and report directly to him. If the mature Royal Pages directed 
62 King to Phichit, 2 Feb.1897, N."\' R5 Ky 1/10. 
63 Nai ChittoKing, 26 Nov.1896, N:-\ R5 Ky5/1. 
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the young ones, the reports would be the former's reports. 64 The other disadvantage 
was that the inspection of the Royal Pages at times obstructed the normal court 
procedure. 
According to the reports of the Royal Pages together with the King's own 
experience in visiting the courts of justice, towards the end of April 1896, the King 
felt justified in telling Phichit that the proceedings in the courts commenced too late 
in the day owing to the lack of punctuality of the parties and judges, and suggested 
that the Ministry of Justice should require the parties to be punctual. 65 Phichit 
informed the King that the Temporary Civil Procedure Act was in process of 
preparation so he would temporarily apply the rule of the Evidence Act 1895 to this 
matter. 66 The King concurred with Phichit but before its implementation, he 
consulted with Prince Thewawong. The latter agreed with the King and suggested 
that the Ministry of Justice should print the regulation on the writ to make the 
people aware of it and act accordingly.67 It seems at times evident that the King 
was the centre of the Government administration, and the ministers had no real 
power. But the King sought opinion from Thewawong, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
even though the latter's influence had declined tremendously after the Paknam 
incident, 68 and applied it to the Ministry of Justice. This caused complications and 
conflict between the different ministers as is evident from the circumstances of 
Phichit's resignation which will be outlined shortly. 
On 3 May 1896, three months after beginning to send the Royal Pages to 
inspect the courts, the King mentioned to Phichit about the lack of punctuality of 
64 King to Phraya Thewet, 17 Feb.1896, NA R5 Ky 1/9. The document did not 
state his office at that time. 
65 King to Pitthayalap, ~ May 1896, NA R5 Ky 2/8. 
66 Phichit to King, 2 May 1896, NA R5 Ky 2/8. 
67 Thewawong to King, 7 May 1896, NA R5 Ky 2/8. 
68 N.J. Brailey, Two Vie\,,ls of Siam on the Eve of the Chakri Reformation, 
(Singapore, 1989), p.98. 
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judges and expressed his desire that he requIre judges to arrive at courts before 10 
a.m. Consequently, Phichit drafted a Ministry of Justice regulation and submitted it 
to his Majesty.69 This regulation was very strict because it required judges to arrive 
at courts before 10 a.m. and commence the business at 10 a.m. exactly. If a judge 
came one minute late, he would be reported to the Minister of Justice on that day by 
the registrar, and if the latter concealed it, he himself would be punished and the 
informant of this matter would be rewarded. The judges could not take their leave 
unless they received permIssIon beforehand. The King authorized this regulation on 
6 May, 1896,70 
Section V Prince Phichit's resignation as Minister of Justice 
According to the documents at the Thai National Archives, Bangkok, Prince 
Phichit resigned from the post of Minister of Justice because he became seriously ill 
with an incurable disease to the extent that he was unable to perform his duties, 
which took effect from 3 March 1897. The King accepted his resignation and 
appointed Prince Raphi as the next Minister of Justice on the same date. 71 
However, this explanation seems unsatisfactory because it ignores or contradicts other 
evidence. 
Firstly, regarding the relationship between the King and Phichit, as has been 
seen, there is evidence to indicate that before the appointment of Phichit as Minister 
of Justice the King disliked him. Secondly, a matter which is worth considering is 
the relationship between Phichit and Prince Thewawong, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
There were two conflicts between them: 
69 Phichit to King, 5 May 1896, N . ..\. R5 Ky 1/18. 
70 King to Phichit. 6 May 1896, NA R5 Ky 1/18. 
71 The Appointment of the new Minister of Justice, PKPS, Vol.15, pp.247-248. 
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I) Phichit criticized Thewawong's inactivity; in conversation with Ernest 
Satow back in April 1886, Phichit said that "he was disappointed. The King does not 
show the same appetite for reform that he had expected .... Devan (Prince Thewawong, 
Phrakhlang Minister) has done nothing towards abolition of forced service, which 
Phichit thinks very important, especially in the Eastern Laos states or provinces 
where 4 ticals a year has to be paid by the able- bodied men as a penalty for the 
rebellion of Wiengchan (Vientiane) 50 years ago. In face of France it is necessary to 
reform the condition of those provinces". 7 2 Thewawong could not stand this kind of 
criticism and it is likely that if he heard of it he disliked Phichit himself. 
2) The serious conflict in 1894 between Phichit and Thewawong over the issue 
of transferring a judge from the International Court. Phichit asked permission from 
the King to rearrange the positions of judges in the Ministry of Justice by transfering 
Phraya Thammasanwit from aLhihodi (Chief Judge) of the International Court to be 
athibodi of the RatchaLhczflphichet court, and to transfer Phraya Manusansat from 
Vice-athibodi of the Appeal Court to be athibodi of the International court. Prince 
Phichit's intention in the rearrangement was to place judges according to their 
abilities and to remove Prince Promwaranulak from athibodi of Sanpakorn (Tax) 
Court to Vice-athihodi of the Appeal Court to assist Momchao Khao the athibodi of 
the Appeal Court who was not well. The King approved Phichit's plan promptly, on 
25 December 1894, because it was a change within the Ministry of Justice itself. 73 
The Ministry of Justice had to report this change to the Foreign Ministry to give 
notice to the ambassadors and consuls of other countries in Siam. 
72 N.J. Brailey, Chiengmai and the Inception of an Administrative Centralization 
Policy in Siam (II), Kyoto Southeast Asian Studies voU!, No.4, March 1974, 
p.456. 
73 King to Phichit. 25 Dec.189~, N.-\ R5 Ky 3/ l. 
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The problem occurred when PhUI.l'a Manusansat refused to accept the post of 
alhibodi of the International court claiming that he was not suited to occupy this post 
and resigned from Government office. Prince Phichit reported this difficulty to the 
Foreign Ministry and ordered Luang Thammasat to assume the position temporarily 
until the matter could be settled. The Ministry of Justice informed the Foreign 
Ministry by a formal letter on 31 December 1894, 7 4 and the latter answered on 19 
January 1895, that Prince Thewawong was not satisfied with Luang Thammasat 
retaining this position and demanding that this decision should be reported for 
approval of the King. 7 5 On the same day, Prince Thewa wong wrote a letter to 
Prince Sommot, the Royal Secretary, demand ing that the latter should write a formal 
letter to warn the Ministry of 1ustice to get permission from the King. King 
Chulalongkorn answered Thewawong's letter: 
It is true that I have written a letter to Prince Phichit allowing him to 
transfer judges in the Ministry of Justice according to his discretion, 
but my wording legves a gap for the person who seeks an opportunity 
to use his power. 7 
It is evident that the King's dislike of Phichit became aggravated because the 
phrase "the person who seeks an opportunity to use his power" presumably means 
Phichit. It is not clear whether Phichit is to be blamed in this incident, but looking 
at the circumstances the King may have left the matter to Phichit's discretion which 
means Phichit had authority to appoint Luang Thammasat in the place of Phraya 
Manusansat. However, this incident did worsen both the relations between 
Thewawong and Phichit, and the King and Phichit. 
It is worth considering the reason why Thewawong interfered with the 
management of the Ministry of Justice. There are two possible reasons: 
74 Phrava Srithammasan to Phra,l'a Pipatkosarat, 31 Dec.1894, N A R5 Ky 3/1. 
75 Phra)'a Pipatkosarat to Phraya Srithammasan, 19 Jan. 1895, NA R5 Ky 3/1. 
76 Sommot to Thewawong, ~O 1an.1895, N A R5 Ky 3/1. 
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1) He might have done it because he genuinely believed that Phichit's decision 
to replace Phraya Manusansat with Luang Thammasat was not according to the 
Government's best interest and he wanted to correct it. 
2) The nature of the Government administration III the time of King 
Chulalongkorn meant that each minister tried to show his ability to please the King. 
The competition and cooperation for the common benefit would bring progress to the 
country but, on the other hand, self - interested competition could bring about 
confusion and hatred. At that time, two Ministers who competed with each other 
were Prince Thewawong, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Prince Damrong, Minister 
of Interior. Thewawong's influence declined dramatically after the Paknam incident 
because he signed the Convention of 3 October 1893 with the French, which involved 
great losses to Siam. 7 7 But Damrong's influence was increasing because after he 
took charge of most of the provincial administration in 1892, his projects met with 
great success. 7 8 Thewa wong's in terference here seems to indicate his struggle to 
regam power. 
Thewawong and Damrong disliked each other. Their dislike was known 
among the foreign ambassadors, consuls, and the government officials. Soon after the 
Paknam crisis, Mr.Scott, the British Charge, reported to the Earl of Kimberley in 
April 1894 that: 
A perhaps inevitable result of the King's illness has been a series of 
plots among Princes. There has been an organized attempt to 
overthrow Prince Thewawong, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The 
most prominent schemers have been Princes Damrong and 
Pitthayalap. 7 9 
77 Scott to Rosebery, 28 Jan.1894, PRO FO 422/39. 
78 Tej Bunnag, The Provincial Administration of Siam 1892-1915. the Ministry of 
Interior under Prince Damrong, Oxford University Press, 1977. 
79 Scott to Kimberley, 14 April 1894, PRO FO -122/39. 
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Damrong had a good relationship with Phichit and later claimed to admire the 
latter for his willingness and ability to improve the Siamese judicial system, and 
especially for his prominence in the Phra Yot case. 8 0 The good relationship between 
Damrong and Phichit would have strengthened Damrong's position and weakened 
Thewawong's. Thewawong had earlier had the advantage because he was a full 
brother of three of the Queens of the King. Queen Saowapha became increasingly 
influential with the King and subordinated all the Chao Cham (the minor royal wives 
who gave a child or children to the King, though the King had no more children 
after 1893) under herself. It is probable that Thewawong used her to get rid of one 
of his opponents, namely Phichit, but Damrong himself was the King's favourite and 
difficult to deal with in this way. 
Also the opportunity to replace Prince Phichit arrived when Prince Raphi, one 
of the King's sons by Chao Chon? Talap, who graduated law from Oxford University, 
came back to Siam in 1896, and was appointed the president of the Justice Ministry 
Special Commissioners to reorganize the provincial courts. The King may have 
thought that the time had come for him to substitute Raphi for Phichit. He still 
disliked Phichit and Raphi was well qualified for this position despite his 
inexperience in the Siamese j ud icial system, so the King no longer had need for 
Phichit's service any more. 
The reason cited for Phichit's resIgnmg from his post, his senous illness, 
seems unlikely. Even though his health was not good, he was still active and capable 
of performing his duties. This is evident from the last important legislation he 
attempted to enact, "The A bolition of the Torture Procedure Act 1897", which was 
promulgated only two days before he left his office. And if he had been seriously 
ill, he should have died soon after his resignation. But he lived twelve more years. 
80 P . 0 ~ . t 1 "l I 5 rmce amrong, op.\.-!., pp. ~- . 
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After his resignation he was also appointed by the King as a judge in the Dika Court. 
This is evident in the report of Prince Sirithat and Dr. Masao, the Japanese Legal 
Adviser, to the King dated 10 April 1906 that Prince Phichit's return to the Dika 
Court, in the middle of 1905, was a great help as the Dika Court was under-staffed. 81 
Phichit was also a teacher in the newly established Law School. After his resignation 
in 1897, he was also appointed by the King as a member of the Law Commission for 
Codification along with M. Rolin-Jaequemyns and others to revise old laws and 
codify codes of law. 82 This indicates that he was still capable of continuing his job. 
Conclusion 
Prince Phichit was a liberal, imbued with the idea of setting people free from 
oppression; i.e. he was instrumental in abolishing slavery, and his policies of releasing 
people from flogging and torture procedures, support this argument. He was even in 
a sense a revolutionary, as seen from his suggestion to the King of reorganizing the 
whole system of the Ministry of Justice, and his plan to implement the Constitution 
of the Ministry of Justice's staff to reorganize the whole of its staff. 
Prince Phichit was a good administrator as shown by his ability to mobilize 
resources; he appointed M. Kirkpatrick as a Special Commissioner to deal with 
unsettled cases in order to have his full support and cooperation. He increased the 
number of the Porisapha Courts with separate jurisdictions to improve their capacity 
and benefit people, enabling them to forward their cases to the nearer court. He 
knew the importance of the cooperation of other Government ministries as he 
requested a conference of the Government officials to consult about issuing desirable 
laws. And Phichit's method of solving the problems was to apply his policies at the 
lower level and, if successful, then extend them to the whole Ministry of Justice. 
81 Sirithat and Masao to King, 10 Apr.1906, NA R5 Ky 10/18. 
82 Botbandit (The Ministry of Justice's journal), (Bangkok, 1968), vol.25, p.490. 
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This is evident from the laws of "Changing the punishment of Flogging to 
Imprisonment" and "The A bol i tion of A ppeal during Trial." 
One controversial question IS whether the reformation of the Ministry of 
Justice was simply aimed to please the Western powers in order to secure Siam's 
independence, or to genuinely benefit Siamese people. In Prince Phichit's case, it is 
difficult to be certain whether his policies aimed mainly to secure Siam's 
independence or to benefit the Siamese people. One could conclude from many of his 
policies that it is unlikely that Phichit, as Minister of Justice, even without any 
Western threat, would have done nothing to improve the Ministry of Justice to 
benefit the Siamese people. If one considers in depth many of his policies, for 
instance, the "Changing the punishment of Flogging to Imprisonment" and "The 
Abolition of Torture Procedure Act", one could conclude that his policies were 
designed to release poor Siamese people, who had no money to pay fines and had to 
receive a barbaric punishment, from agony. The second purpose of these two laws 
was to improve the image of the Siamese judicial system in the eyes of the Western 
powers. But some other of his policies, for instance, "the Establishment of the 
Special Commissioners to deal with unsettled cases" and "the Merger of the two 
Criminal Courts", were aimed to make the Siamese judicial system more efficient in 
order to satisfy the Western powers and secure Siam's independence; the benefit of 
the Siamese people was the second purpose. Admittedly, as a whole, the Western 
powers' threat was a great catalyst to stimulate changes in the Ministry of Justice 
during Prince Phichit's term of office. 
Generally, the maIn purpose of Phichit's modernization of the Ministry of 
Justice was to upgrade the Siamese judicial system to a standard which would be 
acceptable to the Western powers ill order to persuade them to cancel 
extraterritoriality. It is ironi(' th:.1t he served in his office only two years and four 
201 
months, for within this short period he improved the Ministry of Justice to a great 
extent. 
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Chapter 7 Judicial Reform while Prince Raphi was the Minister of lusticeC3 
March 1897-26 June 1910) 
Section I The Background of Prince Raphi 
Prince Raphi Pattanasak was the fourteenth child of King Chulalongkorn, 
born on 21 October 1874, by Chaochom Talap. He was educated at primary level in 
Siamese language by Phraya Owatworakit (Kaen) in 1883. At that time Prince 
Damrong was in charge of establishing Suankulap (Rose Garden) School in the Palace. 
By 1884 Suankulap School was firmly established, and In that year King 
Chulalongkorn went to give pnzes to the good students. After he had seen the 
progress of the school, he mentioned to Prince Damrong that his four eldest sons, 
namely Princes K ittayakorn, Raphi, Prawit and Chira were old enough to enter 
Suankulap School, and asked Damrong to accept them as students. Prince Damrong 
suggested that these four princes should study together in the same class separate 
from other students, and he selected Mr. Pan Sukhum, a member of a wealthy family 
in Kanchanaburi who had disrobed from the monkhood and served under Prince 
Damrong's command, and who later became Chaophraya Yommarat, as their teacher, 
because he knew of Mr. Pan's ability and quality in the Siamese language.! 
It was the King's intention to send his sons to study in Europe. Therefore, in 
1885, after Prince Raphi and the other three princes had passed the ceremony of 
cutting their topknots and had served as Buddhist novices for fifteen days at Wat 
Phra Keo (Emerald Temple), in the Grand Palace, the King commanded Phraya 
Chaisurin to accompany the four princes to London, and ordered Prince Naret, the 
1 Prince Damrong, Phraratchahattaleka Phrabatsomdet Phrachulachomklao thung 
Chnophraya Yommarat and prawnt Chaophraya Yommarat (Pan Sukhum) (Private 
letters of King Chulalongkorn to Chaophraya Yommarat and Biography of 
Chaophraya Yommarat), printed in the cremation book of Chaophraya Yommarat 
10 April 1939, p.(37). 
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Siamese Ambassador to London, to be their guardian. The King also took into 
consideration that the four princes were educated in Siamese language only one year 
in the Suankulap School and were likely to forget it if there was no one to instruct 
them in Siamese. Consequently, the King asked Prince Damrong to find a suitable 
Siamese teacher to accompany the princes. Prince Damrong suggested Mr. Pan 
because he was already the teacher to the princes and was very well qualified in the 
Siamese language. The King agreed with Prince Damrong and promoted Mr. Pan as 
Khun Wichitworasan to accompany the princes as their Siamese teacher.2 
When Prince Raphi and the other three prInces arrived in London, Prince 
Naret provided a house for them in which to stay, together with Khun Wichitworasan, 
and also provided an English teacher to teach the princes everyday. During their free 
time Khun Wichitworasan taught Siamese language to them. In 1886 Prince Naret 
returned to Bangkok,3 and therefore Khull Wichitworasan became their Siamese 
teacher and guardian at the same time. In 1887 the King sent Prince Thewawong to 
the celebration of Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee. On his return to Siam via the 
USA and Japan, he took Raphi and the other three princes on a visit home. He also 
brought back Khun Wichitworasan and the English teacher to continue teaching 
English during the princes' stay in Siam. During this time in Bangkok, the English 
teacher taught them English for half a day and Khull Wichitworasan taught Siamese 
for half a day.4 
Princes Raphi, K ittiyakorn, Prawit and Chira stayed in Bangkok for ten 
months. In 1888, the King ordered Prince Saisanitwong, his cousin, to go to inspect 
the Siamese officials in Europe and also to escort Prince Raphi and the other three 
2 Ibid., pp.(38)-(39). 
3 The reason for King Chulalongkorn calling Prince Naret back to Bangkok was 
probably his participation in the su bmission of the 1885 petition. Though see 
Satow Diaries 28 March 1886, PRO 30/33/15/9. 
4 Ibid., pp.(38)-(39). 
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princes back to London. Khun Wichitworasan was then married to a Miss Talap and 
was promoted to Assistant Secretary to the Siamese Ambassador, still in charge as 
Siamese teacher to the princes. Prince Raphi had a deep relationship with him and 
his new wife because not only were they in charge of his study but also looked after 
him very well when he was in England. 5 
Prince Raphi was sent to study in a school In London for three years and 
finished high school in 1892. The previous year (ie. 1891), Prince Damrong was sent 
on his first trip to Europe as the King's special envoy to return the visit of the 
Tsarevitch of Russia and confer Siamese decorations on European heads of State. The 
King also ordered him to enroll Prince Raphi as a law student at Christchurch 
College, Oxford U ni versity, according to Raphi's desire. Raphi started his legal 
education in Christchurch college in 1892. In 1893, shortly before the Paknam crisis, 
King Chulalongkorn also sent Prince Wachirawut to study in England. It is difficult 
to determine the relationship between Prince Raphi and Wachirawut, who later 
succeeded as Crown Prince on the death of Prince Wachirunhit in January 1895. 
They met together once in Paris on 13 July 1895, when the Crown Prince visited 
Paris and Raphi also went there. 6 Much later, when the Crown Prince became King 
Wachirawut and appointed Raphi as the Minister of Agriculture, he claimed to have 
good relations with Raphi, stating that: 
Prince Raphi is a good elder brother and has had a good relationship 
with me since I studied in Europe right up to the present. He always 
remained loyal to me since I became King and also understands my 
policies. He was a capable Minister of Justice when he reorganized 
the Siamese judicial system and had full legal knowledge. Now the 
post of Minister of Agriculture is vacant and I consider that Prince 
Raphi is a capable person to accept this position.7 
5 Ibid., pp.(42)-(49). The English Secretary to the Siamese Legation, F.W. Verney, 
also bore some responsibility. See Brailey, Two Views of Siam on the Eve of the 
Chakri Reformation, (Singapore, 1989), p.l00 footnote 42. 
6 Tavi Muktarakosa, Phra Mahatiraratchao (King Wachirawut), Bangkok 1963, 
pp.56-58. 
7 Turakitbandit College (ed.), Raphi Sompochkrung (Biography of Prince Raphi), 
(Bangkok 1982), pp.I-2. Yet Raphi the candidate of the 1912 military plotters to 
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Prince Raphi graduated with a law degree from Christchurch College In 1896, and 
went back to Siam in the same year. 
Section IT Prince Raphi's role before his Appointment as Minister of Justice 
Prince Raphi returned to Siam with his English law degree at the beginning of 
1896. Owing to his eleven-year education in England, he was lacking in experience 
of government administration and knowledge of Siamese law. Therefore, the King 
sent him to train in government administration in the Office of the Royal Secretary 
which was under Prince Sirithat's control. At the same time, Prince Raphi spent his 
time studying Siamese laws under the tutelage of Khunluang Phra Kraisi (Pleng 
Wepara)8 who had been the first Siamese to be called to the English Bar and at that 
time was the athibodi of the Public Prosecution Department. Khunluang Phra Kraisi 
was expert in both English and Siamese law because he was educated in English law 
at the Middle Temple and had been trained in Siamese law by Prince Phichit before 
he won the King's scholarship to study law in England. 9 
During his training In the Office of the Royal secretary, Raphi established a 
close relation with La-or Krairoek, a clerk who later became Chaophraya Mahithorn 
and the right hand man of Prince Raphi during his period as Minister of Justice. It 
is important to note his career. La-or K rairoek was born on 2 July 1874, the same 
year as Raphi, into a noble family. His father, Phraya Petcharat (Mora Krairoek) 
was a grandson of Phraya Kraikosa (Roek), the founder of Krairoek family. His 
mother, Mrs. Tarn, was the third wife of Phra,l'a Petcharat. He received one year of 
replace Wachirawut as King. See Vella W.F., Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the 
development of Thai Nationalism, the Univ. Press of Hawaii 1978, 58-59. 
8 His biography will be illustrated in chapter 9. 
9 Marut Bunnag (ed.), Arnusorn naingan Phraratchatan poengsop Khunluang Phraya 
Kraisi (Pleng Wepara) (Biography and work of Khunluang Phraya Kraisi), printed 
in his cremation volume. (Bangkok, 1983), pp.( 1)-(2). 
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prImary education at Chakrawat Temple School, and after that enrolled as a student 
in the Suankulap School in the Palace in 1886, a year after Raphi's first departure for 
England. After six year of study in this school, he finished when he was seventeen. lO 
In August 1891, Phraya Petcharat recommended him to Prince Sirithat, the 
athibodi of the Dika Court in succession to Prince Phichit, to be trained in the Dika 
Court. He worked as a clerk in the Dika court until March 1892, when the 
Proclamation of the Establishment of the Ministry of Justice changed the Dika Court 
to the Royal Appeal Court within the Ministry of Justice. As a consequence, the 
Dika Court ceased to exist during this period and Prince Sirithat was transferred to be 
the Royal Secretary for legal affairs. La-or was also transferred as a clerk in the 
Office of the Royal Secretary. In 1894, he ordained as a monk in Bowornniwet 
Temple, and during this period he established a relationship with Prince-Monk 
Wachirayan. After h is period as a monk, he resumed his position in the Office of the 
Royal Secretary and he married Miss Kleep, a descendant of Chaophraya Rattanapipit 
(Son), the founder of the Sonthirat family.11 
La-or, who was interested in the judicial system and spent his time in the 
office, studied dika cases. This enabled him to research cases for Prince Raphi when 
the latter came to train and seek legal knowledge in his office. Owing to their 
common interest in law, they exchanged legal knowledge and became close friends. 12 
When the King set up the Royal Pages' school in 1896 to train persons for 
government service, he required a qualified person to run this school. As the director 
of this school had to be qualified in the academic field and respectful to others, the 
10 Luang Chakraprani, Reungkhong Chaophraya Mahithon (La-or Krairoek) (the 
Career of Chauphraya i\lahithorn), printed in the cremation volume of 
Chaophraya Mahithorn, (Bangkok, 1956), p.63. 
11 Ibid., pp.46-4 7. 
12 Ibid., pp.49-50. 
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King inquired of Prince Raphi whether he would accept this post. Raphi replied that 
he was specially qualified in the legal field and would prefer a post he was trained 
for, so he rejected this offer. 13 
Prince Raphi's Role as the President of the Special Commission to Reorganize 
the Provincial Court 
A t that time, the work of reorganlzmg the modern Ministry of Justice had 
been proceeding under Prince Phichit for a period of about two years, but was 
restricted to the area of Bangkok and the surrounding towns. The King and Prince 
Phichit shared the opinion that if they carried on with the reorganization of the 
Bangkok courts and left the provincial courts alone, by the time they completed the 
reform of the Bangkok courts, it would be too late to deal with the provincial courts. 
Consequently, they agreed to establish a Special Commission to reorganize the 
provincial courts. 14 On 21 Septem ber 1896, there was a proclamation to appoint a 
Special Commission which comprised Prince Raphi as president of the Commission, 
Khunluang Phra Kraisi (Pleng Wepara), the athibodi of the Public Prosecution 
Department, and M. Kirkpatrick, the legal adviser. 15 
Khullluang Phra Kraisi explained the purposes and methods of reorgalllzmg 
the provincial courts in his memorandum: 
Firstly, the Commission has to establish a provincial court in every 
town in each mOIl/hon in order to confer convenience on people who 
want to bring their cases to court. The town which is the centre of 
the mon/holl has to establish a Jfonthon Court. Secondly, the 
Commission will select some officials in each town who are capable of 
acting as judges and send their names to the Ministry of Justice to 
appoint them as judges. Thirdly, the Commission will authorize these 
judges to decide and enforce cases in their jurisdiction without any 
13 Botbandit, the Ministrv of Justice's jounal, (Bangkok, 1972), vo1.29, section2, 
p.261. 
14 Ibid., p.261. 
15 The Appointment of the Ministry of Justice's Special Commissioners 1896, 
Prachum Kotmai Pr~lcham Sok or PK PS (Annual Collection of Thai Decrees), 
vol.IS, pp.148- 1..t9 
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interference from Bangkok except in very serious cases. They can also 
give judgment without consultation with the Khaluang Thesaphiban 
(the head of the nWlllhol1). Fourthly, the Commission will appoint 
capable persons as public prosecutors in each provincial court. Fifthly, 
the Commission should work from momhon to monthon in order to 
train the officials in the monthon court to retrain the officials in the 
provincial courts in that mOl/thon. 16 
Because of their close relationship, Prince Raphi persuaded La-or to be his 
secretary while he was President of this Commission. La-or accepted this offer and 
resigned from the Office of the Royal Secretary with Prince Sirithat's consent. But 
on 3 March 1897, as La-or was preparing to accompany Raphi to Ayuthya to deal 
with provincial courts in mOllthull Krungkao (Ayuthya), there was a proclamation to 
appoint Prince Raphi as the Minister of Justice. As a consequence, La-or became 
instead secretary to the Minister of Justice. 17 
Section III Judicial Reform while Prince Raphi was the Minister of Justice 
The Ministry of Justice had been formally established in April 1892 and had 
progressed very slowly while prince Sawat was the first minister. The process of 
development had accelerated rapidly while Prince Phichit, the second minister, was 
in charge, but owing apparently to the political situation of that time, he was 
dismissed on 3 March 1897. Even though Phichit had inaugurated fundamental 
changes in the ministry, his period in office lasted only two years and four months, 
and therefore, when he left, the Mi n istry of Justice's work in the modernization of 
the country's legal system was still far from complete. 
When Prince Raphi took over the office of the Ministry of Justice on 3 March 
1897, he also kept his position as president of the Special Commission of the 
16 Marut Bunnag (ed.), op.cit., p.37. 
17 Luang Chakraprani, op.cit..p.50. 
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provincial courts whose duty was to reorganize the the provincial courts. l8 The first 
problem he faced in the Ministry of Justice was the overcrowded jails which, from 
his investigation, was caused substantially by the indefinite terms of imprisonment 
inflicted upon prisoners. According to the old Siamese system, when someone was 
put in prison for a crime, the judge had no authority to fix the term of punishment. 
Officially throughout the whole country, this duty rested with the King, but he had 
many other responsibilities in running the country, and therefore had little time to fix 
the terms of imprison men t for prisoners. Consequently, some of the prisons were 
overcrowded. Prince Raphi recognized this problem because he was the president of 
the Special Commission to reorganize the provincial courts which had less problem of 
overcrowded jails. He investigated and found out that in the provincial areas the 
governors of the provinces applied the method of Prakanchoengla (guarantor), 
whereby the prisoners were allowed to go out of the jails if they could find a reliable 
person to guarantee them. Raphi realized that this system had many weak points: 
firstly, every prisoner irrespective of the violence of the crime he had committed 
would be subjected to the same penalty~ secondly, prisoners who were rich would 
have an advantage, and lastly, the system offered chances of bribery of governors and 
their subordinates. 19 He then reported to the King and recommended that authority 
be given to the Special Commission to fix the term of imprisonment for prisoners. 
As a consequence, the Proclamation to allow the Special Commission to fix the terms 
of imprisonment for prisoners in the provincial courts was promulgated on 21 October 
1896. When Raphi became the Minister of Justice, he recommended to the King that 
the same Proclamation should be applied to all the Ministry of Justice's courts by 
giving the same authority to judges. The King granted permission on 10 March 
18 King to Raphi, 4 March 1897, N A R5 Ky 3/1. 
19 Prince Raphi, Phraratchabanvat-nai-patyuban (Royal Edicts in the Present Day), 
voLl, Ministry of Justice, (Bangkok 190 I), pp.I-3. 
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1897.20 After the promulgation of this Proclamation the problem of overcrowded 
jails was gradually solved. 
1. The Establishment of the Law School 
The most outstanding aspect of Raphi's role in developing judicial reform was 
the establishment of a Law School to teach law to young Siamese. This idea was first 
recommended to the King by the Belgian, Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, when he was 
recruited as the Siamese Governmen t General Adviser in 1892. M. Rolin-Jaequemyns 
argued that Siam needed a law school to produce young lawyers to improve and 
administer their own judicial system. But his idea was not practical at that time 
because the Siamese Government could not find qualified persons to organize the 
school. The idea of establishing the school was emphasized again under Prince 
Phichit, the second Minister of Justice, in November 1895, but he did not carry out 
this project, perhaps because he was dismissed in March 1897. 
The Law School came into existence when Prince Raphi became the Minister of 
Justice. Raphi realized how important the Law School was to the process of 
developing the ministry and gave top priority to it. Consequently, he established the 
Law School shortly after he became the Minister. La-or Krairoek, a student in the 
first group at the Law School who was the first barrister to qualify from the Law 
School and later became Chaophra.1'a Mahithon, recalled the establishment of the Law 
School: 
At first the Law School established by Prince Raphi in 1897 had no 
status in Government office. The class was informal as Prince Raphi 
conducted his teaching in his dining-room connected to his office. 
The number of the law students increased rapidly which forced him to 
move the teaching to the big hall in the Phra Ratcha-arya Court. 
Prince Raphi taught by himself every weekday after lunch time. 
20 King to Raphi. 10 March 1897, NA R5 Ky 1/9. 
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Subsequently, on 22 November 1897, there was an announcement of 
the Ministry of Justice by Prince Raphi, the Minister, to all the law 
students in the Law School who wanted to sit for the first Bar 
examination to register for the examination which would take place on 
2- 7 December 1897. The subjects to be examined were the criminal 
law, the law of contract, succession and tort, law of husband and wife, 
procedural laws and international law. 21 
Chaophraya Mahithon, much later, lecturing at Thammasat University, 
recalled the Law School as a semi-governmental body composed of the president, a 
secretary, a treasurer and another two assistants. Prince Raphi was permanent 
lecturer and Phraya Prachakitkorachak (Chern Bunnag), Khunluang Phra Kraisi (Pleng 
Wepara), Prince Phichit and Phraollgchao Wachariwong were part-time lecturers. The 
number of the students amounted to 100 plus, among whom were a few judges from 
provincial courts. The class was lively as the students and lecturers joined together in 
working out conclusions. Most of the students agreed that Prince Raphi was a good 
and devoted lecturer. 22 
Chaophraya Mahithon described Prince Raphi's policy in the Law School: 
Prince Raphi was of the opinion that the teaching in the Law School 
should follow the style of Western law schools. He explained that we 
must follow the modern legal system. Prince Raphi used the English 
law text books and he also wrote his own text books for the law 
students. He also helped the law students in practising litigation in 
b .. h 23 court y asslgnmg some cases to tern. 
In Raphi's summary of his work in the ministry three and a half years after 
he took office, he emphasized the importance of the Law School to the King: 
The progress in ex tend i ng new courts depends entirely on the supply 
of fit men. Why it has not been quicker is because the supply is small~ 
why it has bee~ possible to make progress at all is because there is a 
21 Luang Saranaiprasat (Thanya Nasongkhla), Pattanakan kansuksa kotmai nai 
prathetthai (Development of Legal Education in Thailand), printed by Thammasat 
University for the cremation \olurne of Chaophraya Mahithon (La-or Krairoek), 
(Bangkok, 1956), pp.3-~. 
22 Ibid., pp.8-9. 
23 Ibid., p.9. 
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supply, even though small. I think I have taken every advantage of it. 
Now Your Majesty will see that this supply is of the highest 
importance; it is our very life-blood. If it were to cease, everything 
may as well be given up as hopeless. This Ministry would be 
shipwrecked.24 
Raphi always emphasized the importance of the Law School as the most urgent and 
indispensable policy of the Ministry of Justice as will be seen in many parts in the 
rest of this study. 
2. The Transfer of Provincial Courts to the Ministry of Justice 
The main purpose behind the establishment of the Ministry of Justice was to 
take responsibility for judicial affairs including the control of all courts all over the 
country, but when the Ministry was formally established in April 1892, it was 
considered capable of taking charge only of the courts in Bangkok and left the 
provincial courts all over the rest of the country in the hands of the regional 
ministries. These ministries were then amalgamated into the new Ministry of the 
Interior in late 1894, which took charge of all their courts. 
At the beginning of May 1897, during the King's absence on his first 
European tour, Raphi received a letter from Queen Saowapha, the Regent, that the 
Committee of the Regency had reached the conclusion that the time had come for 
the transferring of the provincial courts allover the country under the Ministry of 
Justice's control. Raph i, wi thou t any prior knowledge of this matter, wrote a letter 
of 13 May 1897, to the Regent. complaining that the King had never mentioned this 
matter to him, nor had he known the in tention of the King. As the Minister of 
Justice and a member of the cabinet, he had to accept the decision of the Regency, 
which included Princes Damrong ~ll1d Thewawong, which fell upon him. But he 
disagreed with this decision and he saw no need to state his reasons because the 
24 Raphi to King, 2 Sept. 1900, N:-\ R5 Ky 1/9 (in English). 
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decision had been made without his knowledge. Therefore, he submitted this as a 
letter of resignation from his POSt. 25 
It is evident from the letter of the Regent in reply to Raphi's letter, and of the 
same date, that the Committee's decision was based on Prince Damrong's claim that 
he had informed Raphi of the matter and the latter had agreed with it. The Regent 
accepted that there was confusion about the facts, and therefore the Committee's 
decision was void and she could not accept Raphi's resignation. She also asked Raphi 
to attend the Committee's meeting on Monday 17 May 1897, to settle the matter.26 
The confusion ended with a decision that the provincial courts would be gradually 
transferred to the Ministry of Justice as the provincial administration of the Ministry 
of Interior developed, and finally the whole process of transfer was to be completed 
on 5 April 1908, when King Chulnlongkorn promulgated a new Court of Justice Law 
by which all courts all over the country except the Dika Court were brought under 
the authority of the Ministry of Justice. 27 
Prince Raphi revealed the reason for his original disagreement in this matter in 
the summary of his work for King Chulalongkorn of 2 September 1900, that he was 
of the opinion that justice would never be perfect in any provincial courts as long as 
the civil administration of the provinces was m a backward state. 28 Raphi also 
suggested in his 1897 letter of resignation that the Ministry of Justice was not ready 
at that time to assume the responsibility for all courts in the country. This probably 
means the Ministry was still short of staff at that time and the transfer certainly 
would have been a disaster had the decision been made then. 
25 Raphi to Regent (Queen Saowapha), 13 May 1897, NA R5 Ky 8/14. 
~6 Regent to Raphi, I3 i\13y 1897, NA R5 Ky 8~14. . . 
27 Engel D.M., La'\! alH.i Kingship in Thailand Durmg the Reign of KIng 
Chulalongkorn. U. of f'.lichigan 1975, p.72. 
28 Raphi to King, :2 Sept. 1900, NA R5 Ky 1/9. 
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3. The Distinction between Criminal and Civil cases and the Amendment of 
the Evidence Law 
Before Raphi became the Minister of Justice the Siamese law did not 
distinguish clearly between criminal and civil cases. Raphi later explained that at 
that time criminal offences were limited and there were fewer criminal offences In 
Siamese law than the Western law. Raphi considered this an important matter 
because he knew that in order to develop Siamese law up to a standard acceptable to 
Western countries countries he needed to change obsolete aspects of Siamese law. He 
explained that Siamese criminal law mainly covered offences against the King and 
Government which could cause riot or disorder in the country, for example, treason 
and murder, but the offences which only affected one particular person normally 
were not criminal, for instance, cheating and fraud, or embezzlement. As the trade 
of the country developed and society became more complex, Raphi had already 
expanded the criminal offences to cover such things.29 He also amended the law of 
theft by making it a criminal offence even for relatives to steal from each other. The 
only remedy previously was a civil action, which gave rise to a certain amount of 
hardship and public disorder. Husband and wife were excepted from the operation 
of this amendment. 3o Moreover, Raphi made an effort to distinguish between 
criminal and civil cases by giving as the definition of a civil case in the Amendment 
of the Civil Procedure law in 1900: 
A civil case is a case in which: 
I) There is no request for criminal punishment or, 
2) If there is a request for criminal punishment and other request, the 
,. . I 31 tormer IS not materIa. 
29 Prince Raphi, Lecture on Civil and Criminal laws, Ministry of Justice's Library, 
no page number. 
30 Beckett to Lansdowne, 6 Nov.1904, Report of the Minister of Justice for the year 
122 (1903-1904), PRO FO 69/255. 
31 The Amendment of the Civil Procedure RS 115, PKPS, vol.l7, p.198. 
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Raphi accepted that this definition was still not clear because the judge still had 
to consider whether the request for criminal punishment was material or not. He 
further explained that it was difficult to be certain because basically it was the policy 
of the Government to decide arbitrarily whether a particular action should be a 
criminal or civil case, for instance, breach of contract was normally a civil case but at 
times the Siamese Government wanted to punish criminally a person of bad faith if 
the other party could prove that the accused originally, before entering into the 
contract, had no intention to fulfil it. This offence was named Cheating and Fraud 
(Choukong in Siamese). 32 
Raphi explored the Evidence law at that time and found out that it did not confer 
real justice on the defendant because, according to the Evidence Act of 1895, while 
the plaintiff could call himself, the defendant, his ancestors or descendants, as 
witnesses on his behalf, the defendant could not. Therefore Raphi amended article 6 
of the 1895 Act by allowing the defendant also to call himself, the plaintiff, and his 
own ancestors or descendants as witnesses on his behalf. In his letter dated 16 
February 1900 to the King, Raphi gave his opinion that the defendant should receive 
the same treatment from the court as the plaintiff. 33 
4. Appeal to the Appeal Court and Dika Court (Supreme Court of Appeal) 
As illustrated in Chapter 6, Prince Phichit tackled the problems of appeal in 
the Appeal and Dika Court by issuing the regulation to abolish "Appeal during trial" 
which proved to be quite successful, but the problem in both courts of case backlog 
still increased because Phichit had not defined the conditions by which cases were 
qualified to be appealed. This point was explained to the King by Raphi in order to 
32 Prince Raphi, Lecture on Civil and Criminal laws, op.cit. 
33 Raphi to King, 16 Feb 1900, 0:.--\ R5 Ky'2/3. 
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limit the number of cases flowing into the Dika Court. In his letter to the King 
dated 28 April 1898, Raphi expressed his opinion that in order to solve this problem 
it was necessary to impose some conditions on cases appealed to the Dika Court. In 
his opinion in civil cases in which the value of the property or the amount in dispute 
did not exceed 160 ticals, or criminal cases in which the maximum period of 
punishment did not exceed 6 months, no appeal should be lodged to the Dika Court 
unless a Judge of the Court of the First Instance or Appeal Court trying the case had 
certified that there were reasonable ground to appeal or, in the absence of this 
certification, unless the Minister of any Ministry, or the Director of the Public 
Prosecution Departmen L or two Siamese Barristers certified that there were 
reasonable grounds to appeal to the Dika Court.34 
The King agreed with Raphi and later, on 5 May 1898, the proclamation of the 
conditions for appeal to the Appeal and Dika Courts was implemented. At that time 
the judicial system was a time-consuming business because a case might be proceeded 
from the Court of the First Instance, appealed to the monthon Appeal Court, appealed 
to the Appeal Court at Bangkok, and finally appealed to the Dika Court. In order to 
limit the cases which could be appealed to both the latter courts Raphi issued an 
Appeal Act in 1904. 
The substance of th is Act was that no appeal in which the amount in dispute did 
not exceed 400 ticals lay to the Dika court, and no case in which the amount in 
dispute did not exceed 160 ticals that had been decided in the Court of the First 
Instance and confirmed or a little modified in one Appeal Court was allowed to be 
further appealed. Special provision for appeals in such cases was allowed according 
to Raphi's recommendation in the previous paragraph.35 This Act had the potential 
34 The Regulation of the Ministry of Justice no.39, PK PS, vo1.l8, pp.543-544. 
35 Appeal Act 1904, PK PS, vo1.19, pp.1 15- 116. 
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to reduce considerably cases from appeal and Dika Courts, because in the year 1903 
alone there were about 700 cases of under 160 ticals sent up to the Appeal Court at 
Bangkok.36 
5. The Amendment of the Criminal Procedure Law 
In 1901 there was confusion in the practice of issuing criminal warrants 
because the existing law was ambiguous regarding who was entitled to issue these 
warrants and on what conditions. Therefore Raphi, in order to simplify the 
conditions for the issuing of these warrants, wrote a letter of 23 April 1901 to King 
Chulalongkorn. 37 The King arranged a meeting of his Ministers in the Palace on 27 
April, and as a result the Amendment Act of the Criminal Procedure was 
promulgated on 29 April 190 I. This Act established that the arrest warrant could be 
issued by a judge on condition that the Judge made enquiry into the evidence that 
there were reasonable grounds to issue the warrant. Such grounds might be derived 
from information given on oath by the prosecutor or his witness, but if the case was 
conducted by the public prosecutor, enquiry was not necessary. This Act also gave 
power to certain officials in Bangkok and the provinces to issue search warrants, but 
in any cases involving the Pabces of the Royal family from Momchao (a king's 
grandchild or nephew) upward, they could not be searched unless permission was 
given by the King. 38 
The conditions of the search warrants are one of the examples indicating that the 
King and the Royal family were not under the law of the country. It is unfortunate 
that the record of the meeting of 27 April 1902 of the Ministers cannot be found 
and, therefore, nobody knows Raphi's ideas on this matter. But supposing that Raphi 
36 Beckett to Lansdowne, F069/ 255, op.cit. 
37 Raphi to King, 23 April 1901. NA R5 Ky 2/16. 
38 The Amendment of Criminal Procedure Law 190 I, PK PS, vol.18, pp.22-23. 
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disagreed that the palaces of chao/a, Phra ong chao and lvfomchao should not be 
exempt from this Act, it is unlikely that his opinion could prevail because most of 
the Ministers were at least Phra ullg chau themselves. 
Section IV The Influence of Western Education on Prince Raphi 
Raphi had been sent to be educated in England from eleven years old until, with 
some breaks for visits home, he finished his bachelor degree In law from 
Christchurch College at the age of twenty-one. Therefore, his ideas must have been 
heavily influenced by the West. This section will investigate to what extent his ideas 
and conduct were formed by Western influence. 
I. Raphi's idea of the independence of the court of justice 
Prince Phichit's idea of the independence of the courts was probably the 
separation of the Ministry with all its staff from them, and their authority to deal 
with cases in their jurisdiction. This IS the reason why Phichit proposed the 
Constitution of the Ministry of Justice's staff in 1895, in order to organize all the 
staff to belong to and be paid monthly by the Ministry and not their own patrons. 
Yet the modern idea of the independence of the administration of justice from the 
executive power was probably inconceivable to Phichit because he was a largely 
traditional Siamese lawyer who had never been educated abroad. 
Raphi's concept of the independence of the court of justice was different from his 
half-uncle owing to his legal education in England. In his lecture on this matter 
which later became a book called Phraratchabanyat-nai-patyuban (Royal Edicts in the 
Present Day), published by the Ministry of Justice in 1901, he explained that justice 
in court procedure could only be maintained on condition that courts were 
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independent from the excutive power. 39 Raphi adopted the idea from the "Rule of 
Law" which is the fundamental principle of the British constitution, and this principle 
was developed by Professor Dicey while Raphi was studying in England. Dicey 
explained this principle thus: 
Englishmen are ruled by the law, and by the law alone; a man may 
with us be punished for a breach of law, but he can be punished by 
nothing else. 
It means, again, equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all 
classes to the ord i nary la w of the land administered by the ordinary 
law courts; the "rule of law" in this sense excludes the idea of any 
exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedience to the law 
which governs other citizens or from the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
'b I 40 tn una s .... 
According to Dicey, this principle will work only if judges are removed from the 
control of the executive. 
Raphi believed In this "Rule of Law" principle and attempted several times to 
implement it. On I April 190 I, he appointed Phraya Chakrapranee (La-or Krairoek), 
who later became Chaophraya Mahithon, as Under-secretary of the Ministry of 
Justice. He informed the latter that his intention was to apply the principle of the 
English Court system by delegating all his administrative power to him, so that he 
could control the court procedure independently from the executive power. In his 
opinion judges should perform their duties independently without any interference 
from the executive, not even the Minister of Justice, and the latter had a duty to 
render it convenient for them to operate their court procedure. 41 Raphi also put 
forward his idea of the independence of the court of justice in the Ministry of 
Justice's report of 1902. The report states: 
At the moment, the principle of the independence of the courts of 
justice is indispensable. The 3dministrative power in the general 
Government office cannot be applied to judges. There may be many 
groups who oppose the independent power of judges but it is 
39 Prince Raphi, Phraratchabanyat-nai-patyuban vol.l, op.cit., p.156. 
40 C. Turpin, British Government and Constitution, (London, 1985), p.47. 
41 Prince Raphi, Phraratchabanyat-naj-patyuban vol. I , p.162. 
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a bsolutely necessary that judges should perform their duties 
independently without any control from the Government. 42 
At that time Raphi still could not implement the idea of the independence of 
the court of justice because the King and his Senabodisapha (Cabinet) still controlled 
the appointment of judges and interfered with the court procedure. 43 Raphi had to 
be frustrated by not being able to implement what he thought best for the Ministry. 
His last attempt was at the beginning of 1910, when he proposed to the King that 
judges and court procedure should be independent from the administrative power. 
The King informed the SellaboC/i.\apha that Raphi had already persisted in this 
opinion for a long time, wishing to be the Chief Justice who would control all judges 
in the country but not interfere with their discretion in specific cases. The Minister 
of Justice, in Raphi's opinion, should perform his duty like the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs deciding policy, and the Under-secretary of the Ministry would deal with the 
internal administration of the Ministry. That meant a court had sovereignty 
absolutely separate from the control of the Government. The King and 
Senabodisapha disagreed with Raphi on the basis, so they said that it was not the 
right time to apply this principle. 44 Raphi was very upset with this decision and on 
21 April 1910 he resigned from h is post on the grounds of bad health. 
2. The principles of the English Court procedure which Raphi adopted to apply 
to courts in the Ministrv of Justice. 
a) The Accusatorial svstem 
Siamese criminal procedure before the judicial reform put the burden on the 
unfortunate accused because there was a presumption that the accused was guilty, so 
that he had the responsibility to prove his innocence. The judges would use various 
42 The Ministry of Justice's report of 1902, NA R5 Ky 1/31. 
43 Luang Chakraprani, op.cit., p.63. .-\Iso see Chaophraya Surasak and the 
suppression of the 1902 Shan Rebell ion, chapter -l above. 
44 Ibid., p.73. 
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torture methods, for example flogging, In order to extort confession. These methods 
of torture proced ure were abol ished by Ph ichit in 1897, only two days before he was 
replaced. When Raphi succeeded him. he adopted the accusatorial system from the 
English court system and applied it to the Ministry of Justice's courts. As a 
consequence, the position of the accused was much better because there was a 
presumption that he was innocent un til the public prosecutor could prove beyond 
doubt that he was guilty.45 Raphi also applied this principle in civil cases. 
Therefore, if a party alleged any fact in support of his plaint or answer, the burden 
of proof of such fact lay with the party alleging it. Raphi explained in his book, 
Phraratchabanyat-nai-patvuban, that the torture procedure was totally abolished and 
the judges could punish the ::lccused only if there was clear evidence indicating his 
guilt. 46 The judge in this system would examine the witnesses impartially and only in 
the interest of justice. 
It is noteworthy that Raphi did not adopt the English jury system. He did not 
explain his reasons for not adopting it but it is probable that he considered it 
unsuitable for Siam. Even among the well-educated Siamese, people did not want to 
adopt this system owing to the long established belief that the King had the duty to 
give justice to the people. This belief still exists in the present judicial system 
because all judges perform their duties in the name of the King. Another reason was 
probably that the standard of education of the Siamese was very low at that time, 47 
and therefore they lacked the consciousness of the good citizen. Moreover, the 
patron-client relations which still existed in Siamese society at that time deprived 
most Siamese of free will because they were dependent on their patrons. 
45 Prince Raphi, Phr::lrJtchabanv::lt-nai-patvuban vol.2, op.cit., p.621. 
46 Ibid., p.623. 
47 Thanin Kraiwichian. Kanpratirup kansarn naisamai Phrachulachomklao (The 
Judicial Reform in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn), (Bangkok 1968), p.56. A 
national education ::lct was only proclaimed in 1921, see Vella W.F., op.cit.164. 
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Under this system, every free commoner male was required by law to register 
himself under an official patron. Th is registration would entitle them to legal 
protection from their patrons in return 'for their services given for a certain period in 
a year. Therefore, when commoners had been injured or their rights were infringed 
by outsiders, their patrons would take legal proceedings for them. They themselves 
had no right of action in the court of justice. This peculiar relationship put male 
commoners, the majority of the Siamese workforce, under their official patron's 
influence, and they were likely 'to obey their patron's command. This prevented them 
from exercising quality of a good juror under a jury system. 48 
b) Private and Public Prosecutors 
In Siam before the establishment of the Ministry of Justice, the practice was 
to have criminal cases conducted principally by Private Prosecutors. When the 
Ministry of Justice was established, Public Prosecutors were appointed, but they only 
acted in cases where there was no Private Prosecutor, or when the Private Prosecutor 
had abandoned the action, or in cases of offences committed against the Government. 
The Siamese system in this respect was very similar to the English which has both 
Private and Public Prosecutors. In the report of the Ministry of Justice in 1900, 
Raphi confirmed his intention to maintain the existing system.49 
Subsequently, before the Criminal Code of 1908 was promulgated, the question of 
whether it should allow a criminal prosecution to be brought by Private Prosecutors as 
well as Pu bl ic Prosecu tors was ra ised before the Criminal Code Commission. Raphi 
and Mr. Padoux, the French Legislative Adviser, shared the opinion that the existing 
system should be maintained because: firstly, there were a number of criminal cases 
in which only private interest \Vas involved and which would be conducted much 
48 See also the consequences of the Conscription Act in section I of chapter 5. 
49 Report of the Ministry of Justice 1900, NA R5 Ky 1/9. 
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better by Private Prosecutors, for example, the offence of defamation committed to 
the injury of a private individual. Secondly, a private person and a Public Prosecutor 
might have a quite different view as to the importance of an alleged offence. The 
Public Prosecutor might think that it was a mere trifle but the injured person might 
believe in good faith that the offence was an extremely serIOUS one. Therefore, it 
was a good thing that the injured person could take up the case as a Private 
Prosecutor if the Public Prosecutor refused to enter an action. 50 This OpinIOn 
prevailed in the Commission and the Criminal Code of 1908 maintained the existing 
system. 
c) Raphi's improvements to the status of Siamese lawyers up to a standard 
acceptable to Western countries 
Prince Raphi approached this standard by firstly, establishing a Law School 
to convey modern legal knowledge and j ud icial ethics to young Siamese who later 
became judges, pu bl ic prosecu tors and lawyers. Secondly, he successfully persuaded 
the King to raise the standard of the legal profession to the top class in Siamese 
society by giving the incentive of a high salary. In his report to King Chulalongkorn 
in 1902, he insisted on his opinion that judges were not the same as other 
Government officials because they not only needed to be intelligent persons, but they 
also required a special knowledge called in English "technical", which needed at least 
three years study to obtain, and there were very few high rank positions. Therefore, 
they needed good rewards to compensate for these disadvantages. 51 Mr. Beckett, a 
later British Charge d' A ffai res in Bangkok, reported to Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign 
Secretary, in 1907, that a Siamese judge who had finished from the Law School 
started at a salary of 240 ticals a-month including a house, if he was appointed a 
50 Padoux's Report on the Criminal Code Commission, NA R5 Ky 23/4. 
51 Thanin Kraiwichian, op.cit., p.S3. 
224 
judge in the provincial court, and judges In Siam had every reason to be satisfied 
with thei r employmen t. 52 
Section V Pri nee Raph i's Character 
It is not exaggerating to conclude that Raphi was an obstinate person who 
always insisted on his opinion, and if his demands were not met he would protest by 
either resigning from his post or washing his hands of that work. This character of 
his is evident from various incidents. 
I) When the Committee of the Regent imposed its decision transferring all the 
provincial courts to the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice, he disagreed with 
them and protested by resigning from his post until, at the end, his demand was met. 
This incident has already been illustrated on pages 214-215. Raphi also dared to 
disagree with the King on the points of law. This is evident in a dika case 634/121 
in which Dr. Masao, the Japanese Legal Adviser and also a judge in the Dika Court, 
made a decision in favour of the defendant. The plaintiff submitted a petition to the 
King. The latter disagreed with Dr. Masao's decision, and called Raphi to meet him 
in order to alter that dika decision. Despite inclining to follow the King's idea, 
Raphi, after considering the case, insisted that Dr. Masao's decision was correct. 
Raphi also wrote a letter dated 23 March 1902 to Dr. Masao to tell him about this 
matter. 53 
2) In 1906 Raphi was appointed by the King to reVIew the draft of the Criminal 
Code submitted by Mr. Padoux the Legislative Adviser, together with Prince 
Damrong as chairman of this Commission and two other Ministers. Chaophraya 
52 Beckett to Sir Ed ward Grey. 17 Oct 1907, PRO FO 422/61. 
53 Sathaporn Malila, Phraborol1lwongthoe Kromluang Ratchaburi (Prince Raphi's 
Biography), (Bangkok, 1953), p.61. 
225 
Mahithon (La-or Krairoek) recalls that he was the Under-secretary of the Ministry of 
Justice at that time, and Raphi complained to him that as this Commission was 
chaired by Prince Damrong who was a Government administrator, so Damrong 
desired to adopt a Criminal law which suited his administrative purpose such as to 
persuade the defendant to confess in order to obtain a reduction of punishment under 
section 59 of the Criminal Code. But Raphi disagreed because it was against the 
principle of justice. Consequentl y, Raphi washed his hands of this Commission by 
joining King Chulaiongkorn on his visit to Europe in 1907.54 
3) On 21 April 1910, Raphi submitted a letter to the King announcmg his 
resignation as Minister of Justice. He based his resignation on his bad health, that he 
had a terrible head-ache and he could not work properly. Therefore, he should leave 
h is post in order for the King to find a better man to replace him. 55 The pretext of 
bad health was not a true reason, while at the beginning of 1910 Raphi suffered two 
successive disappointments over his principles of justice. 
Firstly, there was the conflict between him and the Crown Prince, 
Wachirawut, over the restoration of flogging. At the beginning of 1910, a small 
group of soldiers got into a quarrel with a group of pages of the Crown Prince over 
the favour of a girl who sold betel nut. The quarrel ended with the soldiers, armed 
with sticks, chasing the pages back into the safety of Parusakawan Palace. The 
following day the Crown Prince demanded redress for the insult to his position by the 
application of an old law of flogging. King Chulalongkorn at first resisted and Raphi 
resisted strongly by pleading that flogging had already been abolished. Undoubtedly 
both the King and Raphi were concerned for the possible bad effect that the 
resumption of such a barbaric practice would have on Western countries' attitude at 
54 Luang Chakraprani, op.cit., pp.71-7?. 
55 Ibid., p.75. 
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the very time Siam was seeking to achieve removal of treaty restrictions on its 
judicial severeignty. But the Crown Prince insisted. At last the King yielded to the 
Crown Prince's demand, and the beatings were carried out oblivious to legal 
procedures. 56 Raphi was very distraught with the King's decision as there were 
already many privileged persons in Siam who were not subject to the law of the 
country and could do anything regardless of law. Secondly, also at the beginning of 
1910, Raphi demanded from the King that the judicial power should be proclaimed 
independent from the executive power but the King rejected his demand on the basis 
that it was still not the right time to apply this principle. This has already been 
illustrated on page 21£r-2 20 Obviously, these two incidents frustrated Raphi's desire 
to implement his principles of justice and therefore he resigned from his post. 
Raphi was also a self-respecting person who always behaved according to his 
opinion of righteousness without considering whether his action would bring 
punishment or prejudice to him. This is shown in the book Kerd Wang Parut (Born 
in the Parut Palace) in which Prince Chula Chakraphong, the son of Chao!a Prince 
Chakraphong, a full-brother of the Crown Prince Wachirawut, wrote: 
Most of my father's brothers disregarded my mother because they were 
afraid of my grandfather [King Chulalongkorn]. Their action was 
understandable. But I am delighted to be able to record that 
Kromluallg Ratburi [Prince Raphi], one of my uncles, who was not 
afraid of anybody and anything, came to visit my mother and asked 
about her well- being. He also gave a camera to her. His action was 
appreciated as he risked the anger of my grandfather. 57 
It is noteworthy that often Prince Raphi wrote letters to the King in English. 
This was probably bec~lUse his English was better than his Thai, and he found it more 
difficult to write in Thai as he was educated in England for eleven years. Also, his 
56 . - 4 Vella W.F., Op.CIt., p.) . 
57 Sathaporn Mal ilJ, op.cit., pp.60-61. King Chulalongkorn and Queen Saowapha 
were furious \\' hen the i r son, Chao! a Pri nee Chakraphong, married a Russian wife, 
and would not accept her. 
227 
English would have been better than his father's, and thus not liable to his father's 
criticism. It is quite possible that his ideas were more English than Thai. He was 
appointed the Minister of Justice in 1897, only one year after his return from 
England. In the cabinets which comprised most of his uncles, whose ideas were 
conservative, Raphi's ideas were frequently contrary to theirs. This led to his 
frequent absence from cabinet meetings and caused dissatisfaction among his uncles. 
One can compare Prince Raphi's fate with that of Prince Pritsdang as they were both 
educated in the West and had radical ideas. Pritsdang was forced into exile because 
of his initiative in drafting the petition of 1885. Raphi was more fortunate as he was 
a son of the King and was only forced to depart from the Ministry of Justice as his 
novel ideas for reforming the Ministry were rejected by the King and cabinet. 
Section VI The Appointment of Prince Charun as the Vice-Minister of 
Justice and Prince Raphi's Resignation 
On the 29 April 1909, Raphi had a personal talk with the King as the King 
referred to that date in a letter to Raphi. 58 In this talk Raphi probably complained to 
the King about his excessive responsibilities in the Ministry that prevented him from 
proceeding with the urgent issues in the Ministry which should be tackled and 
suggested that the King find someone to substitute for him as Minister of Justice. 
On 30 April 1909, Raphi wrote a letter to King Chulalongkorn to complain that 
he was anxious about his heavy work-load in the Ministry. He implied that he was 
not capable of being responsible for all the work of the Ministry, and if he must still 
carryon as before, improvements in the Ministry would not happen in the way they 
should. Raphi also suggested at the end of this letter that the implementation of the 
58 King to Raphi, '"l May 1909, NA R5 Ky 6/7. 
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new Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 required finding someone to replace him in order 
to prepare in advance for the implementation of this treaty.59 
The King responded with his letter of 2 May 1909: 
I am of the opinion that changing the Minister at a crucial time like 
this will bring disadvantages to the Ministry and I cannot find any 
suitable person to substitute for you except as we said that day that I 
will ask Charun to assist you.60 I sent a letter to Charun, and he 
should have received it by now. I observed that at present only you 
can argue and control the Farang [western citizens] because they 
respect you. In this Ministry, the work is concerned with the Farang 
not only to control them as subordinates, but also to communicate 
diplomatic policies concerned with the International Court. Therefore, 
the responsibilities of the Minister are tremendous, and if your health 
is not good I think the appointment of a Vice-Minister, to assist you 
in foreign policy and when you are sick, will be a great help. Charun 
is suitable to be appointed for this job. Even he lacks domestic 
knowledge and is not respected among Siamese, but with your 
assistance and recommendation he will gain knowledge, and with his 
ability in international affairs he will be a great help to you. I have 
already telegraphed him and I hope you will be satisfied with this 
arrangemen t. 61 
The King sent a telegram to Charun on 2 May 1909 to call him back to assume 
the post. He also wrote a letter to follow the telegram to explain the reasons to 
Charun. His letter can be summarized as arguing that the Ministry of Justice had 
three tasks: to administer internal affairs, to control the Foreign Advisers, and to 
communicate about diplomatic policy with the Foreign Ministry and foreign 
diplomats Consuls. Raphi could deal with domestic affairs with the help of his 
Under-secretary, but in the work of control of Foreign Advisers and diplomatic 
policy relations with consuls he lacked an assistant. The King and cabinet considered 
that Charun was the most suitable person to be appointed Vice-Minister to deal with 
59 Raphi to King, 30 April 1909, NA R5 Ky 6/7. 
60 Prince Charun was 3 ,\/ontchao son of Prince Naret and therefore he was a half-
nephew of the King. He was educated in England and at that time was in his first 
spell as the Siamese f\linister in Paris. 
61 King to Raphi, :2 May 1909, NA R5 Ky 6/7. 
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these matters. 62 After Charun returned to Bangkok the King issued a decree 
appointing him Vice-Minister on 12 July 1909, and informed both Raphi and 
Charoon by formal letters. 63 
Raphi wrote a letter of 21 October to the King to describe his aims In the 
Ministry of Justice: 
When there was the plan to appoint Charoon to the Ministry, I aimed 
to spend my time teaching in the Law School for half a day and assist 
Prince Siritat for half a day as my top priority is to deal with the Law 
School which is very important as the source of the food we have to 
eat everyday. Without the production of qualified lawyers from the 
school, the work of the Ministry cannot progress. The situation of the 
Law School has become aggravated and r cannot see anybody who can 
restore it except me. Next year we will scarcely recruit a person from 
it. This is the reason why r however, even though lacking in 
confidence, must try my best to take it up again as soon as possible. 
My second and third priorities are the production of Codes of law and 
helping Prince Sirithat to deal with the Dika Court. But now I have to 
give up my plan owing to Charoon's lack of Siamese legal knowledge, 
so that whenever issues concern legal aspects he has to seek my advice, 
and those issues raised by F nral1g are mostly difficult and need a long 
time to explore the principles of law. As a consequence, this consumes 
nearly all my time and 1 hardly have any left for my original plan. 
However, r persist in my plan to improve the Law School immediately, 
but I still do not know how to solve the problem of the Code drafting 
and the Dika court. 64 
One can conclude from those letters that Raphi was rather pessimistic about 
the future of the Ministry of Justice. It is evident that Raphi's letter of 30 April 
1909 recommending the King to find someone to take over the post of the Minister 
from him was written because he realized that his responsibilities had spread all over 
the Ministry and he could not concentrate on what he thought were priorities. Even 
the King had disagreed with him and had instead appointed Charun as Vice-Minister. 
In Raphi's opinion the plan still did not work because he still needed a lot of time to 
advise Charun. At that time the situation became aggravated because Siam had to 
62 King to Charoon, 2 May 1909. NA R5 Ky 6/7. 
63 King to Raphi and King to Charun, both 12 July 1909, NA R5 Ky 3/7. 
64 Raphi to King, 21 Oct 1909 N.\ R5 Ky 10/16. 
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adjust the court system according to the new Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, and 
Raphi had In mind an idea to transfer some capable judges from the north, but he 
was afraid to carry out this idea because it would damage the court system in the 
north. 65 The root of all the problems stemmed from the inadequacy of staff which 
was caused by wrong policy at the beginning of the first cabinet in 1888. Had a law 
school been established at that time, the Ministry of Justice would not have had the 
same problems in 1909. 
Raphi's Resignation from the Ministry of Justice 
It has been indicated above that at the beginning of 1910 Raphi was despondent 
about two incidents, viz: his conflicts with the Crown Prince over the restoration of 
flogging, and with the King over the independence of the courts which, in Raphi's 
opinion, absolutely obstructed the progress of the administration of justice. As a 
consequence Raphi submitted a letter of resignation as Minister on 21 April 1910. 
After the reception of Raphi's letter of resignation the King kept the letter and 
did not order anything; probably he thought that Raphi's reaction was a protest to 
him about his disagreement over the separation of the judicial power and his consent 
to the Crown Prince's punishment of the soldiers. He did not respond to Raphi's 
resignation probably because he weighed up the situation and concluded that Raphi 
was not so determined for he still continued with his work, and hoped that time 
would calm him down. But it was unfortunate for the Ministry that the Phraya Raka 
case happened at the end of May 1910. The focus of this case was Prince Narathip, a 
son of King Mongkut, a half-brother of the King, and a former Minister of Finance, 
whose principal occupation was now the production of plays at his theatre in 
Bangkok, both as 3uthor 3nd m~lnager. 
65 Raphi to King. 30 April 1909. NA R5 K\' 6/]. 
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Prince Narathip fell in love with an attractive Siamese actress named Pak and 
took her as one of his concubines. Narathip treated Pak badly, hitting her many 
times. The last time happened in December 1909. Pak could not stand any more so 
she escaped to seek protection from Chaophraya Phatsakorawong (Phon Bunnag) who 
did not want conflict with Narathip and so brought Pak to submit to Chaophraya 
Yommarat (Pan Sukhum), the Nakof'llhall Minister, who accomodated her in a police 
station. Prince Narathip went to see Chaophraya Yommarat but the latter did not 
allow him to see Pak claiming that it might provoke further argument, but promised 
to persuade Pak to go back to Narathip. But Pak rejected Yommarat's arguments, 
and as he could not allow her to stay in the police station for a long time as she was 
a woman, therefore Yommarat, in consultation with Prince Damrong, asked Prince 
Raphi to accept Pak into his palace. Raphi, who had an old loyalty to Yommarat and 
his desire to protect Pak, accepted her to stay in his palace. Pak stayed there until 
March 1910 when she left h is palace. 
Prince Narathip was furious with Raphi and Yommarat and tried to find a 
means to take revenge on them. He finally published 500 copies of a lampoon, III 
which the principal characters \vere meant to represent himself as Phraya Raka (a 
powerful cock), Pak as a hen in his control, Chaophraya Phatsakorawong as a pelican, 
Chaophra.l'a Yommarat as a hawk, and Raphi as an owl. The story suggested that Pak 
was a hen in Phra.1'a Raka's charge but she was sexually insatiable and went out to 
see the pelican until the pelican's wife was jealous. The pelican brought the hen to 
the hawk and the hawk brought her to the owl. The owl commited adultery with the 
hen. 
The story suggested that Raphi's intervention to keep the girl was for his own 
sexual purposes. Before it could be produced on the stage, the printer furnished 
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Raphi with a copy of the lampoon, and he, being most indignant at the libel, 
determined to take an action against Narathip. But he himself realized that taking 
any action against another Prince was very difficult as he was one of many privileged 
persons in Siam who were still above the law. Hearing that the King did not do 
anything on getting news of this matter, Raphi, who was already disappointed with 
the King, left the Ministry to stay at Rangsit, a suburb of Bangkok, on 31 May 1910. 
Before he left for Rangsit, Raph i wrote a letter dated 31 May 19 I ° to Chaophraya 
Yommarat explaining the reason he left the Ministry of Justice that: 
T have reconsidered my decision up to now and still insist that it is the 
right decision. My departure is for the benefit of the Crown, not for 
myself. I have typed the announcement regarding the incident but 
Tilleke argued that 1 should not circulate it. 
I think that most lawyers understand my reaction even though it is 
really difficult for commoners. When Kraisi (Pleng) was assaulted by 
some nobles, the court was in disarray fearing being attacked when it 
performed its duty. I have fought until victorious and regained 
confidence in the courts of justice. But this incident has proved that I 
cannot even protect myself from scandal and so how could I protect 
others? Therefore I should not remain the Minister otherwise I would 
be the person to destroy Siam by my own hand. 66 
On the follow ing day the King ordered a Rapsang Court which comprised 
Princes Damrong, Thewawong, and Sanpasit to try Narathip on the charge of 
defamation. Narathip rejected the accusation on the basis that he had no intention to 
insult Raphi, but the RapsQng Court found him guilty of the charge and gave a 
decision on 6 June to imprison him for one year.67 
On 2 June, 28 judges of the courts in Bangkok, led by Khunluang Phraya Kraisi 
(Thiam Bunnag), the Chief Judge of the International Court and Phraya Chakraprani, 
the Undersecreta ry of the Min istry of Justice, drew up a document of resignation 
66 Turakitband i t College (ed.), Raph i Sompoch k ru ng (Biography of Prince Raph i), 
(Bangkok, 1982), p.79. 
67 The Report of Phraya Raka case, June 1910, NA R5 Ky 1/67. 
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from their postS. 68 The King did not allow them to resign claiming that there was no 
reason to resign and ordered them back to their respective duties. 69 All except 
Phraya Kraisi agreed. On 7 June, the King dismissed Phraya Kraisi from 
Government service, and on 26 June, the King appointed Charun as Minister of 
Justice?O Raphi came back to Bangkok at the beginning of July to apologize to the 
King, The King did not punish Raphi for his sudden departure from his post, but 
their relations were beyond repair. 
Probably the King did not want to reinstate Raphi because the latter was too 
determined and obstinate and difficult for him to control, and Raphi did not want to 
be reinstated because it was clear beyond doubt that he could not implement his 
policies at the Ministry owing to the obstacles presented by the King and the cabinet. 
One significant question which is worth considering is whether Prince Raphi 
deserves to be called "The father of Thai law". To answer this question one has to 
look carefully at the role and behaviour of Prince Raphi. Firstly, the most important 
reason why Siamese lawyers call him "the father of Thai law" is because he was the 
founder of the Law School which has produced all lawyers in Thailand up to the 
present. He himself considered that the Law School had the top priority of all his 
policies. He himself was a very good teacher and tried his best to teach the students 
by himself even though he had not much time to do so. Secondly, Prince Raphi lived 
his life as a perfect lawyer. As a Prince and the Minister of Justice he performed his 
duties honestly and never 3bused his power. He appreciated justice and laws. He 
remained probably the poorest son of King Chulalongkorn. All of his properties were 
given to him by the King. 
68 Ibid. 
69 King to Judges, "l June 1910, Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
Thirdly, he raised the status of the Siamese legal profession by increasing its 
income in order to persuade capable persons to join this profession and consequently 
improved the legal professional standard. Fourthly, Raphi had firm principles which 
sometimes caused conflict \vith other princes and even the King. These are evident 
when he disagreed with Crown Prince Wachirawut on the restoration of flogging, and 
when he resigned from the Ministry of Justice when the King and other Ministers 
opposed his plan to separate judicial power from the executive power. Fifthly, he 
believed in the principle that everyone should be equal under the law as evidenced by 
his departure from the Ministry of Justice when Prince Narathip damaged his 
reputation and he could not take an action against him. Most important of all, he 
was the lawyer who organized the modern Siamese legal system. Even though he was 
super-sensitive as evidenced when he resigned from his post, suddenly without trying 
to compromise, this weak point of his was not serious enough to tarnish his image. 
Therefore most Siamese lawyers agree that he deserves to be called "the father of 
Thai law". 
It is also important to consider why Prince Phichit was not considered "the 
father of Thai law". The reason is probably that Prince Phichit was only an expert in 
Siamese traditional law, even though he played a great role in developing it, but the 
application of this title focused on the founder of the modern Thai law. So, in this 
context, Raphi's role was more prominent. Obviously, Phichit's role in reforming the 
Siamese legal system as a whole was not second to Raphi, but because of his radical 
criticism of the K ing ~lfid other ministers he caused himself to be written out of Thai 
history. This study, therefore, desires to emphasize his contribution to the modern 
Thai legal system. 
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Chapter 8 The role of the General Advisers and the Legal Advisers 
Section I The Reasons and Ob iectives of employing the General Advisers and 
the Legal Advisers 
The fate of the 1885 petition was certainly a political disaster for Siam, for 
Prince Pritsdang, instead of writing confidentially to advise King Chulalongkorn on 
the latter's request of how Siam could survive Western colonization, instigated a group 
of young Siamese to submit the petition to the King. If Prince Pritsdang had written 
to the King personally, the latter might have accepted his ideas. The 1885 petition 
had greater consequences than might appear. King Chulalongkorn publicly declined 
to follow the suggestions of the petitioners, but in fact he complied with some of 
those suggestions. The only suggestion of the petitioners which the King totally 
rejected was the recommendation to replace the absolute monarchy by a constitutional 
monarchy. This is evident in the unofficial establishment of the twelve modern 
ministries in June 1888 under the King's control. Critical to the development of 
reform policies was the employment foreign General Advisers and Legal Advisers to 
advise the modern min istries incl ud ing the Min istry of Justice. 
Since early in the Fourth Reign, Siam had recruited Westerners to vanous 
advisory government positions but, like Japan, had never conceded them much 
influence. After the Paknam crisis King Chulalongkorn began to recognize that his 
country required substantial reorganization in administration, including that of the 
judicial system. In order to comply with this sudden necessity, Siam needed a 
competent bureaucracy which, during the first half of King Chulalongkorn's reign, it 
always lacked. Therefore, Siam needed foreign advisers to help with the modern 
administration. This is evident later on in the King's letter to Phraya Wisut (M.R. 
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Pia Malakun) In 1899, In which he explained the reason for employing foreign 
advisers, that: 
A t the moment the greatest shortage of all in our country is the lack 
of capable staff, and because of this we are forced to employ foreign 
advisers to assist us in the fields where our people are not expert and 
able to deal with them. Our people are not particularly bad because of 
lack of strength or capability, but we lack modern knowledge and this 
is the reason why we need foreign advisers because when we use them 
we use the methods which they have already proved to be successful.! 
Owing to the Bowring Treaty between Siam and Britain signed in 1855, and 
the similar treaties which Siam signed later with other European countries and the 
United States, Siam had lost the power to fix its own import tax which was settled by 
the treaties at the rate of three per cent. Furthermore, Siam lost its right to exercise 
its own jurisdiction over foreign citizens and subjects. The reason these countries 
claimed to exercIse their own laws over their people was that Siamese law was 
obsolete, barbaric, and was not up to the standard of civilized countries. The 
problem became more serious when Asian people under European protection were 
also allocated to consular jurisdiction and even the Chinese in Siam sought consular 
jurisdiction by registering themselves as foreign subjects and therefore independent 
of Siamese jurisdiction. Siam's leaders realized that in order to restore their country's 
autonomy and jurisdiction it needed to reform its judicial system by creating modern 
codes of law. Inevitably they needed foreign legal advisers to assist them. 
Another reason was probably foreign advisers were employed partly to look 
after Western subjects who came to work or reside in Siam in order to keep them 
happy. Furthermore, their duty was to settle the conflicts between foreign subjects 
1 Thailand Fine Arts Department, Phraratchahattalekha laenangsuekrapbangkomtun 
khong Chaophrava Phrasadet Surainthathibodi (Letters between King . 
Chublongkorn and Phraya W isut), printed in the Cremation volume of Sanglam 
Sura-inthathipbodi, (Bangkok 1961), p.304. 
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and the Siamese or between foreign subjects themselves because they would know 
their requirements and mentality better than the siamese Government. 
All these aspects related to the legal system, and the three General Advisers 
who served between 1892- 1915, though mainly advising the Foreign Ministry, also 
influenced the development of the legal system in a variety of ways. 
Section II The Role of the General Advisers and the Legal Advisers 
The post of the General Adviser when it was first established in Siam in 
September 1892 was a un Ique one as there had been no such position in other 
independent Asian countries. Quite what the objectives of the Siamese Government 
in creating this post were remain unclear, as the role of its first occupant was long 
hampered by political rivalries within the Siamese Government. In the eyes of some 
knowledgeable foreigners, it was originally intended simply as part of the effort to 
prevent a facade of reform while at root little was to change, although retrospective 
judgments often ascribe much more significance to it. 
The Sphere of Responsibilities of the General Adviser 
When M. Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns2 assumed the post of General Adviser on 
27 September 1892, there was apparently no precedent for the authority vested in this 
post. The contract of employment signed on 29 July 1892, stated that he had to 
perform his duties as the rnternational Legal Adviser to the Siamese Government, and 
to give advice on any problem which might occur in any ministry. Furthermore, he 
2 The spelling M. Rolin-Jaequl"l1n/1s in this study follows t~e book "Two Views of 
Siam on the Eve of the Chakri Reformation" of N.J. Bralley. 
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must assist the Siamese Governmen tin international relations.3 But prior to the 1893 
crisis, it is questionable whether even he enjoyed much influence, thereafter, as he 
gradually convinced the King of his ability and loyalty, his responsibility gradually 
increased. However, by the middle of 1899, Rolin-Jaequemyns realized that his 
declining health would not allow him to stay on any longer so he tried to persuade M. 
Numa Droz, the ex-President of the Swiss Federation Council, to succeed him as the 
General Adviser to the Siamese Government. In his letter to M. Numa Droz, dated 
10 June 1899, he explained clearly the sphere of his duties. 
Regarding the title General Adviser, his functions do not by 
themselves involve any particle of executive power. And it is better 
that it be so, because the General Adviser has to consider himself as a 
disinterested friend, who had to look everywhere, to the utmost of his 
ability, for what may promote justice and public works, without any 
pretension to public power for himself personally. His functions are 
thus merely consultative, but they are so in the broadest sense of the 
word, because he may give his advice about suppression of abuses or 
introduction of desirable reforms, without waiting to be consulted 
either by His Majesty or by his Ministers. 4 
Roli:1-Jaequemyns also explained the projects which the General Adviser had 
to pursue by that time; firstly, to negotiate with France, with a view to substituting 
really good neighbourliness for the existing strained relationship and try to secure an 
agreement by which France would withdraw from Chantabun at the least cost to 
Siam; secondly, to negotiate with Britain about the Siamese Malay states and the 
British subjects in that area; thirdly, to act as liaison between foreign diplomats and 
the Siamese Government, and advise the latter of ways to reach a harmonious 
solution; fourthly, to be instrumental in improving the administration of justice and 
creating Western or modern-style codes of law as soon as possible, fifthly, to secure 
more flexibility in tax regulation, in which Siam had lost autonomy under the unequal 
treaties, in order to improve its economy.5 
3 The contract of employment of Rolin Jaequemyns signed 28 August 1892, NA R5 
Kt 2/6. 
4 Rolin Jaequemyns to Droz (his original letter in English), NA R5 Kt 2/8. 
5 Ibid. 
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Rolin-Jaequemyns wrote this letter to M. Droz when he had been serving as 
the General Adviser for almost seven years. Therefore he was in full knowledge of 
the sphere of responsibilities of this post. Unfortunately, M. Droz declined to accept 
Rolin-Jaequemyns's proposal on the basis of the indifferent health of his wife. 
Rolin-Jaequemyns then heard with surprise of M.Droz's own sudden demise in 
February 1900.6 
Section III The General Advisers 
There were three General Advisers during the reign of King Chulalongkorn 
1. M. Gustave Rolin Jaequemyns (1892 - 1901) 
2. Mr. Edward Henry Strobel (1904 - 1908) 
3. Mr. Jens I.Westengard (1908 - 1915) 
I. The role of M. Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns 
Rolin-Jaequemyns was a Belgian, born in 1835 at Ghent, who graduated in 
law from the University of Ghent in 1857. He worked first as a barrister in the 
Appeal Court of Ghent and then became the editor of the journal "The Review of 
International Laws and Comparative Legislation" in 1869. In 1873, he became a 
founder member of the International Law Council of Belgium and was appointed the 
secretary of this council, and was later selected its president. From 1878-1884, he 
was Belgium's Minister of Interior and Minister of Public Works, so he became expert 
in governmental administration. In 1879 he had been an honorary lecturer in law in 
the universities of Edinburgh ~nd Oxford. He was also a member of Law Councils in 
Madrid, Paris, and Canada, and was appointed a judge in the international arbitration 
6 Rolin Jaequemyns to King, 26 [\13rch 1900, NA R5 Kt 2/8. 
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court at the Hague. Before he accepted the post of General Adviser to the Siamese 
Government he wrote many books on law and International Law.7 
Rolin-Jaequemyns's relationship with Siam started when Prince Damrong was 
on a special mission to Europe in 1891. At that time the Siamese Government 
considered itself in need of an international lawyer to advise it on the internal and 
international affairs illustrated in section I. Therefore Prince Damrong was 
authorized on this trip to recruit an international lawyer to assume the post of 
General Adviser to the Siamese Government. On arrival in London Prince Damrong 
referred this matter to Mr. Frederick Verney who was the English Secretary to the 
Siamese Legation in London. Mr. Verney introduced Prince Damrong to the 
German-born Lord Reay who was a trained lawyer and Governor of Madras in India. 
Prince Damrong asked Lord Reay to find an international lawyer for him. After the 
completion of his business in Europe, again on Verney's advice, Prince Damrong 
visited the Khedivate of Egypt en route home in order to observe the progress of a 
country colonized by the British empire. He again met Lord Reay in Egypt and the 
latter introduced him to M. Rolin-Jaequemyns who was a famous international lawyer 
and was seeking a job suitable for his qualifications in the Egyptian Government. 
The reason for his desire to work outside Belgium was that his financial standing in 
Belgium had been undermined followed by the total loss of his fortune. As the 
president of a joint-stock company, under the direct control of his younger brother, 
which came under threat he sacrificed to the enterprise the whole of his personal 
fortune, as well as that of his wife and children.8 Unfortunately, at that time the 
Egyptian Government had no high-ranking position available. But when he met 
7 Thailand Fine Arts Department, Chaophrava Apairacha (Rolin Jaequemyns's 
Biography), (Bangkok, 1972), pp.I-3. 
8 "France and Siam", The Times, 25 A ug.1893. 
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Prince Damrong, the latter was very impressed with his personality and knowledge, 
and offered him the post of General Adviser to the Siamese Government. 9 
A fter consul tation by telegraph between Princes Damrong and Foreign 
Minister Thewawong, they decided to recruit Rolin-Jaequemyns. King 
Chulalongkorn, being informed about the matter, also agreed with them. What 
induced Prince Damrong to select him was not only his high legal reputation, his 
expenence as a European statesman, his political erudition, and his honourable 
character, but also, and perhaps ch iefly, his Belgian nationality, which rendered his 
position independent alike of the criticism of both England and France.lO 
The contract of employment between the Siamese Government, represented by 
Phraya Mahayotha, the Siamese Minister in London, and Rolin-Jaequemyns, was 
signed in London on 28 August 1892. The contract commenced from the day on 
which Rolin-Jaequemyns arrived at Bangkok. Rolin-Jaequemyns arrived on 27 
September 1892, and went to see Prince Thewawong on 29 September. The latter was 
pleased with his character and personality.11 Rolin-Jaequemyns had a first private 
audience with the King on 12 October 1892. 
a) Rolin-Jaequemvns's role in the Law School 
In his first year in office, Rolin-Jaequemyns inspected varIOUS aspects of 
traditional Siamese administration. In the administration of justice, he realized that 
to eliminate foreign extraterritoriality Siam needed judicial reform with modern codes 
of law and capable staff to operate the new system. In 1893 he launched the idea of 
establishing a law school to produce qualified lawyers. This was recorded in the 
9 Thiland Fine Arts Department, Chaophrava Apairacha ,op.cit., and see Damrong 
to Thewawong, 30 June 1892, N.A R5 Kt 2/6. 
10 "France and Siam", The Times, 25 A ug.1893. 
11 Thewawong to Sommot, 30 Sep.1892, NA R5 Kt 2/ I. 
242 
memoirs of Chaophra.1'a \1ahithon (La-or Krairoek), the first barrister to emerge 
from the Law School.I2 If Rolin-Jaequemyns was first to recommend a law school, 
the second in November 1895 was Prince Phichit. It was probably the shortage of 
capable staff to run it which delayed its establishment until Prince Raphi became 
Minister of Justice in 1896. 
The King decided to appoint Raphi as Minister in March 1897 partly because 
Rolin-Jaequemyns promised to assist him in running the Ministry.I3 Although Rolin-
Jaequemyns had no time to lecture in the Law School, he took part as member of the 
committee of examiners which comprised Prince Raphi, Phraya Prachakitkorachak 
(Chern Bunnag), Khunluang Phra,l'a K raisi (Pleng Wepara), Rolin-Jaequemyns, and 
another Belgian and Rol in -Jaequem yns's son - in-Ia w, M. Kirkpatrick. 14 The first bar 
examination was arranged a t the end of 1897, and nine persons were called to the 
Bar. La-or Krairoek was the first Siamese-trained barrister. 
b) His role in improving criminal justice 
Rolin-Jaequemyns was appointed by the King in 1896 as a member of the 
committee to improve the administration of criminal justice. He accepted this 
appointment with pleasure as he replied to Prince Sommot, the Royal Secretary: 
I had the honour of receiving today your note dated 6 instant with a 
translation of the Royal Mandate, by which His Majesty has been 
pleased to appoint me with Their Royal Highnesses PrincesPhichit and 
Nares to consult together about the best means of improving the 
administration of criminal justice. I5 
12 Luang Chakraprani, Ruangkhong Chaophraya Mahithon (La-or Krairoek) (the 
Career of Chaophraya Mahithorn), printed in the cremation volume of 
Chaophraya Mahithorn, (Bangkok, 1956), p.S!. 
13 See chapter 7. . ' 
14 Thailand Fine Arts Department, Chaophr~1Va Apalracha, Op.CIt., p.30. 
15 Rolin Jaequemyns to Sommot. 7 Oct. 1896, NA R5 Kt 2/8. 
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As a member of this committee, Rolin-Jaequemyns introduced his ideas about 
the privilege granted in former times by laksana Aryaluang (Crime against the 
government), section 28, to noble men of san.1'ahat ( government officials conferred 
titles by the King), not to be prosecuted in criminal cases except after Royal sanction 
had been given. Rolin-Jaequemyns considered that this exemption should be 
abolished as he stated clearly in the letter dated 27 July 1899 to the King: 
In my opinion this law has been implicitly repealed by the new Code 
of Criminal Proced ure [Temporary Criminal Procedure Code of 1896], 
which mentions no exception for the institution of criminal 
proceedings. This privilege would already be a great obstruction and 
nuisance in Bangkok. But in far distant parts of the Kingdom it 
would be perfectly intolerable and cause entire paralysis of the hand of 
j ustice. 16 
Actually this laksana AnJaluang section 28 was one of the laws which 
discriminated between the khunnang (noble) and the phrai (peasants), because phrai 
could take legal action against khw1l1ang only when they obtained permission from the 
King. As for members of the Royal Family, it was quite out of the question as 
nobody could touch them except the King. Rolin-Jaequemyns's idea for abolishing 
this law was to eradicate inconvenience in courts far from Bangkok, and to reduce 
the gap between thekhullllallg class and the phrai. Therefore, this issue was very 
controversial and was debated at length in the meeting of the senabodi on 7 August 
1899. Prince Thewawong argued that this laksana Aryaluang section 28 had been 
confirmed by a Royal Proclamation of 1892, and that the new Temporary Criminal 
Procedure Code had not included any provision to abolish this law. Therefore, it still 
. d 17 eXlste . 
Prince Raphi was of the opinIOn that the abolition of this law might bring 
chaos to the administralion of justice owing to the Siamese liking to make up stories 
16 Rolin Jaequemyns to King, 27 July 1899, NA R5 Kt 2/13. 
17 The report of the senahod i's meet i ng on 7 ..\. ug.1899, N A R5 Ky 1/25. 
and bring them to court. He also explained the practice of the Courts at that time 
, 
that if someone sued khunnang, the judge would submit that case to him and he 
would order the court to make a preliminary examination. If there was a prima facie 
case, he would accept the charge and submit it to the King for authority to proceed, 
but if in his view there was no prima facie case, the charge would be dismissed. IS 
The King presided over the discussion and stated that Rolin-Jaequemyns had 
misunderstood this law, and the meeting of the senabodi unanimously decided to 
dismiss Rolin Jaequemyns's proposal. 19 
M. Rolin-]aequemyns also assisted Prince Phichit by advising him on the 
Evidence Act of 1895, and the Criminal and Civil Procedure Acts of 1896.20 Apart 
from his role in judicial matter, Rolin-Jaequemyns also assisted the Siamese 
Government in international relations. This is evident at the time of the Franco-
Siamese Treaty of 1893, when he was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary by the 
Siamese Government to negotiate with the French, but the latter refused to talk with 
him, and Prince Thewawong was appointed instead. But Thewawong signed with 
France a Treaty totally disadvantageous to Siam without authority from the King who 
had retired up the river. Rolin-Jaequemyns then criticized Thewawong, and accused 
him of disregarding Siam's national interests. From that time the relationship 
between them deteriorated and these circumstances shook the confidence of the King 
. p. Th 21 In nnce ewawong. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 There is no evidence in the National Archives, Bangkok, to support this, but a 
letter from Beckett to Grey dated 17 Oct.1907, inclosure number 3, memorandum 
of Mr. BIJck, PRO FO ~22,'61 evidences this claim. 
:n Scott to Rosebery, 28 Jan.189..t, PRO FO ~22/39, and one can see that from this 
time Thewawong's role was declining and Damrong's increasing. 
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c) Relationship between Rolin Jaequemvns and King Chulalongkorn 
Rolin Jaequemyns had a very good rapport with King Chulalongkorn as IS 
evident from the King's letter of 2 April 190 I to him when he had to leave Siam 
owing to bad health. The King wrote: 
I regret very much that you have to return but it is necessary for your 
health and happiness. f willingly allow you to go because your life is 
very valuable to our country. f am entirely satisfied with your service 
and please believe that I myself and all my cabinet still desire your 
assistance. We are worried that without you we would suffer and we 
could never expect that anybody could replace you. 22 
In this letter the King also referred to Rolin-Jaequemyns's promise to find a 
suitable person to replace him, and he also praised his ability in drafting letters. 
Rolin-Jaequemyns went back to Belgium in April 190 I. Even though he went back 
to Belgium the King still paid him his full salary. In August 1901, Rolin-Jaequemyns 
sent a letter to the King informing him that he might be able to return to Siam in the 
winter of that year. The King was delighted and dispatched a letter to him to say 
that his coming would greatly benefit Siam. 23 Unfortunately, however, he died on 8 
January J 902 at his home in Brussels. 
After the death of Rolin-Jaequemyns, the King's hope of his coming back or 
himself finding a substitute vanished. Therefore, the King wrote a letter dated 2 
February J 902, to Phra.1'a Suriya (Koet Bunnag), the Siamese Ambassador in Paris, 
asking him to find capable person or persons, knowledgeable in diplomacy and 
English, and not a citizen of one of the big nations. The King also outlined the 
distinct abilities of Rolin-Jaequemyns in drafting correspondence or letters, giving 
advice, and reporting other ministerial activities. After his departure the projects of 
22 King to Rolin Jaequemyns, 2,.\,pril 1901, NA R5 Kt 212. 
23 Correspondence between King and Rolin Jaequemyns, Aug.1901, NA R5 Kt 
2/12. 
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all ministries had seemed to slow down. The King explained that it was difficult to 
find someone of the same quality as Rolin-Jaequemyns. 
In the same letter, King Chulalongkorn complained to Phraya Suriya that he 
was desperately in need of a capable person to draft correspondence for him. At that 
time, Prince Thewawong arranged for M. Schlesser, a Belgian lawyer employed in the 
Ministry of Justice by Rolin-Jaequemyns, to draft correspondence, but the King was 
not satisfied with his work, for he said to Phraya Suriya, M. Schlesser was an 
incompetent lawyer, stupid, undiplomatic and not capable of drafting correspondence. 
Because of the incompetence of the other Belgian advisers, the King had no 
alternative but to seek advice from Mr. Rivett-Carnac, the British Financial Adviser, 
even though the King did not trust him as he explained to Phraya Suriya in the 
following letter dated 25 April 1902 that: 
There were difficulties in drafting correspondence and telegraphs. M. 
Schlesser, the Belgian lawyer, was undiplomatic and brusque. This 
necessitates me to swim towards the crocodile, Mr. Rivett-Carnac, the 
Financial Adviser, to seek his advice, and because of his ambition to 
replace Chaophra,l'a Apairacha [Rolin-Jaequemyns] he willingly assist 
me in the required matters. He helped me because his assistance 
conferred benefit upon Britain, but if otherwise he would not help.24 
Because of th is assistance R i vett-Carnac was appointed the Acting General 
Adviser. But the King planned to abolish the post of the General Adviser and 
employ a capable person to replace Rolin-Jaequemyns calling this person the general 
adviser to the Foreign Ministry. The reasons for this change were probably that the 
King did not expect that Phra.l'a Suriya could recruit any person as capable as Rolin-
Jaequemyns, and he did not want to upset Mr. Rivett-Carnac who wanted to occupy 
the post. But the King made out an exception that: "If the person who is recruited as 
24 King to Suriya, :25 Apr.1902. NA R5 Kt 2/1 
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the general adviser to the Foreign Ministry is a capable and knowledgeable person, he 
may be promoted to be General Adviser.,,25 
It is necessary to consider why King Chulalongkorn did not want to employ 
British or French citizens as the General Adviser. It was probably because of the 
scale of both British and French interest in Siam; Britain was increasing its influence 
in the Siamese Malay states and France still occupied Chantabun as a bargaining 
counter to exchange for other Siamese territories. It is understandable that King 
Chulalongkorn and Prince Damrong always believed that the British or French 
Advisers would only assist Siam when Siam's interest coincided with their countries' 
interest, otherwise they would not help. This is the reason the Siamese Government 
never intended to employ Rivett-Carnac as the General Adviser as they believed that 
in the last analysis he would defend British rather than Siamese interests. 26 
King Chulalongkorn also believed that if Siam employed either a British or 
French General Adviser, this would enhance the opportunity for that nation to 
influence the Siamese Government and at the same time would give a chance to other 
nations to claim something to balance their influence. This is the reason the Siamese 
Government decided to employ an American, Mr. Edward Strobel, as the General 
Adviser to the Foreign Ministry, and later as the second General Adviser. 
25 Ibid. 
26 This is probably not true in Rivett-Carnac's case as he sometimes showed more 
concern for Siamese than British interests. For instance, in 1899, he advocated a 
joint guarantee of Siam's independence by. Great Britain, ~~ance. Germany, Russia 
and the United States. but his idea was rejected by the Bntlsh Government, see 
Greville to Salisbury, 16 Dec.1899, PRO FO 422/53. 
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2. The role of Mr. Edward Strobel ([904-[908) 
When King Chulalongkorn authorized Phraya Suriya to recruit a capable 
person as the General Adviser to the Foreign Ministry, the latter was in favour of 
employing an American as he explained to Phraya Akkaraja, the Siamese ambassador 
to Washington, in a letter dated 10 June 1902. In his view, if Rolin-Jaequemyns had 
been an American, Siam would have obtained more sympathy from the American 
people and Government and would have been in a better position regarding the 
relationship with France. Consequen tl y, he asked Phraya Akkaraja to engage a 
capable American lawyer to fill this position. 27 
Mr. John Hay, the American Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
introduced a Professor of law at Harvard University, Mr. Edward Strobel, to Phraya 
Akkaraja. Akkaraja then wrote a letter dated 24 July 1902 to Phraya Suriya, 
describing the career of Mr. Strobel with experience in politics and diplomacy as he 
used to work as secretary to the A merican ambassador to Madrid 1888-1889, and was 
appointed third Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1893-1894. He could 
speak five languages; English, French, German, Spanish and Portugese, and was also 
expert in finance. 28 PhrQ.1'Q Suriya was interested in Mr. Strobel and the latter was 
asked to travel to meet Phra.l'Cl Suriya In Paris where the contract of employment was 
signed on 21 October 1902. 
Mr. Strobel requested a secretary to help him with shorthand and typing to 
which the Siamese Government agreed, but the latter reckoned that it should employ 
a secretary who was a lawyer as it should benefit Siam more. This is what brought 
Mr. Jens Westengard, I\1r. Strobel's student, into Siamese service. The contract 
27 Suriya to Akkaraja, 10 June 1902, NA R5 Kt 211. 
28 Akkaraja to Suriya, 2~ JUly [902, NA R5 Kt 2/2. 
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between the Siamese Government and Mr. Westengard was signed on 11 }'farch 
1903.29 
Mr. Strobel and Mr. Westengard's arrival in Bangkok on 18 March 1904 was 
delayed because they had personal affairs to organize, and they stopped at Paris on 
the way to Bangkok in order to assist Phraya Suriya in negotiating a treaty with the 
French. Soon after Mr. Strobel arrived in Bangkok, he found out that he was 
intended to replace M. Rolin-Jaequemyns, a more influential post. Therefore, he 
requested to be appointed the General Adviser. The Siamese Government reckoned 
that Mr. Strobel was adequately qualified and experienced and agreed to appoint him 
the General Adviser. 
a) Mr. Strobel's role in the conclusion of the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1904 
Two main problems ensued from the disadvantageous position of Siam under 
the 1893 Treaty, firstly, the French occupation of Chantabun, and secondly, the 
increasing number of French Asiatic subjects who were entitled to claim 
extraterritorial rights and therefore were not subject to Siamese jurisdiction. The 
Siamese Government's attempt to persuade the French to renegotiate always failed. 
Finally, at the beginning of 1904, Siam successfully negotiated a new treaty with 
France. 
Phra.1'a Suriya, Siam's representative, asked Mr. Strobel and Mr. Westengard 
who were on their way to Bangkok to stop at Paris and assist him in the negotiation. 
Mr. Strobel considered that the 1904 Treaty was very important for Siam because it 
was the first restriction of French extraterritorial rights, albeit at the cost of some 
Siamese territory.30 Through it, the Siamese International Court obtained jurisdiction 
29 The employment of Mr. Strobel and Mr. Westengard, 21 Oct. 1902, NA R5 Kt 
2/2. 
30 Strobel to Thewa wong, 25 Dec.1904, Foreign Ministry document, File 2.10. 
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over French Asiatic subjects in both civil and criminal cases, but the French Consul 
was entitled to be present at the trial, and be furnished with copies of proceedings. 
He also had the power to evoke such cases from the Siamese International Court if he 
thought proper in the interests of justice and he submitted a written requisition 
before the judgment of the case. Then those cases would be transferred to the 
French Consular Court and the French Consul would decide and deliver the 
judgment. In exchange for this Siam abandoned its claim to the territory of Luang 
Phrabang and other areas on the right bank of the Mekong River, while France 
promised at last to evacuate Chantabun.31 
On the day he arrived in Bangkok, Mr. Strobel submitted a letter dated 18 
March 1904 to the King. In this letter he expounded the immediate problems which 
Siam should try to solve. Firstly, regarding foreign extraterritorial rights, Siam must 
try its best to restore its judicial autonomy. So far its first steps had been successful 
as evidenced in the Chiengmai Treaty of 1883 and and the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 
1904. Secondly, he emphasized the importance of a clearly-defined frontier between 
Siam and French Indochina. He suggested the idea of establishing a mixed 
commission to determine the frontier. 32 
The Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1904 was successful because of the cooperation 
between Phraya Suriya and Mr. Strobel and the political settlement between Britain 
and France which led to the Entente Cordiale of 4 April 1904. One problem ensuing 
from the 1904 Treaty was that after evacuation from Chantabun, the French troops 
moved to Trat, a Siamese province right on the Cambodian border, claiming that they 
needed Trat as a guarantee that Siam would evacuate the right bank of the Mekong 
River and would comply with the conditions in the 1904 Treaty. 
31 Thailand Treatv and Legal Department, Bilateral Treaties between Thailand and 
Foreign Cou n t~ies, \'01.2, (Bangkok, 1969), pp.191 -193 .. 
32 Strobel to King, 18 Nov.1904, Foreign Ministry document, File 2.11. 
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The influence of Mr. Strobe l over the King gradually increased after his 
arrival, and it reached its peak when he sucessfully persuaded King Chulalongkorn to 
conclude the Franco-Siamese Treaty o f 1907 . Mr. Strobel was instrumental in the 
success of this treat y b y consulting with the French Minister, Prince Thewawong and 
King Chulalongkorn. He gave advice, provided conditions, and drafted the treaty by 
himself. 
b) His role in the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1907 
The significant elements of thi s treaty divided into two parts, firstly, Siam 
agreed to abandon its claim to suzerainty over the three Cambodian provinces of 
Battambang, Siemreap and Si so phon in return for the French evacuation of Trat and 
its islands. And both parties agreed to establish a commission to determine the 
common frontier between them. Secondly, France agreed to submit all its Asiatic 
subjects who registered before the date of the Treaty, 23 March 1907 , to the 
jurisdiction of the Siamese International Court in both civil and criminal cases. The 
French Asiatic subjects who did no t register, Or registered after this date, were placed 
under the jurisdiction of the ordinary Siamese Courts in all cases, either as plaintiff 
or defendant, prosecutor or accused. In the International Court the French Consul 
had the right to withdraw cases to be decided in the French Consular Court. The 
system of the Siamese International Court would come to an end, and its jurisdiction 
would be transferred to the ordinary Siamese Courts after the promulgation and 
enforcement of the Siamese Codes: the Criminal Code, the Civil Code, the Code of 
Procedure, and the law of Judicial Organization .33 
As illustrated in a) Mr. Strobel's top priority in dealing with Siamese problems 
was to end extraterritoriality . He was keen to persuade the King to agree to abandon 
33 Thailand Treaty and Legal Department, op.cit., pp.200-20S. 
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the suzerainty of Siam over the three Cambodian provinces. He argued that the 
French considered that Cambodia was very important for the security of French 
Indochina and therefore they wanted to possess the whole Cambodian territory so 
they initiated this Treaty through him. If Siam insisted on its claims to these three 
provinces, France would one way or another succeed in obtaining them and Siam 
would lose the chance of repossessing Trat and restoring part of its jurisdiction.34 
Mr. Strobel was probably also of the opinion that this Treaty marked a significant 
move toward the termination of the whole problem of extraterritoriality in Siam as it 
included a provision to end extraterritoriality. And this might set an example for 
other European powers. 
c) His role in the Anglo-Siamese Treatv of 1909 
After reading the report of Mr. Westengard whom Mr. Strobel sent to study 
the situation in the Siamese Malay states since 1896, Mr. Strobel realized that British 
influence was increasing, and it was probably inevitable that in the near future 
Britain must annex these states to its empire like France with regard to the 
Cambodian provinces. He considered that Siam should also seek some compensation 
from Britain in exchange for offering these Siamese Malay states; namely, Trengganu, 
Kelantan, Kedah, and Perlis to Britain. In his memorandum he wrote: 
The Siamese Government receives no advantage whatever from these 
states, is responsible for their administration and at the same time 
cannot exercise any effective control over them without interference 
from Great Britain.35 
In his memorandum he also noted that King Chulalongkorn might reject his 
proposal, but he was quite confident that his idea was the best for Siam's situation at 
34 Memorandum by Wister, 23 March 1907, PRO FO 422/61. . 
35 Strobel's memorandum, -4 Dec.1907, Foreign Ministry document, FIle 1.8. And 
also see Thamsook Numnonda, "Negotiations Regarding the Cession of Siamese 
Malay States 1907-1909", Journal of Southeast Asia Studies, vol.2 (July, 1967), 
p.229. 
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that time. He noted that "My position is such that I cannot afford to take any steps 
unless I am fairly sure of success beforehand" .36 After King Chulalongkorn arrived 
in Bangkok from his second European tour, Mr. Strobel proposed his idea to the 
King. According to his memorandum , he substantiated his idea by listing the 
benefits Siam would obtain for the sacrifice of those Malay states. He explained that 
in exchange for the abandonment of those four states, Siam could demand firstly, the 
restoration of its legal jurisdiction over British subjects along the same lines as the 
Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1907 . He was of the opinion that if Siam succeeded in 
persuading Britain to submit its Asiatic subjects to Siamese jurisdiction, the other 
European countries which had few e r As iatic subjects would follow suit.37 
Secondly, Siam could demand the abolition of the Secret Agreement of 1897. 
Mr. Strobel was of the opinion th:1t in practice this agreement conferred benefit only 
to Britain because Britain could increase its influence directly all over the Southern 
part of Siam, but Siam received nothing from this agreement. Thirdly, Mr . Strobel 
opined that Siam could demand :1 10:1n with low interest from Britain to build a 
railway in the South. He explained that the railway construction would enable Siam 
to concentrate on improving the real Siamese territory after it had abandoned the 
troublesome Southern Malay states . But this purpose would be fulfilled only if the 
Secret Agreement of 1897 had been abo lished, otherwise this railway would enable 
Britain to monopolize the w hole So uth e rn part of Si a m. Mr. Strobel concluded that 
this was now the best wa y for Siam to employ its tentative hold over its Malay states . 




38 Ibid ., and see Thamsook Numnonda ,op .cit., p .231. 
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King Chulalongkorn agreed with Mr . Strobel and therefore the latter pursued 
his plan seriously by approaching Mr. Paget, the British Minister in Bangkok, and 
proceeded to hold discussions with him as he desired to conclude the Treaty before 
anyone came to replace Mr. Paget. But owing to several problems in the negotiations, 
the conclusion of the Treaty was delayed, and then Mr. Strobel died in Bangkok on 
15 January 1908 . Fortunately, Mr. Westengard who closely cooperated with Strobel 
on this project, was avaibble to continue the negotiations. The Anglo-Siamese Treaty 
was therefore concl uded on 10 March 1909 on the terms proposed by Strobel. 
d) Relationship between Mr . Strobel and King Chulalongkorn 
King Chulalongkorn was pleased with Mr. Strobel's commitment to the 
interest of Siam, but when on one occasion Strobel acted beyond his authority, the 
King wrote a letter dated I I June 1904, asking Prince Thewawong to warn him while 
indicating in the letter that he did not want to lose Mr. Strobel: 
In this case of mual1g [town] Kaentow , Mr . Strobel represented his idea 
to the foreign representative without informing the Siamese 
Government and if they genuinely believe that it is our intention and 
act upon it, and if this issue is one on which we cannot agree, we will 
have problems and we could also lose Mr. Strobel. I think that this 
kind of thing should not be repeated. 39 
When Strobel died in Bangkok, aged 53, the King organized a Royal 
cremation for him at Thepsirin Temple and went to preside at the cremation. The 
King also wrote a letter of condolence dated 6 September 1908, to Mr. Strobel's 
mother that: 
It is needless for me to say how much I deplore the loss of so excellent 
and accomplished a man. It is. however, my duty to mention that he 
had been a devoted servant and true friend of my government. I 
rather doubt being able to find another man equal to him in every 
respect to fill his place. There is for us only one consolation, that is, 
39 King to Thewawong, II June 1904, Foreign Ministry document, File 2.11 (Siam 
and France). 
that the memory of him and of the good he has done for my country 
will ever remain in history and in the minds of the people of Siam. 4o 
3. The role of Mr. Jens I. Westengard (1908-1915) 
The employment of Mr. Westengard by the Siamese Government had of course 
already commenced at the same time as Mr. Strobel. Mr. Westengard had also arrived 
in Bangkok on 18 March 1904, and had acted as the assistant to the General Adviser. 
When Mr. Strobel died in 1908, he took over as the General Adviser, following Mr. 
Strobel's example, and concluding the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. 
When Mr. Westengard took over the post of the General Adviser after 
Strobel's death to the middle of January 1908, he was consulted by the Siamese 
Government on M. Padoux's plan of codification. Padoux, as the Legislative Adviser 
and the president of the Law Commission for Codification, advised two alternative 
codification plans: the first plan contemplated the employment of one assistant and 
one secretary. This verv limited force could accomplish the work within twelve 
years. The second plan contemplated the employment of three assistants and one 
secretary. This larger force would hope to complete the work within five years. 
Westengard preferred the second plan as he suggested that both plans would cost 
almost the same, because, although the second plan employed a larger force, it would 
accomplish the work in less than half the time which would be required under the 
first plan.41 He substantiated his arguments in political and legal respects: 
The larger force will insure the prompt completion of the work, 
whereas the smaller force would result in the work dragging on for a 
long series of years. Now the completion of the codes is of the 
greatest importance in connection with the extension of Siamese 
jurisdiction over foreign subjects. The sooner the codes are completed 
40 King Chulalongkorn to 1\1 rs. Strobel, 6 Sep.1908, NA R5 Kt 2/8. 
41 Westengard to Thewawong, :29 Jan.1908, NA R5 Kt 35.1/11. 
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the sooner we shall be able to exercise jurisdiction over foreign 
subjects. 42 
Princes Thewawong and Raphi agreed with Westengard's idea and the second plan 
was adoPted. 43 
When King Chulalongkorn died on 23 October 1910, Westengard still carried 
on in his position, and was appointed Phraya Kanlayanamaitri in 1911. He played a 
great role in eliminating foreign extraterritoriality for the Siamese Government but 
this is outside the period of this study which ends in 1910. Mr. Westengard resigned 
from the Siamese Government's service in 1915 out of concern for his family 
responsibilities. He returned to the United States and lectured in law at Harvard 
University until he died in 1918. He was the last General Adviser because after his 
resignation Siam felt more secure and abolished the position of the General Adviser. 
Section IV Legal, Judicial and Legislative Advisers 
With respect to the more directly relevant aspect of foreign legal advise, there 
were four important advisers: 
I. M. Richard Kirkpatrick, Legal Adviser 
2. Dr. Masao Tokichi, Legal Adviser 
3. Mr. Stewart Black, Judicial Adviser 
4. M. George Padoux, Legislative Adviser 
I. M. Richard Kirkpatrick 
M. Kirkpatrick, a Belgian barrister despite his name, came into the Siamese 
Government's service by the persuasion of M. Rolin-Jaequemyns. He was engaged as 
the Legal Adviser to the Foreign l\1inistry and arrived in Bangkok in 1895. During 
42 Ibid. 
43 Thewawong and Raphi to King, 19 Feb.1908, NA R5 Ky 35.1/11. 
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his service in Siam he married a daughter of Rolin-Jaequemyns. He left the Siamese 
Government's service in 1898 on the grounds of bad health and died in 1901. 
M. Kirkpatrick's first job in the Siamese Government was to assist Prince 
Phichit, the Minister of Justice at that time, to overcome the tremendous number of 
unsettled cases in the Ministry of Justice. He was the person who drafted the 
regulations for the Special Commission to deal with unsettled cases. 44 He was so 
enthusiastic and willing that Prince Phichit found it indispensable to appoint him as 
one of the Special Commissioners. In this capacity he argued that all kinds of 
unsettled cases should be dealt with simultaneously irrespective of how long they had 
been pending in courts. But Prince Phichit held a different opinion as he believed 
that priority should be given to cases which had been pending in courts for more 
than three years. Eventually, M. Kirkpatrick successfully persuaded Phichit to agree 
with him.45 
When the Siamese Government carried out the reorganization of the provincial 
courts by creating montholl courts to coordinate the many provincial courts in the 
same area, there was a proclamation on 21 September 1896 appointing Prince Raphi 
as the president of the Commission, M. Kirkpatrick and Khunluang Phra Kraisi 
(Pleng Wepara) as Commissioners to deal with this project. They initiated the 
programme in monlholl Krungkao (Ayuthya) by dealing with unsettled cases, and on 
10 June 1897 the King proclaimed the mOlltholl Krungkao Court as the first monthon 
Court in the country.46 
44 Phichit to King, 27 Nov. 1895, NA R5 Ky 1/9. 
45 Phichit to King, 17 Jan.1896, N A R5 Ky 1/3. 
46 Marut Bunnag (ed.), Arnusorn naingan Phraratchatan poengsop Khunluang Phraya 
Kraisi (Pleng Wepara) (Biography and work of Khunluang Phraya Kraisi), printed 
in his cremation volume, (Bangkok, 1983), p.40. 
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In 1897 M. Kirkpatrick was appointed by the King as a member of the Law 
Commission for Codification which comprised Prince Raphi as the president, Prince 
Phichit, Phraya Prachakitkorachak (Chern Bunnag), Rolin-Jaequemyns, M. 
Kirkpatrick and Dr. Masao. The job of this Commission was to revise old laws and 
to codify codes of law. 47 King Chulalongkorn also appointed him as a judge in the 
Dika Court on 29 May 1898 at the same time as Princes Phichit, Sirithat, and Raphi 
and Phraya Arnuchitchanchai to take charge of all dika cases submitted to the King 
after 1 April 1898. Therefore these cases were tried and decided by a quorum of at 
least three judges whose majority opinion formed the decision. 48 Unfortunately, M. 
Kirkpatrick only served in these two capacities for a short period as he resigned on 
the basis of bad health in 1898 and died three years later in 1901. 
2. Dr. Masao Tokichi 
Masao Tokichi, a Japanese lawyer, studied English in a High school in Tokyo 
and finished from the school in 1889. He taught English in Japan for a short period 
and went to study law in the United States, finished a law degree at West Virginia 
University in 1895, and finished his doctorate at Yale University in 1897. He 
returned to Japan in the same year and started work as the editor of the English-
language newspaper "Japan Times". As the editor he knew the Japanese Foreign 
Minister, and probably because of this he was soon sent to Siam as the Legal Adviser 
to assist Siam in codification as a programme under the Japan-Siam Treaty of 1898.49 
The story of Siam-Japan relations In this period IS currently under 
in vestigation by Mr. lida J unzo with particular attention devoted to the role of Masao 
Tokichi. The idea of signing a treaty between Siam and Japan probably originated In 
47 Botbandit, the Ministry of Justice journal, (Bangkok, 1968) vo1.25, p.490. 
48 The Proclamation of the Appointment of dika judges, 29 May 1898, NA R5 Ky 
10/17. 
49 Yoneo Ishii, Kharmsampan Thai- Yepun hokroipi (600 Years Thailand-Japan 
Relations), (Bangkok, 1987), pp.125-126. 
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the visit of Prince Thewawong to Japan In 1887, on his way back from Europe. 
During this visit Thewawong signed a "Declaration of Trade and Friendship between 
Siam and Japan" on 26 Septem ber 1887. A t that time, Japan under the Meji 
Government wanted to create relationships with other Asian countries. In March 
1897, Inagaki Manjiro was sent as the first Japanese Minister to Bangkok and 
represented Japan in negotiating the 1898 treaty. The process of negotiation 
consumed one and a half years owing to different opinions about extraterritoriality, 
desired by Japan but rejected by Siam. Japan argued that at that time Siam still did 
not have modern codes of law and promised that after the implementation of the 
Civil and Criminal Codes, Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure, and the Law of the 
Constitution of the Courts of Justice, Japan would abandon extraterritoriality.5o This 
is the reason Masao came to Siam in November 1897, to assist the Siamese 
Government with the drafting of all codes. The Siamese Government agreed to sign 
the Treaty on 25 February 1898, on the terms Japan proposed, probably because this 
was the first Treaty which provided for the termination of extraterritoriality and it 
wished to set this as a model for future treaties with Western powers. 
After his arrival in Bangkok, Masao assisted Inagaki in negotiating the Treaty 
with the Siamese Government. During this period he worked closely with Rolin-
Jaequemyns, and after the conclusion of the Treaty the latter successfully persuaded 
him to accept the post of Assistant to the General Adviser. Masao was also appointed 
by King Chulalongkorn to the Law Commission for codification (at the same time as 
M. Kirkpatrick and others). In this capacity he was in charge of drafting a Criminal 
Code which will be illustrated in detail in the following section. 
When Rolin-Jaequemyns went back to Belgium because of his poor health in 
190 I, the office of General Adviser temporarily disintegrated and Masao was 
50 Ibid., p. 102. 
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appointed instead Legal Adviser under the Ministry of Justice. He was also 
appointed a judge in the Dika Court. In 1909, when Masao and M. Padoux were in 
charge of drafting the Civil Code, he had a serious conflict with Padoux over the 
question of polygamy, which seems to have left him feeling isolated and 
unappreciated. He resigned from Siamese Government service in 1913, and was 
elected a member of the Japanese Diet in 1915. In 1920 he was appointed the 
Japanese Minister at Bangkok, but died in Bangkok in 1921.51 
3. M. Georges Padoux 
M. Padoux was employed In the Siamese Government serVlce according to a 
provision in the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1904. This obliged Siam to employ 
Frenchmen as advisers in high positions. At that time Siam needed a capable lawyer 
who specialized in legislation. Therefore the French Government proposed M. 
Padoux, one of their nationals, a lawyer who had experience in legislation. His 
qualifications appear in a letter dated 23 September 1904, from Phraya Suriya to 
Prince Thewawong: 
Monsieur Padoux is a clever and nice lawyer whose character and 
qualification is not easy to find in France. He has good experience in 
both legislation and consular courts as he promulgated legislation in 
Tunisia and he also presided as judge in consular courts in French 
colonies. His command of English is not good but he can improve. I 
have investigated the qualifications of many French lawyers and I feel 
that I should recommend Monsieur Padoux. 52 
Consequently M. Padoux was employed by the Siamese Government in 1904 as 
the Legislative Adviser whose duty \vas to design codes of law. His role in drafting 
the Criminal Code will be illustrated in the following section. In 1909, after the 
implementation of the Criminal Code of 1908, M. Padoux and Masao were in charge 
of drafting a civil code. In the part of the Civil Code dealing with Persons and 
51 Ibid., p. 130; also Dr. Masao's file, NA R5 Kt 2.6/135. 
52 Suriya to Thewawong, 23 Sep.1904, The Foreign Ministry'S document file 2.1.9. 
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Family law, the question \vhether it was advisable to substitute monogamy for 
polygamy in Siam was raised for the first time. Padoux opined that the Siamese 
Government and statesmen alone could know what Siam might require and how far 
the old rules of the Siamese Family Law might be altered. He suggested that 
polygamy was an old custom of Siamese society and should be legalized in the Civil 
Code. 53 All the Siamese members of the Law Commission for Codification agreed 
with Padoux, but Masao strongly objected that such an immoral custom, no matter 
how long it had existed, should not be legalized as it would undermine the value of 
the law. He raised the example of Japan which had also had polygamy until M. 
Boissonade, a French Leg isla t i ve Ad \ iser to the Japanese Government, codified the 
Japanese Civil Code, rejecting polygamy. Subsequently the practise of polygamy in 
Japan had gradually declined. 54 
The conflict was referred to King Chulalongkorn, who himself had practised 
polygamy, for his decision. The King was of the opinion that this topic should be 
postponed and await a survey wh ich would be carried out by the Siamese Government 
to estimate the number of men who had several wives. Masao insisted on his opinion 
and argued that the European countries, from which Siam was trying to withdraw 
extraterritorial rights, considered that polygammy was illegal and uncivilized. 
Therefore, in order to ensure their cooperation, Siam should not legalize polygammy. 
But Masao's argument was ignored and he was disappointed with the outcome. He 
foresaw that the survey would take many years and it was unlikely that his opinion 
would prevail. 55 This is probably one of the reasons Masao resigned from the 
Siamese Government's service. 
53 Padoux's memorandum on the question of polygamy dated 9 May 1913, NA R5 
Ky 2/6. 
54 Yoneo Ishii, op.cit., pp. 129-130. 
55 Ibid., p.130, and Dr. Masao's file, N A R5 Kt 2.6/135. Apparently the survey 
was never launched. 
4. Mr. Stewzn[ Black 
Mr. Stewart Black was an English lawyer who was recruited by the Siamese 
Foreign Ministry and en tered into Siamese Government service in 1902 as the first 
Judicial Adviser. He explained his duties in his memorandum which Mr. Beckett, the 
British Charge d Affaires in Bangkok, enclosed in his letter dated 17 October 1907 to 
Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary. Mr. Black explained that: 
The Judicial Adviser is also a judge of the Dika Court (Supreme Court 
of Appeal) and a Special Judicial Commission for the Provinces. The 
Judicial Adviser is the only European in the central office of the 
Ministry. He controls all the other Europeans, and has a voice in all 
matters of general policy; for instance, in the promotion and discipline 
of all Siamese judges, the building of Courts, the issue of departmental 
legislation, the preparation of the budget. All cases in which 
foreigners are concerned are reported to him, and as Judge of the 
Dika Court he has the last say in such cases. 56 
Mr. Black also noted 111 the same memorandum about the Belgian advisers 111 
the Ministry of Justice that: 
Up to the engagement of the present Judicial Adviser [he means 
himself] in 1902, the advisers in the Ministry of Justice were all 
Belgian. There were eight appointments. They have all left or been 
dismissed for incompetence (mostly dismissed) and two only remain. 
When they leave the vacancies will be filled by Frenchmen in all 
probability.57 
According to Mr. Black's account, the authority of the Judicial Adviser was 
tremendous and covered a wide area. He was satisfied with his increasing role, and 
at the same time Prince Raphi, the Minister of Justice, was fully engaged in the 
administration of the Ministry of Justice and Raphi also wanted to concentrate on the 
Law School as already stated in chapter 7. Owing to Raphi's preoccupations, he left 
several aspects of administration in Mr. Black's hands. This subsequently caused a 
serious conflict between Mr. Black and Raphi, as he thought he was working for the 
benefit of the Ministry of Justice but Raphi and the King thought differently. 
56 Beckett to Gre\', 170ct.1907, inclosure number I, PRO FO 422/61. 
57 Ibid. . 
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The conflict happened following the conclusion of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty 
of 1909, which caused dissatisfaction to a group of British subjects. The cause of the 
conflict was explained in detail in King Chulalongkorn's letter, dated 2 May 1909, to 
Prince Charun, the Siamese Ambassador to Paris. The King explained: 
At present there is a chaotic situation in the Ministry of Justice as Mr. 
Westengard attempted to solve the dissatisfaction of British subjects 
who came under the Siamese jurisdiction by drafting a proclamation 
that in the absence of relevant Siamese law, the British law should be 
applied. It is unacceptable that if we abolish that country's consular 
court, we must apply that country's law. Therefore I refused to 
implement it, informing the British Embassy that the issue needs 
consultation with Raphi. 
The following day r received Raphi's letter with memorandum stating 
that Mr. Black drafts the court regulations cancelling the advantage 
Siam should obtain from the new Treaty, by abolishing the Ordinary 
Siamese Court, maintaining only the International Court, and allowing 
the Consul to preside and interfere with all cases. I enclose all 
relevant documents in this letter. Thewawong informed me that Mr. 
Black discussed the draft with Mr. Beckett and Mr. Westengard 
without informing the Ministry of Justice, although Mr. Westengard 
thought that Raphi knew about the regulation. But when Thewawong 
arranged a meeting between Raphi and Mr. Westengard, then the latter 
knew that Raphi did not know. 
If Mr. Black's regulations and Mr. Westengard's proclamation take 
effect, not only will we lose the benefit from the new Treaty but also 
the benefits we maintain under the previous Treaty. We formerly had 
problems with Mr. Black several times, but not as serious as this. Mr. 
Black, as we know, always considers himself as the British Official, 
and because Raph i has 31 ways been fu Ily occupied and entrusted him 
with general administration, he acts as if he has full authority in the 
Ministry of Justice, and this has misled Mr. Westengard to believe that 
Mr. Black's opinion is Raphi's, until this affair, of which Raphi knew 
nothing, happened. Consequently, I ask you to come back to assist 
Raphi as Vice-Minister of Justice. 58 
Raph i's letter wh ich the King referred to Charun was the letter dated 30 April 
1909, which Raphi sent to the King enclosing a memorandum on his discoveries. In 
his memorandum he explained that: 
58 King to Charun, 2 May 1909, NA R5 Ky 6/7. 
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Mr. Black's Draft rules take a way all our jurisdiction in that by Treaty 
there is a distinction between the International Courts and the 
Ordinary Siamese Courts, but the Ordinary Siamese Courts recognised 
by Treaty is [sic] abolished by Mr. Black. We further lose our rights 
before the Treaty in that formerly where defendant or accused is a 
Siamese, we have sole jurisdiction in the case; now that jurisdiction IS 
to be controlled by advisers as well as diplomatic consular officers. 59 
This incident caused the King to recall Prince Charun from Paris to assume 
the position of Vice-Minister of Justice. When Raphi left the Ministry of Justice on 
31 May 1910 owing to the Phraya Raka incident, King Chulalongkorn appointed 
Charun as the Minister of Justice on 26 June 1910. His first job in the Ministry was 
to reorganize the European advisers. He was of the opinion that Siam was capable of 
conducting the administration of justice without foreign assistance, and that if 
European advisers were, in view of treaty stipulations, regrettable necessities, their 
employment should be as limited as possible.6o 
Pri nce Charun had a low op In IOn of Mr. Black and so he dismissed the latter 
after he was appoi n ted the Min ister. Th is emerges in a conversation between Mr. 
Peel, the British Minister in Bangkok, and Prince Thewawong. Upon the question 
put to him by Mr. Peel whether it was definitely settled that Mr. Black was not 
coming back to the Siamese Government's service, Prince Thewawong answered that: 
Mr. Black was not coming back. Prince Charoon [Charun]'s plan was 
to put all the advisers together on one level. Hitherto there had been 
titles of Judicial Adviser, Legal Adviser, Legislative Adviser. Prince 
Charoon's intention was to make all these persons Legal Advisers. 61 
Mr. Peel reported this to Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, and 
the latter wrote back on 22 September 1910, explaining that the nationality of the 
Judicial Adviser in question was a circumstance which had duly been taken into 
59 Raphi to King (in English), 30 Apr.1909, NA R5 Ky 6/7. 
60 Peel to Grey, 30 June 1910, PRO FO 422/65. 
61 Report of con ve rsat ion between The\\i:} wong and Peel, 13 July 1910, N A R5 Ky 
1/70. 
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consideration by the British Government when they consented to make important 
concession to the Siamese Government in the matter of jurisdiction over British 
subjects. He also wrote again on 27 September 19 I 0, ordering Mr. Peel to secure the 
position of Judicial Adviser for Mr. Skinner Turner, a British lawyer. At last the 
Siamese Government agreed to appoint Mr. Turner, as Mr. Peel reported to Grey in 
his letter dated 17 October: " The Siamese Government have now given way and 
agreed to the appointment of Mr. Turner. They had made up their minds to abolish 
the post, and I had some difficulty in persuading them to alter this decision. 62 
Section Y The Role of Foreign Advisers in drafting the Criminal Code 
The idea of drafting modern codes of law probably originated when Prince 
Phichit was the Minister of Justice, as he suggested when implementing the 
Temporary Criminal and Civil Procedure Acts of 1896 that these two Acts were 
designed to be temporary because the completion of the full modern codes would 
consume a long period of time and the Ministry of Justice needed them urgently 
(This has been illustrated in chapter 6). The process of codification was properly 
launched at the end of 1897, a few months before the conclusion of the Siam-Japan 
Treaty of 1898. It was th is Treaty that caused the issue of extraterritoriality to be 
discussed again. Japan had just terminated its unequal treaties with all the European 
powers starting in 1894, by producing modern codes of law, and Siam wanted to 
imitate Japan. Consequently, in 1897 the Law Commission for Codification, which 
comprised Prince Raphi as its president, Prince Phichit, Phraya Prachakitkorachak, 
M. Rolin-Jaequemyns, M. Kirkpatrick and Dr. Masao, was created to establish 
modern codes of law. 
62 Correspondence between Peel and Grey, PRO FO 422/65. 
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Before considering the role of this Commission, it is necessary to discuss why 
Siam needed modern codes of law and to eradicate extraterritoriality. It was in order 
to raise the standard of Siam as a "civilized" nation. The European powers and even 
Japan acquired extraterritoriality in Siam on the grounds that Siam did not have 
modern law and therefore their subjects were exposed to uncertainty and needed 
consular protection. The Siamese Government started its codification programme 
with Criminal Codification because it was less complicated and easier to draft than 
other codes. 
The Commission faced difficulty when M. Kirkpatrick resigned in 1898 on 
the grounds of bad health. M. Schlesser, a new Belgian Legal Adviser, was appointed 
in his place. Owing to most of the commissioners being occupied with work in the 
Ministry of Justice, they deputed Masao and Schlesser to be responsible for the 
drafting of the Criminal Code. Eventually in 1904, the first draft of the Criminal 
Code of Masao and Schlesser was submitted to the Siamese Government. By that 
time Siam had already signed the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1904 by which Siam was 
obliged to employ Frenchmen in high rank positions, so Siam recruited the 
aforementioned M. Padoux as a Legislative Adviser to take over responsibility for the 
drafting of the codes. 
Thus from beginning of 1905 M. Padoux was responsible for the drafting of 
the Criminal Code. He investigated the draft of Masao and Schlesser and concluded 
that this draft was based on the Indi~ln Criminal Code which was a compilation of the 
British Common Law system. Before the appointment of M. Padoux, the 
commISSIoners led by Prince Raphi believed that Siam should adopt the British 
Common Law system as the model of its codification because Siamese lawyers were 
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accustomed to this system, and at that time Siam introduced several English-style laws 
into the courts of justice.63 
But M. Padoux had a different opInIOn. He accepted that the Common Law 
system was suitable for Britain because there it had had a long period of 
development. But it was customary law, based on the principle of precedent, which 
guided the decisions of the courts and therefore involved no clearly-defined code, so 
it was difficult to apply and study. He argued that even Britain found it difficult to 
apply its Common Law system to its colonies. As he argued in his report: 
There are certain forms of English Procedure imported into Siam. I 
beg to state that I have no idea of criticizing the English Criminal 
Procedure. But I doubt very much whether a system which has 
developed during centuries in one of the most peculiar European 
countries may be suitable for Siam. English life and English ideas are 
not so different from Continental life and ideas. Yet the whole 
English judicial system differs very much from the Continental 
systems. And Siam's Government, administration, social life, public 
spirit, reI ig ion, econom ical cond itions are far different from the 
Government, administration, etc. of England or Europe. The British 
Government themselves have found that it was not advisable to import 
their Criminal Procedure into all British colonies. There are for 
instance substantial differences between the English and Indian 
Criminal Procedure. 64 
M. Padoux introduced the alternative Continental system which he thought 
more suitable to Siam. He insisted that the Continental system was clearer, easier to 
understand, and more convenient to apply because it had definite codes of law.65 He 
observed in the same report that: 
63 Raphi to King, 16 March 1905, NA R5 Ky 23/3. 
64 "Report on the Proposed Penal Code for the Kingdom of Siam submitted to HRH 
Prince Raj buri Direckri t (Raph i), Min ister of Justice, by M. Padoux, the 
Legislative Adviser", Bangkok 6 Aug. 1906, NA R5 Ky 23/4. 
65 Yut Saenguthai, "Karnrangkotmainaiprathetthai" [Codification in Thailand], printed 
in the book "Nqancha/ollf; Iworoo hasiopi khonglletiballditsapha"[50 years 
anniversary of Thai Barrister Association], (Bangkok 1964), p.94 and also "M. 
Padoux's memorandum on the drafting of the Criminal Code 1908", Warasan 
N itisat (Thammasa t Law Jou rnal), (Bangkok 1988), pp.1 0- 11. 
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With one exception (England), all civilised countries have realized the 
superiority of codification over any other legal system, either common 
law or case law. In a country like Siam where so large improvements 
are being made and the administration is being transformed in every 
respect, what is most necessary is short lucid Codes, accessible, and 
easily understood by the people. To the public it will give a fair 
knowledge of their duties and rights. To the judges a clear and simple 
statement of law, to which they may refer in any case coming under 
their jurisdiction. Besides, the Question of codification has in Siam its 
peculiar importance with regard to foreign relations. It seems doubtful 
whether foreign Powers will ever consent to the abolition of the 
extraterritorial rights as long as Siam cannot bring forward a better 
legal system..... Such were undoubtedly the reasons which induced the 
Ministry of Justice to take up the matter of codifying the Penal Law. 66 
Most of the commIsSIoners and King Chulalongkorn agreed with M. Padoux. 
One person in the Siamese Government who could influence the opinion of the King 
and other Ministers was Prince Damrong. After the Paknam incident Prince Damrong 
was acting as virtual Prime Minister of Siam. Damrong was also of the opinion that 
the Continental system was more suitable to Siam than the Common Law system. In 
a letter dated 13 December 1903, he wrote to the King that he agreed with the idea 
of codification even though it might take ten or fifteen years to complete, and 
therefore there was no reason to deby the process. 67 
But the conflict of ideas between the English-trained Prince Raphi and M. 
Padoux caused dislike between them. As the Minister of Justice, Prince Raphi should 
have continued as the president of the commissioners, but he refused to accept this 
duty, explaining to King Chublongkorn: 
The process of codification consumes a great deal of time. I already 
have tremendous responsibilities in the Ministry of Justice and I am 
afraid that I have no time to take on this duty. And I would not like 
to be responsible for a job I have not actually performed.68 
66 "Report on the Proposed Penal Code .. ", op.cit. 
67 Prince Oamrong's idea of Codification, NA R5 Ky 23/3, and his letter to the 
King dated 13 Dec.1903, N A R5 K Y 23/3. 
68 Raphi to King, 16 March 1905, NA R5 Kt 23/3. 
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Consequently M. Padoux was appointed the president of the Commission. He 
suggested that as there had been no Siamese involved in completing the previous 
draft, the King appoint a new Criminal Code Commission composed of himself as 
president, Mr. Tilleke, a Ceylonese lawyer who was working as the director of the 
Public Prosecution Department, Phra Attakarnprasit (Peum), a Judge 10 the 
International Court, and Luang Sakonsattayathon (Tongbun), a Judge in the Civil 
Court. 69 
The new draft of the Criminal Code was produced by M. Padoux with only 
mere consultation with the other Commissions. The draft was finished at the 
beginning of 1907, and M. Padoux suggested that the draft should be checked by the 
Ministers involved with this code. Therefore, Princes Damrong, Naret, Thewawong 
and Raphi were appointed to check the new draft. Tn March 1907, King 
Chulalongkorn went on his second trip to Europe, and Prince Raphi accompanied him 
so the latter appointed Masao and Black to attend the investigation for him. On I 
June 1908, the first Siamese Criminal Code was implemented. One reason for Raphi's 
accompanying the King to Europe was that he disagreed with Prince Damrong when 
they reviewed the draft together (this has been illustrated in chapter 7 pp.224-225). 
Another reason was probably that Prince Raphi had already disagreed with the King 
about adopting the Continental system of law and therefore did not want to interfere 
with the Criminal Code's drafting. After the review and investigation, the first code 
of Siam, the Criminal Code, \vas promulgated on I June 1908. 
69 "M. Padoux's Memorandum on the drafting of the Criminal Code", op.cit., pp.10-
II. 
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The question whether the Criminal Code repealed the kotmontienbarn (Royal 
Family Law) was raised by King Chulalongkorn who, in the middle of March 1907, 
commanded Prince Narit, the Palace Minister, to investigate this matter. Prince Narit 
analysed the draft code and replied to the King on 17 March 1907: 
I have investigated the draft of the Criminal Code and am of the 
opinion that on the whole it does not oppose the kotmontienbarn. But 
at first I was doubtful as the beginning of the draft code states that 
when it comes into force any laws which are inconsistent with its 
provisions shall be repealed; therefore, I wrote a letter to ask Phraya 
Chakraprani [La-or Krairoek, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of 
Justice] regarding the matter. He replied that the Criminal Law 
Commission agreed to add a provision to exclude the application of the 
code to the kotmontienbarn, the monk law, and the military law. I 
enclose his letter in this letter for Your Majesty's consideration.70 
This indicates the King's concern over the application of the Criminal Code lest it 
interfere with the privilege of the royal family. 
Conclusion 
The influence of the General Adviser depended on the political situation at 
the particular time; if the independence of Siam was at risk, the General Adviser 
would have more influence on the Siamese Government's policy because King 
Chulalongkorn and his Ministers were desperately in need of the adviser. This is 
evident from the role of Rolin-Jaequemyns after the Paknam incident. His influence 
was so prominent that the King appointed him Chaophraya Aphairacha (the only 
foreigner who received Chaophraya title in the Bangkok period) in 1897, and in the 
same year the King also appointed him to the Committee of Regency when he went 
on his first European trip. In April 1899, the King allowed him to establish a 
ministry (krasuang) of his own, but it was abolished in March 1900 owing to his bad 
health.71 
70 Narit to King, 17 March 1907, NA R5 Ky 23/3. 
71 The establishment and abolition of the Ministry of General Adviser, NA R5 
Miscellaneous file 3/9. 
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In 1904, when Mr. Strobel arrived In Siam, the independence of Siam was 
much more secure owmg to the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale of 1904 between 
Britain and France recognizing Siam's right to independence. Strobel was still very 
influential over the King as he successfully persuaded him to conclude the 1907 and 
1909 Treaties with France and Britain. But the influence of the Legal, Judicial and 
Legislative Advisers was limited to the Ministry of Justice. They were responsible 
for advice, administration and codification in the Ministry. They were responsible to 
the Minister of Justice but they also had to seek advice from and listen to the opinion 
of the General Adviser. But the latter was always fully occupied with the general 
administration of the Siamese Government and therefore had no time to draft codes 
by himself. 
The functions of the General Adviser, the Legal, Judicial and Legislative 
Advisers were merely consultative and not policy-making. Decision-making was still 
in the hands of the Siamese Government but if their advice was desirable and 
practical, it could be implemented (Ind enforced by the Siamese Government. One 
point worth noting is that foreign advisers could be beneficial but sometimes could be 
detrimental particularly when they \vere recruited under pressure from Western 
imperialists or by King Chulalongkorn and Princes Damrong or Thewawong without 
consultation with the Minister of Justice. This is evident from the conflict between 
Prince Raphi and Mr. BI(lck, as has been stated above. 
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Chaoter 9 The Staff of the Ministry of Justice 
The foreign staff of the Ministry of Justice did not cooperate well with Prince 
Raphi because the latter, as Minister of Justice, had never been consulted when they 
were recruited. This caused various problems as illustrated in chapter 8. On the 
other hand, the Siamese staff in the Ministry of Justice worked harmoniously under 
Prince Raphi's control. This was probably because he set a good example as a hard-
working, honest, and capable leader. This chapter will investigate the problems of 
the Siamese staff in the Ministry of Justice at the beginning of its establishment when 
Princes Sawat and Phichit were Minister. The problems were alleviated when Prince 
Raphi was Minister. It also highlights the role of some important Siamese lawyers in 
the Ministry at that time. 
Section I The Organization of Staff in the Ministry of Justice under Princes 
Sawat. Phichit. and Raphi as Minister 
It is helpful at this stage to recall the traditional Siamese staff in the 
administration of justice before the establishment of the Ministry of Justice in 1888-
1889. The administration of justice was previously not centralized but spread through 
every department of government. The procedure in Bangkok was divided into four 
stages; firstly, both criminal and civil cases commenced at the krom Rapphong (office 
for the reception of plaints); secondly, the registrar of the krom Rapphong would 
channel cases to the appropriate tralakarn court of the department which had 
jurisdiction over the case. The tralakarn (judge) would investigate and examine the 
witnesses and evidence and make a report; thirdly, the report would be sent to the 
lukkhun nasarnluang which comprised so-called "Brahmin" legal specialists who would 
give advice on legal matters; fourthly, the Phuprap would make decision and fix the 
punishment or amount of fine. All the officials in the traditional Siamese 
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administration of justice were Siamese including the lukkhun nasanzluang who were 
descendants of immigrant Brahmins. All the offices were common to every case in 
Bangkok except the tralaka,.,z, who were situated separately in each department, for 
the tralakarn (judges) were officials In a particular department. 1 The traditional 
administration of justice in towns outside Bangkok was in the hands of the 
chaomuang (governor of the town) and his officials, except cases which carried capital 
punishment which had to be sent to Bangkok to obtain the King's sanction. 
I. The Organization of Staff in the Ministry of Justice while Prince Sawat was 
the Minister 
As described in chapter 3, the Ministry of Justice was established informally 
In June 1888, and Prince Sawat was appointed the Minister at the same time. Prince 
Sawat's role as the Minister of Justice during the first few years was minimal. His 
activity suddenly increased in March 1892, when the Ministry of Justice was about to 
be established formally and he feared to lose his position to another prince. He 
submitted an important letter of 24 March 1892 to King Chulalongkorn about how to 
reform the Ministry. In his letter, apart from the reorganization of all the Bangkok 
courts illustrated in chapter 3, he also introduced a radical reform of the organization 
of staff, as he explained to the King: 
The present procedure, by which the tralakarn judges conduct trials 
separately from the lukkhun nasarn/uang, produces various 
disadvantages. This is because the trafakanz judges in each department 
examine witnesses and evidence and send reports to the lukkhun 
nasarnluang to decide. The latter deliver verdicts or decisions 
according to the reports sent to them without any participation in the 
trial. This system not only opens the way to the tralakarn to receive 
bribes but also delays the procedure in the court. I therefore request 
Your Majesty's permission to abolish the tralaka,.,z and lukkhun 
nasarllluallg and appoint some of these persons as judges in the seven 
newly established courts. These judges will have authority to examine 
1 Examples of traditional Siamese procedure In the file of Phraya Thammasanniti, the 
Ministry of Justice Library. 
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witnesses and evidence and also deliver judgment upon cases In their 
jurisdiction. 
I will submit to Your Majesty the names of suitable persons to be 
appointed as judges in the seven newly established courts and also ask 
Your Majesty's permission to allocate salary for them. But the clerks 
and other officials in the Ministry will still receive their incomes from 
the fees as usual as I consider that allocating salary for them would 
cost a great deal of Your Majesty's money. In order to eradicate the 
inconveniences of the administration of justice, I am of the opinion 
that the judicial function should be separated from the administrative 
and a group of staff should be established to deal with the 
administrative function to facilitate procedure such as communication 
with other ministries, storage of reports etc. 2 
The Ministry of Justice was formally established on 25 March 1892. The 
King still supported Prince Sawat as there was a formal proclamation to appoint him 
as the Minister of Justice on I April 1892, and the details of the establishment of the 
modern Ministry of Justice were proclaimed on 10 April in the form suggested by 
Prince Sawat. 3 It was unfortunate for the Ministry that even Prince Sawat knew that 
there was a serious shortage of capable persons qualified as judges as he showed by 
asking the permission of the King to transfer some capable persons from other 
ministries,4 but he did not initiate any projects to train Siamese people in legal 
affairs. 
2. The Organization of Staff In the Ministrv of Justice while Prince Phichit 
was the Minister 
When Prince Phichit took over the Ministry of Justice on 22 October 1894, the 
shortage of staff in the Ministry was still a serious problem and this entailed a 
backlog of cases and work in the Ministry. This is evident from Phichit's letter of 30 
November 1894 to the King, in \vhich he complained that: 
2 Sawat to King, 24 March 1892, N A R5 Ky 1/3. 
3 The Proclamation of the Establishment of the Ministry of Justice, 10 April 1892, 
Ratchak itchan u beksa (the Govern ment Gazette), vol.9, pp.9-10. 
4 Sawat to King, 13 Dec.1892, NA R5 Ky 3/1. 
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A t present the courts wh ich deal with criminal cases are the Phra 
Ratcha-arya cou rt (cri m i nal court), the Ratchathanphichet court 
(Penitentiary Court), and the Porisapha court (court of Petty 
Offences). These three courts cannot overcome the backlog of 
unsettled cases and the influx of new cases because of the inadequacy 
of the number of judges in these three courts. 5 
Prince Phichit was very good at finding resources and the following day, 1 
December 1894, he wrote another letter to ask permission from the King to appoint 
some Princes in the Royal family and some government officials, who were not 
employed by any ministry, as judges. In this letter, he enclosed a list of five 
members of the Royal family and three government officials and explained to King 
Chulalongkorn that: 
At the moment apart from conducting trials, judges have to investigate 
accusations against some Government officials and judges themselves. 
The Ministry is short of judges. I therefore ask Your Majesty's 
perm ission to appoi n t some princes and Government officials as 
judges. I enclose a list of names of these persons in this letter. 6 
Prince Phichit was clever in appointing Princes as judges as he knew the 
traditional Siamese custom that Princes of Royal blood should not work under the 
command of nobles. They could work as top officials but there were not many in 
such positions and therefore a good number of Princes were redundant even though 
they were knowledgeable. Prince Phichit utilized this opportunity to ask the King to 
appoint some of them as judges, because all judges in Siamese custom until today, 
work in the name of the king. King Chulalongkorn gave his permission on 25 
December 1894.7 
5 Phichit to King, 30 Nov.1894, NA R5 Ky 1/9. 
6 Phichit to King, I Dec.1894, N A R5 Ky 3/1. The list comprised Princes 
Kasemsi, Chiyanuchit, Worawut, Phanumat, and three government officials. 
7 The Royal Secretary to Phich i t, 25 Dec.1894, N A R5 K y 3/1. 
276 
Prince Phichit was selective in appointing judges as he expressed his ideas 
about the ideal judge to King Chulalongkorn in his letter dated 24 December 1894: 
Judges should possess: firstly, legal knowledge; secondly, legal 
knowledge based on firm ~nd right principles; thirdly, they must be 
reliable and respectful; fourthly, they must be honest and free of 
secret dealing; fifthly, they must foll()w decent behaviour and 
conduct.8 
Prince Phichit's Optnlon of ideal judges partly contributed to the shortage of 
judges in the Ministry of Justice because he had to be fairly certain that the persons 
he wanted to appoint as judges should be able to maintain these standards. When 
Phichit took over the Ministry of Justice, all courts in Bangkok, except the Porisapha 
court, had three judges: one aLhihodi :lnd two ordinary judges. Phichit needed to 
make the most of these judges and in his opinion these judges were not best placed 
according to their abilities. Therefore he successfully obtained permission from the 
King on 25 December 1894 to rearrange their positions in those courts. This 
reorgan ization ca used a serious con fI ict between him and Prince Thewawong. This 
conflict has been illustrated in depth in chapter 6, pages 195-197. 
One dramatic change which Prince Phichit wanted to introduce to reorganIze 
all staff in the Ministry of Justice was the Constitution of the Ministry of Justice's 
staff which he recommended in his letter of 29 May 1895 to the King, but the latter 
disagreed with him as the project would require tremendous finance and therefore the 
project was abandoned. This has been illustrated in chapter 6, pp.173-174. 
Prince Phichit also introduced the idea of establishing a law school in the 
Ministry of Justice to train Siamese in legal education. He suggested this idea to the 
King in his letter dated 27 ~ovember 1895. There is no evidence of the King's 
8 Phichit to King. 2-10ec.1894. NA R5 K\' 3/1. 
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response to his letter, but on 1 May 1896, King Chulalongkorn paid a surprise visit to 
the courts of justice and wrote a letter on that date to Prince Phichit that: 
I have just visited several courts and made various comments today. I 
have returned just now. The other day, I met Khwzluang Phra Kraisi 
at the ceremony which celebrated my reign as equal to King Rama I's 
and discussed with him how to create more judges. He suggested the 
idea of establishing a law school which I absolutely agree with as the 
Egyptian Government has already done it. I also met Khunluang Phra 
Kraisi today in the court and invited him to draw up a plan for the 
establishment of a law school. He replied that he has already 
submitted his plan to you. I consider that this is a very important 
matter for you to carry out, and if the plan is settled upon, we should 
not hesitate to allocate funds in this year's budget for this purpose. I 
am disappointed at not meeting you at the court today but I 
deliberately arranged no appointment. 9 
Prince Ph ich it responded to the King's letter by writing on 2 May 1896 with 
the plan of the law schoo1. 10 The btter wrote further on 3 May to Phichit: 
Thank you for your letter dated yesterday with the plan of the law 
school. I have scanned Khul1lual1g Phra Kraisi's plan of the law school 
and am of the opinion that it is rather a huge project. I think the 
project in Egypt is not as big as this. I have no idea of how the law 
school should be, but I think M. Rolin-Jaequemyns should have some 
idea~ therefore, we should ask Khunluang Phra Kraisi to translate this 
plan into English and give it to Rolin-Jaequemyns to advise on it. 
After that you should conclude and submit it to the meeting of the 
senabodisapha. [will carefully read the copy which you submit to me 
h . 11 when [ ave time. 
There is no evidence of the further progress of the law school project until 
after Prince Phichit's resignation from the Ministry of Justice on 3 March 1897. 
9 King to Phichit, I May 1896, NA R5 Ky 2/8. 
10 Phichit to King, ., May 1896, NA R5 Ky 2/8. 
11 King to Phichit, 3 May 1896, NA R5 Ky 2/8. 
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3. The Organization of Staff in the Ministry of Justice while Prince Raphi was 
the Minister 
The shortage of staff in the Ministry of Justice under Prince Raphi began 
improving as a direct result of the establishment of the Law School in April 1897. 
This is evident from Raphi's letter of 2 September 1900 to King Chulalongkorn: 
I refer to the Law School. I do not think I will exaggerate what I am 
goi ng to say. Before R .S. I 15 [1896 - 1897] the cry was that there 
were no men~ instead of crying in the wilderness and trying to 
discover what do not exist, I thought fit to experiment making what 
we want. This is done by the Law School. It has turned out men, 
some of remarkable ability~ young Siamese have not ceased to astonish 
me yet by what they can do if properly treated. It is true that the 
School has only turned out some 30 men or so, but these 30 have 
already brought a change to Your Majesty's service. 12 
Prince Raphi also complained to the King in the same letter that there were 
even more lawyers at that time but there was no incentive for good lawyers to enter 
the Government's service. He explained that: 
Judges' salary even where high were [sic] not sufficient inducement to 
men of ability, the very men whom we want. It is perhaps 
unfortunate that such men can earn more elsewhere than in Your 
Majesty's service. Furthermore, the work under this Ministry is, I can 
here take my oath, harder than in any other Departments [sic]. It was, 
and is bv no means easy to induce men to see their conditions 
pa trioticall y. 13 
In order to improve the status and to protect judges from executive power 
when they exercised their authority, Raphi initiated the idea of the independence of 
the courts of justice in the Ministry of Justice's report of 1902. This has been 
illustrated In chapter 7 pp.218-220. In the Ministry of Justice's report of 1902, 
Prince Raph i had upgraded the judges' salary to a satisfactory level and he stated that 
12 Raphi to King, 2 Sept. 1900 (in English), NA R5 Ky 1/9. 
13 Ibid. 
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an attempt to even further increase their salary was In the process. Raphi also issued 
Ministry regulations to expbin in detail duties, behaviour, and court regulations to 
the judges. 14 
Prince Raphi always maintained that his ideal judge should be a judge who 
was honest, wise, and diligent. The Ministry of Justice's report of 1906 stated that: 
The Ministry of Justice has already trained judges for ten years but it 
is still not satisfied with the quality of judges it has produced. The 
ideal judge should be honest, wise and diligent. Dishonest judges are 
investigated and, if found guilty, punished by the Ministry. It is 
absolutely essential that judges should be honest. The Ministry is 
anxious about judges who are not wise or diligent. Dismissal has been 
considered but owing to the limited number of qualified judges it 
hesitates to do so. The Ministry is optimistic because the young active 
qualified judges will eventually replace the old inactive ones. At 
present judges' salary is sufficient. 15 
Raphi always emphasized the maintainance of good and qualified staff. In his 
opinion the most important meClns to secure those staff was through the Law School. 
In 1900 he referred to the Law School as "the Ministry's very life- blood. If it were 
to cease, everything may as well be given up as hopeless. This Ministry would be 
shipwrecked. ,,16 In 1909, he observed: " The Law School is very important as the 
source of the food we have to eat everyday. Without the production of qualified 
lawyers from the School, the work of the Ministry cannot progress.,,17 This is the 
reason Prince Raphi, during the last few years of his term of office, disagreed with 
King Chulalongkorn over the issue of the independence of the court of justice, still 
concentrated on the progress of the Law School. 
14 The Mi n istry of Justice's report of 1902, N A R5 K y 1/31. 
15 The Ministry of Justice's report of 1906, NA R5 Ky 1/31. 
16 Raphi to King, 2 Sept.1900 (in English), NA R5 Ky 1/9. 
17 Raphi to King, 21 Oct. 1909 (in English), NA R5 Ky 10/16. 
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Section II The Role of leacling Siamese Staff in shaping the Ministry of Justice 
This section will investigate the most important Siamese lawyers who 
contributed to the improvement of the Ministry of Justice. These lawyers were: 
1. Khun/uang Phra.l'{l K ra is i (Pleng Wepara) 
2. Chaophraya Mahithon (La-or K rairoek) 
3. Phraya Attakarnprasit (William Tilleke) 
I. Khwz/u(Uu; Phren'a Kraisi (Pleng Wepara) 
Khul1luang Phra.l'([ K raisi, personal name Pleng Wepara, was a son of nai (Mr.) 
Ling, himself a son of Ch({()f!hral'{l Phonlathep (Chim) in the Third reign. His 
mother's name was Kaeo. He was born on 27 October 1862 at Banglampu district, 
Bangkok. He started his schooling when he was nine at Bowornniwet Temple School. 
He also had private tuition in Siamese and Pali with his aunt, Saeng, who was a 
daughter of Chaophra.l'{l Phonlathep (Chim). After he finished his schooling at 
Bowornniwet Temple when he was fourteen, Prince Phichit trained him in traditional 
Siamese laws and Governmental work for two years. Prince Phichit also sent him to 
further his study at Nanta-uttayan Palace School which was a school in the Palace set 
up by King Chulalongkorn to teach English and Siamese to Siamese commoner boys. 
Mr. Mcfarland was the head master of the school and Mrs. Edna Cole was also 
employed to teach in this school. 18 Pleng had an excellent record at this school as he 
was the first of his class for the whole three years and received an award from the 
King every year. He finished from this school in 1881 and was then trained by 
18 For the establishment of this school also see O.K. Wyatt, The Politics of Reform 10 
Thailand: Education in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn (New Haven, 1969), 
pp.76-77. 
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Prince Phichit at the Dik.a Court. ~nd Phichit also sent him to train at the office of 
the lukkhwl llasarnluallg. 19 
In that year, 1882, when he w~s twenty, Pleng won a King's scholarship to 
study law in England. When he arrived in London, under the direction of the 
Siamese Minister, Prince Pritsdang, and the Secretary of the Legation F.W. Verney, 
he studied fundamental subjects ~t the South Hampstead Collegiate School for two 
years. Tn 1884, he entered the Middle Temple which was one of the four legal 
institutes for studying law and being called to the Bar. He studied Roman law, 
English law, International law, Mahommedan law, and Hindu law and was called to 
the Bar in July 1888. He was the first Siamese to be called to the English Bar, and 
because he could graduate within three and a half years which was surprisingly fast, 
King Chulalongkorn gave him a fifty pounds reward. 2o 
Khunluang Phr::wa K raisi's role in Siamese Government Service 
After the completion of his education in England, Pleng returned to Siam and 
arrived back at Bangkok in September 1888. He commenced his work in Siamese 
Government service in the following offices: 
I) The krom Tha Ministry (Foreign Ministry) which he entered in September 
1888 as a legal adviser and lawyer whose duties were; firstly, to advise and draft 
correspondence for the Min ister, Pri nce Thewa wong; secondly, to facilitate and assist 
19 Marut Bu n nag (ed.), A rn usorn na i ngan Ph raratcha tan poengsop Khunluang Phraya 
Kraisi (Pleng Wepara) (Biography and work of Khunluang Phraya Kraisi), printed 
in his cremation volume, (Bangkok. 1983), pp.(I)-(2). 
20 Ibid., p.(2). Pleng was the first student who received such a reward from the 
King for quick completion, and later, in Jan.1890, the King issued a regulation to 
inspire Siamese Government students in Europe, that if they finished within 3 or 4 
years they would all be entitled to 50 pounds reward, if within 5 or 6 years, a 25 
pounds reward. 
foreign diplomats in vanous communications with the krom Tha; thirdly, he was 
appointed Luang Ratana Yati on 17 December 1889 as a reward for his work in this 
Ministry, and as he was knowledgeable in both foreign and Siamese laws, therefore, 
he was always appointed the representative of the Siamese Government at the foreign 
consular courtS. 21 
2) The Min istry of Justice wh ich was formally established in March 1892; 
Luang Ratana Yati was transferred to this Ministry on 1 April 1892 to work under 
the command of Prince Sawat, the first Minister, as the head of the sarabob 
department (Registration office). Owing to the abolition of the sixteen obsolete 
courts in various departments in Bangkok to form only seven modern courts in the 
Ministry of Justice, all the unsettled cases in those sixteen courts had to be channeled 
to and redistributed by the Ministry to the appropriate newly established courts which 
had jurisdiction over them. Prince Sawat authorized Luang Ratana Yati to be 
responsible for this job, and on I May 1892, only one month after his appointment to 
this office, he had already accomplished this task. 22 He also introduced a modern 
registration office in each new court and established formal papers for plaint or 
charge, answer, request, warrant of arrest, writ etc. 
Wh ile he was the head of the sarahoh department, there was the controversial 
case of amdaenf{ Pao versus Phra.l'{l Siharatdechochai 23 and his subordinates in which 
she accused them of beating her husband, Ilai To, to death. At that time the idea of 
establishing the krom Ai.l'akam (Public Prosecution Department) was in contemplation, 
therefore Prince Sawat, the Minister of Justice, appointed Luang Ratana Yati as the 
21 Ibid., p (3). 
22 Ibid., pp. 16-17, Sawnt to King, 29 May 1892. 
23 His own name was To Bunnag,a son of Chaophraya Surawongwaiyawat (Won 
Bunnag), and a grandson of Somdef Chaophra.l'a Borommaha Sisuriyawong (Chuang 
Bunnag), graduated from Woolwich England and later in 1900 promoted 
Chauphraya Surawong \\attanasak. 
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public prosecutor to deal with this case. This was the first case where there \\"3.S a 
public prosecutor representing the injured person in the name of the crown, and 
Luang Ratana Yati was the first person to perform this duty. 
Amdaeng (Mrs.) Pao explained that on 5 April 1892, she accompanied King 
Chulalongkorn's entourage as a cook to Sichang island. On 18 June, when she was 
still at Sichang island she heard that the defendants, Phraya Siharatdechochai and his 
subordinates, had arrested her husband and had unlawfully detained him for many 
days. During those days, she claimed that they beat him until he died. All the 
defendants pleaded not guilty and owing to Phraya Siharatdechochai being a 
government official on whom the King had conferred an important title, Prince Sawat 
needed to obtain the King's permission in order to proceed against him. The King 
gave his permission and the case started on 3 July 1892. The public prosecutor, 
Luang Ratana Yati, made an elaborate report of this case in a special note. 24 
Because of its uniqueness and sensitivity, the case had been referred to the 
Dika Court (supreme court of Appeal) which comprised Prince Phichit, Phraya 
Prachakitkorachak (Chern Bunnag), and Phra Thammasat, who eventually gave 
judgment in August 1896, that Phr{l.l'{l Siharatdechochai ordered his subordinates to 
punish nai To, the deceased, by beating him, because he believed his subordinates' 
story that the deceased was a thief who had stolen property from his late grandfather, 
Somdet Chaophraya Borommaha Sisuriyawong (Chuang Bunnag)'s house. He had no 
intention to kill the deceased and was therefore punished only by a fine. But his 
subordinates who were the persons who carried out the beating had beaten the 
deceased excessively, and were each sentenced to three years imprisonment. 25 
24 Marut Bunnag (ed.), op.cit., p.28. 
25 Ibid., p.29. 
284 
3) Luang Ratana Yati was appointed by the King as the first athibodi 
(director) of the krom Ail'akarn which was established in the Ministry of Justice on 1 
April 1893. The reasons for his appointment were probably; firstly, he was 
knowledgeable in both Siamese and English law; secondly, he had performed perfectly 
his duty in the case of amdaellg Pao versus Phraya Siharatdechochai. The purposes 
of establishing the krom Aiyakarn were to prosecute criminal offences in the name of 
the crown and act as Government lawyers in advising departments in the Government 
or representing them in civil cases. While Luang Ratana Yati was the athibodi of the 
krom Aiyakarn there arose the very important political case of Phra Yot Muangkwang 
which ensued from the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 3 October 1893, concluded after the 
Siamese Government surrendered to the French ultimatum in the Paknam incident in 
July 1893, Accord ing to article 3 of th is Treaty, the Siamese Government was 
obliged to commit Phra Yot Muangkwang to trial as charged by the French 
Government of murdering Inspector Grosgurin, a French official, at Kangchek in 
June 1893. This case produced two trials; the first undertaken by the Siamese 
authority. But a second trial before a mixed court could be claimed by the French 
Government if it considered the penalty to be insufficient. The composition of the 
mixed court was to be determ ined by the French Government. 
The first trial which was arranged by the Siamese authorities was led by 
Prince Phichit as Chief Judge and SIX other judges, including Phraya 
Siharatdechochai,26 Luang Su n thon kosa (Koyu Ie Naranong), the second Siamese 
calIed to the English Bar. \Vas appointed the public prosecutor, and Prince Phichit 
appointed Luang Ratana Yati as Registrar of the court in this case. The reason for 
appointing him was probably that Phichit knew of his ability as he had trained him 
in Siamese traditional law, Th is trial commenced on 24 February 1894, and 
26 At tha t time Phra l'a Si ha ra tdec hoc ha i \-vas st i II a defendan t in the case with 
amdaellg Pao. so 'it was always unlikely that he would be punished with 
imprisonment in that case. 
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proceeded splendidly and speedily so that the decision which acquitted Phra Yot of 
all charges was reached within three weeks. In the judgment Prince Phichit expressed 
appreciation of Luang Ratana Yati's assistance, and suggested that the trial was 
concluded so quickly because of his capacity and reliability.27 
As the first mhinodi of the /(}'om Aiyakarn, Luang Ratana Yati laid down the 
duties of public prosecutors as following: firstly, to be adviser to all ministries and 
departments of Government in all cases including cases which concerned foreign 
subjects, and advise them on international treaties; secondly, to provide representation 
as Government lawyer in civil and criminal cases when requested by ministers or 
athibodi; thirdly, to prosecute criminal offenders; fourthly, to draft acts or 
proclamations as requested by the Minister of Justice; lastly, at the Minister of 
Justice's request, occcasionally to act outside the normal duties of public prosecutors. 
He further explained that every case in the krom Ai.l'akarn was his responsibility and 
he must direct all public prosecutors to perform their duty according to law and 
. . 28 Just Ice. 
In 1894, Luang Ratana Yati was promoted Khunluang Phra Kraisi, previously 
the title of a judge in the luk.khwi n([samluang. This promotion was probably a 
reward for his role in the kro!11 Ai,1'akarn and also in the Phra Yot Muangkwang case. 
The title Khullluang Phra Kraisi dated back to the Ayuthya period as it was 
mentioned in the Law of Three Seals that Khunluang Phra Kraisi and Phra Kasem 
Ratchasupawadi were judges In the lukkhwl nasaozluang who were more 
knowledgeable in law than other judges in the same office. Their duties had been to 
maintain the principles of law and interpret them when applied to cases. When they 
app! ied the Law of Th ree Seals, they used the original copy which was kept at their 
27 Marut Bunnag (ed.), op.cit., p.34. 
28 Ibid., p.13. 
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office and they were more influential than other judges In the lukkhun nasarnluang 
office.29 
The appointment of Khwl!U(ll1g Phra Kraisi as the athibodi (Chief Judge) of 
the Phra Ratcha-at".1'a Cou rt (the Cri m inal Court) occurred on 5 April 1897, only 
eighteen days after Prince Raphi was appointed the Minister of Justice. There is a 
record of the day on which the appointment ceremony took place in the Thammasat 
Samai, the law journal of the Ministry of Justice: 
On 5 April 1897, Prince Raphi, the Minister of Justice, followed by 
judges and officials in the Ministry and public prosecutors, assembled 
in the Phf'cz Rcz[cha-{I!".\'cz Court to signify the appointment of 
Khun!uallf.: Phra Kraisi as the mhinodi of the Phra Ratcha-arya Court. 
There were other important persons at the ceremony such as Prince 
Damrong, the Minister of Interior, Prince Maruphongsiriphat, the 
Special Commissioner of Ayuthya, Phraya Sukhumnaiwinit (Pan 
Sukhum), M. Kirkpatrick and M. Schlesser. Prince Raphi read the 
King's proclamation in which King Chulalongkorn stated that 
Khwzluang Phra Kraisi was capable and knowledgeable both in Siamese 
and international law and also honest, therefore he deserved the post 
of athibodi of this court. 
Khull!uallg Phra K raisi then took an oath that he would serve his 
Majesty the King as the Chief Judge of the Phra Ratcha-arya Court to 
the best of his ability and would perform his duty impartially without 
any prejudice and would maintain justice in this court. The 
representative of the k.rom Aiyakarn stated that they regretted 
Khwz/uallg Phr(l K raisi's departure from their department as he was a 
remarkable leader who worked diligently and always advised them in 
their duties regarding both traditional and international practice. But 
they were glad that he was promoted to a job which needed his ability 
to tackle it and they were confident that he would perform his duty 
splendidly.3o 
U ndou bted I y, the appoi n tmen t of K hUIl!u(lng Phra Kraisi as the athibodi of the 
Phra Ralcha-arya Court was at the suggestion of Prince Raphi as the proclamation 
29 There were three original copies of the Law of Three Seals, two were kept in the 
Grand Palace and one at the office of the lukkhwz nasarnluang. This was stated in 
the Law of Th ree Seals, Thammasa tUn i versity Press, volume I, Bangkok 1985, 
p.2. 
30 Thammasat Samai, the Law Report of the Ministry of Justice, volume 1, Bangkok, 
April 1897. 
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was issued eighteen days after his appointment as the Minister of Justice. Raphi 
recognized the ability he had shown in the foundation of the krom Aiyakarn and his 
cooperation in the reorganization of the provincial courts. Raphi was showing 
himself absolutely confident in him as the Phra Ratcha-arya Court was the most 
important court of the First Instance in the Ministry of Justice. Thereafter 
Khunluang Phra K raisi showed his determination in maintaining justice irrespective of 
the status of the person whether commoner or noble. This is evident in the case of 
the public prosecutor versus Mr. Reun in 1897-8. 
The fact of this case was that Mr. Reun was accused by the krom Aiyakarn of 
possessing counterfeit money. He pleaded not guilty by stating that he held a bag of 
counterfeit money for Mr. A, an adopted son of Khwl B 3\ a noble in the Siamese 
service, and was arrested without knowing that it contained counterfeit money, 
having been asked by Mr. A and his father to hold it temporarily during their 
absence in retreat at a temple. He in turn countercharged Mr. A and Khun B, but the 
latter being a noble, this second case again needed the King's permission to proceed. 
The first case in which Mr. Reu n was the defendant came to a conclusion 
when the Dika Court found him guilty and sentenced him to 10 years imprisonment. 
The second case In which Mr. Reun accused Mr. A and Khun B commenced on 10 
June 1897, when Mr. Reun had already been sentenced by the Dika Court. 
Khunluang Phra Kraisi, as the alhihodi of the Phra Ratcha-arya Court, the leading 
Judge in this case, investigated the evidence and witnesses and concluded that the 
counterfeit money really belonged to Mr. A and therefore delivered a judgment of 
not guilty for Mr. Reun, while Khlln B was also found not guilty as there was no 
evidence to indicate his collusion with his adopted son, Mr. A. But practically Mr. 
31 The publisher of the cremation book of Khulllual1g Phraya Kraisi avoids printing 
the real names as it might damage the reputation of the descendants of Khun B. 
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Reun could not be released as the Dika Court's sentence still applied, so Khwzluang 
Phra Kraisi submitted this case to Prince Raphi for his consideration. Prince Raphi 
then submitted this report and asked the King to release Mr. Reun. The King gave 
his permission on 4 April 1898.32 This case signified Khunluang Phra Kraisi's 
determination to confer justice to a commoner against an adopted son of a noble, and 
it also set a precedent for the revision of a miscarriage of justice. After he had 
served as the athihodi of the Phra RalCha-ar.1'a Court for one and a half years, the 
King conferred on him the title of Khwlfuang Phraya Kraisi on 17 October 1898.33 
4) Apart from his work in the Ministry of Justice, Khunluang Phraya Kraisi 
was the first person to initiate legal education by means of the press. He established 
a printing house called ROI1RPim IVichakol'll (Academic Publisher) to publish three 
kinds of legal materials~ firstly, when he was Luang Ratana Yati, the head of the 
Registration office in the Ministry of Justice, he launched a newspaper called 
Thammasat Winitchai (Legal Analysis). This newspaper was issued fortnightly, every 
other Sunday, the first Issue on Sunday 3 April 1892. Its contents were news of the 
court of justice, laws, and the political situation which concerned the Ministry of 
Justice, for instance, this newspaper reported in depth about the Paknam incident and 
the trial in Phra Yot Muangkwang's case. As the editor of the newspaper, Luang 
Ratana Yati once reported the arrest of a group of nobles and people who were 
accused of illegal gambling. On 27 July 1894, as he was travelling from his home to 
his office, he was attacked by three people, one of them a noble, angry with his 
reference to their arrest. who consequently were found guilty of assault and battery 
d ., 34 and sentence to l[npnsonment. 
32 Marut Bunnag (ed.), op.cit., pp.5~-56. 
33 Ibid., p.(5). 
34 Ibid., p.62. 
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Secondly, Luang Ratana Yati compiled laws of the land such as acts and 
proclamations since 1868, the beginning of King Chulalongkorn's reign, and published 
them in seven volumes called kotmaithai (Thai laws), the first volume appearing on 1 
March 1894 when he was the aLhihod i of krom A iyakarll, and the seventh and last 
volume in 1899. Each volume contained about 330 to 400 pages. The publishing of 
these acts and proclamations was very useful to the court procedure as it enhanced 
and facilitated the application of laws to judges, lawyers, public prosecutors, and the 
people. Luang Ratana Yati expressed his objectives in publishing the first volume of 
these books: 
All acts and proclamations which have been issued by the King to the 
people to comply with since 1868 up to now, have been disseminated 
all over as they were published in the Ratchakitchanubeksa [the 
Government Gazette] and leaflets. But most people have not 
maintained them, therefore I am of the opinion that it is desirable to 
collect all of them into one book in order to facilitate the application 
of laws. In this compilation, I only select acts and proclamations about 
law and ignore other proclamations. Apart from this objective, I also 
aim to identify for the people acts or proclamations which have been 
cancelled by subsequent ones, for it is vital for the people to comply 
with the up-to-date laws; and also for the purpose of legal education, 
as people who want to study law can educate themselves with these 
books which can be useful to students and the people as a whole. 35 
Thirdly, he issued the law reports called Thammasat Samai (Contemporary 
Law) ten days after he was appointed the alhihodi of the Phra Ratcha-arya Court in 
1897. These reports contained the judgments of the Court of the First Instance, the 
Appeal Court, and the Dika Court. They were issued twice each month, on the 
sixteenth and at the end of each month. The first issue was distributed on 16 April 
1897 and they contin ued un ti I Septem ber 1900, when Khull/uang Phraya Kraisi's 
health began deteriorating, probably the reason for the cessation of these reports. 36 
35 Ibid., pp.65-66. 
36 Ibid., p.68. 
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During his life time Kraisi had a good relationship with both the King and 
Queen Saowaphaphongsi, the Chief Queen. He was a favourite person of the Queen. 
He had four children with Tongkam, his wife; his third child was a girl whose name, 
Phongsi, was conferred by Queen Saow8pha on I December 1897.37 
Khwzluallg Phra.l'Cl K raisi was one of the greatest lawyers of Siam who gave 
himself to the progress of the administration of justice and achieved as much as was 
then possible for a commoner. His role in the Ministry of Justice was tremendous 
and he also set a good example of an honest, hard-working, and brave lawyer. It was 
unfortunate that he died prematurely in 190 I when he was only thirty-nine, for 
otherwise the progress of the Min istry of Justice would probably have been much 
greater. His repu ta tion rap id I y dim i n ished after h is death and his full funeral was 
never held as none of his descendants knew the place where his wife placed his 
coffin. After his coffin was eventually found and his body was cremated, a book 
about his work and career was published as his cremation volume. This thesis is the 
first sc~olarly study to investigate his role in the Ministry of Justice. 
2. Chaophrava Mahithon (La-or Krairoek) 
The early life of La-or Krairoek and his relationship with Prince Raphi until 
he was appointed by Raphi as the Secretary to the Minister of Justice when Prince 
Raphi was appointed the Minister on 3 March 1897, has been illustrated in chapter 7 
pp.205-206. When La-or took the job of Secretary to the Minister of Justice in 1897, 
he lacked legal training, but he was interested in legal affairs as he noted in his 
memoir that he had spent much time \"hile he worked in the Office of the Royal 
37 I b'd (...,..,) 1 ., p. -) . 
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Secretary studying dika cases. 38 Therefore when Prince Raphi established the Law 
School in March 1897, La-or registered himself as a student in the School. Owing to 
the shortage of staff in the Min istry of Justice, the course in the Law School was 
only nine months, and the examination was set for the first week of December that 
year. The first group of Siamese barristers who passed the examination numbered 
only nine out of about one hundred candidates. La-or was the first of the class and 
was given an award by the King on 26 January 1898. He was also the first person 
called to the Siamese 8ar.39 
La-or only served as the Secretary to the Minister of Justice until I April 
1898, when he was appointed a judge in the Phra Ratcha-arya Court. It was 
fortunate for him to have the chance to work in this court under the instruction of 
Khunluang Phra Kraisi, as the latter was able to advise him on the duties of judge. 
La-or seemed to admire Khulliu{lllg PhrCl Kraisi as the latter had been his law teacher 
at the Law School and also law teacher to Prince Raphi. He noted in his memoir that 
Khunluang Phra Kraisi commanded the respect of most lawyers, and even King 
Chulalongkorn treated him differently from other officials.4o 
La-or had been \-vorking hard Since he was appointed a judge in the Phra 
Ratcha-arya Court. Apart from his work as judge, he assisted Khunluang Phra Kraisi 
in selecting articles for the law journal, Thammasat Samai. He noted in his memoir 
that on 10 December 1898, Prince Raphi came to the Phra Ratcha-arya Court and 
asked him through Khtm!/lQllg Phra Kraisi to help in the Phaeng (Civil) Court and to 
teach in the Law School. This was due to the lack of law teachers in the Law School 
and the increasing number of law students so that even La-or, who had just finished 
38 Luang Chakraprani, Ruangkhong Chaophrava Mahithon (La-or Krairoek) (the 
Career of Chan{Jhral'{l Mahithorn), printed in the cremation volume of 
Chaophraya r-.1ah ithorn, (8angkok, 1956), pp.49-50. 
39 Ibid., pp.53-56. 
40'd -7 -8 Ibl ., pp.) -) . 
from the school the prev 10US year, was requested to teach there. As a reward for his 
hard work in 1898, on 28 December, the King conferred the title of Luang 
Chakraprani on him. On 15 January 1899, he was selected as an examiner in the Law 
School to mark the papers of the law students in that year. 41 
After one year of hard work In the Phra Ratcha-arya Court, Luang 
Chakraprani was transferred to a higher position as athibodi (Chief Judge) of the 
Phaeng Court on I April 1899, when he was only twenty five. Before his transfer 
the Phaeng Court had been divided into two parts, viz: the Phaeng Klang Court and 
the Phaeng Kasem Court. When he \vas transferred to this office the two Courts 
merged into one Phacl1g Court and he was appointed its athibodi. This indicates that 
King Chulalongkorn and Prince Raphi must have been very confident of his ability, 
while Krommeull Charatporn, a Phl'o (lng chao Prince and previously the athibodi of 
the Phael1!{ Kasem Court, was reduced to a simple judge in the Phaeng Court under 
Luang Chakraprani's instruction. On 27 September 1899, he was promoted Phra 
Chakraprani, and after exactly two years in the Phaeng Court, on 1 April 1901, he 
was promoted to be Undersecretary to Prince Raphi at the Ministry of Justice.42 
Phra Chakraprani and Prince Raphi were both hard workers. This is evident 
from Phra Chakraprani's memoir, for when he was first appointed Undersecretary, 
Prince Raphi remarked to him one afternoon that the Ministry of Justice had decided 
to put up a modern building for the mOllthr)ll Krungkao (Ayuthya) Court in 1901, to 
celebrate its establishment as the first of the monthon (circle) courts of the country, 
but the first step \-vas to buy suitable land. Prince Raphi then authorized him to buy 
the land for the building. That \ ery afternoon, Phra Chakraprani caught the train to 
Ayuthya and found a friend who recommended a piece of land situated on the bank 
41 Ibid., p.58. 
42 Ibid., p.59. A.'rommeun Charatporn was a son of the Fourth Reign Second King. 
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of the river. He asked that friend to in \ ite the owner of the land to meet him at the 
residence of the Special Com missioner of mOlltholl Krungkao, Prince 
Maruphongsiriphat, a half-brother of King Chulalongkorn, That night the contract 
for purchasing the land was signed in front of Prince Maruphong, and the following 
morning Phra Chakraprani returned to Bangkok and informed Prince Raphi that 
suitable land was already purchased. Raphi was very pleased with his performance,43 
Phra Chakraprani was very cute in inviting the owner of the land to meet him at the 
residence of the Special Commissioner, as the latter was the most powerful person in 
the monthofl and people tended to please him, and therefore Phra Chakraprani could 
buy the land at a modest price. 
Phra Chakraprani served CIS Undersecretary in the Ministry of Justice from 
1901 until Prince Raphi's resignation CIS the Minister in June 1910. In his memoir he 
described the duties of UndersecretClry as: firstly, to control the administration of 
Justice according to the policy laid down by the Minister; secondly, to secure and 
distribute the Ministry'S budget; thirdly, to procure land for the building of courts; 
fourthly, to govern, reward, and discipline the administrative staff in the Ministry; 
fifthly, to control the execution of judgments in both criminal and civil cases, for 
wh ich purpose the Execu tion of J udgmen t Departmen t was established in 1901. After 
two years in this office, Phra ChaKraprani was promoted to Phraya Chakraprani in 
1903,44 
PhrQl'o Chakrapr~lni had a very good rapport with Prince Raphi and the latter 
had tremendous trust in him and even often authorized him to represent him in the 
meetings of the sCl/ahndi (Ministers). Raphi always complained to Phraya 
Chakraprani that the reason for his absence from meetings was because the other 
43 Ibid., pp.6l-6~. 
44 Ib'ld., 67 70 pp. - . 
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senabodi could not understand him; therefore, he would attend or authorize Phraya 
Chakraprani to attend meetings only when there were issues directly concerning the 
Ministry of Justice. This caused ill-feeling between Prince Raphi and the other 
Ministers, but they could do nothing as King Chulalongkorn permitted Raphi's 
conduct. 45 Not only were Prince Raphi and Phraya Chakraprani good colleagues, but 
they also enjoyed each other's company In hobbies like photography and motor-
boating. They were also of an age. as they were born in the same year. In 1904, 
another plague occurred in Thonburi which was opposite Bangkok on the other side 
of the river. Phro.l'a Chakraprani's house was in Thonburi and was affected as one of 
his sisters died of the disease. He then moved his family to the compound of Prince 
Raphi's palace for several months before moving to a new house in Bangkok.46 
On 2 June 1910, following the Phra.l'a Raka incident, 47 which caused Prince 
Raphi to leave the Ministry of Justice on 31 May in protest at the immunity of 
Prince Narathip to court jurisdiction, Phro.l'a Chakraprani and the new Khwzluallg 
Phraya Kraisi (Tiam Bunnag)48 led 26 other judges and officials in the Ministry of 
Justice to resign from the Ministry in support of Prince Raphi. The consequences of 
this incident have been illustrated in chapter 7. 
This incident not only affected the future of the Ministry of Justice, but also 
Phraya Chakrapran i's. King Ch ulalongkorn did not allow the resignations, and when 
he set up a rapsollg court to try Prince Narathip, Phraya Chakraprani and others 
45 Ibid., p.68. 
46 Ibid., p.70. 
47 The detail has been illustrated in chapter 7. pp.230-233. 
48 Tiam Bunnag was called to the Siamese Bar at the same time as La-or Krairoek. 
He \\'as the se(und in the (lass. He sen'ed in the Ministry of Justice and later 
succeeded to the title of Khunillollg Phroya K raisi. the same title as Pleng Wepara. 
In the Phral'a Raka incident, he strongly supported Raphi and did not apologize 
for his beh~viour to the King. and therefore the latter stripped off his title and 
dismissed him from Go\ernment office. He was written out of Thailand's history 
and the materials about him are minimal. 
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submitted letters of apology to the King. The King accepted Phraya Chakraprani's 
apology but did not give promotion to him and his followers that year. After the 
Phraya Raka incident, Prince Charun was appointed the Minister of Justice on 27 
June 1910. Prince Charun disliked PhraJ'a Chakraprani and wanted to dismiss him as 
he was a close friend of Raphi, but King Chulalongkorn died in October 1910, and 
the Crown Prince Wachirawut, who succeeded as King, considered that Phraya 
Chakraprani was an honest and capable person and therefore simply removed him as 
Undersecretary at the Ministry of Justice to be a judge in the Dika Court. In his 
memoir Phrava Chakraprani noted that also he did not want to work under Prince 
Charun as he had been taught by Prince Raphi to consider people as innocent until 
proved guilty, and he could not change. 49 Later in the Sixth Reign, Phraya 
Chakraprani was appointed aLhihodi of the Dika Court, Royal Secretary, and was also 
promoted Chaophra.l'O Mah ithon. A fter the revolution in June 1932 which changed 
Thailand to a constitutional monarchy, ChaophraJ'a Mahithon was appointed the 
Minister of Justi(:e himself for one year. 
3. Phraya Attakarnprasit (William Tilleke) 
Mr. William Tilleke was a Ceylonese barrister who came to work as a lawyer 
in Siam. He proved loyal to Siam and naturalized as a Siamese citizen. He was born 
on 21 August 1860 to a wealthy family in the old capital of Kandy in Ceylon. He 
finished high school in Colombo and graduated as Barrister from Colombo University. 
He came to Siam in 1892 and cooperated with Mr. Gibbins, an English lawyer, to 
establish a law firm in Bangkok called "Tilleke and Gibbins". His reputation spread 
through Bangkok in 189cl when he represented Plrra Yot Muangkwang as defence 
49 Luang Chakraprani, op.cit., p.80. 
lawyer in the controversial case In which the French Government accused Phra Yot 
of murdering a French official. 5o 
After Luang Ratana Yati (Pleng Wepara), the athibodi of the krom Aiyakarn, 
was appointed the aLhihod i of the Phra RaLcha-arya Court in April 1897, Mr. Tilleke 
was appointed the aLhibod i of the krom A iyakarll in his place. During his time in this 
office he was appointed a member of many law commissions. The most influential 
one was as a Commissioner for Codification. The reason for appointing Mr. Tilleke 
was probably his experience both in English and Siamese law. Even Mr. Black, the 
Judicial Adviser, whose opinion against codification was overruled, suggested to the 
Commission for the Criminal Code: 
My idea is that there should be a small drafting commISSIOn of 4 
members of which M. Padoux should take charge. The second member 
should be a lawyer skilled in drafting in English, and if a man who 
knows something of the country can be found all the better. I don't 
think a more suitable man than Mr. Tilleke could be found for this 
work. He is a good English lawyer, understands Siamese, and has had 
10 years experience of the working of the present Criminal laws. He 
might be temporarily transferred to the Commission, and one of the 
young advisers could take his place in the meantime. The two other 
members should be Siamese legal men. I would sug~est Phra Atakarn 
Prasiddhi, judge in the Foreign Causes Court, as one. 1 
It is still surprising that the Criminal Code Commission selected by M. Padoux 
was according to Mr. Black's suggestion. Mr. Tilleke was in fact selected because he 
was considered as one of the Siamese staff in the Ministry of Justice since he had ten 
years experience in the Siamese law up to that time and was also fluent in Siamese. 
In 1893, Mr. Tilleke and a Mr. Ward organized an English newspaper in 
Bangkok called "The Siam Observer", published at the printing house of Dr. Samuel 
50 Chulalongkorn University (ed.) Wiwattanakarn khongkotmaithai nairobsongroipi 
(The Developmen t of Tha i 13 \\' in 200 years), (Bangkok, 1982), pp.129- 131. 
51 Mr. Black's proposal to the Commission for the Criminal Code, II March 1905, 
NA R5 K y 23/3. 
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John Smith. The Siam Observer tended to criticize the political situation In the 
interest of the ordinary Siamese people, as Thienwan, a liberal Siamese newspaper 
journalist, commented: "The Siam Observer criticizes and emphasizes the political 
situation for the advantage of the Siamese people.,,52 Furthermore, the Siam Observer 
also cooperated with other newspapers to protest against class-distinctions. It also 
stimulated patriotism among Siamese as it printed in its headline everyday after the 
French insisted on occupying Chantabun that" The French still occupied Chantabun, 
but in the near future they must certainly leave. 53 
Mr. Tilleke had a calm and thoughtful personality as he showed in the Phraya 
Raka incident when he successfully persuaded Prince Raphi to stop the idea of 
circulating a letter of protest to the public designed to attract support against Prince 
Narathip and the Government. In that letter, Raphi explained in brief the facts of 
the incident and condemned Prince Narathip for exploiting the status of royal birth to 
escape from the rule of law. The Government (the King) did not do anything to 
bring Prince Narathip to justice :1nd therefore Raphi asked justice from the public. 
Pri nce Raph i planned to ci rculate th is letter before he left Bangkok on 31 May 1910, 
but Mr. Tilleke explained to him the likely bad consequences of that letter, and 
eventually, Raphi agreed with him and gave up his plan. 54 
Mr. Tilleke served in the Siamese Government as the athibodi of the krom 
Aiyakarn through to the end of the Fifth reign and continued in this capacity until 
his death in 1917. At the beginning of the Sixth Reign, he naturalized as a Siamese 
52 Chamnong Wiboonsi, Nangseupimraiwan phasa angkit naiprathetthai (The English 
Daily Newspaper in Tha i land), Ch u lalongkorn U ni versity's research, (Bangkok, 
1980), ppA3. 
53 Ibid., pp.42-~3. 
54 Turakitbandit College (ed.), Raphi Sompochkrung (Biography of Prince Raphi), 
(Bangkok 1982), pp.l 03-\ 07. 
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citizen and King Wachirawut conferred on him the title of Phraya Attakarnprasit and 
also conferred the surname Kun8dilok on him. He died in Bangkok in March 1917. 
Conclusion 
The root problem of staff in the Ministry of Justice was caused by the 
shortage of capable lawyers to run the Ministry efficiently. The cause of the shortage 
was the lack of a college to train cap8ble lawyers. The idea of establishing a law 
school to train lawyers was ignored by Prince Sawat, the first Minister of Justice. 
The idea of creating more staff through a law school was initiated by M. Rolin-
Jaequemyns, Prince Phichit and _Khlmlumzf; Phra Kraisi (Pleng), but Phichit failed to 
carry out the project probably because of his resignation soon after the conception of 
the idea. However, the project was successfully launched when Prince Raphi became 
the Minister of Justice and the progress of the Ministry of Justice during the second 
half of King Chulalongkorn's Reign was largely the product of founding the Law 
School. 
Khwzluallf; Phra.l'a K ra is i (Pleng Wepara) played a great role in developing the 
Siamese legal system and also the foundation of the krom Aiyakarn, the Phra Ratcha-
arya Court and legal education. It was unfortunate for the Ministry of Justice when 
he died at the age of th irty- nine. Ch(l()phra.l'a Mah ithon and Phraya A ttakarnprasit 
also contributed tremendously to the Ministry of Justice but the Phraya Raka incident 
was a major setback for the progress of the Ministry. 
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Conclusion 
During the forty-two years of King Chulalongkorn's reign, the King not 
only consolidated the power of the monarch, but also strengthened it. He had had 
experienced as a puppet king when he was crowned for the first time and 
gradually managed to increase his power after the death of Somdet Chaophraya Si 
Suriyawong, the ex-regent, in 1883. He gradually achieved in gaining absolute 
power by 1885. King Chulalongkorn experienced difficulties in struggling for 
power, therefore once he gained it he did not want to lose it again. His 
determination to maintain his absolute power is very important as it operated as a 
hindrance to the judicial reform. 
The course of the judicial reform, which has been explained in the 
preceeding chapters, raises a number of crucial questions which are necessary in 
explaining the extent and the consequences of the judicial reform. These 
questions are: firstly, what really caused the judicial reform?; secondly, what were 
the limitations of King Chulalongkorn's reform?; thirdly, how far did the King 
intend to pursue it and were the other princes in agreement with him?; fourthly, 
what were the social implications of the judicial reform?; fifthly, was it possible 
to have equality before law in the absolute monarchy or corvee system?; sixthly, 
was the judicial reform of the Ministry of Justice a failure and, if not, what did 
the reform contribute to Siam's survival and the legal system? 
The first question-what really caused the judicial reform?-can be 
discerned by throwing light on the circumstances during the first half of King 
Chulalongkorn's reign. The situation in Siam during that period was very volatile 
because the country was either on the verge of losing its independence or being 
partitioned between Britain and France. The petition of 1885, initiated by Prince 
Pritsdang, substantiates this argument as it symbolizes the struggle of the Princes 
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and the nobles at that time to persuade King Chulalongkorn to develop the 
country radically. The King rejected their proposals but eventually, after 1893 
complied with nearly all of them except the surrender of his monopoly of power. 
It was probably the gradual increase in the Western powers' influence which 
necessitated King Chulalongkorn to develop all the country's administration, 
including the administration of justice. Apart from that, the Bowring Treaty of 
1855 and the similar treaties which Siam signed with the other Western countries, 
restrained Siam from exercising its sovereign jurisdiction over foreign subjects. 
The pretext which the Western powers used to secure extraterritoriality over Siam 
was that Siamese law was barbaric and inadequate in exercising jurisdiction over 
foreign subjects. Such a Western perception played a significant role in forcing 
Siam to reform its laws and judicial system, as a nation which could not exercise 
jurisdiction over foreign subjects in its territory was considered as only a semi-
independent country. It appears that without the Western powers' threat, Siam 
was complacent with its administration and was therefore unlikely to radically 
improve its administration of justice. 
The second question considers the limitations of King Chulalongkorn's 
reform. In response to the petition of 1885 instigated by Prince Pritsdang, the 
King refused to accept the constitutional monarchy system on the grounds that 
any change would be strongly opposed by certain groups 10 the Siamese 
Government. He also explained two more factors viz, the inefficiency of the 
Siamese bureaucracy and the inadequacy of trained men who could carry out the 
reform. These two factors needed to be improved before any reform could be 
implemented. Another limitation of King Chulalongkorn's reform was the 
patron-client relations or corvee system which eradicated the freedom of all 
commoners and prevented equality in the Siamese society. 
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Were these limitations real obstacles to King Chulalongkorn's reform? In 
1888 the King established a set of functionally organized ministries following the 
Western style. The cabinet comprised nine of the King's brothers and three other 
strong supporters. At this point the situation was ripe for the King to conduct his 
reforms. Even at the end of his reign in 1910 when the situation in Siam in 
every aspect, including the bureaucracy and the inadequacy of trained men, had 
improved, the King still showed no signs of surrendering his absolute power. 
Apparently, these limitations were only excuses of the King for not granting any 
form of constitution to the people because he wanted to maintain his absolute 
power as long as possible. It is evident that the crucial constraints to King 
Chulalongkorn's reforms were the King himself and the members of the royal 
family who wanted to maintain their privileges. 
The third question investigates how far King Chulalongkorn intended to 
pursue the reforms and were the other princes in agreement with him? Even 
though the King and the royal family did not want to undertake fundamental 
changes which could affect their privileges, yet they were forced to do so by the 
Western powers' threat. This is evident from the period before the Paknam 
incident of 1893 whereby the King wanted to have "window-dressing" changes. 
After the incident, the King and the members of the royal family realized that 
they had to compromise and allow fundamental changes to occur but without 
undermining their authority and privileges. They knew that if they did not 
compromise Siam's independence would be placed in jeopardy. 1 
King Chulalongkorn wanted to reorganIze the judicial system in order to 
abolish extraterritoriality which prevented his government from exercising 
jurisdiction over foreign subjects. Furthermore he wanted to use law as a means 
1 This point has been illustrated in chapter 1 p.40 and chapter 5 p.134. 
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to facilitate commercial intercourse and to encourage British investment in Siam 
as he believed that this would protect Siam from any French aggression. The 
King was in a difficult position of how to proceed with the judicial reform 
without undermining his privileges and absolute power. This is evident from the 
implementation of the Criminal Code of Siam in 1908 when the King and the 
Siamese Government considered this code as a major step in abolishing 
extraterritoriality. At the same time the King and the royal family wanted to be 
certain that this Criminal Code would not limit their privileges pertaining in the 
the kotmontienbarn (the royal family'S law). In the middle of March 1907, before 
the promulgation of the code, the King ordered Prince Narit, the Palace Minister, 
to investigate this matter. Prince Narit's report, which ensured that the 
application of the Criminal Code would not interfere with the privileges of the 
royal family in the kotmontienbarn, led the King to promulgate the code in June 
1908. 
As regard the absolute power, the Siamese monarch had authority over the 
life and death of his subjects. The King could authorize execution or grant 
amnesty to any Siamese. It was also his prerogative to try, and give judgment to, 
all cases in the country. Moreover he had the power to promote and demote 
members of the royal family, nobles and government officials. This is reflected 
in the King's speech whereby he explained that the power of the Siamese king 
was not specified by any law and was free from all restraint because it was 
unlimited. The King was not directly opposed to laws which would limit his 
power, but regarded any parliamentary system as impractical for Siam due to the 
lack of experienced bureaucrats. People would not trust the members of 
parliament as they trust the King. Therefore the power of the King should be 
maintained as it had always existed. King Chulalongkorn considered that the 
traditional Siamese monarchy at that time was the core of the country, the people 
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and the effective functioning of the government. For this reason the King 
refused to permit the power of the Siamese monarch to be weakened or restrained 
by any law or institution. 
Most of the members of the royal family supported King Chulalongkorn 
because the latter also protected their interest. There were few members of the 
royal family i.e. Princes Phichit and Raphi who disagreed with the King. Prince 
Phichit was the first person in the judicial field who dared to challenge the power 
of the King. In 1886 he criticized the fact that the King did not want to 
surrender any part of his authority. He was disappointed that the King did not 
show the same appetite for reform as he had expected because the death of the 
regent (Si Suriyawong) and the Second King (Prince Wichaichan) had removed all 
obstacles. Furthermore, in 1885, Prince Phichit also wrote an essay "Thammasan 
Winitchai" (A Consideration of Justice) which recommended that the King's power 
should be limited by thamma (the right conscience) in order to confer adequate 
food supply, equal treatment under law and protection from danger to the people. 
These two criticism deprived Prince Phichit from being appointed as the first 
Minister of Justice in 1888, when the first cabinet ministers were established, 
even though he was the most suitable person for this job. 
Prince Raphi, one of King Chulalongkorn's son, whom the king appointed 
the Minister of Justice in March 1897 to carry out judicial reform under the 
King's control, was the second member of the royal family to disagree with the 
King. Raphi was liberal in his ideas having been educated in England for eleven 
years. Prince Raphi tried to apply the principles of English law to the Siamese 
judicial system, but some of his ideas were totally opposed by the King and other 
members of the royal family. The two most serious disagreements between them 
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were the principle of the independence of the court of justice from the executive 
power and the equality of people before the law. 
Firstly, King Chulalongkorn did not allow the court to be independent 
from the government's control by claiming that the time was not right and that all 
the Ministers were opposed to such a structure. This was only an excuse. The 
real reason was probably that the independence of the court would remove the 
judicial system away from the King's control and would create severe problems if 
he wanted to change his policy in the court of justice. Secondly, Prince Raphi 
disagreed with the King concerning the privileges of the members of the royal 
family who were not subject to the law of the country. This is evident in the 
incident at the beginning of 1910 in which a group of soldiers got into a quarrel 
with a group of pages of the Crown Prince, Wachirawut. The soldiers chased the 
pages into the Crown Prince's Palace. The Crown Prince demanded redress for 
the insult to his position by the application of an old law of flogging, which had 
been abolished by Prince Phichit in 1897, without trial in the court of law. 
Prince Raphi resisted strongly to the Crown Prince's demand, but the King 
permitted the Crown Prince to carry out the flogging. 
disappointed with the King's decision.2 
Raphi was very 
Both Princes Phichit and Raphi considered the judicial reform in terms of 
conferring benefit to the ordinary people. But King Chulalongkorn considered it 
as a method to consolidate his power and used it to impose law upon the people. 
The fourth question is what were the social implications of the judicial 
reform? One can interpret social implications of the judicial reform in terms of 
the benefit of the reform to the society and its people. Most of the laws issued 
2 Further details see chapter 7 pp.225-226. 
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by Prince Sawat, the first Minister of Justice, were mainly "window dressing" and 
therefore gave no substantial benefit to the Siamese people. When Prince Phichit 
became the Minister of Justice in October 1894, the policy of the Ministry of 
Justice experienced significant changes as Phichit aimed his reforms to benefit the 
Siamese people. This is evident in his implementation of "Changing the 
punishment of flogging to imprisonment" and "The Abolition of Torture 
Procedure Act". These two laws were designed by Phichit to provide 
humanitarian protection. His policy of increasing the Porisapha Courts with 
separate jurisdiction benefited the people by enabling them to forward their cases 
to the nearer court. His implementation of "The Regulation to abolish the 
punishment of the judges of the Court of First Instance whose decision was 
reversed by the Appeal Court" and "The Regulation to abolish Appeal during 
Trial" benefited the people who suffered from delayed cases. Surprisingly Prince 
Phichit's policies were successful in social terms, even though he was a 
traditional Siamese lawyer who had never been educated abroad. 
Prince Raphi's ideas for judicial reform in social terms was more effective 
than those of Phichit. His role in the establishment of the Law School gave 
tremendous benefit to the Siamese people by producing qualified lawyers to assist 
them in courts. Raphi's policy of establishing the month on and provincial courts, 
and gradually centralizing them under the control of the Ministry of Justice 
benefited the people throughout the country because before the establishment of 
these courts, people were often subject to arbitrary practices of the local chief. 
After the reorganization, these courts were operated on the same standard of law 
and judges. Furthermore, Raphi adopted the accusatorial system from the English 
court system and applied it to the Ministry of Justice's courts. This policy 
tremendously benefited ordinary people as it reversed the burden of proof from 
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the defendant (who prior to change had to prove his innocence) to the public 
prosecutor, who now must prove beyond doubt that the defendant was guilty. 
Prince Raphi tried his best to persuade King Chulalongkorn and other 
Ministers to accept the principle of the independence of the court of justice and 
equality of people before law. But his proposal was rejected on the grounds that 
the time was not appropriate. At the end of May 1910, Raphi himself was the 
victim of injustice as he was defamed by Prince Narathip in the Phraya Raka 
incident and could not bring Narathip to court. He wrote a letter of 31 May 1910 
to Chaophraya Yommarat (Pan Sukhum) that " .. this incident has proved that I 
cannot even protect myself from scandal and so how could I protect others? 
Therefore I should not remain the Minister otherwise I would be the person to 
destroy Siam by my own hand." This indicates that Prince Raphi was 
conscientious about protecting ordinary people from injustice. 
Regarding the benefit to ordinary people, there is one important question. 
What new rights were created for the people under law, and how were these 
rights to be enforced against the government? New rights, for example, the 
abolition of the corvee system by the Conscription Act of 1905 gave right to 
commoners to take their action on their own right, instead of depending on their 
patron. This right gave them access to litigation among the people but they still 
had no access to take action against Government oppression or malpractice. This 
was because the court of justice was under the Government's control and this was 
the reason Prince Raphi was very much concerned with the independence of the 
court. The King and the cabinet, except probably Princes Raphi and Phichit, did 
not appreciate the value of law as they considered law as an instrument of the 
Government to impose its policies upon the people. Therefore the courts of 
justice and judges needed to be under the Government's control in order to 
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control the people effectively. This was evident when Chaophraya Surasak, the 
Siamese Commander-in-Chief of an army to quell the Holy Men rebellion in 
Ph rae in 1902, tried to force the chief judge of Phrae to frame a condemnatory 
judgment against some of the Lao Chao (Princes) to deter the other Chao from 
rebelling against the Siamese Government. But when the chief judge of Phrae 
refused to comply with Surasak's request, on the grounds that there was no 
substantial evidence, another junior judge was appointed to carry out the 
judgment) 
The fifth question asks was it possible to have equality before law in the 
absolute monarchy or corvee system? This was unlikely because the nature of the 
absolute monarchy or the corvee system was in themselves unequal. Equality 
before law could not be expected when the government of the country was 
practically a monopoly of royal family, uncontrolled by public opinion. The 
absolute monarchy system prevented popular limitation of the king's power and 
consequently enabled the king to give immunity to some groups of people. 
Therefore the concept of "everyone is equal under the law" was practically 
inapplicable. This is evident in the Phraya Raka incident where Prince Raphi, as 
the injured person, had difficulty in bringing his case against Prince Narathip to 
the court of justice. Another injured person in this incident was Pak, Prince 
Narathip's concubine, who was assaulted by Narathip. It would have been 
impossibly difficult for Pak as a commoner to bring her case against Prince 
Narathip had she desired to do so.4 Despite the substantial reforms during King 
Chulalongkorn's reign, the law was in practice applicable between commoners. It 
was more difficult for a commoner to bring a case against a government official 
3 This point has been illustrated in detail in chapter 4 pp.126 and chapter 5 p.148. 
4 For details see chapter 7 pp.230-233. 
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holding a title conferred by the King, and much more difficult still against a 
member of the royal family. 
Moreover, the application of law always excluded the King and the 
members of the royal family. This is evident in the Conscription Act of 1905 
which was applicable to all commoners, but was not applicable to the members of 
the royal family nor to senior government officials. Another example is the 
Amendment of Criminal Procedure Law of 1901 which authorized certain officials 
in Bangkok and the provinces to issue search warrants, but in any cases involving 
the Palaces of the royal family, from Momchao (a king's grandchild or nephew) 
upward, they could not be searched unless permission was granted by the King. 
Under the corvee system, commoners (phrai) would derive legal protection 
from their patrons in return for their services given to them. When commoners 
had been injured or their rights were infringed by outsiders, they could not take 
legal action by themselves, but they had to depend on their patrons to take action 
for them. This relationship deprived commoners from access to the court of 
justice, therefore equality before law under the corvee system was by itself 
impossible. Furthermore, the practice of polygammy prevalent in the Siamese 
society at that time, prevented the equality of people before the law because 
women were subject to men's domination. 
The sixth question considers whether the judicial reform of the Ministry 
of Justice was a failure, and, if not, what did the reform contribute to Siam? 
The judicial reform of the Ministry of Justice did not achieve its full purposes 
because the King and members of the royal family obstructed the reforms owing 
to their desire to protect their benefits and privileges. This is evident from the 
King's rejection of Prince Phichit's proposal for the constitution of the Ministry 
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of Justice's staff, which would reorganize the whole staff of the Ministry, because 
the King was not prepared to spend a large sum of money on the staff's salaries. 
Another example was the King and the cabinet's rejection of Prince Raphi's 
proposal for the independence of the court of justice because they wanted the 
courts to be under their control. It was unfortunate that under the absolute 
monarchy system the King's decision was final. 
Even though Princes Phichit and Raphi were not allowed to have a free 
hand in the management of the Ministry of Justice, they and Khunluang Phraya 
Kraisi (Pleng Wepara) and other capable Siamese staff had laid the foundation of 
the Ministry of Justice, the Public Prosecution Department (Krom Aiyakarn), and 
the Law School. Through these institutions, particularly the Law School, their 
ideas were adopted and developed. The judicial reform of the Ministry of Justice 
contributed to: firstly, Siam's survival as an independent nation; secondly, the 
abolition of extraterritoriality. It is obvious that Siam's independence was always 
at risk after the Paknam incident of 1893 until the conclusion of the "Entente 
Cordiale" of April 1904, whereby Britain and France agreed to confirm the 
Anglo-French Declaration of 15 January 1896, and they also agreed to disclaim all 
ideas of annexing any Siamese territory in favour of French annexation of 
Morocco. But without the reform of Siam's administration, including the reform 
of the judicial administration of both in Bangkok and outside, along with the 
provincial centralization of administration and other efforts which made Siam a 
prosperous and secure place for Western investment, Siam would have been 
colonized or partitioned even before the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale of 
1904. 
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Secondly, the judicial reform was one of the most important factors for 
abolishing extraterritoriality in Siam. At the end of May 1910, when Prince 
Raphi left the Ministry of Justice due to his disagreement with King 
Chulalongkorn over the issue of the independence of the court of justice and the 
Phraya Raka incident, Siam already appeared to be on the road to success in 
restoring its extraterritorial rights by signing treaties with France in 1907 and 
Britain in 1909. These two treaties provided that extraterritoriality in Siam would 
be abolished when Siam promulgated complete codes of law i.e. the Criminal 
Code, the Civil Code, the Codes of Procedure, and the law of Judicial 
Organization. Already Siam had promulgated the Criminal Code in 1908 and the 
codification of other laws was well under way, and in 1925 it achieved the virtual 
abolition of extraterritoriality with five major Western countries.5 
In this thesis, the origins of Thailand's modern Ministry of Justice and its 
early development have already been examined. One question still remains, 
namely the long term contribution of the judicial reform. The question is what 
was the contribution of the judicial reform of the Ministry of Justice during the 
reign of King Chulalongkorn to the egalitarian society in Thailand? Regarding 
the Chakri Reformation, historians hold two views; the first view such as that of 
David K. Wyatt, who studied education in the reign of King Chulalongkorn, 
argued that King Chulalongkorn was a perfect leader who reorganized Thailand's 
administration for the benefit of the country and the people. His reform was 
successful and helped Thailand to secure its independence.6 He explains: 
5 In his thesis, "Siam's Effort to Revise the Unequal Treaty System in the Sixth 
Reign (1910-1925)", The University of Michigan, Ph.D., 1974, P.B. Oblas, 
suggests that even though the 1907 and 1909 treaties were steps towards the 
abolition of extraterritoriality in Siam, they did not mark the beginning of the 
end of the treaty system. 
6 D.K. Wyatt, The Politics of Reform in Thailand: Education in the Reign of 
King Chulalongkorn, (New Haven, 1969). 
311 
A feature of great significance for Thailand's survival however , , 
was the fact that the transformation of her society and government 
was accomplished largely through action from above, by leaders 
who were more than leaders; visionaries who were sensitive to the 
needsof the age and who forced change upon their nation and 
themselves d~ected and ordered its economic, social and political 
development. 
On the other hand, historians such as Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, in his 
article "Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai Studies", disagrees with Wyatt. 
He argues that the Siamese monarchs were themselves hindrances to the 
development of Thailand. He explains: 
It will immediately be apparent that these hypotheses call into 
question the accepted view of the modern Thai monarchy and, still 
more important, the relationship between that monarchy and the 
modern Siamese nation. Rather than assuming a harmonious lineal 
descent from one to the other, they suggest contradictions between 
them. In fact, it is tempting to argue that it has been the 
identification of the two that has, on the scholarly level, 
systematically distorted understanding of 20th -century Thai politics 
and, on the political level, retarded the development of the Siamese 
nation--Ieaving it, in songe important respects, "behind" its 
directly-colonized neighbors. 
He also believes that the Chakri Reformation was insignificant as it did not playa 
role in developing Thailand by substantiating his argument that between 1850 and 
1950, a century of revolutionary upheaval in the world, Thailand In very 
substantial ways remained very much the same.9 He is of the opinion that the 
changes in Thailand occurred only after the student revolution in October 1976, 
and therefore disregards the Chakri reformation.I O He also believes that the 1932 
coup was not successful, and was the product of a failure either to maintain the 
pool of royal talent or to remove royalty from active politics. I 1 He substantiates 
7 Ibid., p.376. .. . 
8 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "StudIes of the ThaI State: The State of ThaI 
Studies", in Eliezer B. Ayal (ed.), The Study of Thailand: Analyses of 
Knowledge. Approaches. and Prospects in Anthropology. Art History, 
Economics. History, and Political Science, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, 
Center for International Studies, Southeast Asia Series no. 54, 1978, p.200. 
9 Ibid., pp.215-216. 
10 Ibid., p.197. 
11 Ibid., p.208. 
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his argument that the coup failed to secure the transition of the Thai monarchy to 
the Japanese or the European 20th-century monarchical style, by stating the fact 
that the Siamese monarchy still retains some political power.12 
Having examined the judicial reform of the Ministry of Justice, several 
points may be added. Firstly, Wyatt's ideas of King Chulalongkorn as a perfect 
leader has been challenged as this study demonstrates the King's intention of 
reform to secure his absolute power more than to benefit the country and his 
people. This has been illustrated in question number two and three above. On 
the other hand, this study is in agreement with Wyatt in terms of effectiveness of 
the Chakri Reformation, even though judicial reform was not successful to its full 
purposes. 
Secondly, the ideas of the judicial reform, especially Prince Raphi's ideas 
of equality before law and the independence of the court of justice, have been in 
existence up to the present-day legal system. His ideas have been succeeded from 
generation to generation through the Law School. They were also sine qua non 
for later changes in Thailand toward egalitarianism. The following evidence 
confirm this argument: 1) In 1912, only one year after King Wachirawut's 
succession to the throne, a group of about 100 young officers were arrested on 
charges of conspiracy to overthrow the government. These officers determined to 
bring radical changes to the country by planning to abolish the absolute monarchy 
and substituted it with a constitutional monarchy or the republic. The coup plan, 
however, leaked out to the authorities and all of those officers were arrested and 
punished severely. One of the coup groups suggested that the monarchy be 
completely abolished and a republic instituted, with Prince Raphi installed as first 
president. Raphi's name was nominated because of his reputation for fairness, 
12 Ibid., pp.20B-209. 
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based, no doubt, on his opposition, as the Minister of Justice, to the flogging of 
the army officers in 1910.1 3 
2) Pridi Banomyong, the engineer of the 1932 coup which abolished the 
absolute monarchy in Thailand, was a law student in the Law School and was 
called to the bar in 1919. It was apparent that he adopted Prince Raphi's ideas of 
the independence of the court of justice from the executive power and the 
equality of people before the law. This is evident from his appointment as a 
teacher in the Law School in 1931, when he taught these ideas to the law students 
and was warned by King Prachathipok (Rama VII), through the Minister of 
Justice, to stop stirring up the students.1 4 3) The Law School of Prince Raphi 
which now becomes the Faculty of Law, Thammasat University, was one of the 
leading institutes in the student revolutions in 1973 and 1976, which brought 
down the dictator regime of Thanom Kittikachorn and Prapas Charusathien. 
Prince Raphi's ideas have been followed by generations of lawyers and this is the 
reason he deserves to be called "The father of Thai law". 
Thirdly, the process of changes in Thailand which entailed egalitarian 
society was developed gradually. It was not only a big bang in October 1976, 
consequential from the students revolution, as Anderson suggests in his article. 
The process was probably divided into three stages. 1) The judicial reform under 
Princes Phichit and Raphi were two steps forward as they had granted more 
13 Vichitvong na Pombhejara, Pridi Banomyong and the Making of Thailand's 
Modern History, (Singapore, 1979), pp.51-53. Also see W.F. Vella, Chaiyo! 
King Vaiiravudh and the development of Thai Nationalism, (The Univ. Press 
of Hawaii, 1978), pp.54, 58-59. Vella also suggests in footnote number 15, 
p.285, that Prince Raphi's resumption of his government career immediately 
after the coup as Minister of Agriculture was possibly that the new 
appointment was meant to insure his loyalty. . . 
14 Vichitvong na Pombhejara, op.cit., p.37, and Chulalongkorn Umverslty (ed.), 
Wiwattanakarn khongkotmaithai nairobsongroipi (The Development of Thai law 
in 200 years), (Bangkok, 1982), vo1.2, pp.67 -68. 
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rights to commoners. Raphi's ideas of equality before law and the independence 
of the court of justice had set the right path for Thailand. But the substitution of 
Prince Charun for Raphi, in June 1910, was a step backwards, as he did not make 
any progress to the Ministry. 2) The revolution of the People's Party of 1932 was 
two steps forward because it abolished the absolute monarchy and substituted a 
constitutional monarchy. But the military coup of 1947 which brought Thailand 
under the dictator regime of Pibul and later Sarit Thanarat was a step backwards. 
3) The student revolutions of 1973 and 1976, abolished the dictator regime of 
Thanom Kittikachorn and Prapas Charusathien, Sarit's successors, and set 
Thailand on the right path of democracy, was another two steps forward_ . 
The judicial reform of the Ministry of Justice initiated by Princes Phichit 
and Raphi had set the right path for the present-day legal system. It is actually 
still working through various institutes founded by them and is shaping the 
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